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ABSTRACT
Theorising the relationship between the Church and democracy is at once an ancient and yet 
new proposition. Very recently, there has been a decline in interest in the post-authoritarian 
period owing to various changing endogenous and exogenous factors that have affected the 
Church’s political engagement in a democratic setting. While it has been suggested that the 
Church in many instances has politically demobilised in the post-authoritarian era, the 
Philippine experience continues to witness a church engaged in issues affecting 
democratisation. This study examines the capacity of the Church as an actor in 
strengthening democracy in the post-transition period using the Philippine Catholic Church 
experience and cases of the Diocese of Malaybalay and the Diocese of Bacolod. While both 
dioceses (local churches) are not typical representatives of the Philippine Catholic Church, 
they do provide some insights into the complexity of the Church as an actor in 
democratisation. Both were actively involved during the authoritarian period. But beyond 
that, both experienced similar and divergent political processes and yielded different 
outcomes. Three arguments are proposed to explain the Church’s capacity and role in 
democracy building. Firstly, hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) creates and 
enhances a climate of participation as both leaders and members interact, define and pursue 
organisational goals. Secondly, church-civil society nexus (church ad extra) sets new modes 
of positive interaction (animation, mobilisation and creative partnership) between church and 
civil society, widens the avenue of participation, and increases mobilisational resource in 
building democracy. Church ad intra and ad extra are closely connected, and they are 
crucial conditions for appreciating the Church’s capacity as an actor in democracy. Thirdly, 
engaged citizenship appears to be the single most important contribution of the church in 
post-authoritarian democracy building. The creation of an environmental constituency (in 
the Diocese of Malaybalay), and the formation of a peace movement (in the Diocese of 
Bacolod) made possible a new understanding and practice of citizenship. Citizenship 
engages both the State and society through electoral politics, interest articulation and 
representation, commitment to the rule of law, human rights advocacy, cultivation of a 
democratic culture and the promotion of good governance. Lessons from these cases have 
repercussions not only for other churches but also for civil society actors who profess to be 
protagonists in the democratic enterprise.
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Chapter one 
Introductory remarks: the Church, civil society and democracy
On my arrival in the United States the religious aspect o f  the country was the first thing that struck my 
attention; the longer I  stayed there, the more I  perceived the great political consequences resulting from  
this new state o f  things. In France I  had almost always seen the spirit o f  religion and the spirit o f  
freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America I  found they were intimately united and that 
they reigned in common over the same country. —Alexis de Tocqueville1
Democracy is good for development. Democracy and development go together and by no means
compete with each other. Although this claim is not uncontested, it is a widely accepted premise
in democratic and development studies.2 Nonetheless, democracy, like development, is not
simply structurally driven. Democracy needs actors for its initiation and sustainability. A
conventional idea in democratic studies suggests that the Church is a key actor in
democratisation.3 Just how and why this happens is more complex and less understood than
political theorists and activists would have us believe. The Church is a complex actor with a
plurality of forces within its domain and a whole range of power relations and interests that are
often disparate. Further, the concept of democratisation does not limit itself to democratic
transition after a regime change but extends well into the quality of democracy: its survivability,
sustainability, vibrancy, and deepening.
This thesis proposes to address the following key questions: does the church contribute in
strengthening the quality of Philippine democracy? If so, in what ways? To what extent?
What are the possibilities and limits of its roles in democratisation? While mindful that the
Church may produce undemocratic political outcomes, it is argued that despite its limitations, the
Philippine Church has the potential to strengthen democracy beyond the transition. This
research will focus on the years following the collapse of the authoritarian regime of President
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. The Henry Reeve text as revised by Francis Bowen and further 
edited by Phillips Bradley. Vol. I, (New York: Knopf, 1980), 308.
2 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002; deepening democracy in a fragmented world (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
3 William H. Swatos, Jr., ed., Religion and democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Transaction Publishers, 1995); Jeffrey Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships and democracy in Latin America 
(New York: Orbis Books, 1998).
1
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, namely, during the administrations of President Corazon C.
Aquino (1986-1992), President Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998), and finally President Joseph E. 
Estrada (1998-2001).
This first chapter locates the changes within the Catholic Church after Vatican II and 
clarifies key concepts in the research. The second reviews the body of literature in the hope of 
building a theoretical framework explaining the relationship between the Church and democracy. 
The third situates the Philippine Catholic Church during the authoritarian period (1972-1986) 
and describes the various lines of involvement it played. The fourth looks at its roles in post­
authoritarian Philippines insofar as democracy building is concerned. The fifth tells the story of 
the Diocese of Malaybalay and examines its strengths and limits in democracy building. The 
sixth investigates the various paths of political processes and outcomes of the Diocese of 
Bacolod and compares these with those of the Diocese of Malaybalay. The final chapter 
concludes the study.
1.1 Research interest and scope
This research attempts to shed light on the complexity surrounding the Church’s contributions to 
the process of democratisation. The idea linking the Church, more particularly the Roman 
Catholic Church, and democracy can be traced back to the days of Alexis de Tocqueville. In 
1830s, he was greatly fascinated by the positive correlation between the two in America, quite 
unlike his experience in France.4 This interest has largely receded from academic discourse 
since his time, with the possible exception of French philosopher Jacques Maritain’s attempt to 
revive such thinking in 1940s.5 Over the years, the Church’s contributions to democracy have 
been ignored, but in the recent past, they were equally overstated. In 1959, C. Wright Mills once 
declared that ‘Neither preachers nor the religious laity matter, (they could) be readily agreed with
4 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 308.
5 Jacques Maritain, Christianity and democracy, Doris C. Anson, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986).
2
and safely ignored.’6 This thinking has dominated the literature on religion and politics, some 
strands of Protestantism excepting, until the mid-1960s. In particular, Catholicism, after Max 
Weber’s classic thesis concerning the positive relationship between Protestant ethic and 
capitalism, was held suspect and deemed incompatible with capitalism and the whole project of 
democratisation. Weber asserts that particular variants of Protestantism (e.g., Calvinism, Pietism, 
Methodism and Baptist sects), driven by a spirituality of worldly asceticism and an ethos of 
personal responsibility and freedom, provide religious motivation for rational organisation and 
use of wealth (capitalism).7 For Weber, the ‘other worldliness of Catholicism’ made Catholics 
less ‘engaged in capitalistic enterprise.’8 Thus by implication, Catholicism was not a positive 
factor for political democracy. This thinking became an influential discourse connecting religion 
and democracy. For years then, the Weberian thesis rendered Roman Catholicism suspect as a 
potential religious ally of democracy.9
Nonetheless, the relationship between Catholicism and democracy has once again gained 
currency. Many political analysts cite the celebration of the Second Ecumenical Vatican Council 
(Vatican II) from 1962 to 1965 as the pivotal point of the Church’s public engagement in the 
modem world.10 The pre-Vatican II Church saw itself ecclesiologically as a ‘perfect society’ 
above and disengaged from the world.11 It saw its mission primarily in the salvation of souls 
with minimal involvement in the secular and public affairs. The pre-Vatican II Church was 
generally dominated by the ordained ministers (bishops and priests) with very little, if any, lay
6 C. Wright Mills, The Causes o f  world war three (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1959), 150, cited in Jeff 
Haynes, Religion in the third world: issues in the third world politics (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1993), 1.
7 Max Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit o f  capitalism, Talcott Parsons, trans., (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1930).
8 Ibid., 38.
9 David Beetham, ‘Conditions for democratic consolidation,’ Review o f  African Political Economy 67 (1994), 
168.
10 Dermot Keogh, ed., Church and politics in Latin America (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and 
London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990); Jose Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
11 John Wilkins, ‘How Vatican II changed the Church I: Earthquake in Rome,’ The Tablet 12 October 2002, 
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participation. European theology, more particularly Roman theology, was the dominant 
theological discourse and practice in the pre-Vatican II Church. Local theologies tended to be 
stifled, even anathematised. In this way, the Church was shielded from addressing questions and 
issues confronting the secular world. But there have been attempts to come to terms with the
19political order since the time of Pope Leo XIII in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Vatican II marks a radical change for the Roman Catholic Church in that it moved its 
vision beyond the private sphere to the public arena.13 Two central Vatican II documents clarify 
the Church’s relationship to the State and society: ‘The Declaration on Religious Liberty’ 
{Dignitatis Humanae - Of Human Dignity) and ‘The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modem World’ (Gaudium et Spes - Joy and Hope).14 Dignitatis Humanae endorses religious 
pluralism with the declaration of the right of free expression of religious convictions. This is a 
significant step affirming the protection of individuals from religious coercion and theocracy. 
Religious pluralism is a vital ingredient in a democratic polity as this provides a good theological 
basis for separating church and state powers. Gaudium et Spes clarifies the identity of the 
Church as it engages in the modem world. It further states: ‘The joy and hope, the grief and 
anguish of the men of our time especially of those who are poor or afflicted in any way, are the 
joy and hope, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well.’15 Indeed Vatican II 
formally broke the divide that sheltered the Church from the everyday realities experienced by 
its people.
Although Vatican II did not expressly link the Church and democracy, it laid the 
theological foundation for that connection. Regional and national reinterpretations of the
12 J. Bryan Hehir, ‘Catholicism and democracy: conflict, change, and collaboration,’ in Christianity and 
democracy in global context, John Witte, Jr., ed., (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westerview Press, 1993), 
15-30.
13 Jose Casanova, Public religions in the modern world  (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press,
1994).
14 Hehir, ‘Catholicism and democracy...,’ 21.
15 Austin Flannery, ed. Vatican Council II: the conciliar and post conciliar documents Vol. I, (Dublin?: Pillar 
Books and Costello Publishing, 1975), 903.
4
universal principles laid out in Vatican II subsequently spelled out more specifically their
relationship. Foremost among the regional re-appropriations of the Vatican II was the Latin
American Conference in Medellin, Columbia in 1968, which saw the birth of liberation theology
and the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs). In the Philippine context, CEBs are known as
the Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) and their later variant, the Basic Ecclesial
Communities (BECs). BCCs mainstreamed lay participation in the Church and thus
democratised to some extent its hierarchical structure.
The Papal social teaching from Rerum Novarum (Condition of Labour) to Centisimus
Annus (On one hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum)16 along with Vatican II paved the
way for expanding Christian moral imperatives to include engagement in public affairs
particularly those that involved the promotion of human dignity, social justice, and total human
development. The 1971 Synod of Bishops document Justice in the World strongly endorsed
social justice as an essential component of evangelisation:
Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully 
appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or in other words, 
of the Church’s mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from 
every oppressive situation.17
The aggiornamento (the updating of the Church identity and mission) set out by Vatican II
fuelled the trajectory of the regional and local Church’s role in promoting the common good, and
by extension of democracy as well. Nevertheless, the changes within the Catholic Church in the
wake of Vatican II were uneven. Despite Vatican II’s intent to reform the universal Church and
its mission, ecclesiological cleavages and contentious interpretations of church teaching with
regard to social justice and political involvement continue to operate.
16 Rerum Novarum (literally means ‘Of new things’) was written by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 while Centesimus 
Annus (meaning ‘The hundredth year’) was authored by Pope John Paul II in 1991. The Latin titles of Papal 
encyclicals and other church documents are derived from the opening words o f the document.
17 ‘Justice in the world,’ in Austin Flanner, ed., Vatican Council II, Vatican Collection Vol., 2 (Leonminster, 
Herefords: Fowler-Wright Books, Ltd., 1982), 696.
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While it is widely held that many local Catholic Churches were a vital religio-political 
actor in resisting authoritarian and military regimes in Latin America’s abertura (political 
liberalisation) (1970s and 1980s) and in Africa (1990s), in South Korea (1970s and 1980s), in 
the Philippines (1986), and in the communist states in Central and Eastern European countries in 
the 1989 revolutions,18 it needs to be demonstrated whether or not they equally make significant 
contributions to democracy building beyond the authoritarian period. The post-authoritarian 
period triggers and raises new issues that the Church must likewise address. In an increasingly 
pluralist society where the Church is no longer the primary voice of the voiceless in many Latin 
American countries, the lines of political engagement have changed markedly.19 Given these 
emerging trends and the structural demands of the post-authoritarian period, democracy building 
becomes much more complex and fluid than the transition to democracy. On this point, David 
Beetham correctly maintains: ‘democracy is much easier to inaugurate than it is to consolidate, 
much easier to establish than to maintain.’20 Thus the Churches in the post-authoritarian and 
post-communist settings are struggling to redefine their identity and political niche in a newly 
found democratic space. Subsequently, many, particularly the progressive sectors in the Church, 
have become politically disengaged.21
The narrative of the Philippine Church shares much of the experience of the Latin 
American Churches in terms of its colonial history, dominance of Catholicism as the religion of
18 Swatos, Religion and democracy in Latin America', Paul Gifford, ed., The Christian Churches and 
democratisation o f  Africa (Leidon, New York and Koln: E. J. Brill, 1995); Mary L. Gautier, ‘Church elites and 
the restoration of civil society in the communist societies in Central Europe,’ Journal o f  Church and State 
40(2), (Spring 1998), 298-317.
19 Hannah Stewart-Gambino, ‘Introduction: new games, new rules,’ in Conflict and competition: the Latin 
American Church in a changing environment, Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino, eds., (Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 1-19.
20 David Beetham, ‘Problems of democratic consolidation,’ in The Christian Churches and the democratisation 
o f  Africa, Paul Gifford, ed., (Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill, 1995), 61.
21 Scott Mainwaring, ‘Democratisation, socio-economic disintegration, and the Latin American Churches after 
Puebla,’ in Born o f  the poor: the Latin American Church since Medellin, Edward Cleary, ed., (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990); Carol Ann Drogus, ‘The Rise and decline o f liberation theology: 
Churches, faith and political change in Latin America,’ Comparative Politics 27(4), (1995), 465-475; Tristan 
Anne Borer, Challenging the State: Churches as political actors in South Africa 1980-1994 (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
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the establishment, American geo-political interests and adherence to the bureaucratic 
authoritarian ideology from 1972 to 1986. Like many Latin American Churches, the Philippine 
Church was a key protagonist in the struggle against authoritarianism and underdevelopment. 
Like many Latin American Churches in the post-authoritarian period, the Philippine Church 
struggled to redefine its role and position vis-a-vis civil society and the State. This makes the 
Latin American literature appear closer to the experience of the Philippine Church than that of 
Africa, Eastern and Central Europe and parts of Asia. However, unlike many of the Latin 
American Churches in the post-authoritarian period, the Philippine Church remains politically 
engaged, influential, and a prominent protagonist in the civil society movement, particularly in 
its creative engagement in citizenship advocacy. This makes the study of the Philippine Church 
and democratisation topical and timely.
Three main arguments are proposed in this thesis. Firstly, Church ad intra (internal 
organisational interaction between leaders and members) enhances the internal mechanism of 
participation and encourages productive hierarchy-laity interaction, thereby increasing the 
Church’s potential as an actor in democracy building. Secondly, Church ad extra (Church’s 
involvement with civil society organisations) widens the avenue of participation and provides a 
climate favourable to the democratisation of state and society. Thirdly, the single most 
significant contribution of the Philippine Church to democracy building lies in citizenship 
formation and advocacy.
1.2 Clarification of concepts
Four key concepts in this study need clarification: the Church, civil society, democracy, and 
citizenship. The definitions employed here are useful to the extent that they clarify the concepts 
pertinent to this study, but they do admit of some conceptual limits.
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1.2.1 The Church
It is important to distinguish ‘institutions’ and ‘organisations’ (often used interchangeably in the 
literature) to better appreciate conceptually the Church. Following Douglass North, institutions 
are formal and informal established rules (e.g., laws, customary norms) that regulate human 
interaction.22 In his analogical view, institutions are likened to rules that define a game in 
society, while organisations with a set of objectives and strategies are players. Both govern 
human activity and behaviour. Both interact with and shape each other, but analytically both can 
be differentiated as rules and players in a game.23 Institutions generally stem from provisional 
arrangements becoming habitual practices before they become established having been passed on 
from generation to generation.24 The doctrines, moral norms and laws in Roman Catholicism (or 
any Christian confession) are in this sense institutions since they structure the creed, conduct, 
and cultic worship of believers. Although the Church also has an internal structure governing a 
body of Christian believers, for the purposes of this study, it is a religious organisation25 
inasmuch as it follows, fashions, and interacts with ecclesial rules, generates symbols of 
religious identity, and devises its objectives and strategies. The Roman Catholic Church in its 
totality (or simply ‘the Church’ including its organisations and establishments), owing to its vast 
and complex structure encompassing local, subnational, national and international (beyond the 
state) spheres, is arguably a supra-state religious organisation. Between the smallest ecclesial 
unit in a village and the Vatican leadership are a plethora of actors, that is, associations, religious 
movements, communities, parishes and other ecclesiastical groupings that can collectively 
decide and act. Nonetheless, historically until recent times, in many Catholic countries 
(including the Philippines), the Church and State have been closely associated with each other,
22 Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 4.
23 Ibid.
24 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 83-84.
251 use ‘organisation’ to distinguish the Church in its entirety from its organisations which in this context includes 
all its organised actors (e.g., associations, movements, communities).
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although this arrangement did not prevent some church leaders to criticise the State. Thus the 
Church as a supra-state religious organisation is distinct from civil society, but its organisations 
are civil society actors inasmuch as they are relatively autonomous, organised and they operate 
within the public sphere, the space between the State and households. This overlap blurs the 
distinction between the Church and civil society.
Although this study focuses on the Roman Catholic Church, it does refer to mainline 
Protestant Churches and other Christian denominations when pertinent. It deals with the 
Philippine Catholic Church (national in scope) and two of its local Churches. In the Catholic 
Church Code of Canon Law, the local (or particular) Church principally refers to a diocese or its 
equivalent.26 The unity of all the local Churches is preserved by the Church of Rome, headed by 
the Roman Pontiff. The organogram of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines does not 
seek to depict accurately the Church’s complexities, but it does give an idea of the structure of 
the Church (see Figure 1 next page). Although juridically self-contained, the local Churches 
(dioceses or their equivalents) are linked to the ecclesiastical province27 (a group of nearby 
dioceses and their equivalents). At the ecclesiastical province level, a Metropolitan archbishop 
normally has special functions and powers within the province. The bishops of these local 
Churches have their own regional (e.g., the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference, MSPC) and 
national organisations (e.g., the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, CBCP). There 
are other national organisations such as the Association of Major Religious Superiors (AMRSP) 
and its members belong to local Churches, but juridically under their own respective religious 
superiors. The local Churches contain parishes, associations, chaplaincies, institutes, diocesan 
congregations, chapels, chapel-based movements (e.g., BECs), groups and other organisations.
26 The local Churches may also exist in the form o f a ‘territorial prelature, territorial abbacy, a vicariate 
apostolic, a prefecture apostolic and a permanently established apostolic administration.’ See The Code o f  
Canon Law (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 84.
27 Ibid., 99-100.
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A local Church is generally divided into geographical districts, vicariates, deaneries and other 
units but they all juridically belong to one entity under the resident diocesan bishop. In some 
cases, church organisations are transparochial or transdiocesan, that is, they are not confined in 
particular parishes or dioceses. Insofar as they operate with the approval of the resident bishop 
within the diocese, they technically belong to the local Church.




















28 Adapted from The Code o f  Canon Law, 98-106.
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Ordinarily a local Church is geographically bounded, and run by a resident diocesan bishop with 
his auxiliary bishops, if any, and a council of priests (Presbyteral Council). The Roman Pontiff 
appoints bishops. Once every five years, the resident diocesan bishop of the local Church 
reports to the Bishop of Rome, the Roman Pontiff, concerning his diocese. This is an important 
connection to the universal Church leadership as the principle of subsidiarity, that is, relative 
autonomy of the local governance of the see (diocese), operates in this relationship. For John 
Wilkins, Vatican II reclaimed the import of the local Church in this way: ‘Each local church is
90the whole Church of that place: it is not a department run from the Roman centre.’
Unlike some previous studies that differentiated and at times set in opposition the 
hierarchy (ordained ministers) and Iglesia Popular (popular Church),30 this study takes the 
Church in its entirety (leaders and members) at the same time noting their internal 
differentiations and power relations. Within the hierarchy are individuals with differing 
ecclesiological and ideological preferences, although they can arrive at a consensus and issue 
collective statements. The lay people are equally differentiated in terms of their socio-economic 
stratification, gender differences and other such factors, but they can as a body decide and act 
collectively. In this way, the members of the hierarchy (bishops, priests, and deacons) do not 
completely represent the Church anymore than do the lay organisations or individuals, if left to 
themselves. Put simply, the Church comprises both its leaders and members that are by no means 
homogenous. The internal organisational relationship between leaders and members is the 
Church ad intra. This consists of the vertical interaction between church leaders and members.
Another key dimension of the Church is its involvement with civil society organisations. 
Here, the Church’s relationship with civil society organisations is the Church ad extra. This 
horizontal linkage is crucial in understanding the Church as an agency engaged in
29 Wilkins, ‘How Vatican II changed the Church I....
30 Haynes, Religion in third world po litics....’, Emile Poulat, ‘The Path o f Latin American Catholicism,’ in 
Church and politics in Latin America, Dermot Keogh, ed., (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990), 1-24.
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democratisation. Both are not monolithic and not entirely mutually exclusive since there are 
church-based organisations and movements that form part of civil society.
1.2.2 Civil Society
It is crucially important to unpack the concept of civil society where the Church operates, partly 
belongs, and draws its network and alliances. Gordon White refers to civil society as a 
‘sociological counterpart to the market in the economic sphere and to democracy in the political 
sphere.’31 With regard to the former, neo-liberals and a few neo-Marxists, although for opposite 
reasons, see the inclusion of the economy in the contemporary concept of civil society.32 While 
not dismissing the importance of the Church’s contributions to the economic sphere, it is the 
Church’s role in enhancing political democracy that this study purports to examine.
Civil society has different meanings. Concepts around civil society have evolved 
considerably, at times competitively, in the history of ideas.33 The renewed interest in civil 
society followed the proliferation of social movements which toppled the ‘Soviet bloc’ of states 
in the 1989 revolutions, notably in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. In this 
context, civil society served as a significant counterweight to state power and as a key player in 
collapse of the communist regimes. Through the years, the role of civil society has been cast 
largely in its opposition to the State, a relationship which needs reinvention in the light of post- 
authoritarian democracy. The upsurge of civil society suggests that transition to democracy is no 
longer a sole preserve of elite actors but necessitates the participation of ordinary citizens. In 
this research, the scope of civil society consists o f ‘an intermediate associational realm between 
state and family (or household) populated by organisations which are separate from the state,
31 Gordon White, ‘Civil society, democratisation and development (I): clearing the analytical ground,’ 
Democratization 1(3) (1994), 375.
j2 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil society and political theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 
74-75.
j3 Cohen and Arato, Civil society and political theory', Michael Walzer, ‘The Civil society argument,’ in 
Theorizing citizenship, Ronald Beiner, ed., (Albany: State University ofN ew  York Press, 1995), 153-174.
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enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to 
protect or extend their interests or values.’34 The associational realm is akin to the public sphere 
beyond the state domain where organised public life and autonomous associations function.35 
Similarly for Michael Walzer, civil society denotes ‘the space of uncoerced human association 
and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and 
ideology.’36 Civil society in this sense consists of voluntary organisations, social movements, 
organised communities, kinship groups, and associations that are primarily oriented to articulate, 
represent, protect, and advance their collective interests and values, even those that go beyond 
national boundaries. Civil society organisations confronting the issues raised by globalisation 
has demonstrated its capacity to link up with the international community. They are relatively 
organised and they assume a collective form different from atomised individuals in the absence 
of a social network.37 In addition, civil society organisations are neither homogenous 
associations nor are they typically virtuous development actors confronting the political vice of 
the State. There could well be associations which appear to be critical of democracy just as there 
are those which profess to be democratic actors. In some cases, particularly in the African 
experience, there are ethnic cleavages within the civil society formation.38
The Church, particularly in the Philippine setting, has a vital role in civil society 
considering its network and influence: from smallest political unit (the sitio) to the subnational, 
national, and international levels; the Church’s presence cannot be ignored. Given the general 
weakness of the party system in the Philippines,39 the Church perhaps is the only actor in the
j4 White, ‘Civil society, democratisation and development (I)..., 379.
35 John Keane, Civil society: o ld images, new visions (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), 6.
36 Walzer, ‘The Civil society argument,’ 153
37 Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Uggla, ‘Making civil society work, promoting democratic development: what 
states and donors do?’ World Development 24( 10), (1996), 1621.
38 Nelson Kasfir, ‘Introduction: the conventional notion o f civil society: a critique,’ in Civil society and 
democracy in Africa: critical perspectives in Nelson Kasfir, ed. (London, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1998), 
1- 20 .
39 Gabriella Montinola, ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines,’ Journal o f  Democracy 10(1), (January 
1999), 126-140.
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Philippines which can parallel the extent of network that the government has.40
1.2.3 Democracy
Like the concept of civil society, the meanings of democracy are manifold and at times 
competing. A minimalist view takes primacy of electoral contestation as the defining 
characteristic of democracy. Joseph Schumpeter, for instance, claims that at the core of 
democracy is an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’41 This 
position relies largely on electoral procedure and does not pay enough attention to the 
contributions of organised groups in democracy building. An opposing view, however, stresses 
the role of collective decision-making, popular control and equality as crucial indicators of 
democracy. Following this point, David Beetham argues that in a democratic polity ‘decision­
making should be controlled by all members of the group or collectivity considered as equals.A1 
This definition is difficult to assess empirically and appears to be prescriptive in its approach.
The definition employed here seeks to incorporate the concerns of the two opposing 
views above. Following Larry Diamond, apart from the electoral procedure, democracy is 
defined in terms of 1) ‘the absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors 
not accountable to the electorate,’ 2) vertical accountability of elected officials to citizens and 
horizontal accountability of public officials (among themselves), and 3) ‘political and civil 
pluralism as well as for individual and group freedoms’ through interest articulation, contestation 
and representation.43 This definition privileges civilian authority over military and actors
40 Interview with Mary Racelis, Institute o f Philippine Culture (IPC) Executive Director, Quezon City, 15 
February 2001; see John Carroll, ‘Civil society, the Churches, and the ouster of Erap,’ in Between fires: fifteen  
perspectives on the Estrada crisis ed., Amando Doronila, (Makati City: Philippine Daily Inquirer and Pasig 
City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2001), 246.
41 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy (London: Unwin, 1965), 269.
42 David Beetham, ‘Conditions for democratic consolidation,’ 159. Emphases mine.
43 Larry Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 10-11.
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without an electoral mandate, accountability of elected and public officials, and recognises the 
importance of civil society actors’ participation in building democracy. Democracy in this 
context, however, does not pretend to be a panacea for problems around class relations, ethnicity 
and gender. Nonetheless, the participation of marginalised sectors of society in a democratic 
polity may address questions of social and gender inequalities. Admittedly the definition has 
conceptual limits, but it is a defensible concept as a starting point in this research.
Democratisation is a continuous process involving political changes which are essentially 
participatory and democratic.44 There is no one single and predictable outcome of 
democratisation. Democracies may consolidate, deepen, or they could be eroded and reversed. 
Building post-authoritarian democracy constitutes a broad process of democratisation including 
democratic transition after a regime change. For Scott Mainwaring, the manner of democratic 
transition has a bearing on the prospects of building post-authoritarian democracy.45 The divide 
between democratic transition, that is, a political process involving regime shift from non- 
democracy to democratisation, and building post-authoritarian democracy is, by no means, clear 
and distinct. They tend to overlap, but one can separate analytically the two moments to make it 
plain that it is one thing to transform a non-democratic polity and quite another to sustain 
democracy and make it endure.
Transition to democracy is not enough since no democracy endures and becomes 
sustainable by mere default on the part of political agencies.46 Various emphases on 
democratisation that at times compete with each other have been put forward. The 
Schumpeterian view holds that an operative electoral system is a sine qua non condition of any 
democracy. Regular elections ensure that the national and local public leaders have an electoral
44 David Potter, ‘Explaining democratization,’ in Democratization David Potter et al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 3.
45 Scott Mainwaring et al., Issues in democratic consolidation (Notre Dame, Indiana: University ofNotre Dame 
Press, 1992).
46 Larry Diamond, ‘Is the third wave of democratisation over? The imperative of consolidation,’ Working 
Paper 237 (Notre Dame: the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1997).
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mandate, directly or indirectly. Although the electoral system is certainly not a sufficient 
condition in a democracy, the participation of voters in elections is a defining character of a 
democratic regime.47 Others argue that economic growth is the main determinant of 
democracy.48 In this view, the prospects for democratisation increase with economic 
development. For some, however, without negating the value of an electoral system, political 
culture is a very significant factor in maintaining democracy. Diamond argues that the 
development of a political culture, namely, beliefs, sentiments, values and ideas that give 
legitimacy to democracy, underpins democratisation.49 In another vein, civil society advocates 
believe that associational life is key to the vibrancy of any democratic life.50 Still, others make a 
case for the rule of law as an essential component of democratisation.51 Some are inclined to 
think that human rights advocacy engenders a brand of citizenship that deepens democratic 
institutions in post-authoritarian regimes.52 This study does not seek to resolve the contentious 
issues on democratisation. It is proposed, however, that citizenship is another window on which 
the Catholic Church does potentially make a significant progress in democracy building. This 
theme remains topical and could offer insights as regards the Church’s roles in democracy.
1.2.4 Citizenship
Citizenship is a relatively recent interest in development and democratic studies. The exercise of 
citizenship does not always presume that democracy is working, but it is vital in any 
democratising polity. Citizenship is not merely the exercise of civil, political and social rights
47 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule o f law in Latin America,’ in The (Un)Rule o f  law and 
the underprivileged in Latin America, Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo Sergio, eds., (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 304-305.
48 E.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinemann, 1960);
49 Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation, 161-217.
50 Robert D. Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); see also Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, ‘The Paradox o f civil society’ Journal o f  
Democracy 7(3), (July 1996) 38-52.
51 Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo Sergio, eds., The (UnJRule o f  law and the underprivileged in 
Latin America (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1999).
52 Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds., Constructing democracy: human rights, citizenship, and society in 
Latin America (Boulder, Colorado: Westerview Press, Inc., 1996).
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asserted in the work of T. H. Marshall,53 nor is it simply the legal claims of individuals on the 
State like a bundle of rights given to citizens by virtue of their membership in a given polity.54 
This largely rights-based and status-oriented liberal notion of citizenship presupposes that 
individuals act rationally while the State protects the exercise of rights by citizens. An opposing 
view of citizenship prioritises the common good over individual rights. This communitarian 
view stresses the importance o f ‘socially-embedded citizen and community belonging’ where 
collective rights and individual responsibilities are exercised.55 The civic-republican notion of 
citizenship incorporates individual rights within a collective framework but stresses individual 
responsibilities to community life through deliberation and negotiated arrangements.56 The 
notion of citizenship used in this study draws elements from the three schools of thought raised 
above: individual rights as provided for by the State (liberal), community belonging and the 
primacy of the common good (communitarian), and exercise of rights and responsibilities in a 
deliberative process (civic republican). In this way, citizenship is a status (comprising rights and 
obligations) and active participation which often is shaped by class and gender relations, 
political identities, ethnicities and other such factors.57 This is akin to Margaret Somers’s claim 
that citizenship is ‘a set of institutionally embedded social practices’ derived from one’s 
‘network of relationships and political idioms that stress membership and universal rights and 
duties in a national community.’58 The ‘institutionally embedded social practices,’ mediated 
through laws and institutions, centre around membership rules, and rights and responsibilities
53 T. H. Marshall, Class, citizenship, and social development (New York: Doubleday, 1964), 65-123.
54 See Karol Edward Soltan, ‘Introduction: civic competence, democracy, and the good society,’ in Citizen 
competence and democratic institutions, Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan, eds., University Park, 
Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 2.




58 Margaret Somers, ‘Citizenship and the place o f the public sphere: law, community, and political culture in 
the transition to democracy,’ American Sociological Review  58 (October 1993), 587.
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expected of a citizen.59 These institutionalised political entitlements and duties arise out of 
people’s interaction with each other over time and from the political identity with which they 
share. The locus of citizenship, however, does not limit itself to the national community as 
Somers suggests, but also includes the local and global contexts.
The exercise of one’s citizenship can democratise a political regime.60 As such, this 
strikes a distinction between a citizen and an inhabitant. Without political affiliation and bereft 
of any political rights and responsibilities, the person remains an inhabitant without political 
entitlements and duties.61 A citizen, however, who is conscious of political rights and 
obligations can potentially articulate and channel one’s own public perceptions, political 
interests and needs. In this way, a citizen becomes a real actor in a given democratic polity.
A'?This idea builds on the proverbial note that ‘democracy cannot do without democrats.’
Engaged citizens, acting individually and collectively, will try to ensure that democracy works.
1.3 Methodology
Apart from treating the Church in the national scene, two dioceses in the Philippines are 
examined at greater depth: the Diocese of Bacolod and the Diocese of Malaybalay. These local 
Churches are by no means typical representatives of the Philippine Catholic Church (see Figure 
2 next page). The local Churches maintain specificities even within their own regions. While 
the cases are not intended to represent the national or regional Church, they provide insights into 
the dynamics and complexities of the Philippine Church. These two local Churches were 
radicalised and politicised during the Marcos years. In the post-authoritarian period, while still
59 Maria Serene I. Diokno, ‘Becoming a Filipino citizen: perspectives on citizenship and democracy,’ in 
Philippine Democracy Agenda: democracy and citizenship in Filipino political culture Vol. 1 (Quezon City: 
Third World Studies Center, 1997), 28-31.
60 Lucy Taylor, Citizenship, participation and democracy: changing dynamics in Chile and Argentina (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1998), 12.
61 Ibid.
62 Hadenius and Uggla, ‘Making civil society work...., 1622.
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Figure 2: Some local churches in the ecclesiastical map of the Philippines
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politically active in some areas, they took divergent turns and emphases. Part of the study is to 
describe how and explain why the divergence has come about despite the similarity of 
experiences during the authoritarian period.
The choice of these two dioceses as case material is deliberate. Both dioceses responded 
positively to the reforms set out by Vatican II. Both dioceses had strong BCC/BEC movements 
particularly in the mid-1970s and 1980s. In the transition period, both engaged not only the local 
but also the national government, particularly in issues where democracy was at stake. In both 
cases, their respective bishops led the struggle of the local Churches, particularly in the 
authoritarian period. In both cases, the emergence of civil society forces factored in the 
Church’s attempts to reinforce democracy in both local and national arenas. These qualifications 
justify the choice of the two dioceses.
A total of eighty-nine individual open and semi-focused interviews including six pairs 
were conducted on key informants (cf. Appendices, Appendix 1 for the Guide Questions). In 
Bacolod, many of the interviews were conducted in English, some in Tagalog, and a few, with 
the help of an interpreter, in Hiligaynon, the local language of the province.63 In Malaybalay, 
most of the interviews were conducted in Cebuano, a widely-used language in Bukidnon, and a 
few in English. Snowball sampling was occasionally used to select key informants, that is, the 
people interviewed were asked to recommend other resource persons. The gender imbalance of 
the key informants is admittedly noticeable. Sixteen of the informants were female and sixty- 
one were male. This betrays the dominance of male perception of the Church which could be 
rectified in future research. On the whole, there seems to be a wide range of respondents coming 
from varied sectors. Thirty-eight respondents were members of the clergy (including bishops) 
and religious sisters, and forty were either lay people and/or critical observers of the Church.
63 Hiligaynon and Cebuano are closely related languages, possibly one a variant o f the other. I am a native 
Cebuano speaker and would tend to understand 50% of Hiligaynon.
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Some of the respondents were activists, intellectuals, government officials, business people, 
Protestants, and others who were not affiliated with any of the mainline Churches. All but three 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed. Four group interviews were made during 
on-site visits to small villages.
Some interviews conducted in Bacolod were particularly difficult given the acute 
polarisation of the Church at the time of the fieldwork. Some thought I was sent by 
ecclesiastical authorities to investigate the conflict in the local Church. Many views were 
conflicting depending on the camp to which the respondent belonged. One cautious respondent 
refused to have the interview recorded and quoted. To remedy the strong bias in both camps, I 
interviewed a good number of respondents who were of independent-mind and critical of the 
contending sides.
Other sources of data included the local and national newspapers, national surveys on 
public opinion, historical documents, monographs, personal communication with four key 
informants when face-to-face interviews were not possible, published materials, documentations 
and archival records from both the Church and the government. This study also takes on board 
my personal experience in the civil society movement and church circles for two decades now. 
Since 1979,1 have been involved in various sectors of the civil society movement: students, 
labour unions, urban poor, religious sector, electoral movements, and other national and local 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and peoples’ organisations (POs). In both People 
Power I (collapse of the Marcos government in 1986) and People Power II (removal of the 
Estrada administration in 2001), I was personally involved more in the former than in the latter. 
As a member of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) since 1983,1 became directly involved in 
church affairs in the various places of my assignments in the Philippines. Being a priest- 
researcher was both an asset and a liability in the conduct of the fieldwork. A Roman Catholic 
priest in Philippine society still commands relatively high confidence and trust from the public.
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It meant having easy access to the various sources and data which otherwise would be 
confidential or inaccessible. However, in a few cases, it also meant that some of the informants 
either tended to be extra measured in their responses or painted a rosy picture to make an 
impression about the Church. In the first case, they were assured of confidentiality, particularly 
when they declared that the matter is ‘off-the-record.’ In the second case, their responses were 
re-examined carefully.
During the fieldwork, Christian communities, villages, church organisations and 
establishments were visited. Three months were given to Metro Manila to gather national data 
and follow closely the Church’s involvement in the Church’s engagement in good governance 
that led to the ouster of President Estrada. Seven months were devoted to the two local Churches 
gathering, processing (e.g., transcribing interviews), sorting the data and writing narratives about 
the dioceses. These narratives were shown to local people and external observers for comments. 
These were subsequently revised to form part of the empirical chapters of the thesis.
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Chapter two 
Towards a theoretical framework explaining the Church’s roles in democracy building
By the side o f  every religion is to be found a political opinion, which is connected with it by affinity. 
—Alexis de Tocqueville1
This literature review incorporates the key elements of the proposed theoretical framework. 
Firstly, it discusses the roles of the Church during the democratic transition along with its 
Church ad intra dynamics. Secondly, it explores the interventions of the Church in building 
post-authoritarian democracy. Thirdly, it examines Church ad extra interaction and show how 
this may strengthen democracy. Fourthly, it investigates the Church’s cultivation and practice of 
citizenship as a window on building democracy. Finally, it assesses the possibilities and limits of 
the theoretical framework.
2.1 The Church during the period of democratic transition and Church ad intra 
(hierarchy-laity interaction)
Much of the existing literature on church and democracy concerns the democratic transition and 
only partially encompasses the period after that. The literature written in 1970s and 1980s on the 
subject focuses on the hierarchical Church as it increasingly dissociates itself from the State. 
These materials typically see the hierarchy as the main official organ of the Church and its 
members take their cue from its pronouncements. This is reflected in the works of Ivan Vallier2 
and Thomas Sanders.3 Both Vallier and Sanders distinguish church leaders from members of 
the flock. It is to these church elites; the episcopal hierarchy for Vallier, the bishops, and priests 
and lay leaders for Sanders; that the religious energy for opposing the State and social change
1 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, I, 300.
2 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, social control, and modernization in Latin America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1970).
3 Thomas Sanders, ‘The Church in Latin America,’ Foreign Affairs 48(2), (January 1970), 285-299.
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gradually took form.4 Fairly recent conceptions of the Church in the works of John Witte, Jr.,5 
Thomas S. Bokenkotter,6 and Jose Casanova,7 and those writers focusing on the Philippine 
experience,8 although cognizant of the contributions of the local communities, similarly zero in 
on the Church in the macro sphere as it disengages from the State. By stressing the role of the 
hierarchy and other national church elites, this literature invariably tends to mask local Church 
initiatives and contributions in the democratisation project.
In the transition period, Samuel Huntington offers a most optimistic view of the Church’s 
contributions to democracy.9 John Witte’s collection of essays linking the Church and 
democracy shares the same optimism of Huntington.10 The authors in the Witte collection used 
sociological, theological and feminist perspectives to pursue the Huntington thesis, but 
unfortunately no writer offered a theory of democracy whereby the experience can be analysed 
with some rigour. Huntington’s notion of the third wave of democratisation consists of the 
phenomenal period between 1974 and early 1990s when some thirty non-democratic regimes 
transited to become democratic political systems.11 Huntington observes that in 1988, thirty nine 
of the forty-six democratic countries, that is, eighty-five percent were largely of Western 
Christian religion whereas only seven of the fifty eight democratic countries or 12 percent were
4 Ralph Della Cava, ‘Catholicism and society in twentieth-century Brazil,’ Latin American Research Review 
11(2), (1976), 8.
5 John Witte, Jr., ed., Christianity and democracy in global context (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: 
Westerview Press, 1993).
6 Thomas S. Bokenkotter, Church and revolution: Catholics in the struggle o f  democracy and social justice  
(New York: Image Books, 1998).
7 Jose Casanova, Public religions in the modern world  (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press, 
1994).
8 Robert Youngblood, Marcos against the Church: economic development and political repression in the 
Philippines (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); Gasper Gretchen, Fragile democracies: the 
legacies o f  authoritarian rule (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1995); John J. Carroll, ‘Forgiving or 
forgetting? Churches and the transition to democracy in the Philippines,’ Monograph 20, Pulso (August 1999).
9 Samuel Huntington, The Third wave: democratisation in the late twentieth century (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 72-85; Samuel Huntington, ‘Democracy’s third wave,’ Journal o f  Democracy 2(2), 
(1991), 12-34.
10 Witte, Christianity and democracy in global context.
11 Huntington notes the following waves o f democratisation: first long wave o f democratisation (1828-1926); 
first reverse wave (1922-42); second short wave o f democratisation (1943-62); second reverse wave (1958-75); 
and the Third wave of democratisation (1974--). See Huntington, The Third W ave..., 16.
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of other predominant religions.12 He proposes that there appears to be a strong correlation 
between Western Christianity and building democracy.13 Huntington sees five crucial factors that 
explain the third wave: 1) global economic development; 2) renewal of the Roman Catholic 
Church; 3) the increasing legitimacy crises of authoritarian States; 4) shifts in the role of 
international bodies such as the European community, the United States, former Soviet Union, 
and 5) the 'snowballing' effects of democratic transition experiences.14 Of these variables, 
Huntington claims that ‘Catholicism was second only to economic development as a pervasive 
force making for democratisation in the 1970s and 1980s.’15 Indeed the symbol o f this wave of 
democratisation ‘could well be a crucifix superimposed on a dollar sign.’16
Some factors contributed to the transition to democracy of many Catholic nations. 
Historically, Huntington claims, Protestant countries enjoyed better economic well-being 
compared with the Catholic countries which were generally poor. Economic development in 
these Catholic countries, he argues, placed them in a better position to wage a democratic
• 1 “7transition. Moreover, the doctrinal and pastoral changes that swept across the Catholic Church 
throughout the world following the reforms set out by Vatican II made an enormous difference 
to the Church’s public role.18
Changes were also noticeable at the grassroots level with the rise of the CEBs with 
different ideological proclivities. The CEBs from below, coupled with reforms from above, 
Huntington claims, produced a ‘new church’ that resisted military and authoritarian regimes.19 
He cites too the leadership of some key figures in the Church that led the opposition against 










Han Cardinal Kim in South Korea, Jaime Cardinal Sin in the Philippines.20 The pastoral visits of
John Paul II in Catholic countries (particularly in Poland) during the dictatorship rule made an
9  1impact in the inauguration of democracy.
Huntington's notion of the third wave has set a discourse in church-state and democratic 
studies during the 1990s. However, there are crucial issues in his exposition that relate to this 
study. First, the third wave of democratisation, particularly in the developing countries, was
• 99  •  •uneven as shown in the study of Robin Luckham and Gordon White. Their findings seem to 
nuance the sweeping generalisation that the third wave was uniformly democratic in character. 
Indeed within the Catholic Church, Vatican II reforms proceeded unevenly since within the 
hierarchy and laity disparate and at times opposing doctrinal and pastoral tendencies representing 
certain interests and values continued to affect the public role of the Church. Second, by 
locating his analysis during the 1970s and 1980s, he largely limits his analysis to the transition 
phase. Obviously some countries like Portugal and Spain at that time point were starting to 
consolidate their democratic gains. Others like the Philippines (from 1986) and Brazil (from 
1987) were still in transition while Poland (from 1989), South Africa (from 1989) and a host of 
African countries (1990s) were only beginning to make their transition to democracy. Thus 
beyond the democratic transition setting appears insufficiently treated in Huntington. Third, 
Huntington limits his treatment largely on democratisation by way of church-state relations at 
the macro sphere. Although Huntington is aware of the initiatives of the basic Christian 
communities, he leaves very little room to examine their dynamics with the hierarchical 
leadership. Fourth, typical of the literature on the Church in democratic transition, church-state 
opposition has frequently dominated the paradigm to explain the Church’s democratic impulse. 
There is very little insight one can find on the Church’s partnership and interaction with civil
20 Ibid., 82.
21 Ibid., 83.
22 Robin Luckham and Gordon White, Democratisation in the south: the ja gged  wave (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996), 274-277.
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society actors and subsequently its engagement with the State and society. Thus Huntington 
narrows the real context of the Church’s role, which in practical terms concerns engagement not 
only with the State but also with civil society. In sum, Huntington does not sufficiently address 
the Church’s involvement beyond its opposition against authoritarian regimes.
A more thoroughgoing monolithic conception of the Church is provided by Anthony Gill 
and those that followed his line of thinking.23 Using the rational-actor framework, Gill examines 
the Church as a rational agent behaving according to the calculus of costs and benefits. In his 
view, the Church’s conflict or cooperation as the case may be vis-a-vis the State can be 
explained similarly along the lines of this economic logic. The Church, and by this, Gill means 
the hierarchical leadership primarily, like any other economic actor, seeks to protect and advance 
corporate gains and minimise losses.24 Gill applies the same principle with regard to the 
Church’s tendency to compete with the Pentecostal movement, one that has grown by leaps and 
bounds in Latin America.25 In all this, Gill focuses on the official political strategies which are 
often declared by the national episcopacy where grassroots organisations must ultimately receive
' j / r
hierarchical sanction for their survival.
While Gill alerts keen observers on church and politics to the collective interests which 
could militate against the Church’s vision of human development and democracy, his view of the 
Church as a unitary economic actor tends to homogenise the complexity within the Church 
structure. This view oversimplifies the Church’s motives and the outcomes of its interventions
23 Anthony J. Gill, Rendering unto Ceasar: the Catholic Church and the State in Latin America (Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1998); Anthony Gill, ‘The Economics o f evangelization,’ in Religious freedom  
and evangelization in Latin America Paul Sigmund, ed., (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books), 70-84. Other writers 
likewise follow Gill’s notion o f the Church as a rational actor. See Stephen R. Warner, ‘A New paradigm for 
sociological study o f religion in the United States,’ American Journal o f  Sociology 98(5), (1993), 1044-1093; 
Robert B. Ekelund, Robert F. Hebert and Robert D. Tallison, ‘An Economic model o f the Medieval Church,’ 
Journal o f  Law, Economics and Organizations 5(2), (1989), 305-331.
24 Anthony Gill, ‘The Struggle to be soul provider: Catholic responses to Protestant growth in Latin America,’ 
in Latin American religion in motion Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy, eds., (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999), 17-42.
25 Ibid.
26 Gill, Rendering unto Caesar, 4-5.
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which may not be necessarily nor primarily in economic terms. His excessive regard for the 
hierarchical position appears to downplay initiatives from and interaction with local 
communities. By implication, this weakens the import of the ‘people of God’ ecclesiology 
outlined in Vatican II, and the potential of creative interaction with civil society since the Church 
is presumed to be largely protective of its own corporate interests.
Thus far, views espoused by earlier writers and fairly recent writings of Huntington, Gill 
and those who have followed their lead tend to overemphasise the roles of the hierarchy. These 
ideas are at best partial conceptions of the Church’s own self-understanding of its nature as a 
pilgrim ‘people of God’ with its hierarchical element. Using macro level analysis of church- 
state relations, they insufficiently address the post-authoritarian context of democracy building in 
the national, sub-national and local contexts.
Apart from the highly hierarchical conception of the Church, another view of the subject 
looks at the local and basic communities as the prime movers of social transformation leading to 
the inauguration of democracy. The phenomenal surge of CEBs in Latin America in the 1970s 
and mid-1980s grabbed the limelight of political investigation from a highly hierarchical 
conception of the Church in the earlier literature. There is considerable debate on the extent of 
CEBs’ political influence during the transition phase.27 A minority opinion led by orthodox 
Marxists insists that CEBs’ involvement or any church influence for that matter was not a central 
but merely an ancillary force in popular mobilisation leading to democratisation.28 Mainline 
opinion, although to varying degrees, maintains that CEBs were vital religio-political 
protagonists during the transition period. CEBs lent direct political support to social movements, 
resisted authoritarian regimes, and provided spaces for political actors to meet and plan their
27 William H. Swatos, Jr., ed., Religion and democracy in Latin America (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 1995).
28 W. E. Hewitt, ‘Religion and the consolidation o f democracy in Brazil: the role o f the comunidades eclesiais 
de base in Religion and democracy in Latin America, William Swatos, Jr., ed., (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 1995), 46-47.
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political action.29 Nevertheless, their political significance in the post-authoritarian era appears 
to be dwindling owing to the withdrawal of hierarchical church support,30 inherent weaknesses 
of CEBs,31 lack of a more focused agenda,32 the challenges brought about by the new democratic 
context, and finally because of the proliferation of the Pentecostal movement. Questions too 
have been raised regarding the strength in quantity and quality of these CEBs as supposed by 
liberation theologians and their advocates.34 A minority opinion, however, claims that CEBs 
continue to exert political influence locally in the post-authoritarian period.
Studies on CEBs and their impact on democratisation abound in the literature. David 
Lehmann represents the thinking of some of these writers in the literature. He examines the 
relationship between Latin American democracy and development. He attempts to establish a 
connection between 'post Marxist democratic theory and local-level politics.’37 He believes that 
the State (macro level) has not demonstrated itself as a capable actor in the modernisation 
project. Thus one must consider taking development from below which is what basismo stands 
for.38 Lehmann asserts: Tt is to this myriad of organized activities, to the comunidades de base, 
and to the ideological biases which accompany them, that I refer when I speak of basismo.’39 
Briefly, CEBs typify basismo. Lehmann identifies five key features of basismo: 1) grassroots
29 Christian Smith, ‘The spirit and democracy: base communities, Protestantism, and democratisation in Latin 
America,’ in Religion and democracy in Latin America, William Swatos, Jr., ed., (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 82-83; James C. Cavendish, ‘Christian base communities and the 
building o f democracy: Brazil and Chile,’ in Religion and democracy in Latin America, William Swatos, Jr., 
ed., (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 4-10.
30 Hewitt, ‘Religion and the consolidation o f democracy in Brazil..., 55-57.
31 Iain S. Maclean, Opting fo r  democracy? Liberation theology and the struggle fo r  democracy in Brazil (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2000), 176.
32 Cavendish, ‘Christian base communities and the building o f democracy,’ 88.
33 Carol Ann Drogus, ‘The Rise and decline of Liberation Theology,’ Comparative Politics 27(4), (July 1995), 
465.
34 Phillip Berryman, Religion in the megacity: Catholic and Protestant portraits from  Latin America 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1996), Chapter 5.
35 Rowan Ireland, ‘Popular religions and the building o f democracy in Latin America: saving the Tocquevillian 
parallel,’ Journal o f  Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41(4), (Winter 1999), 111-136.
6 David Lehmann, Democracy and development in Latin America: econom ics, politics and religion in the 
post-war period  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990)
37 Stephen Glazier, ‘Latin American perspectives on religion and politics,’ Latin American Research Review 
30(1), 253.
38 Lehmann, Democracy and development in Latin Am erica..., 214.
39 Ibid., 186.
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organisations; 2) high proportion of women leadership relative to other social movements; 3) 
engagement and partnership with the local government; 4) capacity for institution-building; and 
5) funding linkages with ideological and donor agencies.40 These features connect well with the 
democratisation project since they basically enhance participation of local groups and 
organisations. Lehmann, however, ignores evidently basismo’s engagement with hierarchical 
leadership. His hesitation to engage the State beyond the local context weakens its import in the 
sub-national or national sphere.
Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, although sympathetic to the political crusade of 
the base communities, do not go as far as Lehmann in dissociating them from the hierarchical 
leadership.41 Mainwaring and Wilde investigate the internal dynamics within the Church; the 
emergence of the progressive sector within the Church; the nature and causes of the changes that 
swept the Church; and the tensions that deeply divided progressives and conservatives. Their 
anthology examines the complexity of the progressive Latin American Churches in Brazil, Peru, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador not only as acted-upon by national exigencies but also as political 
actors.42 By ‘progressive church’ they mean that which synonymously applies to ‘Iglesia 
popular’ (popular Church), ‘the grassroots church,’ ‘church of the poor,’ but not as a distinct 
church within a larger Church.43 Mainwaring and Wilde argue that more often than not ‘the 
progressive Church does not eschew the institutionality of the Church as a whole but rather has 
attempted to develop an alternative conception of that institutionality.’44 This is an important 
point in understanding the complexity of the Church, but has not received the attention it 
deserves in the literature. This characterisation suggests that the ‘progressive church’ is not
40 David Lehmann, Struggle fo r  the Spirit: religious transformation and popular culture in Brazil and Latin 
America (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 29
41Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, ‘The Progressive Church in Latin America: an interpretation,’ in 
The Progressive Church in Latin America, eds., Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University o f Notre Dame Press, 1989), 1-37.
42 Scott Mainwaring and Alexander Wilde, eds., The Progressive Church in Latin America (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1989)
43 Mainwaring and Wilde, ‘The Progressive Church in Latin America: an interpretation’...., 5.
44 Ibid., 5.
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merely the existence of radical elements in the Church, but ‘that the center of gravity in these 
Churches is now more progressive.’45 While the progressive Church was many a time at 
loggerheads with the hierarchical Church, the former did not see itself apart from the latter, no 
matter how sharp the conflict was.46 The dispute between the hierarchical leadership and the so- 
called ‘popular Church’ was more complex than it appeared. Mainwaring and Wilde in this 
regard remark that one cannot assume that the hierarchical Church is by any means a singularly 
conservative body anymore than the CEBs are uniformly progressive.47 These assertions are 
crucial in constructing a framework towards understanding the Philippine Church as a 
democratic actor: the internal dynamics of its disparate actors. Unfortunately, Mainwaring and 
Wilde’s treatment scarcely touches upon the Church’s involvement in post-authoritarian issues.
Along the lines proposed by Mainwaring and Wilde, Ronald Kassimir argues that rather 
than positing a priori a political role of civil society organisations, and by extension including 
the Church, one must first examine them using ‘the lens of social power.’48 This constitutes then- 
capacity to socialise and mobilise groups for political action based on their ‘internal 
organisational dynamics.’49 Following Kassimir, ‘internal organisational dynamics’ are the 
relationship and interaction among leaders, and between them and their constituents as they 
define and actualise organisational goals.50 To demonstrate his point, Kassimir uses the 
Ugandan Catholic Church as case material and investigates its limits and capacities to socialise 
and mobilise organisations to engage the State. Kassimir claims that the Ugandan Catholic 
Church Tacks the kinds of linkages with its members that foster such mobilisation and the
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 15-16.
47 Ibid., 17; see also Daniel H. Levine, Popular voices in Latin American Catholicism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 44-51.
48 Ronald Kassimir, ‘The Social power o f religious organisation and civil society: the Catholic church in 





mechanisms for socialising members into new values and roles.’51 Weak ‘internal organisational 
dynamics,’ Kassimir argues, emasculated the Church’s political resource and outcome.
A similar point is argued by Mary Gautier in explaining the Church’s role in the 
restoration of civil society in communist societies in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. 
Political values, she maintains, are influenced by the Church through its elites (the ordained 
clergy) and through the shared values of its ordinary believers.53 The emergence of the civil 
society movement in Central Europe in 1980s issued from both levels of influence: church elites 
and regular members. Unlike Kassimir, Gautier does not go forward to discuss what sort of 
interaction these two entities should have to produce desirable political outcomes.
Kassimir’s construct seems to give importance to two layers of internal interaction: the 
definition and pursuit of organisational goals among the leaders themselves, and then between 
them and their members (baptised lay people). Kassimir’s idea of leaders and members appears 
to be not differentiated enough and glosses over internal conflicts and power relations.
Moreover, this sort of interaction between leaders and members appears to be unilateral, that is, 
issuing from the top to the bottom. While this mode of interaction may bid well in pressing and 
urgent cases needing swift discernment and action, in the definition and pursuit of organisational 
goals, there should be more inclusion of the ordinary lay people in the deliberation of the vision 
and mission of the Church. Kassimir’s construct can be pushed a step forward by arguing for the 
kind of interaction between leaders and members that is more participative, shallow 
hierarchically and more discerning so that the Church leaders, who eventually will act on issues 
affecting the Church and society, are better informed. In the context of the dioceses which are 
under study in this research, internal organisational interaction consists of the hierarchical 
leadership, that is, the resident diocesan bishop and his presbyteral council (priests assisting the
51 Ibid., 76.
52 Mary L. Gautier, ‘Church elites and the restoration o f civil society in the communist societies in Central 
Europe,’ Journal o f  Church and State 40(2), (Spring 1998), 292-293.
53 Ibid.
bishop in ecclesial governance) with the consultative bodies including lay leaders as they, in 
consultation and deliberation with the regular members, local communities and organisations, 
define and pursue the goals of the diocese. This entails too that the laity with its broad spectrum 
of actors form a broad consensus on issues affecting the State and society. This construct avoids 
Kassimir’s two-tiered interaction, that is, interaction first among leaders, and then between 
leaders and members. This conflates the two levels of interaction into one. Given the plurality 
of forces and ecclesiological cleavages underpinned by varying and contentious doctrinal 
positions within the hierarchy and laity, it is necessary to reduce internal contradictions that 
inhibit the Church’s resolve and political outcomes. Church ad intra addresses these internal 
contradictions by persistent mutual communication within and between the hierarchy and laity. 
Hierarchy-laity interaction does presuppose the presence of intermediaries (e.g., organisations, 
persons and establishments). Thus local communities’ interests can be generated, articulated and 
represented by the CEBs or BCCs with their leaders (priests or lay).
The insistence on elites-members interaction seems like a truism in an organisational 
structure, but often hugely understated or simply ignored in many attempts to explain the 
Church’s capacity to strengthen democracy. Given the issues and opportunities in the post­
authoritarian period, lessons from the literature tell us that neither the hierarchical Church alone 
(without grassroots mobilisation) nor the local base communities in themselves (without the 
support from hierarchical Church leadership) can muster enough force to sustain and influence 
political democracy in a profound way. Kassimir correctly argues that by ignoring its internal 
organisational capacities, linking the Church and democratisation has not been examined 
carefully.54 Thus the possibilities and limits of the Church as a democratic protagonist are not 
laid bare adequately. This vertical linkage does not by any means connote that the Church is a 
monolithic actor. The internal capacity of the Church rises or falls with its internal organisational
54 Kassimir, ‘The Social power of religious organisation and civil society..., 55.
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dynamics that includes interaction, conflict and difference between and within its entities. Put 
simply, vertical linkage (Church ad intra) between the leaders and members enhances the 
Church’s capacity for socialisation and mobilisation of society for a political outcome such as 
democracy building. It induces participation from those ordinarily excluded. It widens the 
avenues for consultation, deliberation and participation towards informed decision-making. 
Nonetheless, Kassimir’s argument, while mindfiil of the potential of civil society in constructing 
democracy, does not demonstrate the Church’s functions within the civil society movement. His 
construct relies heavily on the vertical linkage and does not present the Church’s possible roles 
with civil society (horizontal linkage) in post-authoritarian democracy.
In sum, the literature issuing from both hierarchical and popular views of the Church in 
the transition period is abundant, informative, and in many ways path-breaking in the whole 
discourse on church and democratisation. First, it recognises the transformations within the 
Catholic Church making it a potent religio-political actor in the transition period. Second, it 
narrates church-state disengagement, in particular, the Church’s role in initiating and leading 
opposition against military and authoritarian regimes. Third, it shows the Church’s disparate 
roles in democratic transition. Fourth, it sees the intra-church dynamics of the hierarchy and 
local communities as crucial factors in the Church’s capacity to socialise and mobilise actors 
within the civil society network for a political outcome.
Notwithstanding the contributions of the existing literature on the transition period, there 
are understandably significant gaps that remain unattended. First, the time and location of the 
analysis limit the scope of the literature to the political and ecclesial contexts during that phase. 
Second, the church-state relations have been often moulded as opposing actors with very 
minimal post-authoritarian interaction between the two actors in building democracy. Third, 
church-state relations dominate the discourse in the literature. This masks church-civil society 
nexus in democratisation. The latter’s political import in the transition period can be gleaned
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from the experiences of Central Europe, South Korea, and Latin America.55 Hence there is a 
need to re-examine the Church’s role in post-authoritarian setting.
2.2 The Church’s interventions in building post-authoritarian democracy
The literature on the Church’s involvement in post-authoritarian democracy particularly in the 
long term is sparse. Hannah Stewart-Gambino outlines the changing contexts in the post­
authoritarian period by noting three factors that have shaped the nature of church’s involvement 
in Latin America: the democratic context, the emergence of the Pentecostal movement, and the 
restoration of the lines of church authority.56 Firstly, the democratic climate has in many cases 
effectively whittled down the mobilising capacity of civil society organisations. Not only is the 
common political enemy gone, but also a democratic pluralist society has emerged. The Church 
in this new pluralist setting, more than ever, finds itself no longer taking the lead role in 
democratisation as in many cases in the transition period. Rather, it is merely one of the many 
players in the democratic arena. Secondly, the growth of the Pentecostal movement as a ‘parallel 
church’ posed a challenge to the dominance of the Catholic Church in Latin America.57 Conflict 
and competition characterised the relationship between the Pentecostal movement and the 
Catholic Church. This phenomenon was likewise evident in developing regions in Africa,58 and 
some countries in East and Southeast Asia (including the Philippines).59 And thirdly, the 
centralising tendency of the Vatican leadership has led to the appointment of conservative 
bishops. There are a few examples of Vatican appointments in the post-authoritarian period
55 Gautier, ‘Church elites and the restoration of civil society in the communist societies in Central Europe;’ 
Chang Yun-Shik, ‘The Progressive Christian Church and democracy in South Korea,’ Journal o f  Church and 
State 40(2), (Spring 1998), 437-465;’ Mehran Kamrava and Frank O. Mora, ‘Civil society and democratisation 
in comparative perspective: Latin America and the Middle East,’ Third World Quarterly, 19(5), 899-903.
56 Stewart-Gambino, ‘Introduction.... ’
57 David Stoll, Is Latin America turning Protestant? The politics o f  evangelical growth (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
Oxford: University of California Press, 1990); David Martin, Tongues offire: the explosion o f  Protestantism in 
Latin America (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990).
58 Paul Gifford, African Christianity: its public role (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998).
59 Yun-Shik, ‘The Progressive Christian Church and democracy in South Korea.’
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which showed clear predilection for conservative leadership.60 Brazil’s Dom Helder Camara 
was replaced by conservative prelate Dom Jose Cardoso Sobrinho in 1985. In San Salvador, El 
Salvador, a ring-wing Opus Dei archbishop took over from progressive Archbishop Arturo 
Rivera y Damas in 1995.61 In Lima, Peru, Opus Dei archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani was 
appointed in 1999. Klaiber, however, argues that in a few cases, the appointment of 
conservative bishops such as Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno (Santiago, Chile) did not
necessarily mean an immediate change in the overall thrust of the Church as the successors
♦ •  62basically maintained the political strategy of their predecessors.
In addition to Stewart-Gambino’s reading, one could argue that the collapse of
communism in Central and Eastern Europe profoundly weakened many of the social and
political movements that pinned their hopes in the socialist ideal. The net effect in all these
factors was an increasing demobilisation in many cases of the Church. Jose Casanova sums up
this phenomenon in this way:
The successful transition to democracy and the ensuing institutionalisation of political 
society lead per force to a relative privatisation of Catholicism. Everywhere, once the 
phase of consolidation of democracy begins, the church tends to withdraw from political 
society proper, leaving this realm to professional politicians.... Everywhere, once the 
phase of consolidation begins, the political hour of a civil society, united in opposition to 
an authoritarian state, tends to come to an end. Even if the church wanted to resist this 
structural trend, it is unlikely that it would be able to maintain the highly prominent 
political role of the transitional phase.63
Stewart-Gambino’s and Casanova’s observations are to some extent reflected in the Philippine
experience, but the process of demobilisation was uneven as the cases in this study show.
Apart from the issues raised above, the Church has in some instances been perceived to
have acted, by impulse and by purposive intervention, to bring about undemocratic outcomes.
Post-authoritarian Argentina, for instance, found the Church ambiguous in the manner and
60 Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘Church and religion in Latin America,’ n.d., 2-4.
61 See 4.2.2, Chapter Four for more details on the nature of Opus Dei in the Philippine context.
62 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 14.
63 Casanova, Public religions in the modern world, 133.
36
purpose of lobbying against legislation in favour of divorce and human rights.64 The Polish 
Church too, after the demise of communism, was perceived to encroach upon democratic 
institutions in defence of its stance in favour of religious education in schools, its manner of 
lobbying against birth control, and the hierarchy’s campaign for some candidates in partisan 
politics.65 In Latin America, where there is an increasing demand to liberalise laws concerning 
personal and sexual morality (e.g., divorce, population control, equality of religious rights), 
church interventions in some cases have not been received as strengthening democratic 
institutions.66 These areas are politically and religiously charged. Further, they are bound to 
create tensions between the Church and State, and between the Church and civil society.
Jeffrey Klaiber’s comparative historical survey of Latin American Churches, their 
opposition to dictatorship and their promotion of democracy, opens up some possibilities of the 
Church in promoting democracy in the post-authoritarian period.67 He carefully argues that the 
Church (the official leadership and local faith communities in general) contributed to the 
restoration and maintenance of democracy in five ways: religious delegitimation of dictatorships 
by public denunciation and symbolic gestures, defence of human rights, conferring legitimacy on 
opposing political actors, mediation of conflicts, and creation of participatory spaces for the 
opposition.68 In all these, the defence of human rights and the mediation of conflicts stand out as 
significant contributions of the Church during the post-authoritarian setting, in the short run at 
least. With regard to the advocacy of human rights, the Church during and after the authoritarian 
period was a mouthpiece and grievance machinery for the victims of state abuses. In Latin 
America, Klaiber cites the human rights centres in Chile’s Vicariate of Solidarity, in El
64 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 89-90.
65 Mirella W. Eberts, ‘The Roman Catholic Church and democracy in Poland,’ Europe-Asia Studies 50(5)
1998), 817-842; Frances Millard, ‘The Influence o f the Catholic Hierarchy in Poland 1989-96,’ Journal o f  
European Social Policy 7(2), (May 1997), 83-99.
66 Michael Fleet and Brian H. Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru, (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997) 287-289.
67 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America.
68 Ibid., 7-10.
37
Salvador’s Tutela Legal (Legal Defence), Sao Paulo’s Commission of Peace and Justice, as 
some examples of how victims were helped and how the abusive tendencies of the State were 
monitored and held at bay.69 At that time particularly, the defence and promotion of human 
rights was a politically sensitive business. In many cases, it was plagued with a lot of 
controversies and some ambivalence for fear that the military would resume its rule over the 
people. However, the Bishops in Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala argued that national 
reconciliation could only take effect if those responsible own up to their misdeeds.70
Apart from getting involved in human rights issues, many Latin American Churches 
played a vital role in initiating peace between armed or opposition groups through their 
mediation of conflicts. In particular, Klaiber notes that the national accords in Chile and 
Paraguay and the national dialogues in Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala were principally 
spearheaded by the Church.71 Although these national accords and dialogues were plagued with 
all sorts of problems coming from the government, military, and opposing parties, these attempts 
characteristically engendered the participation of significant actors by addressing issues 
concerning peace, human rights, and democracy building. In Guatemala and in El Salvador, ‘the 
church participated in the peace process, not as a mere neutral spectator but as a protagonist with 
its own agenda.’72 The Church in this way manifested its capacity to be an actor, mediator and 
moderator of society with regard to democracy. The Church’s moral position in Latin America 
society made it the only national Organisation acceptable to warring and often armed groups.73 
The Church’s wide public acceptability is extremely pivotal in pressing for its political reach and
69 Ibid., 8. See also Carl E. Meacham, ‘The Role o f the Chilean Church in the new Chilean democracy, Journal 
o f  Church and State, 36 (Spring 1994), 277-299; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Democratic consolidation and human 
rights in Brazil, Working Paper 256, (Notre Dame: The Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 
1998); Edward L. Cleary, The Struggle fo r  human rights in Latin America (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
1997).
70 Brian H. Smith, Religious politics in Latin America: Pentecostal vs. Catholic (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University o f Notre Dame Press, 1998), 52-53.




agenda, a crucial comparative advantage that the Philippine Church likewise enjoys.74
The defence of human rights and mediation of conflicts are potential factors in 
strengthening post-authoritarian democracy beyond the transition. In this way, Klaiber partially 
shows how the Church can contribute to strengthening democracy in the post-authoritarian 
setting. However, there are relevant issues that the Klaiber survey does not address. First, 
Klaiber deals extensively with issues in the transition period and therefore does not substantially 
analyse the Church’s influence in the post-authoritarian. Second, Klaiber seems to focus his 
treatment mainly on macro church-state relations. Although he cites the Church’s role in 
shaping the public agenda and providing a mechanism for interest articulation and representation 
as in the cases of the national accords and dialogues, Klaiber does not elaborate on the Church’s 
engagement with civil society (apart from CEBs) in building democracy. And finally, since 
Klaiber’s historical approach did not present a working definition of democracy, it is difficult to 
assess whether or not the Church in Latin America contributes to post-authoritarian democracy.
Michael Fleet and Brian Smith’s comparative analysis of the Catholic Church in Chile 
and Peru is a step forward in the literature since they treat the post-authoritarian phase more 
extensively than others.75 Their research examines the Church’s political outcomes during the 
democratic transition and consolidation in Chile and Peru. They do not entirely focus their 
analysis on church-state relations at a macro level. They examine how the local communities, 
Catholic activists and bishops as units of analysis have been agents or obstacles in the 
democratisation of Chile and Peru. Their methodology involves extended interviews with 
church leaders and lay activists, attitudinal survey research and investigation of archival 
materials.76 At the outset, the authors realise that the internal dynamics within the Latin 
American national Churches, their interactions with civil society and pastoral strategies have
74 John J. Carroll, ‘Church and State: the light o f the Gospel on public issues,’ in Duet fo r  EDSA, looking back, 
looking forward, 1996, Loma Kalaw-Tirol, ed., (Manila: Foundations for Worldwide Power Inc., 1995), 190.
75 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru.
76 Ibid., 9.
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posed new issues and opportunities as regards the future of the Churches and the whole 
development of many countries in the region.77 They present the internal conflicts within the 
Church after the appointment of conservative prelates and the decline of the influence of the 
moderates and progressive bishops in the post-authoritarian Churches. But with the conservative 
appointees (e.g., Cardinal Fresno in Santiago, Chile), their effects on the life of the Church were
na
not uniform, a point which Klaiber shares.
Fleet and Smith suggest that the Catholic Church in Chile figured more prominently in 
democratic transition than in Peru. The hierarchy ‘pressed for a peaceful and orderly transition, 
playing first a neutral, and then a mediatory, role.’79 Nonetheless, the authors claim that the 
Chilean Church’s contributions to the consolidation of democracy have been ‘modest and at 
times obstructive.’80 The politicised military of Augusto Pinochet continued to exercise its 
supremacy and autonomy which the Church was unable to hold at bay. By adopting a cautious 
stance for fear that the military would restore its rule as in the Pinochet days, the Church and its 
civilian supporters did not do much in terms of deepening democratisation in Chile. Here and 
there in Chile, the bishops and lay activists intervened in social justice and human rights issues, 
but the threat of another military rule proved too daunting to press ahead with their demands. 
This was further compounded by the division between progressive bishops and conservatives.81 
Additionally, the bishops’ interventions in policy debates concerning issues such as divorce, 
birth control, public education and abortion have been seen as undermining democratic processes 
and values.82 These issues are not infrequently a source of tension between the Church and civil 
society in the post-authoritarian period. In the Philippine context, this is a potential source of 
division between the Church and civil society when otherwise the two would generally be allies
77 Ibid., 8.
78 Ibid., 271-272, 275; Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 13-15.
79 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru ,271 .




in the task of democratisation.
On the other hand, Peru had a deeply divided and ambivalent ecclesial leadership with 
regard to democracy during the transition period under the administration of Morales 
Bermudez.83 While individual progressive bishops spoke on crucial political and social issues, 
there were equally dissenting opinions from some elements of the hierarchy. This prevented the 
Peruvian bishops from promoting a wide consensus in support of democracy, unlike their 
counterparts in Chile. From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s ‘Peru’s reestablished democracy 
never took root.’84 In the case of Peru, apart from the political and socio-economic crises that 
beset the country, civil society and the church leadership, withdrew from political involvement.
In addition, the absence of church support for democratic groups proved to be a major setback in 
consolidating democracy.85 In this regard, Fleet and Smith suggest that there is a potential role 
for the Church in civil society during the post-authoritarian democracy building. What exactly it 
is they do neither say nor demonstrate. While the authors are obviously aware of the potential of 
the Church’s role in strengthening civil society as a pathway to building democracy, their 
research merely raised this possibility and did not go far enough to explore the relationship 
between the two.
Fleet and Smith’s concluding remarks have a direct bearing on this research. They assert 
that the Church’s ‘political influence is primarily a function of the moral authority of its bishops, 
priests, sisters, and lay activists.’86 Insofar as the Church enjoys a relatively high level of public 
confidence and continues to be engaged in non-partisan politics on the basis of moral authority, 
its influence with regard to the State and civil society can be far reaching. Fleet and Smith 
hypothesise that the moral and political influence of Church actors can be maintained 






to the Church’s religious mission.’87 This point shares much of the emphasis of the Church ad 
intra construct drawn above, but they have not really demonstrated how this achieves the desired 
political outcome. In exploring the possibilities of the Church in post-authoritarian era, Fleet and 
Smith rightly claim:
In sum, if it is to be put to political use, the Church’s moral authority must be exercised 
judiciously and infrequently. In times of crisis, the Church may serve as a surrogate 
political actor or social service provider. With secular forces or institutions unable to 
operate normally, Church authorities may take over their functions or launch initiatives 
of their own. In doing so, they may help to stabilize and sustain a country’s social and 
political processes. They can also enhance the cause or credibility of specific groups for
o o
whom they choose to speak....
These observations connect well with the experience of the Philippine Church. Given the 
political bankruptcy of the party system,89 and weak political institutions,90 the Church has time 
and again exercised its moral influence on key issues affecting the democratic life of society. As 
will be shown in the empirical chapters, the Philippine Church was not simply reacting against 
the issues exogenous to its life and interests, but it acted also on the basis of its moral suasion 
and its own understanding of its religious mission, during and beyond the authoritarian era.91 
Fleet and Smith, by comparing two national Churches in their contributions to democratic 
transition and consolidation, have broadened the issues connected with church and democracy. 
They point out the changing patterns of church roles during the period of transition and 
consolidation.
Nonetheless, a few problems remain in the Fleet and Smith exposition. A first 
inadequacy of their piece is that, like Klaiber, they have not provided an adequate working 
concept of democracy. They equate democratic consolidation (an aspect of post-authoritarian
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Gabriella Montinola, ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines.’
90 James Putzel, ‘Survival o f an imperfect democracy in the Philippines,’ Democratization 
6(1) (January 1999), 198-223.
91 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?...; Robert Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches: a “constructive critical 
solidarity”,’ Pilipinas: a journal o f  Philippine studies. No. 13, (Fall 1989), 57-71.
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democracy) with the democratisation o f ‘institutions and practices’ that empower and make 
public officials accountable.92 While this is not entirely dismissive of civil society actors, it does 
not do justice to their potential roles vis-a-vis state and society in a democratic context. Second, 
typical of the pre-transition and transition moments of democratisation, the cases (Peru and 
Chile) presented by Fleet and Smith do not allow a notable changing view of church-state 
relations from one of constant conflict with each other to one of critical engagement as evident in 
some post-authoritarian countries. In a democratising context, it is argued that reforming the 
State is a decisive actor in democratisation. This is premised on the widely accepted assumption
Q'i m
that a strong civil society needs a strong state. And finally, the church-civil society connection 
remains a lacuna in their analysis. Church-state relations continue to dominate the discourse 
with very little reference to church-civil society engagement in the task of democratisation.
2.3 Church ad extra (the Church’s involvement with civil society actors) and democracy 
building
Earlier it was shown that the relationship between the Catholic Church and civil society is fuzzy. 
While the Church (stretching from the Vatican to the smallest ecclesial unit with its own logic of 
governance and sources of moral norms, values, religious identities), can be classified as a supra- 
state organisation that is distinct from civil society, its associations and movements form part of 
civil society. Thus it is analytically possible to see the Church’s relationship with civil society, 
despite the overlap. Church ad extra provides an important resource in the post-authoritarian 
setting not only for the Church, but also for civil society particularly in countries that have a 
significantly influential church presence as in the Philippines. Three modes of church-civil 
society interaction are proposed here as possible ways by which democratisation could be 
strengthened.
92 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru, 160.
93 H. Secher Marcussen, ‘NGOs, the State and civil society,’ Review o f  African Political Economy 69 (1996),
421.
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The first mode of interaction concerns the Church’s capacity to mobilise civil society 
actors through the use of religious symbols (including ecclesial pronouncements and statements). 
In Argentina, Chile and Brazil, not only did the Church erode the moral legitimacy of dictatorial 
regimes, but, as Klaiber argues, it also conferred upon the pro-democracy forces (e.g., civil 
society organisations, opposing political parties) some religious legitimation.94 In this regard, 
religious symbols (e.g., Sunday Masses and homilies, icons) became a mobilisational resource 
that emboldened individual believers and organised groups to democratise state and society. In 
Central and European experience, similar use of religious symbols became a politicised resource 
for individuals and civil society organisations. In using the icon of Our Lady of Czestochowa of 
Jasna Gora (a symbol of collective memories of Polish affliction, opposition and victory), 
members of the Solidarity movement drew immense inspiration and mobilisational capacity.95
The second mode of interaction stresses the role of the Church as an animator of civil 
society forces. Given the Church’s relatively high level of public confidence, Fleet and Smith 
propose that ‘the Church’s programs and facilities can provide formative, life-sustaining places 
of gestation, from which repressed social and political groups may emerge revitalized.’96 
Reflecting on the Latin American experience, Edward Cleary suggested (echoed by Fleet and 
Smith)97 that the Church could be a ‘mediator, moderator, or mentor of democracy.’98 This point 
has some bearing on the Church’s role as an animator in civil society in a democratic polity. As 
an animator, it can potentially socialise and mobilise civil society organisations even as it can 
likewise be animated by the same actors.
A third mode of the Church’s interaction with civil society is the former’s creative
94 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin American, 7-8.
95 Casanova, Public religions in the modern world, 97-98.
96 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru, 290.
97 Ibid., 281-282.
98 Edward L. Cleary, ‘Conclusion: politics and religion,’ in Conflict and competition: the Latin American 
Church in a changing environment eds., Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 204.
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partnership with the latter in the task of democratisation. In the post-authoritarian context 
(particularly in countries where the Church played a crucial role in the transition), the Church on 
its own, despite its vast network of organisational formation, does not have sufficient resources 
or mobilising capacity, nor does it have the monopoly of moral mandate and constituency to 
speak and act on behalf of the people on democratic issues. Thus the Church’s partnership with 
civil society organisations appears crucial in delivering democratic outcomes. By virtue of the 
Church’s moral leverage and public confidence in the Philippine setting, it occupies a significant 
location in society.
Robert Putnam’s idea of social capital (trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks of 
social organisations) is a starting point in clarifying the relationship between the Church and 
civil society organisations." Social capital enhances collaborative efforts benefiting the 
parties concerned. ‘Networks of civic engagement’ (e.g., neighbourhood, associations, 
cooperatives), in Putnam’s view, can bolster not only the economy but also political 
democracy.100 Ties that bind the Church and civil society organisations are crucially 
important in delivering political outcomes in their interventions. Ties make possible creative 
partnership and division of roles. Nonetheless, it is argued that this relationship must be 
sustained not merely by means of social ties of mutual trust and confidence cutting across the 
church-civil society divide, but also through their shared interest in democratisation. The 
Church’s engagement with civil society offers possibilities for alliance formation, 
organisational pluralism, associational and mobilising functions in view of democracy 
building. This partnership creates and expands, sustains and strengthens sites of participation 
and thereby enabling individuals and groups to engage the State and society to democratise.
This politicises the notion of social capital which Putnam appears to gloss over. His idea of
99 Robert Putnam, ‘Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital,’ Journal o f  Democracy 6(1) (1995), 65- 
78; Robert D. Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993).
100 Ibid., chapter six.
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social capital seems to de-emphasise the political variable. Indeed Putnam’s ‘networks of 
civic engagement’ appear undifferentiated by power relations, static, and depoliticised.101
The three modes of interaction (mobilisation, animation, and partnership) mentioned 
above are key expressions of the Church’s involvement with civil society organisations in 
democratisation. These have been tried in some transitions to democracy. The Church’s 
relationship with the Solidarity movement in Poland is one such case. While the collaboration 
between the two actors put up a strong resistance against the communist regime, when Solidarity 
rose to power in 1989, the partnership became too fragile and frizzy to yield any substantial 
democratic outcomes.102 Arguably, church-civil society partnership can be sustained. The 
Church can be an important ally in democratisation whose non-participation would greatly 
whittle down any political outcome.103 Indeed in post-colonial Philippines, no political 
transformation has successfully occurred without the participation of the mainline Catholic and 
Protestant Churches.
2.4 The Church’s involvement in citizenship: a pathway to building post-authoritarian 
democracy
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that Church ad intra (hierarchy-laity internal 
dynamics) and Church ad extra (church-civil society interaction) conceptions in themselves do 
not transform the quality of democracy. They can, however, create participatory spaces within 
and beyond the Church. In this way, they are likely to increase the influence of the Church as a 
democratic actor. Post-authoritarian church-civil society partnership including hierarchy-laity 
interrelation can be strengthened through citizenship formation. To better appreciate this
101 John Harriss and Paolo de Renzio, ‘An Introductory bibliographic essay’ in ‘Policy Arena - “Missing link” 
or analytically missing?: the concept of social capital.’ Journal o f  International Development 9(7), (1997), 919- 
937. See also James Putzel, ‘Accounting for the “dark side” o f social capital: reading Robert Putnam on 
democracy,’ Journal o f  International Development 9(7) (1997), 939-949.
102 Casanova, Public religions in the modern world, chapter 4.
103 See G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Gamer Noble, ‘Citizen movements Philippine Democracy,’ in Organizing 
fo r  democracy: NGOs, civil society and the Philippine State (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1998), 
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possibility, it is important to turn to the theories on civil society vis-a-vis democracy. There 
have been attempts to explain civil society’s functions in promoting democratisation.104 A 
minority opinion in democratic studies has raised scepticisms and levelled criticisms against civil 
society.105 Nevertheless, there is need to take a qualified position that civil society could factor 
in the trajectory of democratisation.
The Church’s engagement with civil society vis-a-vis democratic strengthening can be 
explained initially using the analytical framework offered by Axel Hadenius and Fredrik 
Uggla.106 The authors assign to civil society two functions that potentially impact on political 
democracy: the pluralist and educational functions. The pluralist function refers to ‘the 
distribution of power in society and in political life.’107 This is attained by organising, 
networking, bringing groups together to form a multiplicity and plurality of associations to 
engage the State and society. Michael Foley and Bob Edwards characterise this particular
• 1 Oftfunction as the associational and mobilisational aspects of civil society. Organisations in
themselves making horizontal linkages on the basis of trust do not necessarily secure democracy, 
unless ‘patterns of civility’ (e.g., democratic values) are derived from associating109 and unless 
these organisations are mobilised to democratise the State and society.110
The function of socialisation draws its inspiration from Alexis de Tocqueville, probably 
the first to theorise a direct positive correlation between associational life and democracy.
104 Ibid., Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking civil society: towards democratic consolidation,’; Michael Walzer, ‘The 
Civil society argument,’ in Theorizing citizenship, Ronald Beiner, ed., Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1995), 153-174.
105 Robert Fatton, Jr., ‘Africa in the age o f democratisation: the limitations of civil society,’ African Studies 
Review 38(2), (September 1995), 67-99; Kasfir, Civil society and democracy in Africa....
106 Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Uggla, ‘Making civil society work, democratic development: what can states and 
donors do? World Development 24( 10), (1996), 1621 -1639.
107 Ibid., 1622.
108 Foley and Edwards, ‘The Paradox of civil society,’ 38-52.
109 Ibid., 39.
110 Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement: social movements and contentious politics  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), see also Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative 
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(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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TocqueviUe insists: ‘There are no countries in which (political) associations are more needed to 
prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prince than those which are 
democratically constituted.’111 He notes a thriving democracy in the United States in the 1830s 
thanks to the proliferation of vibrant associations. He argues strongly that ‘In no country in the 
world has the principle of the association been more successfully used or applied to a greater 
multitude of objects than in America.’112 The art o f association which TocqueviUe refers to as 
the ‘mother of action’113 is a deeply ingrained process in America where it is initiated in the 
stage of infancy and reinforced by formal education.114 This notion Unking associational life 
and democracy is given a contemporary articulation in Robert Putnam’s civic community as the 
matrix of democracy budding.115 One key difference between the two, however, is that whUe 
Putnam includes civic community and glosses over poUtical association as the main actor in 
democracy, TocqueviUe links the two, but privUeges the latter more than the former in making 
associational life conducive for democracy.116 Without these poUtical associations, Putnam’s
• • . , , 117civic community can hardly make any lasting political impact.
Another dimension of the pluraUst function is the mobilising character of civU society. 
The social movement theorists provided some theoretical direction about the mobiUsing function 
of civU society. CivU society can exploit poUtical opportunities (factors that encourage 
engagement), mobilising structures (through organisations, formal or informal aUiances) and 
cultural framings (shared meanings and identities) to widen the poUtical participation of
111 De TocqueviUe, Democracy in America, I, 195.
112 Ibid., 191.
113 Ibid., II, 117.
114 Ibid., I, 195.
115 Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, chapter six.
116 De TocqueviUe, Democracy in America, I, 195; II, 115-124.
117 See Joe Foweraker and Todd Landman, Citizenship rights and social movements: a comparative and 
statistical analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 239-241; see also Harriss and de Renzio, ‘An 
Introductory bibliographic essay;’ Putzel, ‘Accounting for the “dark side” o f social capital...’
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citizenry.118 Cultural framings mediate political opportunities and mobilising structures.119 Thus 
collective action becomes ‘a sustained movement,’ but ‘only when consensus is built around 
common meanings and identities.’120 Positive church ad intra and ad extra dynamics bring 
about broader consensus within and among actors. Further, civil society’s capacity to mobilise 
presupposes an independent, strong, and ‘multiplicity of well-developed organisational networks 
in society.’121 This enables civil society to be sensitive to popular demands so that taken as a 
whole, it can strike a good ‘balance between different power centers and interests and 
opinions.’122
Apart from the pluralist function of civil society, Hadenius and Uggla argue for civil 
society’s educational function in the democracy building. By this they mean initiating, 
socialising, and enabling the citizens to pursue democratic practices and operate within political 
regulations demanded of a democratic polity.123 Informed and active citizens are extremely vital 
in any democratic life. They argue: ‘The growth and preservation of democracy depend 
ultimately on the support this form of government has in the hearts and minds of the people.’124 
The formation of an active citizenry, however, is not limited to formal political education of 
citizens. Larry Diamond maintains: ‘There is no better way of developing the values, skills, and 
commitments of democratic citizenship than through direct experience with democracy, no
118 Foley and Edwards, ‘The Paradox o f civil society,’ 39; Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement: social 
movements and contentions politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 2nd edition); Doug 
McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, eds., Comparative perspectives on social movements: political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); see 
also Adam Michnik, The Church and the left, ed. and trans. by David Ost, (Chicago: Univeristy o f Chicago 
Press, 1993).
119 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, ‘Introduction: opportunities, mobilizing structures, 
and framing processes -  toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,’ in Comparative 
perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing, Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.
120 Tarrow, Power in movement...., 201.





matter how imperfect it may be.’125 Civil society, by virtue of its involvement in democratic 
practices, provides a fertile ground for the educational experience of people. Nonetheless, 
Hadenius and Uggla do not specify further what this educational function is and what its 
outcome will be, apart from participating in democratic activities such as public debates and 
voting exercise.126 Although they seem to hint at citizenship education and practice as a way 
forward to enhance democracy, it has not been sufficiently shown how this can be assumed by 
civil society and how this ties in with post-authoritarian democracy.
On this point, it can be proposed that the specificity of the pluralist and education 
functions of civil society as cited by Hadenius and Uggla finds its focus and direction in engaged 
citizenship. These roles are tightly linked with each other, but citizenship is the centrepiece that 
makes effective the twin-function of civil society. The pluralist and educational functions of 
civil society assume their political efficacy insofar they enable people to become active, 
participative, informed, and competent citizens. Post-authoritarian political regimes, more often 
than not, have restored their democratic institutions, imperfect though they may be. The exercise 
of citizenship then becomes a pressing issue in this regard lest such polities may only be rightly 
called ‘democracies without citizenship.’127 Citizens make up a democracy. Social movements 
and civil society organisations as such do not democratise state and society unless the members 
engage themselves in redefining their political identity, make effective demands on the State, 
induce participation from society, and act in accord with their rights and responsibilities, - the 
kernel of citizenship.128 The building of a critical and participative citizenry develops a political 
culture that privileges democratic values, beliefs, sentiments and in turn allows the people to
125 Larry Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 162, italics mine.
126 Hadenius and Uggla, ‘Making civil society work, promoting democratic development...., 1623.
127 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, ‘The Rule of Law and the underprivileged in Latin America: introduction,’ in The 
(Un)Rule o f  Law & the underprivileged in Latin America, Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo 
Sergio Pinheiro, eds., (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1999), 2.
128 Walzer, ‘The Civil Society argument, 171; Foweraker and Landman, Citizenship rights and social 
movements: a comparative and statistical analysis, 239-243.
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become habituated to the democratic ways of proceeding, - an educational function of civil
129society.
The Church’s involvement in citizenship building has thus far not received the attention 
it deserves in the corpus of literature. During the democratic transition, the Church, albeit 
uneven in many areas, has been engaged in citizenship education and practice in view of 
democratisation. Its involvement in human rights advocacies in Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, 
among others;130 its engagement in initiating citizenship of indigenous peoples in Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Guatemala and Mexico,131 its participation in electoral system to clip the powers of 
Pinochet in Chile132 and the Marcos ouster in the Philippines to name a few; mobilisation of the 
citizens to resist political tyrannies and military rule; formation of CEBs to mainstream 
participation —all these demonstrate the Church’s potential role in citizenship building.
There are a few crucial elements (expressed as ‘emphases’ in Chapter One) for a 
functioning democracy in the post-authoritarian period. These elements include: reforming and 
building confidence in electoral politics, mainstreaming interest articulation and representation, 
promoting good governance, defending human rights, instituting the rule of law, and cultivating 
democratic culture. These areas are not only dimensions of democratisation, but they can also be 
sites of potential citizenship building.
The first element concerns the building of confidence in, and reform of, regular 
competitive elections. Electoral contestation as indicated by Schumpter is a necessary condition, 
although by no means sufficient, for democracy to work.133 Voting for public officials rather 
than appointing them distinguishes a democracy from a non-democratic political regime.
129 Linz and Stepan ‘Towards consolidated democracies’; John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and 
democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1992; Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation, 163.
130 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America.
131 Deborah J. Yashar, ‘Contesting citizenship in indigenous movements and democracy in Latin America, 
Comparative Politics 31(1), (October 1998), 23-43.
132 Carl E. Meacham, ‘The Role o f the Chilean Catholic Church in the new Chilean democracy,’ Journal o f  
Church and State 36(2), (Spring 1994), 277-285-289.
133 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy (London: Unwin, 1965), 269.
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Although the act of voting itself does not necessarily lend credibility to democratic institution, 
the Church does and can promote a voting culture compatible with democracy by exhorting 
voters to be informed and to vote wisely; cultivating a patterns of electoral civility; by 
mobilising resources and people to ensure fair, clean, and honest elections; by networking and 
collaborating with various electoral watchdogs; by keeping watch over newly elected public 
officials and so on. In the process, an informed citizenry is being constructed. These activities 
are expressions of Hadenius and Uggla’s pluralist and educational functions of civil society, but 
in this case, the Church with civil society is a key factor. Citizenship, on this note, is not merely 
the responsibility of voting, but a sustained involvement in electoral reforms. This is an antidote 
to the uneven playing field in electoral politics generally found in many developing countries.
By building, restoring and sustaining public confidence in the electoral institution, the Church 
participates in strengthening democracy.
Apart from electoral education and mobilisation, the Church as it interacts with civil 
society, can also provide avenues for interest articulation and representation for the building of 
post-authoritarian democracy.134 This makes the church-civil society nexus a ‘transmission-belt 
between state and society.’135 The presence of this intermediary structure may induce 
participation of marginalised groups. The formation of interest groups, constituencies of 
pressing issues such as environment, gender, and peace, is one such expression of this assembly 
of informed citizens. This very likely creates a venue for denizens to assert their citizenship, one 
that is participative, enabling, politically informed, responsive and competent in accordance with 
their rights, duties and obligations.
Good governance is another important element in democratisation since it aims at 
transparency and accountability of public officials who exercise power and influence over
134 Diamond, ‘Rethinking civil society..., 8.
135 White, ‘Civil society, democratisation and development (I)....,384.
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political institutions and the public. Corruption reduces public confidence not only in 
government officials but also in the institutions that make democracy possible.136 Good 
governance happens when the citizens and institutions are committed to the values of public 
honesty, integrity, and social responsibility. The Church with its experience of democratic 
transition can likewise potentially act with civil society as a vigilant group mobilising its 
citizenry, promoting good governance and strengthening political institutions.
Another important dimension of democracy is the promotion and defence of human 
rights.137 Human rights advocacy attempts to restore the primacy of law in the democratic legal 
framework, although in some cases (e.g., death penalty) it challenges existing laws to expand 
and safeguard fundamental rights. Laws within the constitutional framework need to be 
constantly reviewed to enhance democratic performance. An engaged citizenry can serve as a 
pressure group in asserting the primacy of law when it is favourable to democratisation, but it 
can equally challenge the law when basic rights are not upheld. The Church in many cases is 
known to have supported human rights issues during the democratic transition.138 Many cases of 
human rights violation have been attributed to the politicised military and the establishment, but 
post-authoritarian democracy cannot exclude any perpetrator of abuses, since the law of a 
democratic polity must have universal application. This then leads to the importance of laws in 
democratisation.
The primacy of law over lawlessness, corruption and clientelism can enable democracy 
to work. In this way, the State and non-state actors are not above the legal framework.139 The 
law as enshrined in a democratic constitution facilitates the transition from clientelism to a new
136 Mark Robinson, ed., Corruption and development (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers,
1998).
137 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Polyarchies and the (un)rule o f Latin America: a partial conclusion,’ in The (un)rule 
o f  law & the underprivileged in Latin America Juan E. Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell and Paulo Sergio 
Pinheiro, eds., (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame), 303-337; Jelin and Hershberg, eds., 
Constructing democracy: human rights, citizenship, and society in Latin America.
138 Cleary, The Struggle fo r  human rights in Latin America.
139 O’Donnell, ‘Polyarchies and the (un)rule of Latin America: a partial conclusion,...’; Linz and Stepan,
‘Towards consolidated democracies,’ 18-20.
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sense of citizenship. Defending a democratic constitution from arbitrary amendments that serve 
the interests of the ruling elite or purging an existing constitution of its undemocratic tendencies 
as in the case of the Church’s intervention in Chile,140 enhances the primacy of the law, and by 
extension the quality of democracy. By mobilising the people to defend their democratic 
constitution or pressuring the State to reform the constitution along democratic principles, the 
role of an informed citizenry becomes crucial.
Finally the promotion of a democratic culture is another potential locus of the Church’s 
involvement in post-authoritarian setting. Democratic values such as social participation, 
political inclusion; attitudinal preference for democracy rather than authoritarianism; habituation 
to the democratic rules all form part of democratic culture and represent the ‘patterns of civility’ 
that can strengthen the citizenry.141 The Church, by virtue of its relatively high moral 
confidence, can potentially facilitate and aid the cultivation of a political culture and citizenship, 
one that creates good prospects for democracy building in the long run.142
2.5 Possibilities and limits of the framework
To summarise, the theoretical framework in this study seeks to explain in part, without 
concealing its deficiencies, how the Church can play its role in democratisation. A little diagram 
(see Figure 3) may illustrate the main points of the theoretical framework.
Figure 3: The Church, civil society and citizenship in post-authoritarian democracy: 
a theoretical framework
4  electoral politics
interest articulation/representation 
4  good governance 
4  human rights 
4  primacy of law 
4  democratic culture
140 Meacham, ‘The Role of the Chilean Church in the new Chilean democracy.’
141 Foley and Edwards, ‘The Paradox of civil society,’ 39.
142 Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation, Chapter V.
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A few variables have been noted as crucial. First, the internal organisational dynamics (Church 
ad intra) defines the interaction among leaders, between them and their members. This enhances 
the Church’s capacity to socialise and mobilise society for an engagement with the State and 
society. Second, the Church’s interaction (through animation, mobilisation and creative 
partnership) with civil society organisations (Church ad extra) enables both to share and 
collaborate their functions (pluralist and educational roles in citizenship) vis-a-vis democratic 
building. The interaction between the two actors is particularly crucial in the Philippine setting 
where both parties are vital in any democratic impulse or enterprise. Third, engagement in 
citizenship appears to be a unifying theme that directs the pluralist and educational functions.
The dimensions of democracy building are likewise locations of the Church’s involvement in 
citizenship formation: reforming and restoring confidence in electoral politics, institutionalising 
interest articulation and representation, promoting good governance, human rights advocacy, 
primacy of law, and enhancing a democratic culture.
There are positive aspects of the theoretical construct proposed. The first positive note is 
its holistic yet disparate view of the Church as opposed to the notion of the Church as either a 
monolithic or a fragmented actor. A realistic and critical view of the Church as proposed in the 
foregoing sees the complexity of the Church’s structure as distinct from the uncritical optimism 
or thoroughgoing pessimism of many writers. A second positive development in the proposed 
framework is that it encompasses the church-civil society interaction which is another way of 
looking at the Church’s role in democracy other than the often used church-state relations.
Direct church-state interaction still figures in the theoretical design, but it is not the main frame 
of reference. By using this horizontal linkage of the Church, one can examine its engagement in 
and with civil society seen not only in terms of the democratisation of the State, but also of 
society. This church-civil society partnership in view of democratisation contains pluralist and 
educational functions of civil society, both of which are concerned with citizenship building. A
third advantage of the framework is its exploration on citizenship as a window on strengthening 
democratisation, a relatively new field of interest, for the Church and also for civil society.
One obvious limitation of the framework is its predilection for an actor-oriented approach 
in explaining the process of democratic building. The structural determinants such as economic, 
cultural, and political systems; the role of the State, global international support, and other 
exogenous factors, while no doubt crucial in democratisation, do not figure centrally in the 
theoretical design. The omission is deliberate for the purposes of this study and in no way 
suggests their lack of importance. Indeed the combination of both actor-oriented and structural 
approaches makes a better case in explaining democratisation.143
Second, linking church and democracy in the post-authoritarian setting remains a huge 
minefield in democratic and development studies. The framework attempts to cast a glimpse at a 
tiny but central problematic in democratic discourse. For instance, the Philippine Church is a lot 
more complex than the cases can hope to argue. Likewise, Philippine democracy, known to be a 
problem child in the literature of democratisation,144 is another area o f complexity. Thus the 
Philippine case needs to be subjected to a comparative analysis to see the points of convergence 
and divergence with the other cases. This inchoate framework therefore invites more critical 
investigation on the Church’s role in post-authoritarian democracy building.
Finally, by way of a caveat, by examining the contributions of the Philippine Church in 
democratisation, there is no attempt to conceal its undemocratic impulses or interventions. As 
indicated in this study, the Church has its own fair share of limitations as a democratic actor. 
Democracy too offers possibilities, but it has its own inherent constraints.
143 Scott Mainwaring, ‘Democratic survivability in Latin America,’ in Democracy and its limits: lessons from  
Asia, Latin America, and the M iddle East Howard Handleman and Mark Tessler, eds. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1999, 60.
144 Mark R. Thompson, ‘Off the endangered list: Philippine democratisation in comparative perspective,’ 
Comparative Politics 28(2), (1996), 180.
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Chapter Three 
The Philippine Catholic Church under the authoritarian period: 
an actor in initiating democracy or acted upon by political exigencies?
‘The third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave.’
—Samuel Huntington1
The next two chapters seek to locate the Philippine Catholic Church during and after the 
authoritarian period. Although there have been attempts to situate the Philippine Church after 
Vatican II particularly during the authoritarian period, there is little, if any, explicit consideration 
of its role in citizenship formation as a pathway to the restoration of democracy in 1986 and 
beyond. James Kroeger2 and Pasquale T. Giordano3 using theological lenses analyse the 
development of Vatican II’s influence on the life of the Philippine Church especially its 
involvement in the public domain. While succeeding to explain how the Vatican II reforms 
influenced the Church’s social mission, neither linked explicitly its reforms with democracy nor 
examined the political processes and outcomes arising from the Church’s involvement. Thus its 
explicit connection with democracy building remains largely unattended. Other accounts do not 
deal explicitly with the Church as a democratic actor. Warren Kinne’s treatment of the 
Mindanao and Sulu Church provides an analysis of the internal conflict within MSPC (the MSPC 
bishops vs. the lay secretariat), - indeed a case of church ad intra breakdown.4 Dennis 
Shoesmith notes the cleavages existing within the Catholic Church and how these factored in its 
response against the authoritarian regime of President Marcos.5 Robert Youngblood’s exposition
1 Huntington, The Third wave..., 76.
2 James Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization: a 
Philippine experience and perspective since Vatican I I -  1965-1984 ( Roma: Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, 
1985).
3 Pasquale T. Giordano, Awakening to mission: the Philippine Catholic Church 1965-1981 (Quezon City: New 
Day Publishers, 1988).
4 Warren Kinne, The Splintered staff: structural deadlock in the Mindanao Church (Quezon City: Claretian 
Publications, 1990); a similar analysis is offered by Karl Gaspar, Readings: on contemporary Mindanao Church 
realities (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1994).
5 Dennis Shoesmith, ‘The Church,’ in The Philippines after Marcos, eds. R. J. May and Francisco 
Nemenzo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1985), 70-89; Dennis Shoesmith, ‘Church and Martial 
Law in the Philippines: the continuing debate,’ Southeast Asian Affairs (1979), 246-257.
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• f\  1is an important account of the Church’s opposition to the Marcos regime. John J. Carroll 
extends Youngblood’s period of analysis to the post-authoritarian period. These writers typically 
look at church-state relations and the socio-political involvement of the Church in the macro 
domain. They are quite aware of the intra church dynamics (e.g., progressives, moderates and 
conservatives; hierarchy-laity), but church-civil society nexus and engaged citizenship do not 
occupy a central place in their treatment.
Following Giordano and Kroeger, it is argued that the Church was not simply against the 
Marcos dictatorship. Rather, it was indeed an actor in democratisation with its own agenda that is 
to say, citizenship advocacy as informed by Vatican II, Papal social teaching, and by the 
historical context of that time. It is further argued that the church’s ad intra (hierarchy-laity 
interaction) and ad extra (church-civil society interaction) dimensions were inchoately at work 
during the authoritarian period. Church ad intra increased lay participation and broadened 
consensus building within the Church. Church ad extra widened the zone of political 
engagement and enabled the Church along with civil society actors to democratise the State and 
society. Internal division within the hierarchical leadership during martial law emasculated 
hierarchy-laity interaction and the Church’s engagement with civil society organisations. The 
consolidation of church positions towards the end of the authoritarian regime was a result of 
healthy hierarchy-laity relationship and church-civil society linkage that saw action in 1983 
leading to the 1986 February Revolution. The Church contributed to the inauguration of 
democracy by instilling a quality citizenship that confronted the authoritarian regime.
This chapter outlines the trajectory of the Church’s religio-political role vis-a-vis 
democratisation of the State and society during the period of dictatorship. It has three main 
parts. The first looks broadly at the gradual renewal of the Church’s mission and religious 
identity on the bases of the Papal social encyclicals and Vatican II. The second considers the
6 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church....
7 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?...
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vital church actors in the democratisation of Philippine State and society. The third examines the 
roles of church actors that initiated the democratic impulse.
3.1 Catholicism in the Philippines: then and now
Catholicism in the Philippines, as in Latin America, is deeply rooted in colonial history.
Although Islam came first, the Catholic faith spread rapidly after it was initially introduced in the 
16th century by the Spanish conquistadores and religious leaders. Under the Patronato Real de 
las Indias system the Church and State jointly engaged in the evangelisation of the colonies 
under the Spanish monarch.8 The royal patronage (patronato real) meant that the State supported 
the missionaries, brought them to the Philippines, and provided them with material and financial 
backing to undertake the mission.9 In return the Spanish Crown provided the Holy See with a 
list from which it could choose colonial bishops. Priests appointed by them must be approved by 
a colonial governor or viceroy. Further, the Spanish Crown examined and approved all 
ecclesiastical communication to the colonies, and asked clergy to undertake civil functions.10 
Thus Catholicism became the official religion of the establishment. This enabled the Holy See to 
recognise the claim of the Spanish monarchy to its colonies.11 In return for this recognition, the 
monarchy promoted and defended the Catholic faith in its colony. This led to the fusion of 
church and state powers for centuries, although in some instances the Church challenged state 
hegemony.
In 1902, the Iglesia Filipina Independiente [IFI or Philippine Independent Church (PIC)], 
headed by Archbishop Gregorio Aglipay, broke ranks with the Catholic Church and attracted 
possibly a fourth of the Catholic population.12 Protestantism made critical advances when the
8 Horacio de la Costa, ‘The Priest in Philippine life and society: an historical view,’ In ‘The Filipino clergy: 
historical studies and future perspectives,’ ed. C. G. Arevalo, Loyola Papers 12, (Quezon City: Cardinal Bea 
Institute for Ecumenical Studies, 1980), 7. In English, the term means ‘Royal Patronage of the Indies.’
9 Ibid., 708.
10 Ibid.
11 Pasquale T. Giordano, Awakening to mission: the Philippine Catholic Church 1965-1981 (Quezon City: New 
Day Publishers, 1988), 8.
12 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 109.
59
Americans took over the Philippines as the new colonial rulers towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. The proliferation of the Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ, INC) and more recently the 
fundamentalist and evangelical communities has posed a challenge to the dominance of 
Catholicism and mainline Protestantism (e.g., National Council of Churches in the Philippines) 
in the country (see Chapter Four).13 The upsurge of fundamentalist and evangelical churches is a 
global phenomenon, and one that affected the momentum of democratic currents in Latin 
America14 and various parts of Africa.15 Still, the Catholics remain the vast majority of the 
population (see further below).
3.1.1 Sources of church renewal: Papal social teaching, Vatican II interacting with 
historical realities
Contrary to the commonly received knowledge that the Philippine Church only began to become 
socially aware and responsive after Vatican II, in the 1930s church initiatives were underway to 
tackle social questions.16 Propelled by the papal social encyclicals Rerum Novarum in 1891 and 
Quadragesimo Anno (‘On Reconstruction of the Social Order’) in 1931, the Social Justice 
Crusade, pioneered by American Jesuits, campaigned to address social issues particularly 
regarding land redistribution.17 These Papal social encyclicals interacted with the burning social 
questions (e.g., Huk rebellion, agrarian issues, socio-economic inequalities) of Philippine society 
at that time. Although their impact was fragmented, they succeeded in implanting the idea that 
the Church had a social message.18
13 Margot Cohen, ‘Catholics and fundamentalists fight for the faithful: an unholy row,’ Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 27 April 1989, 43 & 45. See also Grace Gorospe-Jamon, ‘The El Shaddai Prayer movement: political 
socialisation in a religious context,’ Philippine Political Science Journal 20(43), (1999), 83-126.
14 Brian H. Smith, Religious politics in Latin America: Pentecostal vs. Catholic (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University o f Notre Dame Press, 1998).
15 Paul Gifford, African Christianity: its public role (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1998).
16 Wilfredo Fabros, The Church and its social involvement in the Philippines, 1930-1972, (Quezon City: Ateneo 
de Manila University Press, 1988).
17 Ibid., Chapter 1. Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum Novarum (literally meaning ‘Of new things’) in 1891 while 
Pope Pius XI penned Quadragesimo Anno (literally means ‘In the fortieth year’) in 1931.
18 Ibid., 167.
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The post-war period saw the establishment of the Institute of Social Order (ISO) in 1947 
led by Jesuit priest Walter Hogan. He and Johnny Tan formed the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW) in 1950.19 In 1953, the Jesuits working in ISO assisted the formation of the Federation of
0Ci
Free Farmers (FFF) founded by Attorney Jeremias Montemayor and Fernando Esguerra. These 
two unions drew immense inspiration from the teaching of Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo 
Anno.2] FFW became an alternative union which was not aligned with company unions nor
99those affiliated with the communist-led Congress of Labour Organisations (CLO). FFF 
similarly was concerned with the moral and socio-economic welfare of the farmers and the plight 
of the nation, but over time it would become highly politicised before its cooption by the Marcos 
government. In both Catholic-inspired organisations, Catholic lay leaders and some members of 
the clergy were involved principally in the moral formation and socio-economic upliftment of 
labourers and peasants.
The Church hierarchy’s support for FFW and FFF was, however, ambivalent particularly 
when the issue affected its own interests or those of the elite. Despite FFW’s rootedness in the 
Papal social teaching, the financial and other kinds of assistance from some bishops, and the 
verbal support of the rights of workers given by Archbishop Rufino J. Santos, Archbishop of 
Manila, when the same Catholic principles were applied to church establishments, opposition 
from him and elements of the Philippine Church hierarchy was swift and firm. This was the case 
in the labour row at the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), the oldest Catholic university in the 
country run by the Dominicans, and the labour issues in La Loma Catholic cemetery in 1956.23 
The UST union, affiliated with FFW, staged a strike after the labour-management final
19 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization . .., 167.
20 Ibid., 122-123.
21 Fabros, The Church and its social involvement in the Philippines, 44-50.
22 Ibid., 37.
23 Armando de Jesus, ‘The Archdiocese of Manila: 1945-1995,’ in The Archdiocese o f  Manila: a pilgrimage in 
time (1565-1999), ed. Crisostomo A. Yalung, DD, Vol. 2 (Manila: The Roman Catholic Archbishop o f Manila,
1999), 367.
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negotiation failed. Archbishop Santos then moved to forbid Fr. Hogan to write or speak in 
public regarding social issues in his archdiocese.24 The Philippine bishops supported by the 
Papal Nuncio Archbishop Egidio Vagnozzi and Catholic Action of the Philippines (CAP), led by
25lay people, condemned the strike. This caused resentment for some time from the labour sector.
The hierarchy’s disengagement from FFW was also evident in FFF. The former led the 
‘go-home strike’ of the sacadas (transient sugarcane workers from Antique) in 1959 to protest 
labour conditions in Negros Island.26 Sadly, despite the hierarchy’s official endorsement of 
FFF’s goals, the Church’s support for the FFF-sponsored strike was nil.
FFW and FFF became independent of any linkage with the Church over the long haul. 
Following the UST strike, the Philippine hierarchy turned inward with hardly any statement 
regarding socio-economic involvement.27 Regrettably, FFF’s leadership would eventually 
support the government vision of the New Society during the martial law period.28 Nevertheless, 
like many Latin American Churches, the Philippine Church’s involvement in public affairs took 
a decisive turn in the wake of Vatican II (see previous chapter). The transformation that 
occurred within the Philippine Church was more or less pari passu with the global trend. 
Although it had its peculiar brand of reformation, it was infused subsequently with some 
elements of Latin American liberation theology, the Filipinisation movement within the Church, 
and deteriorating socio-political and economic realities.
In a pastoral letter issued on January 13, 1967, the Bishops’ Conference (CBCP) desired 
to sponsor the National Congress for Rural Development (or National Rural Congress) ‘to 
awaken everyone in the country to the crying needs of the rural population.’29 The National
24 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 12.
25 Fabros, The Church and its social involvement in the Philippines, 67-70.
26 Ibid., 77.
27 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization ..., 125.
28 Fabros, The Church and its social involvement in the Philippines, 45 & 77.
29 ‘Joint pastoral letter of the Philippine Hierarchy on social action and rural development,’ available from 
http://www.cbcponline.org/documents/1960s/1967-rural development.html. 21 February 2003.
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Rural Congress, inspired by the Papal social encyclical Populorum Progressio (‘On the 
development of peoples’), was conducted in Cagayan de Oro City in February 1967 and in 
Bacolod City in September 1967.30 Claver notes that this ‘was a turning point of crucial 
importance to the Church of the Philippines.’31 Bacolod and Malaybalay dioceses refer to the 
National Rural Congress as a major point of departure in the rise of the local Church’s social 
development programmes (see Chapters Five and Six).
Changes within the Church’s pastoral programmes and activities manifestly drew out 
more explicit lay participation in the Church and greater involvement in the public sphere. The 
Synod of Bishops in 1971, declared that the new equation of the Church’s mission makes the 
promotion of social justice and social transformation inevitable consequences in one’s practice of 
faith.32 In this way, there is an inseparable connection between one’s faith and the task of 
liberating the human race from all shackles of oppression such as those inherent in non- 
democratic and authoritarian regimes. Indeed the practice o f faith must address issues that 
militate against social justice, civil liberties, human development and, by extension, democracy. 
Some noticeable outcomes arising from the renewal set out by Vatican II included liturgical 
reforms, the rise of social action programmes, the church leadership’s insertion into the lives of 
the poor, and the burgeoning of lay organisations and movements particularly the BCCs. These 
changes within the Church, however, were not uniform since internal contradictions of its 
teaching and practice affected the outcome of its interventions (see also Chapter Four).
In sum, notwithstanding the internal conflicts within the Church, there were initiatives to 
reform the Philippine Church and make it more responsive to the demands of the times, 
beginning with programmes in the 1930s. These programmes were grounded in early papal
j0 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 139.
31 Claver, ‘A history o f BCCs: the Philippines.’ In Church o f  the people: the Basic Christian Community 
experience in the Philippines, Gabino A. Mendoza et a l ,  eds. (Manila: Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference for 
Human Development, 1988), 19.
32 Flannery, Vatican Council II..., 903.
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social teaching and subsequently in Vatican II and post-conciliar documents.33 These reforms, 
aligned along the lines of key theological and ecclesiological principles, demonstrate that the 
Church was not simply reacting to the historical conditions of the time. The Church became a 
protagonist by projecting its own programme and agenda which were embedded in what it 
thought would be pertinent Christian principles given the historical context. The Church was not 
simply shaped by the situation, but was an actor in its own right in Philippine society.
3.1.2 Extent of Catholicism
Catholicism in the Philippines is exceptional in Asia. Until the independence of East Timor, the 
Philippines for centuries remained the only Catholic nation in the continent. Only two percent of 
Asia’s population are Christians, nearly half of whom are in the Philippines.34 In the Philippines, 
the percentage of Catholics relative to the total population ranged from 82% to 84% in the years 
from 1985 to 1995.35 The other religious groups include the Protestants (5%), Muslims (4%), 
PIC (2.6%), and INC (2.5%).36 In 1985, the nominal count of Catholics was 45,455,421; in 
1988, 47,752,369; in 1992, 53,062,612 and in 1995, 57,027,474.37 This makes the Philippines the 
third largest national Church in the world after Brazil and Mexico.38 The church leaders’ 
influence on their members is another story altogether. This can be gleaned from the rate of 
participation of its members. A preparatory document of the Second Plenary Council of the 
Philippines (PCP II) notes that only 20% of the Catholic population are catechised, 10% are 
regular churchgoers and recipients of the sacraments while a mere ‘2% belong to Church-related
33 Post-conciliar documents consist of ecclesial pronouncements after Vatican II.
34 James Kroeger, Church Truly Alive: journey to the Filipino Revolution, (Davao City: Mission Studies 
Institute, 1988), 9.
35 CBCP Research Office, 1985 to 1995 Statistical profile o f  the Catholic Church in the Philippines (Manila: 
CBCP, 1997), 17.
36 Richard Ulack, ‘Republic of the Philippines,’ available from http://www.wrad.org/philippines- 
bio.htm. 10 March 2003.
37 Ibid., 13.
38 Kroeger, Church Truly Alive: journey to the Filipino Revolution, 9.
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affairs.’39 Thus the document concludes: some 88% of the Catholics are ‘unchurched, 
uninvolved, and untouched by the parish.’40
Nevertheless, the Church is not only made up of individual members. It has multiple 
establishments, organisations and agencies. In 1995, the Philippine Church had a total of 80 
ecclesiastical jurisdictions with ‘16 archdioceses, 50 dioceses, 7 apostolic vicariates and 6 
prelatures’ and one Military Ordinariate.41 Catholic schools (primary, secondary and tertiary 
education) in the Philippines registered a total of 2,069 in 1995 involving a total of 1,628,213 
registered students.42 The number of parishes posted a significant gain from 1,971 to 2,345 
parishes or 18.98% rise in the years from 1988 to 1992.43 This is understandable considering the 
11 % rise of the Catholic population during the period, high ratio of ‘priest-to-Catholic- 
population’ in many dioceses, and increasing numbers of diocesan and religious priests, although 
not all are based in parishes.44 In 1995, the number of parishes slightly went up to 2,408 which 
is a 2.69% increase.45 To be sure, the increase of parishes did not necessarily mean that the 
Catholic population was proportionately rising with the general population. From a Catholic 
population of 83% in 1988, it slowed down to 82% in 1992.46
3.2 Actors within the Church and their roles during the authoritarian period
This section cites the key actors within the Church and in Philippine society during the 
authoritarian period. Further, it identifies broadly the prominent roles they assumed in bringing
39Amado L. Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines: an ecclesiologicalperspective. Roma: 
Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, Facultas Theologiae, 1995, 57. The International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP) in 1991 claims that 48% o f the Filipinos attend religious services and participate in church affairs and 
organisations. See Mahar Mangahas and Linda Luz Guerrero, ‘Religion in the Philppines: the 1991 ISSP 
Survey, SWS Occasional Paper (May 1992), 4. The figure seems too big on the strength of empirical evidence. 
See interview with Francisco F. Claver, Former NASS A National Director and former Bishop o f Malaybalay 
Diocese, 13 January 2001, Quezon City.
40 Cited in Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines...., 57.
41 CBCP Research Office, 1985 to 1995 Statistical profile o f  the Catholic Church in the Philippines, 2.
42 Ibid., 39.
43 Ibid., 25.




about the inauguration of democracy in Philippine society. They continue to play crucial roles 
beyond the authoritarian period affecting not only the national scenario but also the local 
Churches like the Diocese of Bacolod and the Diocese of Malaybalay. These actors included the 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), the most influential Catholic 
organisation; its social arm, the National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace 
(NASS A); the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), the leaders 
of religious congregations and orders; the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference (MSPC), a 
regional grouping of Churches in Mindanao and Sulu; the competing ideological groups within 
the Church; and individual church leaders.
3.2.1 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
CBCP started as the Catholic Welfare Organisation (CWO) in 1945.47 In 1968, CWO was 
renamed CBCP as the official body of the Philippine hierarchy, headed by one of its member 
bishops.48 CBCP was and still is the foremost church organisation which has tremendous 
influence in the trajectory of the national church’s involvement in Philippine politics. In 1997, 
there were 93 active members covering some 80 ecclesiastical jurisdiction.49 The CBCP 
periodically issues pastoral letters and statements responding to key issues pertaining to faith and 
morals, and those affecting the lives not only of its faithful but also the whole citizenry. It 
established linkages with the various sectors of society and national religious organisations 
which shared their interests in addressing issues concerning participation of marginalised groups, 
peace building, social development, and interreligious dialogue. Bishops-Businessmen 
Conference (BBC), CBCP-NCCP (National Council of Churches in the Philippines) Joint Peace
47 Ruperto C. Santos, ‘A Short history of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, 1945-1995,’ 
Philippiniana Sacra, no. 96 (September-December 1997), 395.
48 Ibid., 424.
49 ‘A History of the CBCP,’ available from httD://www.rc.net/philippines/cbcp/cbcDhist.htm. 15 November 
2002. For an excellent analysis of political inclinations of CBCP bishops in the 1970s, see Robert Youngblood, 
‘Structural imperialism: an analysis of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,’ Comparative 
Political Studies 15(1), (April 1982), 29-56.
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Committee, Bishops-Ulama (Muslim religious leaders) Forum (BUF) are a few partnerships that 
were set up for these purposes.
3.2.2 National Secretariat for Social Action -  Justice and Peace (NASSA)
CBCP established its own social arm as its implementing agency: the National Secretariat for 
Social Action which later became known as NASSA. NASSA was created in 1966 after the 
delegates of the Priests’ Institute of Social Action (PISA) in 1965 in Hong Kong proposed to the 
bishops the creation of an episcopal commission and a secretariat on social action.50 NASSA 
along with PISA pushed for the appointment of a social action director in each diocese to 
supervise and coordinate social action programmes.51 NASSA in turn provided a support system 
to the different social action centres of the local Churches. Sub-national social action structures 
subsequently emerged for some time. These were known as the Luzon Secretariat for Social 
Action (LUSSA), the Visayas Secretariat for Social Action (VISSA), both created in 1974, and 
the Mindanao-Sulu Secretariat for Social Action (MISSSA) which started much earlier in 1968.
NASSA was reorganised in 1987 when Jesuit bishop Francisco F. Claver took over as its 
national director amid reports that it was re-channelling funds to the underground movement and 
being infiltrated by elements in the Left. This was an unfortunate episode which betrayed an 
acute hierarchy-lay chasm. Although the bishops never cast judgment regarding the reports, they 
took preventive measures making the reoccurrence of such a charge unlikely.53
NASSA is more than just a secretariat since it was registered in Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a non-profit organisation in the post-authoritarian period. NASSA was 
one of the major convenors in the formation of the Caucus of Development NGO Networks
50 NASSA News, ‘Social Action Centers in the Philippines helping the poor become more human,’ XXIH(3), 
(May-June 1991), 6.
51 Luis B. Gorgonio, ’30 years on the job: NASSA has made a difference,’ NASSA News XXIV(l), (January- 
February 1996), 4.
52 Ralph Salazar and Sophie Bodegon, ‘Subsidiarity and participation: the regional secretariats,’ in O f joys and 
hopes, o f  griefs and anxieties: fifteen years o f  NASSA, 1966-1981 (Manila: NASSA, n.d.), 67.
53 Francisco F. Claver, ‘Some clarification on NASSA,’ n.d.
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(CODE-NGO) in 1988, the largest coalition of NGO networks in the Philippines.54 In times of 
issue advocacy of national scale, NASSA, with the approval of the local bishops, linked up and 
mobilised the different social action centres of the dioceses nationwide.
3.2.3 Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP)
The AMRSP is a joint association of two groups: the Association of Major Religious Superiors 
of Men in the Philippines (AMRSMP) and the Association of Major Religious Superiors of 
Women in the Philippines (AMRSWP) which were created in 1955 and 1957 respectively.55 
Some 200 female and 60 male religious congregations and orders of uneven sizes compose the 
AMRSP.56 At the outset of the authoritarian period, the AMRSP leadership, pursued a more 
activist stance with regard to martial law than the generally cautious CBCP. Official positions 
as regards pressing political and social issues coming from both parties were sometimes causing 
tensions between the two.
The AMRSP not only made statements on major issues. It initiated programmes and 
organisations. In 1969, the AMRSP established the Rural Missionaries (RM). In the 1974 Joint 
convention of AMRSP, commissions were created that included the Task Force Detainees 
(TFD), a well-known human rights group.58 Other commissions included the Task Force Data 
Gathering (TFDG), Task Force on Urban Conscientisation (TFUC), Task Force for the 
Orientation of Church Personnel (TFOCP) and Committee on Education or later known as 
Education Forum.59 In 1977, the Urban Missionaries (UM) was created to address issues of the 
labour sector. The presence and involvement of hundreds of foreign missionaries who were
54 Antonio F. Moreno, ‘The Politics and participation o f NGOs in Philippine democratic consolidation: evidence 
from the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO),’ M. Phil. Thesis, University o f Sussex, 
Brighton, United Kingdom, 31 August 1999, 39-41.
35 Cres Lucero, ‘Brief history of the Association o f Major Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP),’ in AMRSP 
25th Year Souvenir Book, eds., Pedro Arquilla et al., 1996.
56 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines: an ecclesiological perspective, 62.
57 Shoesmith, ‘The Church,’ 74.
58 Lucero, ‘Brief history of the Association o f Major Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP).’
59 Ibid.
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members of different religious orders and congregations made it possible for them to draw on 
international advocacy support, media exposure abroad, and even financial backing for their own 
local projects.60 Even before martial law was declared, many religious (priests, brothers and 
sisters) were already socially and politically involved in the organisation of labourers, farmers, 
urban poor and other marginalised sectors of Philippine society. The first religious priests to be 
arrested in 1972, after the declaration of martial law were Fr. Daniel Mac Laughlin MM 
(Maryknoll Missionaries), Fr. Vincent Cullen SJ (Society of Jesus), Fr. Comelio Lagerway MSC 
(Missionary of the Sacred Heart), Fr. John Peterson OFM (Order of Friars Minor), and Fr. Bruno 
Hicks OFM.61
3.2.4 Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference (MSPC)
The MSPC was formed in 1971 to respond to the concerns and issues common to the Churches 
in Mindanao and Sulu, the youngest of all the regional Churches. The Diocese of Malaybalay 
was and still is a crucial member of this conference. Of particular concern in the MSPC were 
Muslim-Christian dialogue, the tribal (indigenous peoples) apostolate and BECs.62 A board and a 
secretariat were created to implement the directives set out by the conference in between 
triennial meetings. The MSPC was not only the first to introduce BCCs in the Philippines. It was 
also instrumental in the proliferation of BECs putting Mindanao way ahead in the BCC/BEC 
movement compared with its regional counterparts in Visayas and Luzon.63
In 1976, five conservative bishops wrote a letter dissociating themselves from the MSPC 
as suspicions were rife that it was infiltrated and influenced by the underground Left. There 
were attempts to save the conference, but the tension took a serious turn in the 1980s. Issues 
ranging from one’s understanding of ecclesiology, organisational set-up and ideological alliances
60 Shoesmith, ‘The Church,’ 74.
61 Lucero, ‘Brief history of the Association of Major Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP).’
62 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines: an ecclesiological perspective, 64.
63 Ibid., 86; Gaspar, Readings....
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prompted the bishops to dissociate themselves from the MSPC board and the secretariat in 
1982.64 The bishops felt that the MSPC secretariat and the board were pushing their own 
people’s church ecclesiology, and increasingly becoming autonomous and politicised by the 
Left.65 On the other hand, the board and the secretariat charged that the bishops were 
uncomfortable with greater lay participation and autonomy over which they had very little 
control.66 In 1983, two MSPCs were convened: one by the bishops and the other by the board 
and the secretariat. The MSPC board decided to rename the body to Mindanao Interfaith 
People’s Conference (MIPC) whereas the bishops retained the name MSPC which continued to 
have triennial meetings. The withdrawal of the more activist elements of the MSPC board and 
secretariat weakened momentarily MSPC’s socio-political involvement. The split indicated a 
sad moment in hierarchy-laity relationship.
3.2.5 Ideological cleavages within the Church
Divisions within the Church were quite pronounced during the martial law years. Depending on 
one’s attitudes with regard to martial law and ecclesiological preferences, bishops could be 
classified as conservative, moderate or progressive.68 In 1979, 46 bishops were classified as 
conservatives, 18 moderates, and 15 progressives.69 The conservatives were generally 
supportive of martial law and hesitant to involve the church in temporal affairs because of its 
religious mission. The moderates were described as critical of government policy that threatened 
the collective interests of the Church but ambivalent with regard to martial law. They were 
influenced by the reforms of Vatican II but cautious about the Church’s political involvement. 
The progressives were critical of martial law and supportive of groups that struggled for political
64 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church..., 91-93. For a more detailed account see also Gaspar,
Readings....; Kinne, The Splintered staff. ...
65 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines..., 64.
66 Gaspar, Readings....
67 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines..., 64.
68 Youngblood, ‘Structural imperialism...,’ 35-36.
69 Ibid., 40.
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liberation.70 Political and ecclesiological cleavages in the Church were also visible among 
organised groups and parties. These politically oriented groups were also actors within the 
Church and in the national arena. The groups aligned with the Communist Party of the 
Philippines-National Democratic Front-New People’s Army (CPP-NDF-NPA) were the most 
organised and extensive ideological group that offered a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist framework for 
social transformation.71 NDF was the united front of which the CPP was, and still is, the leading 
element, and the NPA was the armed sector.72 Some priests, religious and lay people actively 
collaborated with the forces of the CPP-NDF-NPA. Cadres and sympathisers of this political 
movement were called ‘natdems’ as they espoused the national democracy programme. Led by 
Christian activists such as Fr. Edificio de la Torre, Fr. Zakarias Agatep and Fr. Luis Jalandoni, 
many priests, nuns and other members of religious congregations joined the Christians for 
National Liberation (CNL), an NDF affiliate.73 CNL became the ‘church sector’ in the 
underground Left which was engaged in the mobilisation of church personnel and resources in 
aid of the armed revolution waged by the revolutionary Left, and in the transformation of 
Churches around national democratic principles.74 David Wurfel estimates that some ‘2 to 3 
percent of priests and nuns were committed to the NDF.’ CNL’s membership surged from 
1,500 before the February 1986 uprising to 4,000 during the Aquino period.76 The crisis in the 
Left in 1990s leading to the conflict between the RJs (rejectionist camp) and the RAs
70 Ibid., 35-36
71 Joel Rocamora, Breaking through: the struggle within the Communist Party o f  the Philippines (Pasig: Anvil 
Publishing Inc., 2001), 20-21.
72 Ibid., Chapter 5.
73 Ibid., 14.
74 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines..., 66.
75 David Wurfel, Filipino politics: development and decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 
1988), 279.
76 Wilffido V. Villacorta, ‘Ideological orientation o f political forces in the Aquino era,’ In Economy and 
politics in the Philippines under Corazon Aquino, ed. Bernhard Dahm (Hamburg: Institut fur Asienkunde; 
1991), 166.
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(reaffirmist camp)77 triggered a split within the revolutionary movement including CNL. As a
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result, CNL split into three factions while other members were demoralised and left.
Other Christian activists while committed to social transformation and justice, advanced 
an alternative ideology built around social democratic principles leading to a democratic socialist 
society. These activists had a party, namely, Partido Demokratikong-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas 
(PDSP, Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines) with a small band of armed cadres called 
Sandigan,79 Proponents of this political group were called ‘socdems’ because of their adherence 
to social democracy. The socdems, although initially open to an armed component in their 
struggle, relinquished the means and adopted a militant but non-violent approach to political and 
social change.80 They were much smaller and less organised compared with the natdems. They 
were vigorously anti-communist, but committed to social justice and political transformation. 
They saw themselves as an alternative force that tried to parallel the CPP-NDF-NPA. Like the 
natdems, they splintered into factions after the fall o f Marcos. In the post-authoritarian period, 
the Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas (Collective for a Socialist Philippines) emerged as 
a significant force within the democratic socialist formation.
Contestations between the natdems and socdems were evident not only in politicised
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secular groups but also in the formation of church organisations. Sympathisers or members in 
both camps came from various segments of the Church: lay leaders, seminarians, religious nuns 
and priests, and bishops. Both groups subtly vied in occupying key establishments and positions
77 The rejectionists (RJs) opposed the tenets o f the CPP (particularly on the means o f the revolutionary struggle) 
as espoused by Jose Maria Sison while the reaffirmists (RAs) basically adhered to his line o f thought. Factions 
within the NDF likewise emerged leading other NDF affiliates to break away from the movement. See 
Rocamora Breaking through: the struggle within the Communist Party o f  the Philippines’, Patricio N. Abinales, 
ed. The Revolution falters: the Left in Philippine politics after 1986. (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia 
Program, Cornell University, 1996.
78 Rocamora, Breaking through. .., Chapter 3.
79 Mark Richard Thompson, ‘Searching for a strategy: the traditional opposition to Marcos and the transition to 
democracy in the Philippines,’ Vols. I & II, Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1991, 231-234.
80 Wurfel, Filipino po litics ...., 217-218.
81 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church..., 81-83; Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the 
Philippines..., 65-67.
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of influence within the Church. Both competed in recruiting members and sympathisers within 
the Church. Both groups, however, were not monolithic and had internal rifts within their ranks 
which eventually caused splits in both camps. The influence and struggle of both ideological 
groups are reflected in the narratives of the Diocese of Bacolod and Diocese of Malaybalay.
The natdems and the socdems were not the only ideological groups within the Church. 
But compared with the ring-of-centre liberal democrats, independent liberals and other right- 
wing groups (e.g., the Opus Dei), they had a more rigorous social analysis of the NSS ideology, 
more politicised programme of action, and more organised participation from the grassroots. 
These ideological groups engaged, critically or collaboratively, with church actors, agencies and 
leadership in addressing issues concerning democratisation. These church actors (the CBCP, 
NASSA, AMRSP, MSPC) along with individual church leaders have influenced the Philippine 
Catholic Church in the critical moments of democratisation.
3.2.6 Key Church leaders
Apart from church organisations which have helped to define the nature of church involvement 
in democratisation, a few among many church leaders have likewise been instrumental. One key 
leader who has undoubtedly and persistently influenced the direction of Philippine democracy is 
Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, who has led the Archdiocese of Manila since 1974. Since the seat of state 
power is in Manila, the Archdiocese of Manila has a privileged location. Historically, Manila 
determines a good deal of the country’s political life, despite efforts towards political and 
ecclesial decentralisation. Cardinal Sin’s influential leadership in the Archdiocese of Manila for 
nearly three decades now proved vital in the Church’s commitment to democratisation. Cardinal 
Sin is the only prelate in the world who has engaged with, either critically or collaboratively, five 
successive heads of the government during his episcopacy: Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-1986), 
Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992), Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph E. Estrada (1998-2001) 
and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (ongoing). Arguably, Cardinal Sin is a principal church actor in
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the many key moments of Philippine democratic transition and survival. Of his involvement 
during the Marcos years of dictatorship, Huntington writes: ‘Cardinal Sin may have played a 
more active and more powerful role in bringing about the end of a regime (Marcos government) 
and a change in national political leadership than any Catholic prelate since the seventeenth 
century.’82
Other influential bishops during the authoritarian period include Nobel Peace nominee 
Antonio Y. Fortich, former bishop of the Diocese of Bacolod; Bp. Julio X. Labayen OCD, 
former NASSA Executive Director and the resident bishop of the Prelature of Infanta; Bp. 
Francisco F. Claver SJ, Bishop Emeritus of the Diocese of Malaybalay and former NASSA 
Executive Director; and Manila Auxiliary Bishop Teodoro D. Bacani. Evidently as this chapter 
unfolds, various priests, religious and lay leaders figure as significant individuals whose 
involvement helped to push the Catholic Church forward in restoring and rebuilding democracy.
3.3 Church roles in democratisation
The roles of CBCP during the authoritarian period generally evolved from adaptation and 
ambivalence with regard to the status quo to outright active resistance. The evolving roles were 
shaped by the Church’s struggle to renew itself along the lines of Catholic social teaching and 
Vatican II principles. These principles were appropriated to respond to escalating state 
repression engendering political and economic decay, human rights abuses particularly of church 
personnel and establishments, and a growing sense of patriotism and militancy in the protest 
movement. Gradually, the Church assumed a new concept and practice of citizenship which 
would persist beyond the authoritarian period.
82 Huntington, The Third wave..., 84.
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3.3.1 De-legitimation of the National Security State (NSS) ideology 
One significant contribution o f the Catholic Church in Philippine democratisation was the de­
legitimation of the NSS ideology of the Marcos government. When martial law was
O'} 0
promulgated on September 21, 1972, an authoritarian State emerged and legitimised by the 
1973 Constitution. This form of government became known as ‘constitutional authoritarianism.’ 
The NSS ideology with extensive backing from US foreign policy was extracted from the Latin 
American experience.84 This shifted profoundly the role of the military from external defence to 
internal security, from being largely professional to being politicised.85 A New Society’s slogan 
captured the core of the NSS ideology: ‘Sa ika-uunlad ng bayan, disiplina ang Jcailangan’ (for 
the progress of the country, discipline is needed). In the name of national security, discipline 
was exacted from the citizenry, civil liberties were suspended, and thus violation of human rights 
became rampant. ‘Subversion’ was understood by authorities as ‘Anybody who goes against the 
Government or who tries to convince people to go against the Government...,’86 so that political 
dissent was not possible without the risk of detention, torture, disappearance, and, in many cases, 
death.87 Thus the military rule effectively suppressed civilian supremacy. Apart from being 
enforcers of martial law, the military implemented government policy and in some instances
oo #
adjudicated cases of the accused in military tribunals. They determined the standard of media
censorship and were assigned in some key positions in the government.89 Owing to US military 
assistance, the military budget rose from 0.77% of the national budget at the inception of martial
83 The date of Proclamation 1081 (Declaration o f Martial Law) is actually September 23, 1972 but this was 
promulgated two days earlier (See Santos, ‘A  Short history o f the Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f the 
Philippines,’ 426).
84 Gretchen Casper, Fragile democracies: the legacies o f  authoritarian rule (Pittsburgh: University of  
Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 30-39.
85 Ibid.
86 Statement is attributed to Minister o f National Defence Juan Ponce Enrile in a BBC documentary in 1977. 
Cited in Youngblood, Marcos against the Church, 140.
87 Ibid., 40, Chapter 6.
88 Rocamora, Breaking through, 54.
89 Ibid.
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law to some 8.66% in 1986.90 Military personnel and logistics expanded exponentially, nearly 
doubling in size in the first three years of martial law and doubling again in the following 
decade.91 Although martial law was formally lifted in 1981, excessive powers of President 
Marcos effectively curbed any meaningful legal opposition to the State.
The Church hierarchy’s initial position regarding martial law was one of cautious 
acceptance that masked internal division. Five days after its declaration, the Administrative 
Council of CBCP, while cautioning the government to respect human dignity, exhorted the 
people ‘to remain calm and law-abiding.’92 Soon cracks within the Church position surfaced. 
Shortly after the CBCP statement, 17 bishops and 17 members of AMRSP issued their statement 
of concern against possible state abuses and sought for the lifting of martial law, not for years but 
within months.93 The absence or lack of mass protest against martial law in the beginning 
indicated that the people as a whole likewise tolerated it.94 After a year of martial law, ‘22 
Catholic priests and nuns as well as hundreds of laymen had been arrested,’ a telling sign that the 
Church was under state repression.95 In 1973, the bishops had their first meeting after martial 
law was declared. An outcome of this meeting was the creation of the Church-Military Liaison 
Committee (CMLC) the following year.96 CMLC was an attempt to assist and settle cases of 
church people who were suspected of subversive activities in the eyes of the military.
Individual bishops (conservatives, moderates and progressives) remained sharply divided 
regarding martial law.
90 Ibid.
91 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John Sidel, Philippine politics and society in the twentieth century: colonial 
legacies, post-colonial trajectories (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 46-47.
92 ‘Statement of the CBCP Administrative Council on Martial Law,’ available from 
http://www.cbcponline.org/documents/1970s/1972-martial law.html. 21 February 2003.
93 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 19.
94 Karl D. Jackson, ‘The Philippines: the search for a suitable democratic solution, 1946-1986,’ in Democracy 
in developing countries: Asia, eds. Lariy Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, Vol. 3, (Colorado: Lynne 
Reinner Publishing Inc., 1989), 244.
95 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 176.
96 Santos, ‘A Short history of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,’ 427.
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Pastoral Letters of the CBCP from 1972 to 1975 plainly showed a cautious hierarchical
• 07leadership which neither categorically denounced nor endorsed martial law. The July 1973 
CBCP statement (‘Evangelisation and Development’) was deeply cognisant of the Philippine 
social problems and called for more integral development without manifesting its opposition 
with regard to martial law.98 The CBCP Lenten Pastoral Letter in 1975 on AI ay Kapwa 
(Offering to People) stressed social responsibility to the poor as part of the practice of faith.99
The impact of CBCP statements was greatly impaired by deep cleavages among its 
members. The Church’s position as regards the 1976 referendum-plebiscite was acutely divided 
between the conservatives led by Julio Cardinal Rosales of the Archdiocese of Cebu who 
advocated participation and 14 progressive bishops along with the AMRSP leadership who 
called for boycott.100 On November 24, 1976, 17 bishops in an unsent letter iUt omnes unum 
sin f (‘That they may be one’) reacted to a Roman letter criticising AMRSP and calling the 
bishops to assert their leadership.101 In response to their letter, Archbishops Antonio Mabutas 
and Francisco Cruces penned ‘Et veritas liberabit vos’ (‘And the truth shall set you free’) which 
maintained conservative thinking.102 Deep division within the CBCP meant that the hierarchy’s 
position was at best ambivalent.
In response to the political manipulation of the 1976 referendum, the CBCP 
Administrative Council denounced its outcome claiming that it was designed to perpetuate 
Marcos’ presidency during martial law.103 With relative success of the boycott campaign, a spate 
of military assaults on the Church ensued: deportation of two foreign priests (Fr. Edward 
Gerlock MM and Fr. Albert Booms PIME); closure of Catholic radio stations in Tagum and
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Malaybalay; termination of two Catholic publications, The Communicator and Signs o f  the 
Times, an AMRSP newsletter; and detention of some 70 lay leaders in a Mindanao mission 
district run by the Maryknoller Missionaries.104
Sustained persecutions of the Church marked the beginning of the consolidation of the 
critical position of its leadership. The CBCP statement (‘The Bond of Love in Proclaiming the 
Good News’) in January 1977 endorsed the liberationist approach to social change and was 
explicitly critical of the excesses of martial law.105 From 1977 to 1981, during the CBCP 
presidency of Cardinal Sin, CBCP’s leadership adopted ‘critical collaboration’ as its attitude 
with regard to the authoritarian State.106 The CBCP criticised martial law particularly when 
injustices were done by the regime, but otherwise it generally tolerated the State. Over time, 
however, there was more criticism than collaboration.107 On July 5, 1979, Cardinal Sin called
1 AO
for the abolition of martial law and the resignation of Marcos. In October, the Manila Synod 
approved unanimously the lifting of martial law as soon as possible.109 President Marcos, 
roughly a month before the Pope John Paul II’s first visit to the Philippines from February 18 to 
22, 1981, ‘lifted’ martial law ostensibly to impress upon the Pope a changing political climate 
and ease the escalating church-state tension.110 Marcos apparently acted against the advice of 
President Reagan who cautioned the government about lifting martial law at that time.111
The CBCP statement on January 27, 1984, in anticipating the May 14, 1984 Batasang 
Pambansa (National Assembly) election, underscored the need to respect the citizens’ right not to 
vote if this was ‘contrary to the dictates of conscience.’112 This position clearly veered away
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from CBCP’s September 1975 statement encouraging the citizens to participate in the
referendum.113 This betrays increasing opposition of the CBCP as regards the moral legitimacy
of the authoritarian regime. Still, the CBCP did not advocate boycott nor did it endorse
participation, while AMRSP campaigned for boycott.114
The most important church statement that undermined greatly the State’s legitimacy was
the CBCP collegial statement on the 1986 snap presidential polls held on February 7. The
bishops met in an emergency session on February 13, 1986. Pressures were coming from the
government (through First Lady Imelda Marcos) not to release the statement, and from the Papal
Nuncio Archbishop Bruno Torpigliani and Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Agostino Casaroli
not to issue the statement before Marcos was officially proclaimed by the Marcos-dominated
Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly).115 The bishops went on to release their statement on
February 14. Claver claims that statement made history when for the first time the Church
‘declared for a revolution before, not after, the fact.’116 The CBCP statement, the first one
among the national organisations, exposed the illegitimacy of the Marcos government.
In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their 
conduct.... According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power 
through fraudulent means has no moral basis.... We therefore ask every loyal member of 
the Church, every community of faithful, to form their judgment about the February 7 
polls. And if in faith they see things as we the bishops do, we must come together and
• 117discern what appropriate actions to take that will be according to the mind of Christ.
In this statement, the bishops were not so much playing partisan politics as acting as a moral 
centre challenging the people to evaluate the situation for themselves and come up with their
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own decision. The CBCP defined the gravity of fraud and the moral illegitimacy of the Marcos 
government without imposing upon the people their collective opinion or giving any directive as 
to what course of action to take. Instead, they invited the people to form their own judgment. If 
their reading agreed with that of the bishops, then they should ‘come together and discern,’ and 
act.118 Clearly, they were speaking not above the people, but discerning with them on what 
appropriate actions should be taken.119 The bishops then insisted that they should ‘pray together, 
reason together, decide together, act together, always to the end that the truth prevail, that the 
will of the people be fully respected.’120 This was an invitation to hierarchy-laity interaction 
(church ad intra) that enabled participation and involvement of the Church in its entirety.
The people had long lost confidence in the Marcos government. The CBCP articulated 
their sentiments by declaring that its governance had ‘no moral basis.’ The National Council of 
Churches of the Philippines (NCCP), an aggregation of Protestant Churches, also issued a
191statement, similar to that of CBCP, but it did not have as much impact. The CBCP statement 
became the opening salvo of massive post-electoral protests, and boycott campaigns of enormous 
scale against Marcos crony companies until the events in the February 1986 revolution.
By speaking boldly against the illegitimacy of the State, the Church was trying to 
accomplish its mission as indicated by the Catholic social teaching and Vatican II. The Vatican 
II document Gaudium et Spes, for instance, privileged ‘the protection of human dignity’ at the 
heart of the social ministry of the Church.122 The massive fraud and violence that marred the 
1986 elections clearly militated against human liberty and dignity, and the values enshrined by 
the social teaching of the Church and Vatican II. Perhaps, were it not for these theological
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principles interacting with social and political realities and the renewal that was happening 
within the universal and Philippine Church, the hierarchy would not have reached a broader 
consensus than they had done in their February 1986 statement.
3.3.2 Defence and advocacy of human rights
Increasing militarisation, illegal detention o f ‘subversives’, widespread use of torture and rising 
cases o f ‘salvaging’ (extrajudicial killing o f ‘subversives’) made human rights violations a sore 
issue in church-state relations. A year after the imposition of martial law, the Church leadership 
and organisations made some attempts to safeguard human rights. NASSA helped to create 
CMLC in 1973 to address the military-church conflict at the national level. It formed the 
diocesan-based Citizens’ Committee for Justice and Peace to keep watch on the violations of 
human rights at the local level.123 Reacting to reports of massive illegal detentions, the CBCP 
endorsed an AMRSP-sponsored nationwide survey on the effects of martial law.124 Contrary to 
the unequivocal claim of President Marcos in December 1974 that ‘no one, but no one has been 
tortured,’125 the 1973 AMRSP report disclosed a lack of documentation about the extent of the 
illegal detention, extensive use of torture, and surveillance of families and relatives of the
10Adetainees. These concerns led to the creation of TFD along with the Task Force Data 
Gathering (TFDG) in 1974 to gather and document cases of human rights offences, both under 
the auspices of AMRSP.127 In setting up TFD and TFDG, some CNL personalities like Fr. 
Edicio de la Torre SVD, Fr. Carlos Tayag and Gerardo Bulatao played significant roles.128 The 
leadership of Sr. Mariani Dimaranan SFIC was crucial in TFD’s expansion and organisation.129
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In the same year it was established, TFD formed a partnership with the Free Legal 
Assistance Group (FLAG), founded by former Senator Jose Diokno.130 By 1993, TFD had 
offices and staff in 69 out of 72 provinces in the Philippines.131 Arguably, TFD became ‘the 
largest human rights NGO both in the Philippines and in the developing world as a whole.’132 
TFD’s initial goals were material and financial provisions to detainees and their families; legal 
assistance to suspects; advocacy against the use of torture; and documentation and information 
dissemination about human rights condition.133 TFD’s documentation indicates that 30,000 
political arrests were made within weeks of the declaration of martial law and 75,000 political 
incarcerations were reported when authoritarian rule was formally lifted in 1981. By end of the 
Marcos regime in 1986, some 15,989 were detained for political reasons.134 During the Marcos 
regime then, a total of 21,883 political arrests, 2,491 ‘salvagings’ and 709 disappearances were 
reported.135 The documentation proved useful not only for the political education and 
mobilisation o f the people and church authorities, but also for international exposure, pressure 
and support for human rights advocacy. However, increased CPP influence in TFD in the 1970s
1 'Xfsand 1980s weakened its independent character and deepened divisions within the organisation.
By and large, TFD became more engaged in cases which were aligned with or sympathetic to the 
national democratic movement and thus alienated those human rights victims outside of the 
movement. TFD eventually diminished in strength and number following the split in the 
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Defence of human rights was a priority concern of the Catholic bishops during the martial 
law regime. This issue became much more acute when military harassments included church 
people and establishments. Persistent military assaults on church establishments and other 
violations of the CMLC terms of agreement led the Catholic bishops to disengage from it in 
January 1983.138 It is said that from 1972 to 1984, ‘at least twenty-two major military raids on
1 'XQchurch (including Protestant) institutions’ were executed. These military raids betrayed 
rampant human rights abuses, thus straining irrevocably church-state relations.
The Philippine hierarchy’s commitment to human rights was evident in the statements it 
made to promote its cause. The CBCP statement on October 7, 1979 (‘Exhortation Against 
Violence’) raised concerns about the rise of militarisation and violence.140 In this pastoral letter, 
some conservative bishops like Archbishop Antonio Mabutas, joined the clamour against 
escalating and persistent military atrocities.141 The Church’s involvement in human rights 
stemmed not just because it became increasingly an object of state abuses. Rather, the Church, 
in keeping once again with the Catholic social thought and Vatican II, had to denounce human 
rights violations and uphold the dignity of the human person. For this reason, the Church had to 
condemn equally violations of human rights not only of the military and the government, but also 
the use of terror by the armed Left.
Nonetheless, it took some time for the Church to condemn the violence perpetrated by the 
Left. Pope John Paul II in his February 1981 visit admonished the government to uphold human 
rights and be mindful of the poor and at the same time he urged the Church people not to be part 
of the revolutionary struggle of the Left.142 MSPC V followed the position of the Pope by 
unequivocally condemning human rights abuses committed by the Marcos repressive State and
138 Santos, ‘A Short history of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f the Philippines,’ 431.
139 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church..., 114 and Chapter 5.
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the use of intimidation and terrorism by the underground movement: 4 We strongly condemn the 
abuses against human rights by both Right and Left: the repression of basic freedoms, arbitrary 
arrests, searches, detentions, torture of people, hamletting,143 abuses, ‘salvaging’ and 
liquidations.’144
On July 11, 1984, a CBCP pastoral letter (‘Let there be life’) condemned ‘salvagings’ and 
sweeping executions perpetrated by both the military, the para-military forces and the 
revolutionary Left.145 Also criticised were the continued deployment of so-called ‘secret 
marshals’ who could execute enemies of the State and the prerogative of President Marcos to 
exercise martial law powers by virtue of Amendment 6 in the 1973 Constitution.146 Amendment 
6 provided constitutional backing to the notorious Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) which 
replaced the nefarious Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) and the Preventive Detention 
Action (PDA).147 These presidential prerogatives perpetuated illegal detention practices and 
human rights abuses making the ‘lifting’ o f martial law futile. The CBCP unambiguously 
denounced these presidential prerogatives as immoral.148
‘Let there be life’ was followed up by another CBCP letter (‘Message to the people of 
God on terrorism’) on July 8, 1985 condemning both Right and Left forces for human rights 
abuses and the use of cultist sects for counter-insurgency purposes.149 Further, it called for the 
reorganisation, if not dismantling, o f the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF), a para-military 
unit known for human rights violations.150 Likewise, the MSPC declared it was not only the 
government which was held accountable for human rights abuses but also the underground
143 Military assaults on villages where suspected rebels are stationed. The local residents are forced to vacate 
their land and then an all-out military offensive follows. This practice severely affected people’s livelihood and 
living conditions.
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movement. The centrist position of the bishops gave more impetus to the active non-violent 
movement known as Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA, Action for Peace and 
Justice) that Fr. Jose Blanco SJ tried to popularise among base sectors and BCCs.151 AKKAPKA 
held seminars nationwide with various groups and organisations based on Gospel principles of 
peace, justice, and love coupled with Mahatma Gandhi’s principles of active non-violence to 
rectify evil and transform society. The movement’s influence became an important factor in the
* 1 ^ 9non-violent resistance during the February 1986 revolution.
The Church’s commitment to safeguard human rights contributed much to the political 
awareness, education and mobilisation not only of the Church people themselves but of the 
citizenry at large. The issues around human rights became a crucial arena for rallying the people 
to unveil the illusions that concealed the systematic atrocities of the national security State. 
Human rights advocacy helped to provide a driving force for advancing the cause of 
democratisation.153 Being a highly politically charged issue, the defence of human rights became 
an ideological battleground of political groups. This affected human rights groups and TFD’s 
independent character. The Church hierarchy took a centrist position by denouncing the use of 
violence by both the government-military and the revolutionary Left.
3.3.3 Expanding the sites of people’s participation through the Basic Christian 
Communities (BCCs)
Vatican II’s ecclesiology underpinned the beginnings of BCCs. It stressed that the Church is the 
‘people of God’ (comprising the hierarchy and laity) making its pilgrimage in history.154 The 
Medellin Conference in 1968 affirmed this ‘people of God’ ecclesiology and proposed that
151 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 28.
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BCCs are the way forward for the Church in Latin America. The Puebla Conference in 1979 
further pushed the BCCs initial engagement closer to the lives of the poor.155
BCCs in the Philippines were launched in the National Rural Congress in January 
1967.156 The congress adopted the theme: ‘The Church goes to the barrios' (rural villages).157 
In this way, the Church steered clear of town-centred Catholicism that has so characterised much 
o f faith practice since the time of the Spanish conquest. The congress was convened a year 
before the Latin American Conference in Medellin in 1968 officially endorsed BCCs. For 
Claver, Philippine BCCs are ‘wholly indigenous and not.... copy-cat imitations’ of Latin 
American BCCs, although influences from the latter affected the former subsequently.158 The 
first BCCs in the Philippines were introduced in the Prelature of Tagum in Mindanao by the 
Maryknoll Fathers in the late 1960s.159 It is thought that the Maryknollers were then influenced 
by the growth of BCCs in Latin America.160 In 1971, a similar attempt was initiated in the 
Prelature of Malaybalay.161 Both stressed lay leadership and participation; face-to-face 
interaction, prayer, and reflection anchored in biblical texts; and kapilya (chapel)-based 
communities which took to task various local and provincial issues. Since both were local 
Churches in Mindanao, the MSPC in 1971 reflected on their experiences and endorsed BCCs as
1A7the pastoral thrust for the local Churches in Mindanao. The first five MSPC meetings were 
focused on the theme: ‘Building up Christian communities in Mindanao-Sulu,’ a telling sign that 
the formation of BCC became central in MSPC’s pastoral thrust.163 MSPC’s strong backing
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explains to a great extent the phenomenal growth of BCCs in Mindanao compared with those in
Visayas or Luzon. It was only in 1977 when the CBCP issued a pastoral letter adopting BCC as
a new lay mission in the country.164
There were a few variants of BCCs and at times they competed with each other despite
efforts to bring them together in meetings and conferences. In terms of pastoral approaches,
many BCCs were focused on liturgical concerns (worship, prayer), others stressed on
developmental projects (livelihood programmes), and a few aimed to adopt liberational strategies
(regime and structural change). The nascent BCCs, particularly those which were initiated in the
Prelature of Malaybalay were Jcapilya-based communities headed by an alagad (lay leader).165
KRISKA {Kristiyanong Kasilinganan, Christian neighbourhood community), stressing
neighbourhood contacts rather than the kapilya-based communities, was popularised and
introduced in various parts of Mindanao in the early 1970s.166 The Redemptorist Mission Teams
(RMT) BCC version in Mindanao had a strong community organising (CO) component in their
programme.167 The BCC-CO (BCC cum community organising) employed CO as a tool for
sectoral, not necessarily parochial, formation. BCC-CO used a strict Marxist framework of
social analysis. It is still perceived to be sympathetic to the national democratic movement.
It is difficult to measure the extent of BCC presence throughout the country during the
Marcos period since no reliable and comprehensive survey has been undertaken thus far.
Nonetheless, Wurfel summarises the general impact of BCCs in the Philippine countryside:
In rural areas the growth of basic Christian communities (BCC) was of greatest 
importance. The Catholic Church traditionally had little direct contact with the village; it 
was a fortunate barrio that had a visit from the parish priest once a year, on the day of the 
local patron saint. By the early 1980s the BCC movement had practically revolutionized 
the locus and purpose of church activity in several provinces. Basic Christian 
communities at the village level, with lay leadership but at least initial religious guidance,
164 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church..., 87.
165 Francisco Claver, ‘Pastoral and administrative organization o f the prelature,’ In Quinquennial Report: 
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not only brought a new awareness of the faith to the peasantry but related that faith to 
everyday problems, among them illegal expropriation by multinational corporations, 
midnight raids (sometimes with rape and pillage) by the military, and even evacuation 
from ‘free fire zones’.... This sense of lay autonomy and new linkages between activists 
clergy and peasantry greatly strengthened Church-based protest.169
BCCs, to some degree, ‘brought the church to the rural population’ by stressing ‘human
development and liberation’ through social consciousness raising and mobilisation of people and
resources.170 BCCs virtually regenerated church presence in the rural areas since the Church was
basically town-centred. This was particularly the case in some local Churches in Mindanao.
Two confidential government reports prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Minister of
National Defence in 1975 and 1978 respectively raised some suspicions about the BCC
• • • 171movement which was viewed as a ‘dangerous form of threat from the religious radicals.’ In 
some cases, thoroughgoing state repression of BCCs led some members to join the underground 
movement. Other BCCs remained committed to non-violent activism such as the case of the 
‘Negros Nine’ in the Diocese of Bacolod (Frs. Niall O’Brian SSC, Brian Gore SSC, and Vicente 
Dangan and six lay leaders) who were all BCC proponents and leaders.172 They were accused of 
murdering Mayor Pablo Sola, Mayor of Kabangkalan, in 1983. They were detained while the 
trial was in progress. Under intense pressure at varying levels (local and particularly the BCCs, 
national and international), the charges were eventually dismissed in 1984.173
Claver claims that while some BCCs were suspected of being ‘subversive by the 
government... they were perceived as carriers of the revolution by elements on the Left -and 
attempts to so use them have not been wanting.’174 Still, BCCs were virtually a significant force
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for democratisation in Philippine society. Claver notes key qualities of BCCs making them 
genuine actors in democratisation: an ethos of participation, a commitment to the poor and to lay 
leadership, community-orientated, liberational, concerned with integral human development, 
discerning and faith-based communities.175 BCCs not only provided sites of participation within
11 fithe Church, but in some cases they became effective vehicles for mobilising the rural poor.
The BCCs experiences in the Diocese of Malaybalay and Diocese of Bacolod (see Chapters Five 
and Six) are but a few examples of how these small Christian communities were able to engage 
critically the local government and military in their struggle to educate the people politically and 
mobilise them for collective action.
3.3.4 Socialisation and mobilisation of the citizenry
To a large extent, a crucial role that the Church played along with civil society groups was the 
socialisation and mobilisation of existing groups and the citizenry to challenge the Marcos 
regime. This enabled the people, who were initially ambivalent or tolerant of the State at the 
inception of martial law, to stand for social justice, freedom and political transformation of the 
state and society. Prior to martial law, the Church was socio-economically involved in 
organising and mobilising workers and peasants. A significant post-Vatican II push to socialise 
and mobilise people for social action was the National Rural Congress in 1967. Owing to the 
participation of government agencies in the congress, church-govemment partnership was at its 
peak and it made critical inroads in various socio-economic projects in rural areas.177 In two 
years (1967-1969), the Church sponsored two thousand socio-economic projects.178 Reforms 
within the Church, nonetheless, were not progressing in tandem with Vatican II. In 1969, two 
years after the National Rural Congress, the clamour for reforms was focused on the church
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leadership. Catholic students and leaders belonging to the Laymen’s Association for Post- 
Vatican II Reforms (LAPVIIR) and the Christian Socialism Movement (CSM) held a 57-day 
rally at the residence of Rufino Cardinal Santos, Archbishop of Manila on March 28, 1969 to 
challenge ‘the responsiveness of the archdiocese to present needs’ and its ‘resistance to 
change.’ This concern became a unifying theme in the first three yearly assemblies of the 
Philippine Priests Incorporated (PPI), whose members numbered one thousand four hundred 
priests.180
In the late 1960s and 1970s, the Church was a key player in the initiation and expansion 
of social groups and movements that in turn were crucial for organising the people. Some 
members of the clergy were actively engaged in different political and sectoral organisations and 
movements. Apart from the creation of FFW and FFF, various church clergy and lay people 
were engaged in the formation of Kilusang Khi Rho ng Pilipinas (KKRP) (Khi Rho Movement 
of the Philippines), Kilusang Kristiyano ng Kabataang Pilipino (KKP) (Christian Movement of 
the Filipino Youth), Kapulungan ng mga Sandigang ng Pilipinas (KASAPI) (Assembly of 
People for whom the Philippines relies) and the Young Christian Socialists of the Philippines 
(YCSP).181 Lakas ng Diwang Kayumanggi (Power of the Malay Spirit) or Lakasdiwa and CNL 
were founded respectively by Edmundo Garcia, a Jesuit scholastic, and Fr. Edicio de la Torre.182
An important partnership binding the bishops and the business sector was the Bishops- 
Businessmen’s Conference (BBC), created in 1971. The two parties shared the vision ‘to bring
1 O'!about radical reform in Philippine society by democratic and peaceful means. ’ This 
partnership not only displayed hierarchy-laity interaction but launched a new vision of human 
development anchored on Papal social teaching (particularly Populorum Progressio) and Vatican
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II, and promoted a sense o f ‘corporate citizenship.’184 In this regard, Fabros reports that ‘the 
sixty corporations comprising the Foundation for Social Progress pledged to deposit 1 percent of
1 UStheir net earnings to the foundation’s fund for development projects.’ Apart from generating a 
corporate fund for social projects, BBC’s backing for NAMFREL in the 1980s proved to be
1 OiT
crucial to its electoral projects in 1984 and 1986.
Mass protests either church-backed or led were not highly visible from the beginning of 
the martial law period until 1983. Although the Church became increasingly critical over time,
‘the parliament of the streets’ or the protest movement, prior to 1983, was not seen as an avenue 
for engaging the State, at least as far as the mainstream Church was concerned. The year 1983 
marked a sea change in the progressive deterioration of church-state relations, and the 
phenomenal growth o f the protest movement. Worsening church-state relations led the CBCP to 
dis-engage from the CMLC in January 1983.187 On August 21, 1983, former Senator Benigno 
‘Ninoy’ Aquino, thought to be the political leader who could unify the opposition was 
assassinated upon arrival at the Manila International Airport (later renamed Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport), under the custody of military guards. His death sparked the biggest mass 
protests in the post-colonial Philippines. Cardinal Sin led eleven bishops in presiding at the 
funeral Mass which was followed by a funeral procession of about 13 miles to the cemetery.188 
The mourning of the Filipino people turned into a sombre protest movement. Some 1,000,000 
people manifested their indignation and mourning during the nine-hour funeral.189 Others 
watched on television and many tuned in on their radios. The spirit of solidarity was well
184 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization. ..,139; Eva- 
Lotta E. Hedman, ‘In the name o f civil society: contesting free elections in the post-colonial Philippines,’ Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Cornell University, 1998,268-273.
185 Fabros, The Church and its social involvement in the Philippines..., 143.
186 Hedman, ‘In the name o f civil society...,’ 272-273.
187 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church..., 197.
188 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 250.
189 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 31; two other estimates put the figure to 2,000,000, see Rocamora, 
Breaking through..., 34; Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  
evangelization..., 250.
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captured in the words etched in mourning pins: Ninoy, hindi ka nag-iisa (Ninoy, you are not
alone). The people’s use of religious symbols (e.g., celebration of Masses, prayer vigils,
religious articles) during the wake and funeral of Ninoy Aquino became powerful images of
resistance for subsequent protest movements.
Aquino’s death, in many ways, consolidated the middle force (social democrats, liberal
democrats, independent groups) and the Church in their opposition to the Marcos government.190
Kroeger summarises the immediate outcome of the Aquino assassination in this way:
In the weeks following the assassination, there were well-attended and largely peaceful 
demonstrations almost daily in Manila and in other parts of the country; they called for 
justice for Aquino, national reforms, an end to the U.S. role in the 
Philippines and Marcos’ resignation. These demonstrations were, by far, the largest and 
most frequent since the declaration of ML (martial law) in 1972.191
Indeed between August 21 and the end of September 1983, the government claimed that ‘there
were 165 rallies, marches, and other demonstrations.’192 These demonstrations were
accompanied by the emergence of coalition building and consolidation of organised groups to
forge a unified anti-Marcos opposition. The groups included an umbrella organisation called
Justice for Aquino, Justice for All (JAJA),193 which later was subsumed under Coalition for the
Restoration of Democracy (CORD) for the 1984 election,194 August Twenty-One Movement
(ATOM), led by Aquino’s brother, Agapito ‘Butz’ Aquino, business group Manindigan (Fight),
Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD),195 which was incorporated
in the founding congress of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN, New Nationalist Alliance)
190 Wurfel, Filipino politics, Chapter 10; Thompson, ‘Searching for a strategy: the traditional opposition to 
Marcos and the transition to democracy in the Philippines,’ 341-343.
191 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 251.
192 Thompson, ‘Searching for a strategy: the traditional opposition to Marcos and the transition to democracy in 
the Philippines,’ 341.
193 JAJA, led by former senator Tanada as chair and former senator Jose Diokno, was the first major coalition of  
the Left and middle forces.
194 David Timberman, A Changeless land: continuity and change in Philippine politics, (Pasir Panjang: Institute 
of South Asia Studies, 1991), 132-133.
195 NAFJD, chaired by former senator Lorenzo Tanada, was dominated by national democrats with a few 
liberals and moderate nationalists.
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in 1985,196 Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA, United Nation in Spirit and 
Purpose),197 Bukluran para sa Ika-uunlad ng Sosyalism sa Isip at Gawa (Unity for the Progress 
of Socialism in Theory and Practice),198 Lakas ng Sambayanan (Power of the People). Two 
distinct streams of protest movements confronted and challenged the State: the ‘yellow’ and the 
‘red.’ The former was led by the business sector, the middle and upper class, BANDILA, 
ATOM and other political formations representing liberal democrats, social democrats and 
independent socialists, and mainline Churches (including some protestant groups), while the 
latter was spearheaded by political groups allied with the Left, the organised poor and workers 
led by BAYAN.199 In the ‘yellow stream,’ moderate and some conservative church leaders and 
lay people were involved in various tasks: providing theological and religious motivations for 
Christian involvement, celebration of Masses and prayer vigils, attendance during rallies, holding 
religious services during protest assemblies, resource mobilisation, and lending logistical 
support.200 Progressive church people, on the other hand, supported the ‘red stream.’ Thus the 
Church along with other political groups became a key player in organising, networking, and 
mobilising the citizenry.
Amid fears of vote rigging and election-related violence, the CBCP stance on the 
Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) elections in May 1984 was neither for nor against 
participation. While some elements in the Church, including Cardinal Sin, called for 
participation, the CBCP remained neutral. Others including the AMRSP and the Left urged 
boycott. In many areas, however, some clergy, nuns and lay people supported the reactivation 
and mobilisation of the National Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL), an electoral
196 BAYAN (meaning ‘people’) is a broad alliance largely led by the national democrats, socialists and a few 
liberals.
197 BANDILA is a left-of-centre and middle force coalition composed mainly by social democrats, independent 
liberals and liberal democrats.
198 BISIG is a coalition o f socialists and independent Marxists.
199 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 33-34.
200 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 242-277; 
Thompson, ‘Searching for a strategy: the traditional opposition to Marcos and the transition to democracy in the 
Philippines,’ 336-348.
93
watchdog established in 1951, with backing then from the US government through the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), business groups and to a limited extent by the Church in 1950s.
Some bishops accepted the task as NAMFREL provincial co-chairpersons, while priests, nuns 
and lay people acted as poll watchers.202 With the backing from the business sector, civic groups 
and the Church, the electoral movement was able to recruit 200,000 poll watchers.203 Unlike the 
massive boycott in the 1976 referendum and 1981 presidential polls, participation in the 1984 
electoral exercise was seen as more attuned to the general desire of the public than the boycott 
movement.204 NAMFREL’s work factored in what appeared to be a successful challenge against 
the administration with the opposition garnering 70 out of the 183 congressional seats, despite 
the odds.205 The economy meantime was teetering on the verge of bankruptcy as capital flight
•  906intensified, foreign debt increased and cronyism became widespread.
Marcos, feeling the intense pressure from the people and the US government, sought a 
fresh mandate by announcing a snap presidential election on February 7, 1986, one year earlier 
than mandated in the 1973 Constitution.207 Corazon ‘Cory’ C. Aquino, with the full backing 
from the Church and middle force protest movement, emerged as the symbol of hope and 
struggle to restore democracy in the country. Cardinal Sin, with clear US approval, was pivotal 
in forging a unified opposition party under United Nationalist Democratic Organisation 
(UNIDO) with Aquino running as president and Salvador 4Doy’ Laurel as her vice-president.208 
The Left boycotted the snap elections following a failed bid to unify the broad anti-Marcos 
coalition in the founding congress of BAYAN.209 Nevertheless, the proponents of the boycott 
movement underestimated the pulse of the people. The move proved to be a costly political
201 Hedman, ‘In the name o f civil society: contesting free elections in the post-colonial Philippines,’ 116-133.
202 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 259.
203 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church,..., 198.
204 Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization..., 259.
205 Youngblood, Marcos against the Church,..., 198.
206 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 33-34.
207 Wurfel, Filipino politics, 295.
208 Ibid., 296.
209 Rocamora, Breaking through..., 33-41.
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blunder as it displaced them from the mainstream of the people’s struggle. Soon cracks within 
the Left began to surface. The boycott movement left some unintended effects: deepening of 
division within the ranks and the subsequent decline of the movement as a whole.210 The 
campaign period served as a forum to educate people on pressing issues that affected them most 
and to mobilise them to press for the removal of Marcos during the electoral exercise. Sobra na, 
tama na, palitan na (Enough is enough, change now) was the battle cry of the citizenry. The 
multiplicity of political groups (liberal democrats, social democrats, independent socialists) and 
individuals who had no political affiliation did not have any broad consensus that would suffice 
as a political programme of the opposition. Thus collective struggle was not anchored on 
ideological programmes and the only factor that united the opposition movement was their firm 
determination to remove Marcos.
NAMFREL was once again reactivated and reaccredited by the Commission on Elections 
(COMELEC). The Church vigorously campaigned for participation in the voting exercise and in 
the work of NAMFREL. Church support for NAMFREL was by no means wanting. Cardinal 
Sin in a letter to the Archdiocese of Manila urged his pastors to offer ‘material and moral 
support’ to NAMFREL and organise prayer vigils in parishes for a fair, clean and honest 
election.211 NAMFREL organised its Bantay ng Bayan (Watchdog of the People) and enlisted 
some half a million electoral volunteers all over the country. Some 80 national organisations 
and groups participated in the work of NAMFREL.213 Some twenty percent of NAMFREL 
coordinators on the national and provincial levels were members of the hierarchy (priests and 
bishops). The Catholic establishments such as parishes and those belonging to the Catholic 
Education Association of the Philippines (CEAP) were hosts to NAMFREL headquarters in the
210 Wurfel, Filipino politics, 314.
211 Jaime Cardinal Sin, ‘Letter to the priests o f the Archdiocese,’ Manila: Arzobispado de Manila, 15 January 
1986.
212 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, ‘Whose business is it anyway? Free and fair elections in the Philippines,’ Public 
Policy 11(3), (July/September 1998), 159.
213 Hedman, ‘In the name of civil society...,’ 236.
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provinces.214 The La Salle brothers hosted the NAMFREL Operation Quick Count (OQC) at the
de la Salle University while Loyola House of Studies, a Jesuit institute at the Ateneo de Manila
• 01  ^University Campus, was a command centre of the NAMFREL Marines and volunteers. The 
NAMFREL Marines were priests, religious and seminarians clad in their cassocks and religious 
habits as they monitored the conduct of the polling places, guarded and transported the ballots to 
official canvassing areas, and kept vigil until the counting was over. NAMFREL was resolutely 
determined to protect the dignity of the ballot, ensure clean and honest elections, despite actual 
threats on the lives of volunteers. As expected, massive cheating and systematic fraud were 
uncovered, not to mention many incidents of election-related violence. NAMFREL’s OQC 
showed Aquino leading by a substantial margin against Marcos. The walk-out of COMELEC 
computer operators to protest the electoral fraud further buttressed the claim of massive 
cheating.216 These operators were housed in houses of religious congregations for fear of being 
hijacked. The Church was at the forefront of this electoral and post-electoral struggle: 
mobilising NAMFREL volunteers, hosting electoral headquarters, monitoring and safeguarding 
electoral and post-electoral results. All these showed that the Church contributed significantly to 
the socialisation and mobilisation of the citizenry. The Church and the BBC were key allies in 
NAMFREL providing all kinds of support: spiritual, logistical, personnel, leadership, material, 
and moral confidence.
Following the CBCP snap polls statement, on February 16, a massive mobilisation 
dubbed as the Tagumpay ng Bay an (Victory of the People) staged a Mass in Rizal Park, Manila. 
Some one million people assembled to proclaim their own version of the real victors of the snap
^ i <7 ^ 1 0
election. Various organised protests o f massive scale followed. A faction of the military
214 Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino “miracle” and the Philippine Churches,’ 9; Hedman, ‘In the name o f  
civil society: contesting free elections in the post-colonial Philippines,’ 232.
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216 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 36.
217 Rey Arquiza, ‘Cory: seven steps to bring Marcos down,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer 17 February 1986.
218 For more details see Arquiza, ‘Cory....’
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led by the Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippines Movement (RAM) had planned a coup 
against Marcos but the plot was uncovered. This prompted the resignation of then Minister of 
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, a key influence in RAM, and military Vice Chief of Staff Lt. General 
Fidel V. Ramos while they were holed up in military camps (Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame) 
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Cardinal Sin appealed to the public to protect 
Enrile and Ramos while military leadership defections followed. This sparked the momentous 
‘people power’ mobilisation from February 22 to 25, where more than a million people trooped 
to EDSA.219 The people, armed with religious icons and symbols, responded to the appeal of Sin 
to protect the rebel troops from being assaulted by the loyalist soldiers. They did so not so much 
‘because he was Cardinal,’ as Carroll puts it, ‘but because through the years of martial law he 
had spoken out on their behalf and they had come to trust him, and most of all because at that 
moment he was voicing their anger and frustration at a stolen election.’220 The Catholic radio 
station Radio Veritas was a key instrument for keeping the people informed of events and 
ensuring a peaceful resolution to the conflict as military defections in support of Aquino started 
to gain momentum. On February 25, Marcos left the presidential palace for Hawaii and in no 
time Corazon C. Aquino was sworn in as the President of the Republic by Chief Justice Claudio 
Teehankee.
3.4 Conclusion
Gill’s theoretical framework explaining the Church’s relationship with the State in Latin 
American on the basis of a ‘rational-actor model of behaviour’221 when placed side-by-side with 
the Philippine Church experience appears untenable. Gill posits that the Church seeks to
2,9 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 37.
220 John J. Carroll, ‘Civil society, the Churches, and the Ouster of Erap,’ in Between fires: fifteen perspectives 
on the Estrada Crisis, ed. Amando Doronila (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc., and Makati City: Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 2001), 247.
221 See Gill, Rendering unto Caesar.... For similar views, see Warner, ‘A New paradigm for sociological study 
of religion in the United States;’ Ekelund, Hebert, and Talison, ‘An Economic model o f the Medieval Church.’
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maximise its corporate benefits (e.g., ecclesial interests and the expansion of membership) and 
minimise costs (e.g., diminished income, influence and membership). He likens the Church to 
an economic ‘unitary actor’ which like any secular establishment must allocate its resources to 
maximise its economic gains and minimise loses.222 The Philippine Church, far from being a 
monolithic actor, is characterised by complexities, differences and conflicts, and can hardly be 
considered as a unitary actor as Gill would want it to be treated. The ideological cleavages and 
varying pastoral emphases showed that the reforms set out by Vatican II were uneven. Despite 
its own internal dynamics, over time it was able to form and consolidate a broad consensus 
regarding its relationship with the State.
More importantly, the Church was not simply acted upon by exogenous factors 
impinging on its own interests (e.g., state repression, human rights violations, and persecution 
against the Church), although these factored in the Church’s increasing resolve to oppose the 
Marcos regime. The Philippine Catholic Church, following the reforms set out by Vatican II and 
Catholic social teaching, had an agenda, however provisional initially it might have been, for the 
sort of engagement it would have with Philippine State and society. These theological principles 
(e.g., people of God ecclesiology) anchored on Vatican II and Catholic social teaching provided 
a framework for the Philippine Church’s own religious identity, insertion in the public domain, 
and mission. The Latin American bishops appropriated for themselves with the participation of 
the laity, these general principles in the Medellin Conference (1968) and Puebla Conference 
(1979). The Philippine bishops too reinterpreted for themselves along with their flock what 
these ‘signs of the times’ meant for them in the light of faith.
Although Vatican II did not explicitly propose concrete lines of action in view of 
democracy, it did provide a foundational experience and understanding that by implication must
222 Gill Rendering unto Caesar, 10-11.
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come to terms with democracy. Hehir correctly connects Vatican II and the experience of
democracy in this way:
Both the experience and teaching of Vatican II provided the church with a new basis for 
relating to democracy.... The (Vatican II) document Gaudium et Spes, focused on 
defining the church’s relationship to the world, has had a profound and systematic impact 
on the life of the church.... The conciliar document {Gaudium et Spes) not only 
legitimised social ministry, it also moved the social dimension of ministry toward the 
center of Catholic life. If one surveys the experience of the church since 1965, in 
situations as diverse as Latin America, Eastern Europe, and South Africa, it is virtually 
impossible to explain on an ad hoc basis the public role played by the Catholic hierarchy 
and the wider community of the church. The intensity of public engagement has 
escalated and the willingness to confront major centers of political and economic power 
in the name of human rights and social justice has noticeably expanded.223
Thus the Philippine Church along with the other Churches that resisted authoritarian and
communist regimes was not merely reacting to the events that appeared to threaten its interests.
It was indeed an actor in democratisation with its own experience of ambivalence, limitation,
internal conflict, but not without a vision of human society. This vision was immensely driven
by Vatican II and Catholic social teaching starting from Pope Leo XXHI’s social encyclical
{Rerum Novarum) in 1891, although the reforms did not proceed uniformly. The roles assumed
by the Church as discussed in the foregoing were enabling steps that brought their vision of
human society closer to reality.
The Philippine Church promoted democratisation, firstly, by withdrawing moral
legitimacy from the NSS ideology and conferring it instead upon the pro-democracy forces
through its pronouncements. These pronouncements shaped the position of the Church with
regard to the State. Its relationship with the State evolved from one of adaptation, and
ambivalence to an increasing opposition and disengagement. The deterioration in church-state
relations culminated in the February 1986 statement of CBCP when the hierarchy declared that
the State had ‘no moral basis’ to govern in the wake of electoral fraud and violence. The
hierarchy when passing moral judgment on the legitimacy of the State invited its members to
223 Hehir, ‘Catholicism and democracy,’ 23.
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make their own decision. The February 1986 statement clearly did not want to impose the 
reading of the bishops on the people nor were they talking above them, but discerned with them, 
decided and acted with them. All this points to hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) as an 
important resource for sustained collective action. This interaction was persistent and sustained 
considering that both parties had disparate elements whose understanding of the Church’s 
pastoral strategies and social mission varied to some degree.
Secondly, the Church was engaged actively in the defence and advocacy of human rights 
through its organisations and its leaders, even coming from conservative prelates like 
Archbishop Mabutas of Davao. Like the process of de-legitimation of the State, commitment to 
human rights evolved from one of timidity to outright condemnation of the excesses of the 
military rule. Defence of human rights, whether promoted by the CBCP, AMRSP, individual 
church leaders or by TFD along with other human rights group (eg FLAG) not only confronted 
the authoritarian government to rein in military abuse of power, but served as a good political 
education, a rallying point for mobilisation and opposition to the hegemonic tendencies of a 
repressive state. The death of Ninoy Aquino under the custody of the military crystallised the 
gravity of military abuses. Thus the Church’s opposition vis-a-vis authoritarian rule became 
much more consolidated.
Thirdly, the Church’s involvement in democratisation included rural areas through the 
formation of BCCs as sites of people’s participation. The BCCs not only decentralised the 
Church’s power and influence, but more importantly, they mainstreamed lay participation 
particularly in the rural populace. The flourishing of BCCs demonstrated the high point of 
positive ordained ministers and lay interaction. BCCs became loci of interest articulation and 
representation, enabling structures that facilitated hierarchy-laity interaction. The local cases in 
the Diocese of Malaybalay and that of Bacolod as presented in this study aptly demonstrate this 
point.
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Finally, the Church was a rallying actor for the socialisation and mobilisation of civil 
society groups and citizens that eventually toppled the Marcos dictatorship. Evidently it was 
clear from the Church’s involvement with organised groups (e.g., FFW and FFF) in the 1950s 
that the civil society organisations were crucial to the success of the democratic project. Thus 
the Church in various moments leading to the restoration of democracy had to engage in 
partnership with civil society organisations (church ad extra). Church partnership with 
politicised groups, to varying ideological predilections, with the electoral movement 
NAMFREL, with the business sector (BBC), and with the traditional political opposition proved 
immensely vital in the final drive to oust Marcos from power. The socialisation and mobilisation 
of the citizenry, through rallies, prayer vigils, electoral participation and vigilance particularly in 
the 1986 election, and the events in February 1986, buttressed people’s capacity to effect the 
needed political change.
Thus one can see some beginnings o f the church ad intra (hierarchy-laity interaction) and 
ad extra (church-civil society connection) in its religio-political involvement. The growing 
empowerment of the laity (e.g., rise of BCCs, laity’s political involvement) and the emergence of 
civil society groups were a post-Vatican II development. The finest hour of church ad intra was 
the Presidential snap polls in 1986 which eventually lead to the ouster of Marcos. The CBCP 
February statement correctly read the pulse of the people. Cardinal Sin’s decisive call for support 
in EDSA was matched by people’s participation and show of solidarity. Alongside the 
progressive development of church ad intra was the Church’s engagement with civil society 
actors. In human rights issues, key church organisations such as TFD and NASS A likewise 
played a vital role in linking up with other organised groups. Church involvement shifted from 
direct engagement of the hierarchy with the State to more hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad 
intra) and church-civil society partnership (church ad extra) in view of the democratic enterprise.
The roles played by the Church during the transition period were likewise assumed by 
many national Churches around the globe that struggled against authoritarianism and 
communism. The de-legitimation o f authoritarian states in Latin American countries and 
conferral of moral support for the opposition were likewise done by the different Churches. This 
was also the case in Eastern and Central Europe, particularly Poland, and some African countries 
(see Chapter Two). In a similar way, the defence and advocacy of human rights, the 
proliferation of BCCs as sites of interest articulation and representation, and the socialisation and 
mobilisation of the citizenry, as collective or individual actors, -- in all these the Church actively 
engaged itself to varying degrees.
These roles too had an important political outcome on people: the initiation of a new 
understanding and practice of citizenship. In the process of articulating a broad consensus on the 
illegitimacy of the authoritarian regime and the legitimacy of the pro-democratic forces, 
advocating human rights, building BCCs, and socialising and mobilising the people and civil 
society actors, the Church was fashioning a new breed of citizenry that eventually challenged 
and confronted an authoritarian state and inaugurated an era of democracy. Citizenship in this 
sense is not merely a status, but also entails active participation. The Church’s commitment to 
enhance citizenship education and practice was a function of both church ad intra and church ad 
extra linkages. The Church’s push to inaugurate a season of democracy would not have been so 
effective and lasting were it not for these two enabling linkages that boosted the potential of the 
Church as a democratic actor.
The Church’s roles during the martial law period have a bearing in the post-authoritarian 
period. Restoring democratic space, however, is one part of the story. It needs to be 
complemented with the building of democratic gains by ensuring survivability, consolidation and 
deepening of democracy. Reconstructing post-transition democracy is a much more complex 
task than initiating democratisation. Given the complexity of this democratising polity,
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particularly when the early appetite of people and organised groups for democratisation has been 
whittled down, the Church assumes perhaps an even more crucial role than it did during the 
democratic transition. The next chapter will shed more light on this point.
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Chapter Four 
The Philippine Catholic Church in the post-authoritarian period: 
returning to the sacristy or re-engaging with democracy?
‘In many mature democracies, political mobilisation is carried out by the political parties. In our 
(Philippine) democracy, the Church’s national infrastructure serves as the vehicle for mass mobilisation.’ 
-Amando Doronila1
Chapter Three argues that the Church was not simply acted upon by the repressive condition of 
the Marcos regime, but was indeed an actor with its own democratic agenda buttressed 
principally by Vatican II and Catholic social teaching. In initiating democratisation, the Church 
played vital roles: de-legitimating the NSS ideology of the regime, sustaining defence and 
advocacy of human rights, expanding sites of people’s participation through the BCCs, and 
promoting socialisation and mobilisation of the citizenry leading to the collapse of the 
authoritarian State. In these areas of involvement, church ad intra (hierarchy-laity interaction) 
and church ad extra (church-civil society linkage) enhanced the Church’s capacity as a key 
protagonist in democratisation. In the process, the Church was shaping a new concept and 
practice o f citizenship that propelled the democratic current. The main arguments in Chapter 
Three are pursued further in the context of post-authoritarian Philippine society. To simplify this 
narrative, a chronology of events is provided for in the Appendices (see Appendix 3).
This chapter will first locate the Catholic Church in the post-authoritarian setting. Some 
attempts have been made to situate the politics of the Church in the post-authoritarian 
Philippines. The works of John J. Carroll,2 Robert Youngblood,3 and some chapters in Gretchen 
Casper4 are important in this regard, but none has adequately treated the Catholic Church’s ad 
intra and ad extra dynamics and its engagement in citizenship building. Second, it will
1 Amando Doronila, ‘Pulling back from the brink,’ The Manila Chronicle, 22 September 1997, 9.
2 Carroll, ‘Church and State...;’ John J. Carroll, ‘Cracks in the wall o f separation? The Churches, civil society, and 
the State in the Philippines, in The Fall o f  Estrada: the inside story, ed. Amando Doronila, Vol. II (Pasig City: 
Anvil Publishing Inc., and Makati City: Philippine Daily Inquirer, forthcoming); Carroll, ‘Forgiving or 
forgetting?....’
3 Robert Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches: a “constructive critical solidarity”, ’Pilipinas: a journal o f  
Philippine studies 13 (Fall 1989), 57-71.
4 Casper, Fragile democracies....
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investigate the Church’s involvement in enhancing democracy. This involvement can be seen in 
its support for the 1987 Charter, its defence of the fragile democratic state, its push for electoral 
reform, its promotion of peace and human rights, its advocacy against the Charter change 
attempts, and its commitment to good governance. These attempts to build democracy, if not to 
ensure its survival, plainly show that the Church was a proactive actor and not simply reacting to 
democratic issues. Finally, the chapter will conclude by re-stating the basic proposition of this 
thesis: church ad intra (hierarchy-laity) and church ad extra (church-civil society) linkages 
provide better prospects for the Church’s involvement in citizenship formation.
4.1 The Church in a democratising context
The post-authoritarian Church was well positioned in Philippine society following the accession 
of President Corazon C. Aquino to power. The Church was seen by the State as a vital ally in 
democratisation. In terms of its public acceptability, the Philippine Church in the post­
authoritarian setting enjoyed a huge trust margin in surveys of popular opinion posting +65 (‘big 
trust’ minus ‘small trust’) in September 1988, +66 a year later.5 Like many national Churches 
especially in Latin America immediately after the post-authoritarian and post-communist 
societies,6 the Philippine Church was the most credible and trusted organisation beating the other 
national establishments and organisations including the judiciary, Congress, business and the 
media.7 Although persecution and harassment of some church people continued, unlike during 
the days of Marcos, the State, as a matter of policy, was careful not to antagonise the Church.
Nevertheless, the Church struggled with its new found role in the post-Marcos era. On 
July 14, 1986, the Pope in a letter to the Philippine bishops, while expressing gratitude to them 
for the peaceful resolution of the crisis that gripped the nation, reminded them ‘not to take
5 Mahar Mangahas, ‘Who’s afraid of the Catholic Church?’ Social Weather Bulletin 91-4, February 1991, 1-2; see 
also Table 1 in the Appendices.
6 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002 ..., 69.
7 Mangahas, ‘Who’s afraid of the Catholic Church?’ 1-2.
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positions of a political character, or to take part in partisan conflicts but to give society the expert 
contribution which is proper to her....’8 The bishops’ role, the Pope said, was to be ‘an 
instrument of reconciliation and communion’ and therefore they should avoid provoking or 
deepening divisions.9 Similarly, Cardinal Sin admitted: ‘Our situation now should be in a low 
profile, avoiding the limelight.’10
The popular perception appeared to indicate some ambivalence with regard to the 
Church’s involvement in politics. The Ateneo de Manila University-Social Weather Stations 
(SWS) in April 1986 revealed equally opposing views with 40% against and 40% for the 
Church’s participation ‘in the struggle of the oppressed.’11 The Ateneo-SWS’s June 1986 report 
suggested that 45% agreed that the ‘church should not get involved in working for clean and 
honest elections’ as opposed to 34% who disagreed.12 An even larger plurality of 49% agreed as
1 Topposed to 29% who disagreed that it ‘should not support any candidate in an election.’ Given
this climate, political demobilisation was the order of the day, but not for long.
Church-state relations during the Aquino administration were anchored on ‘constructive 
critical collaboration’ that largely stressed collaboration.14 The Church backed Aquino 
generally. Similarly the State sought help from the Church particularly in strengthening the 
fragile democracy. The Church made occasional criticisms against the State. Cardinal Sin, in 
his homily at the Mass commemorating the first 100 days of the Aquino administration, 
lamented that the gains of the People Power I uprising were ‘little by little being lost.’15 In 1987,
8 L ’Osservatore Romano, ‘Pope’s letter to bishops o f (the) Philippines: ministry o f teaching and guidance at service 
of truth and justice,’ 28, 14 July 1986, 5.
9 Ibid.
10 Rodney Tasker, ‘The Religion factor: the Church remains a potent though low-profile political force,’ Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 15 January 1987, 16.
11 Mangahas, ‘Who is afraid of the Catholic Church?’ 3.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Wilfrido V. Villacorta, ‘Ideological orientation o f political forces in the Aquino era,’ in economy and politics in 
the Philippines under Corazon Aquino, ed. Bemham Dahm (Hamburg: Insitut fur Asienkunde, 1991), 166. In a 
similar vein, the Philippine bishops used ‘constructive critical solidarity’ to press home the point that they would 
support government initiatives which in their judgment are compatible with church teaching and criticise those 
opposed to it. See Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches.. . . ’
15 The Tribune, ‘Cardinal Sin criticises Aquino government,’ 24 August 1986, 1.
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church leaders raised the issue of graft and corruption in the administration and the drift of 
President Aquino away from the constituency that backed her to power.16 The CBCP issued a
• 17statement on July 14, 1987 insisting that peace could be achieved through genuine land reform.
In 1988, by way of a follow up, Cardinal Sin urged the Aquino administration to push for land 
reform as mandated in the Constitution.18 In another vein, some one hundred bishops met on 
August 7, 1988 and urged the Aquino government to uphold human rights.19 Further, they 
warned right-wing military officers to desist from destabilisation efforts through military coup 
attempts.20 Church-military relations during the Aquino administration remained tense
71particularly with regard to the latter’s counter-insurgency campaigns and human rights abuses. 
The persecution of some lay people continued and human rights violations persisted despite 
institutional commitment to uphold human dignity.
Another source of tension in church-state relations was the government’s health 
programme on maternal health and child welfare. This was not primarily a fertility reduction 
scheme, although it may eventually lead to that.22 Despite a fruitful church-state dialogue, a 
CBCP statement in October 1990 criticised the government programme as if the dialogue had not 
occurred.23 The government’s stand to scale down its population growth of 2.48%, the fastest in 
Southeast Asia, did not sit well with the Church’s leadership position following the line of
16 Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches..., 58.
17 CBCP, Catholic Bishops ’ Conference o f  the Philippines..., 117-121.
18 Malou Mangahas, ‘Sin prods government on genuine land reform,’ The Manila Chronicle, 26 February 1988, 1 & 
8 .
19 Caesar A. Espiritu, ‘Reflections on the process o f “redemocratisation” in the Philippines,’ in Economy and politics 
in the Philippines under Corazon Aquino ed., Bamhard Dahm (Hamburg: Institut fur Aseinkunde, 1991), 313-318.
20 Ibid.
21 Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches....
22 Carroll, ‘Church and State...,’ 183-184.
23 Ibid. A repeat of this tension during the Ramos administration was occasioned by the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development in 1994. The Church’s concerns followed the Vatican line and opposed 
the government position as regards abortion on demand, population control, sexuality, and non-traditional union of 
couples. See Carroll, ‘Cracks in the wall o f separation?.. .,5 1 .
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Vatican thinking.24 In dealing with women’s fertility rights debate, the Church and State, and to
• • 25some extent along with civil society organisations, were constantly at loggerheads.
The Church’s continuing involvement in Philippine society can be further gleaned from 
the Second Plenary Council in the Philippines (PCP II) in 1991 where it affirmed the Church’s 
collective aim to pursue the renewal set out by Vatican II, although some of the reforms were 
already well underway in the Philippine Church (see Chapter Three).26 PCP II had 146 lay 
delegates or 30% o f479, the total number of participants.27 Bishops alone had ‘deliberative’ 
votes, while the rest had ‘consultative’ votes. Bp. Claver argued that while ultimately the 
bishops decided, everyone had the opportunity to participate in the deliberation and in practice 
the consultative votes had a way of swaying the bishops’ verdict. It was an historic moment in 
that for first time in the life of the Philippine Church the lay people were not merely consulted. 
Indeed they participated and deliberated with the hierarchical leadership, a shining moment of 
hierarchy-laity relationship.
PCP II’s thrust to become a church of, not for, the poor through the formation of BECs
T A
was a major ecclesiological breakthrough in the Philippine Church. The poor were to become 
subjects and co-actors with the hierarchical leadership in the Church.31 The building of BECs 
was confirmed as the way forward for the Philippine Church where elements central to PCP II 
can be located: lay participation especially the poor, communion of the whole Church, and
24 John McBeth, ‘Battle of the bulge: church and state clash over contraception,’ Far Eastern Economic Review 12 
August 1993, 26.
25 Carroll, ‘Church and State...’ 183-184. Interview with Danilo Songco, Executive Director, CODE-NGO, 25 
January 2001, Quezon City.
26 For more details on PCP II see The National Coordinating Office, ‘Primer on the Second Plenary Council o f the 
Philippines,’ (Manila: CBCP, 1989)
27 Pedro de Achutegui, ‘Historical overview of the preparation and celebration of the Second Plenary Council o f the 
Philippines,’ in Journeying with the Spirit: a commentary on PCP II, eds. Paul Bernier and Manuel G. Gabriel, 
(Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1993), 6.
28 Francisco F. Claver, ‘Renewing a Church and nation,’ The Manila Chronicle, 02 February 1991, 5.
29 See The National Coordinating Office, ‘Primer on the Second Plenary council o f the Philippines,’ 44.
30 PCP II, Acts and Decrees o f  the Second Plenary Council o f  the Philippines, 20 January - 1 7  February 1991, 
(Manila: PCP II Secretariat, CBCP, 1992), 47-53; Antonio F. Moreno, ‘PCP II ecclesiology: a critical evaluation,’ 
Landas: Journal o f  Loyola School o f  Theology 8(1), (January 1994), 36-53.
31 PCP II, Acts and Decrees o f  the Second Plenary Council o f  the Philippines..., 52.
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renewed integral evangelisation.32 PCP II urged lay people to be politically involved ‘with 
singular competence and integrity.’33 In sum, it envisioned a ‘participatory church,’ a local 
version of the Vatican II ecclesio logical project.34
The implementation of PCP II, however, remained uneven in that some local Churches 
were more responsive to it than others. After a decade of PCP II, the National Pastoral 
Consultation on Church Renewal (NPCCR), composed of 369 delegates from all over the 
country, met in January 2001. The NPCCR declared that ‘many prescriptions of PCP II have not 
been implemented.’35 Weaknesses in many diocesan programs, attitudes of church leaders and 
in many cases sheer inaction of the Church people were highlighted as some of the key reasons. 
Within the Church, competing ecclesio logical and theological interpretations of the Church’s 
public engagement continue to cause internal division despite the reforms set out by Vatican II 
and PCP II. While organised church groups proliferated (e.g., Opus Dei, Couples for Christ, El 
Shaddai), they had different, at times opposing, theological bases for political involvement.
4.2 Emerging church actors and ecclesiological cleavages
Civil society organisations were not the only ones that proliferated after the authoritarian period. 
Church organisations and new religious movements likewise mushroomed. In the Philippine 
context, emerging church actors included the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC - Church of Christ), the 
fundamentalist movements that were staunchly anti-Catholic, Catholic groups such as El 
Shaddai, other charismatic movements, and Opus Dei. These actors sprang from different 
contexts. While many a time they competed with each other, the political positions they took 
made them either as allies or critics of both the Catholic Church and State.
32 Moreno, ‘PCP II ecclesiology....’
33 Ibid., 119.
j4 Claver, ‘Renewing a Church and nation.’




4.2.1 Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) and fundamentalist movements
The INC was founded in 1914 by Felix Y. Manalo, and later succeeded by his son Erano. 
Towards the end of President Marcos’ era, the INC rose to prominence, partly owing to his 
support. He visited periodically the INC’s main headquarters in Quezon City.37 In turn the INC 
leadership directed its members to vote for him in the 1986 elections, a move that nearly split its 
membership.38
The INC is a tightly organised and secretive church. Information about its total 
membership and operation is difficult to obtain. It was estimated in 1990 to have a following of
- IQ
1.4 million believers. At present, it has more than 200 congregations in 67 countries outside of 
the Philippines and its membership is estimated to be in the region of 3 to 10 million.40 The INC 
has a number of defining characteristics. Firstly, it is a highly centralised and directive church. 
The Church Council headed by Erano Manalo demands uncritical fidelity from its members.
From Biblical interpretation, personal moral behaviour to political issues such as voting 
candidates to public office, members are told to toe the INC line or face expulsion.41 During 
election periods, the INC officially endorses their candidates and members are told to vote for 
them, although poll survey expert Felipe Miranda argues that increasing socio-economic status 
of its members has given them more leeway in making political choices.42 Secondly, as part of 
its fundamental creed, the INC strictly maintains that only its members are the ‘elect of God,’ -  
the only ones to be saved by God.43 Marrying a non-INC member is a ground for dismissal.
37 Malou Mangahas, ‘Iglesia ni Cristo: Church at the crossroads,’ available from 
http://www.pcii. org/stories/2002/inc/html. 10 March 2003.
38 Ibid.
39 Malou Mangahas and Avigail M. Olarte, ‘Iglesia ni Cristo: “a most powerful union”,’ available from 
http://www.pcii.org/stories/2002/inc2.html. 10 March 2003.
40 ‘Iglesia ni Cristo (Church of Christ), ’ available from http://www.Catholic.com/librarv/iglesia ni cristo.asap. 07 
March 2003.
41 Ann C. Harper, ‘The Iglesia ni Cristo and Evangelical Christianity,’ Journal o f  Asian Mission 3(1) (2001), 113- 




They not only oppose vigorously the Catholic Church but also mainline Protestant Churches and 
the evangelicals. Irenic relationship with the INC as in many ecumenical circles remains a 
difficult task. Thirdly, although members are forbidden to join labour unions and other such 
associations, and from interfering in politics, the INC leadership openly supported President 
Marcos in the 1986 elections, Eduardo Cojuangco in 1992, and along with El Shaddai endorsed 
the candidacy of Joseph Estrada in 1998. Centralised governance within the INC makes its 
membership attractive politically to politicians seeking for public office or maintaining their 
incumbencies.
Apart from the INC, the fundamentalist groups were equally a contending force in the 
exercise of religio-political influence over a range of issues. The rise of fundamentalist 
movements was a universal phenomenon in new democracies. It affected, if not challenged, 
mainline Catholic and Protestant groups in Latin America, Africa and some parts of Asia (see 
Chapter Two). From 1985 to 1988, the non-Catholic population in the Philippines rose by 13%, 
and from 1988 to 1992, non-Catholics posted a significantly high 18% increase.44 With the 
increase of non-Catholics, one can only intuit that the ‘converts’ came mostly from the Catholic 
Church, although some belonged formerly to mainline Protestant Churches. The sizable drift to 
fundamentalist groups, notably the Bom Again movement and the evangelical Christians, is a 
significant factor that explains the growing number of non-Catholics. The fundamentalist 
Philippine cmsade movement estimates that in 1984, some 7,000 evangelical churches rose to
12,000 in 1989.45 On the basis of SEC records where organisations and establishments are 
registered, the Archdiocese of Manila observes that an ‘average of 290 non-Catholic religious 
groups established in 1987 and 1988, double the yearly average in the six previous years.’46 The 
challenge posed by the evangelical movement was evident in the bishops’ 1989 pastoral
44 CBCP Research Office, 1985 to 1995 Statistical profile o f  the Catholic Church in the Philippines, 18.
45 Cohen, ‘Catholics and fundamentalists fight for the faithful...,’ 43.
46 Ibid.
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statement ‘Hold fast to what is good,’ which criticised the group and declared a ‘National Bible 
Year.’47 Clearly this was a collective acceptance of the threat of fundamentalist groups and an 
attempt to protect its own fold from further drifting to the other side.
4.2.2 El Shaddai, other Catholic renewal movements and Opus Dei
The upsurge of El Shaddai, a Catholic charismatic movement, paralleled the Bom Again 
movement and other fundamentalist groups, although it also created some tensions within the 
Catholic Church. The genesis of El Shaddai was founded on Mariano (Brother Mike) Velarde’s 
‘miraculous healing’ of a heart condition in February 1978. Brother Mike, a failed real estate 
developer, acquired .the radio station DWXI in an effort to spread the Good News. In 1981, 
Brother Mike started a regular radio programme (through DWXI) that became successful. In 
1984, the radio listeners were invited to a Mass and healing session with Brother Mike. This 
small assembly (about a thousand) started the regular gathering of El Shaddai. Thus the DWXI 
Prayer Partners Foundation International (PPFI) was launched, and later acquired its full title ‘El 
Shaddai-DWXI-PPFI.’ It is basically a lay-led movement whose members come mostly from the 
working class. By 1995, around 1,300 local chapters have been established and 61 international 
chapters were set up in 25 countries.48 Some eight to ten million members are estimated to be 
members of El Shaddai making it the largest new religious movement in the Philippines and 
possibly all around the globe.49 El Shaddai’s political significance was laid bare when it took 
political choices that run counter to the official position of the Catholic Church. Although not as 
cohesive as the INC, Brother Mike commands a vast influence over his flock. In an effort to 
bridge the gulf between the Church hierarchy and El Shaddai, representatives of the CBCP met
47 Ibid.
48 Gorospe-Jamon, ‘The El Shaddai prayer movement..., 87; See also Esmeralda Fortunado-Sanchez, ‘The 
Experiences of several members of El Shaddai-DWXI-PPFI: a phenomenological study.’ A paper presented at the 
2002 CESNUR International Conference, Salt Lake City and Provo (Utah), 20-23 June 2002.
49 Gorospe-Jamon, ‘The El Shaddai prayer movement..., 88. Another estimate claims that El Shaddai has six million 
members. See U.S. Department of State, ‘Annual Report on international religious freedom for 1999.’ Released by 
the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington, D.C., 9 September 1999.
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Brother Mike in 1993 and ironed out a number of issues dividing the two parties. Bishop 
Teodoro Bacani became El Shaddai’s spiritual adviser along with a host of priests including Fr. 
Anton Pascual. Despite efforts to close ranks, tensions persisted between the two.
El Shaddai’s theological orientation generally follows mainline Catholic teaching while 
stressing some religious attitudes and practices. Like any charismatic movement, it has a 
tendency to over-spiritualise the human condition which can lead to depolitisation. In one 
survey, 72.9% of the respondents claim they pay their tithes religiously because they believe that 
blessings will go back to the giver.50 El Shaddai stresses the need for personal conversion as 
more crucial than structural transformation of society.51 Brother Mike’s dynamic preaching 
coupled with theatrics, popular bywords and personal touch of the masa (masses) is highly 
esteemed. In a survey conducted, 70.5% of the respondents ‘believe in everything that Velarde
52 • •says.’ Politicians seek his endorsement during election period because of his masa appeal over 
the members. Finally, El Shaddai seeks to follow the principle that the believer must obey 
incumbent authorities (church and state) since they all emanate from God.53 However, the 
movement became politicised and held political choices that challenged the Church and State.
Middle class Catholic charismatic movements, although not as numerous as El Shaddai, 
likewise grew during the post-Marcos period. These movements included the Couples for Christ 
(CfC), Ligaya ng Panginoon (Joy of the Lord), Bukas-loob sa Diyos (Generosity to God) and 
Brotherhood of Christian Business and Professionals. Of these movements, the CIC was most 
involved in the anti-Estrada campaign along with civil society actors.
Apart from the charismatic communities, the growth of Opus Dei in the Philippine 
Church has been extraordinary in the recent past. The Opus Dei, founded in 1928, rose to 
prominence particularly during the Pontificate of John Paul II. In 1982, the Pope declared the





Opus Dei as a personal prelature.54 Its founder, Josemaria Escriva de Balaguer, who died in 
1975, was beatified in 1992 and declared a saint ten years later.55 Governed by its own statutes 
and norms, Opus Dei’s 80,000 members (ordained ministers and lay people) come from every 
continent in the world and do not fall under conventional groupings (e.g., religious orders and 
congregations, traditional associations and movements) within the Church and are governed by 
their own statutes and norms.56 In 1964, the Opus Dei started in the Philippines and has since 
then gradually increased its membership and establishments. It is known for its conservative 
understanding of the Catholic faith and rigid observance of church teaching. Its members are 
highly educated, top professionals and coming mostly from the middle class and rich families. 
They run the country’s most expensive schools and some of their members are quite influential 
in ecclesial and government circles. Bernardo M. Villegas, a Harvard University trained 
economist and prominent Opus Dei member was a former Constitutional Commissioner. He was 
influential in crafting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Land (CARL) seen by many agrarian 
reform advocates as a ‘conservative version’ of reform.57 He used to head the Center for 
Research and Communications (CRC) (later to become the University of Asia and the Pacific), 
an Opus Dei-inspired establishment known for its influence in policy making that embodies neo­
liberal values (e.g., free-market economy). It is said that he lobbied intensely for a ‘conservative 
version’ of CARL at times using Catholic doctrines to back his position, while other noted 
church personalities (e.g., Jesuit priest Joaquin Bemas) supported a more liberal version.58 
Another Opus Dei member and Harvard University educated Jesus P. Estanislao served as
54 A ‘personal prelature’ is designed ‘to promote an appropriate distribution of priests, or to carry out special 
pastoral or missionary enterprises.... ’ (See The Code o f  Canon Law, 65). While in many cases the faithful belong to 
a territorial jurisdiction (e.g., diocese), members of the Opus Dei are juridically under this personal prelature. The 
Pope appoints a prelate (normally a bishop) to govern the prelature in accord with the statutes approved by the 
Apostolic See. The declaration became effective the following year.
55 Beat Muller, ‘Information Handbook on the Opus Dei Prelature,’ available from 
http://www.geocities.com/info opus dei/oous-dei-en.htm. 30 June 2003.
56 Ibid.
57 James Putzel, A Captive land: the politics o f  agrarian reform in the Philippines, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1992), 181-183, 205-209.
58 Ibid.
114
Cabinet Secretary59 to President Aquino, and as an adviser to President Ramos during the 1996 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
The significant rise of these Catholic charismatic communities and the Opus Dei speaks 
of the plurality of forces and ecclesio logical divides within the Church. If the tendency of these 
charismatic movements is to focus on community fellowship, spontaneity in faith expression and 
spiritual consolation, the Opus Dei stresses Christian education for personal conversion, strict 
observance of orthodox church teaching (often interpreted in its depoliticised form), and rigorous 
practice of faith and morals. In both cases, there is a tendency to dichotomise spiritual and 
temporal affairs by privileging the importance of the former over the latter. Both tend to de- 
emphasise Catholic social teaching and are less enthusiastic about rectifying acute class 
inequality. Both are hesitant to involve the Church in politics, although its moral position often 
has political implications. Other actors within the Church, having disparate ideological and 
political inclinations, are critical of both orientations (See 3.2.5 in Chapter Three). Clearly this 
plurality of church actors indicates that decades after Vatican II and one hundred years of 
Catholic social teaching did not resolve competing tendencies within the Church.
4.3 The Church’s support for the 1987 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution was not properly ratified and largely tailored to legitimise the 
authoritarian regime. President Aquino spared no time in abolishing it and ruled by Presidential 
Decrees under the so-called ‘Freedom Constitution.’60 She convened a forty-eight member 
Constitutional Commission, although the general public would have wanted an election of its
59 Estanislao first became the Secretary o f Economic Planning and Director General o f the National Economic 
Development Authority (NEDA), and then as Secretary of Finance, two key positions that addressed the economic 
recovery programme o f the government.
60 On March 25, 1986, Aquino officially declared her provisional constitution (Freedom Constitution), until the new 
constitution was ratified. In the meantime, she ruled by presidential decrees, abolished the National Assembly
(Batasang Pambansa), and restored the Bill o f Rights. See Wurfel, Filipino politics . .., 309.
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members.61 The Constitutional Commissioners included a wide range of representation from the 
NGO sector, political groups including Marcos’s KBL and activists from the Left, academic 
establishments, sectoral formations, business and professional groups and many others. The 
Catholic Church did not have official representatives but had people, likewise coming from 
different segments of the ecclesio logical spectrum, who were identified with it: Bp. Teodoro 
Bacani, Jesuit priest Joaquin G. Bemas, activist Good Shepherd nun Christine Tan, and lay 
leaders like Ambrosio Padilla, Francisco Rodrigo, Opus Dei economist Bernardo Villegas and 
Wilfrido Villacorta.62 Likewise, Rev. Cirilo Rigos, a pastor of the United Church of Christ in the 
Philippines (UCCP) was identified with the Protestant Church.63
The draft Constitution received full backing from the CBCP when it secured its own 
interests: a pro-family stance, anti-abortion, anti-divorce and anti-death penalty provisions, 
openness to religious instruction in government schools, human rights protection, social justice 
provisions, and safeguards against declaration of martial law.64 Cardinal Sin was particularly 
elated with the draft, although some church leaders had some misgivings about it.65 The CBCP in 
their pastoral letter of November 21, 1986 while ‘aware of the imperfections of the draft 
Constitution,’ appealed for an educational campaign to inform people about the new Constitution 
and recommended its ratification.66 Clearly the CBCP was not content on seeking its ratification 
as a public conferral of legitimacy on the Aquino presidency, although this was necessary. 
President Aquino’s campaign slogan was: ‘Yes to Cory! Yes to Democracy! Yes to the 
Constitution!’ while those opposed cried: ‘No to Cory! No to Communism! No to the
61 Jeffrey M. Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups: the challenges of democratic consolidation in the Philippines,’ in 
Democracy and its limits: lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the M iddle East eds., Howard Handleman and 
Mark Tessler (Notre Dame, Indiana: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1999), 182.
62 Santos, ‘A Short histoiy of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,’ 435.
63 Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino ‘miracle’ and the Philippine Churches,’ 17.
64 Desiree Carlos, ‘Sin backs Charter, peace talks, ’ M alaya, 05 November 1986,2. Santos, ‘A Short histoiy of the 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,’ 435.
65 Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino ‘miracle’ and the Philippine Churches,’ 17.
66 ‘A Covenant towards peace: A Pastoral Letter o f the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines on the 
Ratification of the 1986 Constitution of the Philippines,’ available from 
http://www.cbcponline.org/documents/1980s/1986-1986constitution.html. 21 February 2003.
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Constitution!’67 The National Council of Churches (NCCP) likewise campaigned for its 
ratification, but qualified its stance: ‘yes, but critical.’68 The NCCP found the draft strong on 
human rights, but less satisfactory in many provisions, such as safeguarding ‘freedom of 
religion.’69 On February 2, 1987, the Constitution was ratified overwhelmingly by 76% of the 
twenty-two million voters -an  extremely high participation rate of 90% of the total number of 
registered voters.70 Philippine Churches, particularly the Catholic Church, had a fair share of this 
victory as they campaigned vigorously for its ratification. The Left, on the other hand, expressed 
disappointment in the 1987 Constitution and campaigned for its rejection.
The 1987 Constitution underpinned Philippine democracy in the post-Marcos era. First, 
it was an attempt to mainstream people’s participation in a restored democracy. In the Charter, 
the Philippines is characterised as both ‘democratic and republican state’ to underscore the role 
of ‘people power’ which toppled the Marcos dictatorship in the February revolution.71 To this 
end, ‘The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organisations 
that promote the welfare of the nation.’72 In addition, ‘The State shall respect the role of 
independent people’s organisations to enable the people to pursue and protect collective interests 
and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.’73 The empowerment and participation of 
organised communities and associations became institutionalised in the 1987 Constitution that 
mandated the State to ‘facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.’74 
Given this auspicious constitutional backing, NGOs/POs flourished exponentially. It is estimated 
that from 1986 to 1995, the number ofNGOs rose by 160 percent, that is, from 27,100 to
67 Mark R. Thompson, ‘Off the endangered list: Philippine democratisation in comparative perspective,’ 
Comparative Politics 28(2), (1996), 192.
68 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 47.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Joaquin G. Bemas, ‘’’People power” in the charter,’ Today 14 February 2001, 8.




70,200.75 Although these NGOs were of different varieties, their phenomenal increase was a big 
boost for the civil society movement in the Philippines. The enactment of the Local Governance 
Act in 1991, principally authored by Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., also enabled devolution of 
power and the participation of NGOs and POs in the localisation of the democratic agenda. 
Assessment on the Local Governance Act, however, remained mixed: while the possibility of
7local governance was opened, local patronage politics and clientelism continued. Nonetheless, 
the fact that NGOs and POs occupied an important place in the Constitution meant that a new 
wave of citizenship was in the offing. In a way, the 1987 Constitution enlarged the discourse 
and practice of citizenship to promote people’s participation and social inclusion as a new mode 
of ‘people power’ in the post-authoritarian context. Although dismissed by many as merely 
trappings of formal democracy, James Putzel argues that with the growth of NGOs and POs in 
the Philippines, formal democratic institutions allowed interest articulation and representation of
• 77basic sectors of society which otherwise would not have been possible.
Second, the Constitution instituted safeguards against a powerful executive branch to 
avoid a repeat of political dictatorship. Thus it clipped the powers of the executive branch 
notably by not allowing the president to seek office for a second consecutive term. A powerful 
congressional commission was tasked to confirm or deny any presidential appointee to the 
cabinet. A party list system based on proportional representation for 20% of the congressional 
seats (51 of the 250 possible seats) was later drawn up to ensure participation of politically 
excluded but organised sectors of society who have less chances of winning electoral contests.78 
The party list system in principle was a legislative mechanism to secure participation from
75 Gerard Clarke, The Politics o f  NGOs in Southeast Asia: participation and protest in the Philippines (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 93.
76 James Putzel, ‘Survival of an imperfect democracy in the Philippines,’ Democratization 6(1), (1999), 214. On 
this point, Sidel argues correctly that local bossism and capital accumulation in the Philippines, a rather widespread 
phenomenon, does undermine democratisation. See John T. Sidel, Capital, coercion, and crime: bossism in the 
Philippines (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999).
77 Putzel, ‘Survival o f an imperfect democracy in the Philippines,’ 198-223.
78 David Wurfel, ‘The Party-List elections: sectoral failure or national success,’ Political B rief 6(2), (February 
1998), 4.
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marginalised groups, although its operation left much to be desired. A small number of the Left 
and political activists in the 1998 and 2001 elections and beyond would later assume 
congressional seats owing to the party list system.
Third, the 1987 Constitution gave legitimacy to state apparatuses such as the judiciary as 
well as legislative and executive branches of the government. However imperfect and weak they 
were, they restored public confidence and enabled a number of social activists to become part of 
the very establishment they so despised during the Marcos years. Thus the Constitution 
reaffirmed the primacy of law, a far cry from the personalistic rule of Marcos.79
Finally, the 1987 Constitution enshrined key provisions that in a way induced organised 
groups and marginalised sectors to participate in framing policies affecting their lives. This is 
particularly true in the case of human rights and social justice provisions (e.g., agrarian 
reform).80 Although the social justice provision in the 1987 Constitution as such is not equated 
to democracy building in the sense used in this study (see Chapter One), it provided a political 
opportunity for people to articulate their concerns and participate in framing social policies, a 
key dimension of democracy building. Provisions on the protection of labour, agrarian reform, 
urban land reform and housing, health, women and the premium given to people’s organisations 
appear to indicate the Constitution’s concern for the marginalised sectors of society, although the 
legislative translations of these were veiy uneven. Although the agrarian reform provision in the 
Constitution was not progressive, it did not stop activists including Florencio Abad (later 
appointed as Agrarian Reform Secretary by Aquino) from trying to make it work. His 
appointment increased farmers’ confidence and enabled them to participate actively in 
articulating and lobbying their interests. Nonetheless, many social reform bills were diluted by a 
deeply cautious Congress and a weak executive leadership that did not exert enough influence on
79 Mark R. Thompson, The Anti Marcos struggle: personalistic rule and democratic transition in the Philippines 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995).
80 The 1987 Constitution o f  the Republic o f  the Philippines..., 4-8, 46-51.
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the Congress in crafting social legislations.81 A typical example of this is the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Land Reform (CARL), a supposedly social reform centrepiece of the Aquino 
administration that was emasculated when passed by the Congress. On the other hand, the 
successful passage of the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) in 1992 indicated that it 
was possible to pass pro-poor social legislation through skilful, persistent and coordinated 
lobbying efforts of the parties concerned. In UDHA’s case, the key players included the Urban 
Land Reform -  Task Force (ULR-TF), the Institute of Church and Social Issues (ICSI), the BBC 
through Jesuit priest Joel E. Tabora, Cardinal Sin and influential elements in the Congress.82
4.4 Defending a fragile democracy
The Aquino administration inherited a deeply politicised and fragmented military arising from its 
experience of martial law. It survived seven attempted military coups, a rather exceptional case 
among new democracies.83 These were led at some point either by key leaders of REFORM84 
the Armed forces of the Philippines movement (RAM) including Lt. Colonels Gregorio Honasan, 
Victor Batac and Eduardo Kapunan or by Marcos military loyalists, and in some cases jointly by 
both parties. Although these military mutinies failed, ironically ‘they unwittingly scored 
victories for the Armed Forces as a whole in its bid for more political influence.’85 As a result of 
these coups, increasingly the Aquino government favoured collective military interests by 
acceding to their demands for a large budget allocation, more counter-insurgency operations, and
81 Rocamora, Breaking through..., 45, 50-53.
82 Anna Marie A. Karaos, Marlene V. Gatpatan, Robert V. Hotz, ‘Making a difference: NGO and PO policy 
influence in Urban Land Reform advocacy,’ Pulso 15 (January 1995).
83 Thompson records 8 attempted military coups. See Thompson, ‘Off endangered list...,’ 179.
84 Thompson, The Anti-Marcos struggle..., 169. REFORM originally stands for Restore Ethics, Fair-Mindedness, 
Order, Righteousness. Initially a reformist bloc within the AFP, but RAM became a new political group after the 
seventh coup attempt. The movement later changed RAM to Revolutionary Alliance for the Masses and presented 
its comprehensive programme during the peace talks, which appeared no different from that of a political party, see 
Temario C. Rivera, ‘O f guards and gods: the military rebels and the peace process,’ in Ending the armed conflict: 
peace negotiations in the Philippines ed. Emmanuel C. Lallana (Quezon City: University o f the Philippines Center 
for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippine Press, 1992), 57, 60-61.
85 Villacorta, ‘Ideological orientation of the political forces in the Aquino era,’ 165.
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the dismissal of reform-minded elements in the Cabinet.86 The last and worst attempted military 
coup in December 1989 was held at bay due to the intervention of US Air Force planes which 
flew over Metro Manila to prevent rebel planes from flying. These attempted military coups not 
only hampered the process of democratisation but equally damaged the ailing national economy. 
Clearly at this point, Philippine democracy was far from Dankwart ‘habituation phase’ where 
conflicting interests of actors are sorted within the confines of democratic institutions.87
Cardinal Sin assailed the military rebels as ‘false messiahs,’ but was also equally forceful 
in pressing the government to introduce much awaited social reforms (e.g., agrarian reform).88 
The Archdiocese of Manila mobilised the people to a gathering of the faithful for a Mass and 
prayer at the blessing of the Shrine of Our Lady of Peace at EDSA on December 8, 1989.89 The 
faithful were enjoined to assemble in their parishes and demonstrate their support ‘for peace and 
democracy.’90 The coup plotters were condemned. The prayerful event was also intended by 
Cardinal Sin as a soul-searching occasion and time for repentance for the ‘sins that have 
contributed to this national tragedy.’91 In his view, the coup attempts were neither purely 
military adventurism on the part of the perpetrators nor were they simply the government’s 
faults, but partly linked to people’s political culture and exercise of citizenship. By rallying the 
people to defend the fragile democracy, the Church rekindled people’s sense of citizenship and 
vigilance against attempts to erode democratic gains. People’s participation in this exercise 
displayed a fine church ad intra (hierarchy-laity interaction) in operation.
In 1991, the AFP Chief of Staff General Lisandro Abadia released from detention almost 
100 military officers and rank and file soldiers associated with coup attempts and placed them
86 Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups...,’ 192-194.
87 Dankwart A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model,’ Comparative Politics 2 (1970), 337- 
363.
88 Amando Doronila, ‘Constitution gives Cory a vast arsenal against coups,’ The Manila Chronicle 08 December 
1989, 3
89 The Shrine was dedicated by the Catholic Church in honour o f the Blessed Virgin Mary whom the Church 
believed interceded during the days of the EDSA uprising in February 1986.
90 Institute on Church and Social Issues, ‘People power returns,’ The Manila Chronicle, 08 December 1989, 5.
91 Ibid.
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under the charge of their respective commanders ostensibly to facilitate peace talks with the 
RAM and other rebellious factions within the military. Various civil society organisations and 
church people opposed the reinstatement of the military rebels. Cardinal Sin deplored their 
release as ‘overhasty accommodation’ and argued that these coup plotters ‘ought to be punished,
• • Q*} #not reinstated in office, and banned forever from military power.’ In the interest of national 
reconciliation, Aquino supported Abadia’s peace efforts, believing that peace based on justice 
was still a viable option.94 At this point, the Aquino government was beholden to the military for 
‘saving’ constitutional democracy. This was quite evident in the treatment of coup plotters 
which ‘was typically personalistic and indulgent rather than principled and institutional.’95
4.5 The Church and elections
Strengthening democracy entails enhancing institutions that underpin democratic life and 
processes. A crucial democratic institution is the electoral system which guarantees that elected 
public officials have a direct mandate from voters. During the authoritarian period, there was 
little public confidence in the electoral system. Electoral exercises in 1980 (local), in 1981 
(presidential), in 1984 (national assembly) and in 1986 (presidential), ‘held under the repressive 
conditions of centralised authoritarian rule, were neither free nor fair,’ in the estimation of many 
political analysts.96 Low participation, except in the 1986 elections, was expected. In contrast 
the people including some elements in the Left who had traditionally called for electoral boycott, 
participated in the electoral system in the post-Marcos period. Moreover, these elections had
0 7generally lower violent and death-related incidents. John Linantud claims that the deployment
92 Rivera, ‘Of guards and gods: the military rebels and the peace process,’ 61.
93 Ibid., 62.
94 Ibid.
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of the military in its increasingly depoliticised state and the active involvement of the Church in
• QOelectoral reform were important developments curbing electoral violence. The Church’s 
participation in restoring confidence in the post-authoritarian electoral processes particularly in 
the 1992 and 1998 elections was indeed a significant factor in democracy building.
4.5.1 The 1987 congressional and local elections
The first congressional elections after the ratification of the 1987 Charter were held on May 11, 
1987. Owing to the restored confidence in the electoral system, unlike in the 1986 elections, the 
Church was not organised as an electoral watchdog for the 1987 elections. Having supported 
wholeheartedly the ratification of the Charter, some elements in the Church leadership wanted to 
ensure that the elective posts should be given to the people it thought would strengthen 
democratisation. Cardinal Sin appeared in a TV programme and endorsed 10 administration 
candidates as a ‘moral choice,’ despite his insistence that the members of the clergy ‘should not 
campaign for any political party or candidate.’99 The AMRSP, without overtly campaigning, 
also came up with its own list of acceptable candidates for the Senate which included three Left- 
leaning candidates.100 These manifestations of partisan politics cast a shadow on the Church’s 
credibility as a non-partisan Organisation. Nonetheless, the partisan tendencies did not represent 
an official church position since the CBCP ostensibly maintained neutrality.
The 1987 elections showed incremental signs of maturing democracy. First, the 85.5% 
rate of participation showed people’s growing confidence in the electoral system.101 Second, 
pro-Aquino candidates got 22 of the 24 seats in the Senate and 170 of the 196 seats in the House
A. B. Villanueva, ‘Parties and elections in Philippine politics,’ Contemporary South Asia 18(2), (September 1996), 
175-192.
98 Ibid.
99 Clad, ‘Priests o f “peaceful revolution” committed to new role...,’ 42.
100 Ibid.
101 Clarita R. Carlos, and Rommel Banlaoi, Elections in the Philippines: from precolonial period  to the present 
(Makati City: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1996), 143.
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of Representative.102 In effect the Marcos traditional political machinery was dismantled at this 
juncture. Third, the participation of the Partido ng Bayan (Party of the People) and the Alliance 
of New Politics (ANP), although they failed miserably, heralded the Left’s partial re-entry in 
electoral politics.103 Since the disintegration of the Democratic Alliance in the late 1940s, the 
Left has generally boycotted participation in elections.
4.5.2 The 1992 elections
The May 11, 1992 synchronised (national and local) elections were extremely crucial in the 
transition to democracy. This electoral exercise was the first democratic presidential voting 
exercise since Filipinos elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1965. Since July 1991, the 
CBCP had issued a total of four pastoral statements pertaining to the 1992 elections to 
underscore the significance of the event in the life of a fledgeling democracy.104 President 
Aquino endorsed the candidacy of Fidel V. Ramos, her former Defence Minister who stood by 
her government during the attempted military coups. Ramos, a Protestant in a dominantly 
Catholic nation, was thought to have been feared by some conservative members and leaders of 
the Catholic fold.105 He was a key enforcer of martial law in the 1970s as chief of the Philippine 
Constabulary (PC). This was still fresh in the minds of people who resisted the Marcos regime, 
especially to Cardinal Sin.106 Although the CBCP did not endorse any candidates, Cardinal Sin 
was perceived to have made a ‘whispering campaign’ for Ramon Mitra who finished in the 4th 
place.107 When it was evidently clear that the INC with its 2 million voting members was 
supporting Eduardo Cojuangco, Sin released a pastoral letter on April 19 citing issues militating 
against the candidates without their names.108 Political observers were quick to notice that Mitra
102 Ibid., 144.
103 Ibid.
104 Fancisco F. Claver, ‘ Church: non-partisan but active,’ Intersect 6(6), (1992), 8-9.
105 Carroll, ‘Cracks in the wall o f separation?..., 20.
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was not implicated in the criticisms in the Cardinal’s pastoral letter. Mitra’s defeat sent an 
unmistakably strong signal that the electorate had had enough of traditional politicians 
(trapos).109 President-elect Ramos was not perceived as a trapo.
By Philippine electoral standards, Ramos assumed the presidency anchored on a 
relatively weak electoral mandate. Ramos garnered only 23.58% of the votes cast in a six-way 
contest, meaning, at least 75% of the voting public rejected him.110 Moreover, the electoral 
outcome showed that the Marcos allies were alive and well. If one were to combine the votes for 
Imelda Marcos and Eduardo Cojuangco who were natural political allies, 28.49% of the 
electorate voted for them, higher than that of Ramos.111 This plainly showed the resurgence of 
the Marcos loyalists and supporters.
4.5.3 The Church-based electoral movements
Post-independence church involvement in elections was uneven until the elections of 1984. The 
1986 presidential snap elections saw a massive reactivation of the electoral watch group 
NAMFREL after the Catholic bishops formalised an alliance with business and professional 
groups. They were traditional supporters o f NAMFREL since early 1950s.112 NAMFREL, being 
the only recognised electoral movement in the 1986 elections was a very broad formation of 
sectors covering the business people, academic establishments, the Church, civic groups and 
other private organisations. NAMFREL, however was tainted with partisan politics when its 
head, Jose Concepcion, was appointed as Secretary of Trade and Industry, a Cabinet position in 
the Aquino government. Further, allegations that it favoured government candidates in
« i  i  -i
NAMFREL’s OQC in 1987, tarnished its image as non-partisan. These, among others, were
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reasons that prompted church leaders who were involved in NAMFREL to form their own 
electoral movement.114 Two important church-based electoral movements surfaced in the 1990s: 
the Pastoral Parish Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and Voters Organisation, Training 
and Education toward Clear, Authentic, Responsible Voting (VOTE-CARE).
PPCRV, a PCP II baby, was a concrete lay response to help build the country’s fragile 
democracy.115 PPCRV, together with NASS A’s VOTE-CARE in no time became a key national 
electoral watch movement in 1990s. The creation of church electoral watchdogs PPCRV and 
VOTE-CARE in 1991 marked a watershed in the Church’s engagement in electoral reform 
because for the first time in history, church-based electoral organisations of national importance 
emerged. Given the fragility of the electoral institution, it was crucially important that the voting 
public be politically informed and that they participate in the electoral exercise. Thus PPCRV 
and VOTE-CARE attempted to increase public confidence in the electoral system. Although in 
practice, a good number of church people (priests including) would still be involved in 
NAMFREL, both PPCRV and VOTE-CARE being church-based and church-initiated, were 
ultimately under the Church leadership. Three smaller church-based electoral groups with 
national scope collaborated with PPCRV and VOTE-CARE: Simbahang Lingkod ng Bay an 
(SLB, Church -Servant of the Country) which provided voters’ education materials, logistics 
support and volunteers; Seminarians’ National Network for Free Elections (SEM-NET), a 
network of diocesan seminaries and the Association of Catholic Radio Broadcasters comprising 
of at least 40 church-based radio stations throughout the country.116
PPCRV was the Church’s response to the proverbial threat o f ‘guns, goons and gold’ that 
plagued Philippine electoral politics.117 PPCRV had three general objectives: 1) ‘to draw forth
114 Ibid.
115 Interview with Dra. Zenaida Rotea, former Vice-Chairperson of PPCRV, Quezon City, 18 January 2001.
116 Claver, ‘Church: non partisan but active.’
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awareness to the necessity of Christian involvement in Elections 1992 as an integral expression 
of faith in God and in the human person;’ 2) ‘to provide fora and materials to inform and 
motivate the Filipino voter, and to vote wisely and responsibly;’ 3) ‘to organise, support and/or 
network with groups concerned in the implementation of a truly democratic election, free from
n o  • • •
anomalies, so as to uphold the people’s will.’ Although initiated by the Archdiocese of 
Manila, with full backing from Cardinal Sin, PPCRV became a national electoral arm of the 
Philippine Church covering some 54 local Churches all over the country.119 Henrietta T. de 
Villa, then chairperson of the Council of the Laity of the Philippines (CLP) headed PPCRV.120 
The COMELEC accredited PPCRV on February 18, 1992 well before the May 1992 elections. 
Major activities of PPCRV included pre-election preparations such as organisation of 
coordinating councils (e.g., arch/diocese, district, parish) to recruit trainers and volunteers; 
voters’ education; and information campaign.121 On the election day itself, PPCRV assumed 
many tasks such as poll watching, voters’ assistance to the voting public, assisting members of 
the Board of Electoral Inspectors (BEI), ensuring and protecting electoral returns, monitoring 
electoral exercise, assisting NAMFREL’s operation quick count (OQC), and keeping watch 
during the canvassing of votes in designated places. PPCRV was able to recruit 346,688 
volunteers in the 1992 elections.122 Printed educational materials which were distributed reached 
899,435.123 Public approval of PPCRV was relatively high after the 1992 elections. With 69% 
level of awareness, in September 1992, PPCRV gained a satisfaction margin of +45.124
118 ‘Faith and fire: the PPCRV way,’ A Post election report o f the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting 
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VOTE-CARE was conceived in October 1991, eight months after the celebration of PCP 
II, when the bishops and the social action directors expressly desired to participate in the 1992 
elections. In the National Social Action General Assembly (NASAGA), Edilberto Calang 
Guyano, then a new staff of NASS A, was tasked to conceptualise the programme.125 Some
550,000 volunteers were recruited by NAMFREL, PPCRV and VOTE-CARE for the 1992 
elections. Many volunteers in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections assumed double affiliations 
(PPCRV and VOTE-CARE), even triple memberships including NAMFREL.127 VOTE-CARE’s 
primary goal along with that of PPCRV was voters’ education.128 The voters’ education was 
aimed not only to make the electoral exercise peaceful, clean and honest, but meaningful, 
namely, enabling the voters to shift from patronage-based to issue-based politics.129 VOTE- 
CARE, like PPCRV, was accredited by COMELEC, a positive recognition that these citizens’ 
electoral organisations were allies of the government in ensuring electoral confidence.
PPCRV and VOTE-CARE were basically led by the lay leaders (e.g., de Villa and 
Guyano) with the support and participation of the bishops, members of the clergy and religious 
orders and congregations. The conceptualisation of their programmes was mainly done by lay
1 mpeople. Its operations were largely conducted by lay people in conjunction with church 
leaders in the national and local areas. In this way, the two electoral watch groups exemplified 
church ad intra (hierarchy-laity) interaction making the project truly a church endeavour.
The 1992 elections were relatively peaceful compared with the elections during the 
authoritarian period, although incidents of cheating and election-related violence were reported. 
Some 87 violent incidents and 60 deaths were reported, a significant improvement on the 296
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violent incidents and 153 deaths in the 1986 elections or to the 1984 elections where 918 counts 
of violence and 154 deaths were recorded.131 Thanks to PPCRV’s candidates forum, the 
programmes of the candidates were scrutinised by the voting public.132 The signing of ‘peace 
covenants’ among candidates was institutionalised by electoral watch movements making the 
candidates promise to desist from using violence and respect the electoral outcome. Honouring 
the covenants was another thing, but at least they sealed their intent under the watchful eyes of 
the citizenry. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of PPCRV and VOTE-CARE’s voters’ 
education campaign which included tri-media exposure. Nonetheless, the information campaign 
did create an alternative venue of debate and discussion, other than the campaign issues raised by 
the candidates themselves. Poll watching was the main event for PPCRV and VOTE-CARE on 
election day itself.133 Voters’ assistance desks were set up in polling places making PPCRV’s 
presence visible and assistance readily available when voters were in need of help. In many 
cases where members of the Board of Electoral Inspectors (BEI) were not around, PPCRV 
volunteers assisted.134 Citizens’ political education was initiated by both PPCRV and VOTE- 
CARE, but unfortunately this was not sustained beyond the election period.135
4.5.4 The 1995 congressional and local elections
The 1995 elections, like the 1992 elections, were relatively smooth, despite some 97 counts of 
violent incidents and 73 reported deaths. A new technique of electoral fraud, namely, 
Operation Dagdag-Bawas (vote padding and shaving),137 was uncovered, but the case was never
131 Linantud, ‘Whither guns, goons, and gold?..., 301. See Appendix 5, Appendices
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settled.138 PPCRV and VOTE-CARE were both engaged in the 1995 congressional elections, 
but not to the extent that they did in 1992 and later in 1998. PPCRV had 270,000 volunteers 
(from 368,455 in 1992) while VOTE-CARE recruited 250,000 members.139 Once again many 
PPCRV and VOTE-CARE volunteers assisted NAMFREL’s OQC.140 Having successfully made 
the 1987 and 1992 elections, the 1995 elections were not perceived as a crucial electoral 
exercise. PPCRV, for its part, lost members to political parties that hired volunteers.141 Political 
parties paid generously their volunteers, whereas PPCRV did not have enough funds for its 
members. These developments probably help to explain why in June 1995, PPCRV’s level of 
awareness dropped slightly to 66% (from 69% in 1992) and its satisfaction margin slid down to 
+34 (from+45 in 1992).142
4.5.5 The 1998 elections
The CBCP in July 1997 issued ‘Pastoral Exhortation on Philippine Politics’, a lengthy exposition 
clarifying the nature of church’s political involvement. The pastoral exhortation once again 
affirmed that the Church’s political involvement is principally rooted in religious and moral 
motives derived from the Sacred Scriptures, Vatican II and PCP II.143 An outcome of this 
exposition was a resolution issued by NASAGA mandating VOTE-CARE to focus on ‘political 
education for critical and responsible voting’ in between elections.144 The programme began in 
October 1997, which was relatively late for the May 1998 elections. The political education 
conducted by both PPCRV and VOTE-CARE in the 1998 elections did not seem to make an 
impact since the voting public still elected a number of people on the basis of personal popularity 
and not in terms of the programmes they represented.145 This appears to be a significant
138 Carlos and Banlaoi, Elections in the Philippines..., 151-155.
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limitation of the PPCRV and VOTE-CARE campaigns, but given the political machineries, 
deeply entrenched political base of many traditional politicians, and the resources that sustained 
their political clout, personality-based politics was still the order of the day. In addition, PPCRV 
and VOTE-CARE were reactivated when the election period was getting close (around six 
months before the elections). This meant that they needed more time to launch their pre­
elections activities. Further, given the time constraints, the success of voters’ education was 
uneven and largely dependent on the skills and knowledge of the staff giving the seminars. 
Voters’ seminars often were conducted in a non-participatory way.
Nevertheless, PPCRV and VOTE-CARE in general were involved in a systematic and 
extensive way in the 1998 presidential elections. PPCRV was engaged in sanitising voters’ 
registration, voters’ education, recruitment of volunteers, poll watching, and all the other 
activities they did in the 1992 elections. In many cases, PPCRV had more national projection in 
the media, volunteers and extensive network while VOTE-CARE had more financial resources, 
better educational and more progressive materials for voters’ education.146 PPCRV sent 
volunteers to 57 out of 79 or 72% of the total number of arch/dioceses.147 VOTE-CARE 
supported financially 42 out of 79 (53% of the arch/diocesan social action centres) a total of 
$156,100 with an average of $3,700 per local Church.148 In February 1998 PPCRV garnered a 
relatively high +49 trust rating while VOTE-CARE had +26 which showed positive recognition 
in what they were doing, the former more than the latter.149
Mainline Church sentiment was apprehensive that popular action movie star Joseph 
‘Erap’ E. Estrada would be elected as President. Although not officially articulated by the
146 Ibid.; Lopez interview, 15 January 2001. See Schaffer ‘Clean elections and the “great 
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Church, short of mentioning his name, it campaigned against Estrada on the basis of his known 
lifestyle and moral values.150 In their Sunday homilies, priests exhorted the faithful to vote for 
morally upright candidates.151 This was perceived as a campaign against Estrada. These 
attempts to erode popular sentiments for Estrada proved unsuccessful. Estrada remained very 
popular particularly with the poor. He successfully projected himself as a crime-buster when he 
was in charge of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) as Vice President to President 
Ramos. He also built an image, perhaps owing to his movies, as an action man not identified 
with the trapos. Most importantly he was commonly identified with the masa (masses). 
Estrada’s campaign rhetoric, Erappara sa mahirap (Erap for the poor) captured the sentiments 
of the masa. Much to the chagrin of the Church, the INC and El Shaddai supported Estrada. 
Shortly before the election, Estrada declared: ‘Brother Mike is more influential than Cardinal 
Sin, that’s why I’m choosing him as my spiritual adviser and with him around, the country can’t 
go wrong.’152 Given his popularity plus a well-oiled political party, Laban ng Makabayang 
Masang Pilipino (LAMMP, Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino Masses), supported by business 
tycoons including Lucio Tan and Eduardo Cojuangco, he won nearly 40% of the total votes cast, 
largely from poorer classes.153 In a ten-candidate contest, the administration candidate former 
House Speaker Jose de Venecia could only collect close to 16% of the voters.154 Alfredo Lim, 
backed publicly by Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin, finished a poor fifth garnering only 8.7% 
of votes.155 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ran successfully for Vice-President under the Lakas- 
NUCD party securing some 50.2% of votes cast, more than Estrada’s votes.156
150 See Belinda A. Aquino, ‘Filipino elections and “illiberal” democracy,’ Public Policy 11(3), (July/September 
1998), 8.
15lMontinola, ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines,’ 128.
152 Gorospe-Jamon, ‘The El Shaddai Prayer Movement..., 89.
153 Mahar Mangahas, SWS Surveys in the 1998 national elections (Quezon City: Social Weather Stations, 1998), 
124.
154 Montinola, ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines,’ 128.
155 Ibid.
156 Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups...,’ 207.
132
More than any of the elections prior to 1998, quite a significant number of athletes, 
movie stars, and showbiz (show business) celebrities were elected to public office leading one
1 ^ 7political observer to label the phenomenon as ‘star-isation not democratisation,’ Another take 
of the 1998 elections sees not so much the triumph o f ‘personality politics’ as its linkage with 
money and political machinery which increased one’s chances of securing public office.
However one views it, clearly in the Philippine electoral experience, given its weak party system 
and lack of unifying ideological programme distinguishing the manifold political parties, there is 
a proclivity to focus less on the programmes and party lines that the candidates represent.
PPCRV and VOTE-CARE’s candidates’ forum and voters’ education attempted to address these 
issues, but failed to some degree.
4.5.6 The electoral watchdogs: tensions and synergies
The relationship between the PPCRV and VOTE-CARE was not always smooth. In some cases, 
tensions and competitions arose mainly from ‘personality conflicts’ and ‘turf battles’ particularly 
among the leaders based in Manila.159 The COMELEC’s mandate to both the PPCRV and 
VOTE-CARE were similar: voters’ education, assistance to voters on election day, poll watching 
and assistance to NAMFREL’s OQC.160 The bishops as early as January 1992 agreed that each 
diocese or local Church would decide on which lead group to choose (VOTE-CARE, PPCRV or 
NAMFREL). Further, they should coordinate efforts amongst themselves and with 
COMELEC.161 Nonetheless, their (VOTE-CARE and PPCRV) working relationship continued to 
overlap and the question of legal accountability when the volunteers had double affiliations was
1A7raised. Their relationship was further strained when VOTE-CARE got funding from Misereor,
157 Aquino, ‘Filipino elections and “illiberal” democracy,’ 19-21.
158 John Sidel, ‘Take the money and run? “Personality” politics in the post-Marcos Era.’ Public Policy 11(3), 
(July/September 1998), 27-38.
159 Callahan, Pollwatching, elections and civil society in Southeast Asia, 91.
160 Guyano, ‘Citizens for clean polls,’ 17.
161 General Secretariat, ‘Minutes of the Bishops’ 65th Plenary Assembly, 24-25 July 1992,’ (Manila: CBCP, 1992), 
22 .
162 Edilberto Calang, Guyano, ‘Success at the grassroots,’ NASSA News XXIII(3), (May-June 1995), 11 & 12.
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a German funding organisation, and PPCRV did not. This led to the impression that NASSA 
blocked PPCRV’s bid. NASSA’s Executive Director Bp. Claver rectified this impression in a 
CBCP meeting.163 The bishops thought of fusing the two parties on the national level, but this 
was unsuccessful.164 In January 1997, it was resolved in the bishops’ meeting that PPCRV 
would handle the election activities while VOTE-CARE tackle voters’ education in between 
elections, and let NAMFREL take charge of its OQC.165 While the overlapping of tasks still 
continued in the 1998 elections, these electoral movements in general collaborated with each 
other and accomplished their respective mandates from the bishops.166 To simplify the 
operations in many dioceses, the volunteers held the PPCRV, VOTE-CARE and at times 
NAMFREL identification cards.167 They used the appropriate ID card when they assumed 
various tasks.
PPCRV, associated with known personalities such as COMELEC Commissioner Haydee 
Yorac and CLP head Henrietta T. de Villa, PPCRV chairperson, had more extensive media 
exposure compared with VOTE-CARE, but the latter, since it was not parish-based, enjoyed the 
confidence of other volunteers who were not necessarily Catholics (e.g., Muslims and 
Protestants) and non-practicing Catholics.168 PPCRV, owing to the fact that Cardinal Sin had a 
hand in it, was initially under the Archdiocese of Manila and later placed under the jurisdiction 
of CBCP, although the divide was not always clear.169 PPCRV held Metro Manila and many 
provinces while VOTE-CARE focused on the arch/dioceses outside of Manila.170 PPCRV had 
the parishes to mobilise, while VOTE-CARE relied on the social actions centres.
163 General Secretariat, ‘Minutes o f the Bishops’ 70th Plenary Assembly, 09 January 1995,’ (Manila: CBCP, 1995), 
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The partnership between the Church-based electoral watchdogs and civil society 
organisations (e.g., NAMFREL) was generally based on their commitment to electoral reform. 
Despite some tensions particularly amongst the national leadership of the electoral movements, 
there was cooperation overall on the national and local levels. PPCRV and VOTE-CARE 
handled the voters’ education and activities on election day while NAMFREL conducted its 
OQC.171 PPCRV’s linkages with NAMFREL and with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 
(IBP) were formalised by way of covenant signing and memorandum of agreement respectively. 
With NAMFREL, it was agreed that they ‘pool together any and/or all their resources in a 
coordinated manner,’ create coordinating councils from national to local, and the division of 
labour between the two parties, that is, PPCRV would take the voters’ education and assist 
NAMFREL’s OQC.172 With IBP, mutual assistance and coordination was agreed particularly in
• * 1  H'X •dealing with legal electoral issues and voters’ education. In this way partnership between the 
Church (through PPCRV and VOTE-CARE) and other civil society organisations (e.g., 
NAMFREL and IBP) was defined and aimed to strengthen the electoral system.
A number of factors help to explain church-based electoral groups and NAMFREL.
First, the historical affinity between the Church and NAMFREL, even dating as far back as in the 
early 1950s when the latter was created, factored in this relationship. The Church has since then 
consistently backed NAMFREL’s electoral agenda and its unwavering support saw action in the 
1986 snap presidential election. Second, aside from the hierarchy’s continued pronouncement of 
support for NAMFREL, some members of the clergy and lay people continued their affiliation 
with it. The presence of these church people was crucial for the maintenance of their 
relationship. Third, the electoral agenda was prized highly by both the Church and NAMFREL,
171 Ibid.; Lopez interview 15 January 2001.
172 PPCRV-NAMFREL, ‘Covenant of commitment and collaboration,’ in “Report of the Parish Pastoral Council for 
Responsible Voting (PPCRV) to the Commission on Elections and to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f the 
Philippines on the conduct of the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, n.d., unpublished.
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so whatever tensions that existed between the two arising from the personalities of their national 
leaders and competition to win public recognition, these were eventually relegated to the 
background.
In sum, the Church’s involvement in the conduct of electoral exercises in the 1990s 
revolved mainly around its support for church-based electoral watch movements (PPCRV and 
VOTE-CARE) and their relationship with NAMFREL, apart from the customary 
pronouncements it made urging voters to participate in the exercise, to vote wisely and to ensure 
fair, clean, honest, and meaningful elections. These electoral mobilisations evidently 
underpinned a new wave of citizenship that enabled people to participate in the electoral process 
and not something which can be conveniently left to the parties and the COMELEC (a 
government commission). The church’s efforts at citizenship building in this regard seem to 
nuance two positions that dominate the literature on electoral politics: elections as a ‘means of 
depoliticising populations’ and elections as a way o f ‘widening the sphere of legitimate political 
activity by demonstrating the illegitimacy of the old regime.’174 Neither of the two phenomena 
was fiilly evident in the Philippine context. The post-authoritarian elections were a political 
opportunity for mobilising an informed and engaged citizenry with the aid of PPCRV, VOTE- 
CARE as both interacted with the Church hierarchy alongside other civil society organisations 
(e.g., NAMFREL, IBP). These electoral movements not only attempted to restore confidence in 
the electoral institution, but also broadened the issues around electoral politics through political 
education and participation.
In PPCRV and VOTE-CARE, hierarchy-laity interaction and the collaboration with civil 
society organisations were generally positive, although their relationship with and among each
173 PPCRV-IBP, ‘Memorandum of Agreement,’ in “Report o f the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting 
(PPCRV) to the Commission on Elections and to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines on the 
conduct of the May 11, 1998 national and local elections,” n.d., unpublished.
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Asia ed., R. H. Taylor (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and the Press Syndicate o f the University of  
Cambridge, 1996), 8.
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other was fraught with tensions and competitions. PPCRV and VOTE-CARE’s voters’ 
education, presence and help at the polling areas, challenging electoral anomalies, poll watching, 
canvass monitoring, assistance to NAMFREL’s OQC were among tasks which earned them 
consistent recognition from COMELEC (through its accreditations in the subsequent elections) 
and from the voting public. The voters’ education appeared to be an ambivalent area in its 
campaign as evident in the result of the 1998 elections. Despite emphasis on issue-based 
politics, many candidates were elected on the basis of their personal popularity and not on the 
programmes they envisioned. This indicates the deficiencies of their voters’ education project. 
At times some methods and assumptions made of voters’ education created a backlash against 
the very aims to which the electoral movements aspired.175 PPCRV and VOTE-CARE limited 
themselves to the election period. Sustaining political education in between elections was a 
recurrent problem. Consequently political education did not do much to strengthen people’s 
understanding and practice of citizenship. Clerics who were campaigning whether directly or 
indirectly for some candidates were perceived as divisive and tarnished the credibility of the 
Church in its avowed claim to be non-partisan.
4.6 Shaping and promoting the peace agenda
A consolidated democracy assumes that ‘all politically significant groups accept established 
political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game.’176 In post-authoritarian 
regimes, armed groups waging their political and ideological crusades bear signs of resistance 
against the democratic institutions. Insofar as armed conflict persists, the prospects of 
strengthening democracy diminish greatly. Peace is an important, if not necessary, condition for 
democracy building. The intense clamour for peace started almost immediately after Aquino
175 Frederic Charles Schaffer, ‘Clean elections and the “great unwashed”. . . . ’
176 Burton, Gunther and Highley, eds., Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,
3.
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rose to power. Owing to their high level of acceptability by warring groups, the Church and 
peace advocates (groups and individuals) played vital roles in initiating peace efforts.
4.6.1 Church’s engagement with the State and insurgency movement
The insurgency movement in the Philippines led by the CPP-NPA is one of the longest running 
in the world. Shortly after the CPP was established in 1968, its armed-wing, the NPA, was 
formed. During the Marcos period, no peace negotiation with the CPP-NPA was attempted. 
Like many Latin American Churches, immediately after the abertura (political liberalisation),177 
the Philippine Church was a key player in brokering peace deals. Soon after assuming her office 
as President, Aquino sought the assistance of the Church in a bid to end the conflict with the 
CPP-NDF-NPA.178 This invitation fitted in well with the Pope’s exhortation urging the bishops 
in the wake of the February revolution (People Power I) to be ministers of reconciliation.179 The 
CBCP enjoined the people to promote ‘national reconciliation, unity, and peace.’180 National 
reconciliation was relatively high on the agenda of the Church immediately after the ouster of 
Marcos. Less than a month after the February Revolution, twenty-two bishops met to assess 
their relationship with the new government and insisted that the task of national reconciliation 
should be based on justice.181 They suggested as an initial step the abolition of the notorious 
Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF).182 Aquino tried to abolish the para-military CHDF in 
1987 but failed due to strong objections from the military. CHDF was later converted into the 
Civil Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) upon the insistence of senior military 
officers that these units were ‘a cost-effective counterinsurgency strategy.’183 Thus 89,000 
civilians became members of CAFGUs by 1992, notwithstanding a constitutional prohibition on
177 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America.
178 Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino “miracle” and the Philippine Churches,’ 19.
179 L ’Osservatore Romano, ‘Pope’s letter to bishops of (the) Philippines.... ’
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para-military groups as ‘not consistent with the citizen armed force’ in the 1987 Charter.184 
Although the CAFGUs were placed under direct supervision of the military, de facto, there was 
no noticeable fundamental change in terms of reining in their human rights violations.185
Striking a peace settlement with the CPP-NDF-NPA was the most precarious and 
difficult of all the armed groups. Despite objections from Defence Minister Enrile, who reflected 
the sentiments of the military and the Pentagon, the Aquino administration started peace 
initiatives with communist rebels by releasing 500 political detainees which included top leaders 
of the Communist Party of the Philippines including Jose Maria ‘Joma’ Sison.186 In May 1986, 
preliminary discussions between the two groups (GRP, Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines and NDF) started leading to a negotiated 60-day ceasefire agreement to take effect on 
December 10, 1986.187 Two military coup attempts in July and in November 1986, the killing of 
KMU leader Rolando Olalia in November and Enrile’s unyielding criticisms of Aquino’s ‘kid- 
glove approach’ to communism jeopardised the initial talks between GRP and NDF.188 Despite 
the turn of events, a ceasefire agreement was signed on November 27, 1986 while talks were 
going on.189 Bacolod Bishop Antonio Y. Fortich chaired the National Ceasefire Committee 
(NCC) which monitored and supervised the ceasefire agreement. Subsequently, 14 regional and 
7 local ceasefire committees were formed.190 For the first time ever since the beginning of the 
insurgency movement in 1969, a ceasefire was in place, despite some cases of reported 
violations. Church-linked organisations such as the Peace Promotion and Monitoring Council 
(PPMC) and the National Citizens’ Peace Monitoring Council (NCPMC) were instrumental in
184 Ibid.; The 1987 Constitution o f  the Republic o f  the Philippines, 62.
185 Silliman, Human rights and the transition to democracy.’
186 Maria Serena I. Diokno, ‘Peace and human rights: the past lives on,’ in Duet fo r  EDSA, 1996: Looking back, 
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providing reports to the NCC on ceasefire violations.191 During the ceasefire period, the NCC 
dealt with a total of 167 complaints, 9 reported violations, and asked their local and regional 
committees to handle 21 cases.192 NASS A served as the NCC secretariat. Maria Serena I. 
Diokno, a member of the GRP panel, remarks: ‘The ceasefire could not have been implemented 
without the cooperation of the bishops, priests and other religious who served in the national and 
local ceasefire committees.’193
The military coup attempts that plagued the first year of the Aquino administration 
undermined the peace process. Suspicions and distrusts between the military and the NDF 
heightened. On January 22, 1987, eighteen demonstrators who were mostly farmers protesting in 
Mendiola Street leading to the Presidential Palace were killed.194 This caused an irreversible set 
back leading immediately to the withdrawal of the NDF from the peace talks. In her address to 
the graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy on March 22, 1987, the nation’s 
premier military school, Aquino, virtually beholden now to the military that contained the coup 
attempts, vowed to ‘unleash the sword of war’ against the insurgents.195 This policy shift in 
dealing with the insurgents elicited divided reactions from the Church. Cardinal Sin, arguing 
that ‘after compassion, justice should now be dispensed,’ threw his support to a military solution 
to the insurgency crisis.196 In addition, he endorsed a para-military counter-insurgency campaign 
in 1986 and 1987, although the CBCP remained consistently leery of such a campaign.197 Still, 
the CBCP did not oppose the policy shift o f the government. While some conservative elements 
in the Church hierarchy concurred with Aquino ‘that perhaps sterner measures against the Left
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were necessary,’ they nevertheless condemned violence.198 Progressive bishops and clergy 
members were quick to point out the dangers of employing a total military approach to the 
crisis.199 This all-out war against the rebels had devastating effects in the military Thunderbolt 
Operation in Southern Negros Occidental in April 1989 (see Chapter Six) resulting in a severe 
criticism by the local Church, AMRSP and church leaders.
In another development, Aquino further deepened her war against the communists by 
endorsing the anti-communist vigilante group Alsa Masa (masses arise) and the Nagkahiusang 
Katawhan Alang sa Kalinaw (People United for Peace, NAKASAKA).200 The latter was 
projected as an appropriation of ‘people power’ because its members were supposedly ‘unarmed’ 
and ‘law-abiding citizens’, but in fact they were armed with bolos (machetes).201 Davao City 
was considered as a showcase of Alsa Masa. Lt. Colonel Franco Calida, a key military 
proponent of the group and top Metropolitan District Commander in the city, reportedly boasted 
that there were no communists left in Davao ‘just the priests and nuns, and we’ll go after them 
next.’202 Despite its known human rights abuses, Aquino praised Alsa Masa in a visit to Agdao, 
Davao City on October 23, 1987: ‘We look up to you as an example...While other regions are 
experiencing problems in fighting the insurgency, you here.... have set the example.’203 Pressed 
by criticisms, the government later issued guidelines regarding the vigilante movements: no
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coercion of members, no criminal elements within the movement, ‘exclusively for self- 
defence.’204 Nevertheless, these guidelines were many a time not enforced.205
While the AMRSP in their April 1987 statement criticised the use of the vigilante groups 
for the counter-insurgency campaign as ‘ill-conceived, dangerous and counter-productive,’206 the 
bishops, except a few, were ambivalent.207 They condemned ‘the military’s use of armed 
religious fanatical sects and undisciplined armed vigilantes’ but not the whole vigilante 
movement as such. They argued that some vigilantes were under supervision by the military 
while others not,209 and since they were frequently supported by the military for counter­
insurgency purposes, they tended to take the law into their own hands.210 The bishops, however, 
suspected the links between the vigilante movements and the CIA through fundamentalist right- 
wing Christian groups but stopped short in condemning these in their January 27, 1989 statement 
regarding fundamentalist churches.211 Thus the Church leadership on the whole (excepting some 
individual bishops, clergy members and the AMRSP leadership), by maintaining an ambivalent 
position with regard to the counter-insurgency campaign emasculated the peace agenda they so 
desired.
There were attempts to prod the government and the NDF to re-negotiate after the 
breakdown of talks in January 1987. The CBCP issued a statement on January 26, 1987, four 
days after the killing of farmers in Mendiola, urging the government that working for peace
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necessitates social justice, particularly agrarian reform.212 Led by prominent members of the 
Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA) including Senator Wigberto Tanada, Maria Serena 
Diokno, Edmundo Garcia, SFIC Sister Cres Lucero and Teresita Quintos-Deles, peace 
consultations were held with members of the Cabinet, while the CBCP, NCCP and AMRSP 
offered a peace framework agreeable to both the government and the insurgents, but all these 
failed to engage both parties.213 The Church joined forces with other organised groups in 
pressing for a peace settlement based on justice. When the peace talks collapsed, there were 
attempts at regional peace negotiations through a ‘bishop-negotiator’ in every region. One 
attempt in Region XII, headed by Bp Fernando Capalla, achieved a multisectoral meeting 
consisting of representatives from the government, MNLF, MILF and NDF in Iligan City in May 
1987.214 Bp. Fortich pushed for a local ceasefire agreement in Negros Island, but it was not
r
successful. The NDF rejected local peace talks as divisive.
Following the coup attempts of 1989, the clamour for peace was all the more intensified. 
Upon the suggestion of peace advocates and the Churches, Aquino proclaimed 1990-2000 as the 
Decade of Peace.216 Peace, she claimed, was not simply the ‘absence of conflict’ but must be 
coupled with ‘authentic development with justice, whose fruits benefit all.’217 By way of a 
follow up to the EDS A Shrine gathering, on January 1, 1990, the bishops of Manila in a pastoral 
letter categorically declared that ‘to seize power through a coup d’etat is a sin.’218 The pastoral 
letter urged the people to resort to non-violent ways of rectifying the problems of Philippine 
society. While the bishops of Manila admitted ‘abuses and incompetence, graft and corruption’
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in the government, the people must use the existing grievance mechanisms provided for in the
0 1 QConstitution. The Manila bishops also urged the government to undertake social reforms while 
soliciting people o f ‘solidarity, collaboration and self-sacrifice’ to defend constitutional 
democracy.220 On January 31, 1990, the CBCP issued a pastoral letter (‘Seek peace, pursue it’), 
following the basic lines of the bishops of Manila in December 1989.221 Echoing the 
government’s declaration of a ‘Decade of Peace (1990-2000), the bishops proposed a 10-point 
peace agenda. Peace in this context was not simply the absence of war but ineluctably linked 
to the issues that bred the armed conflict. The NCCP-RDO (Research and Documentation 
Office) maintains that this was the CBCP’s ‘most concrete agenda for peace.’223 The NCCP 
earlier issued a statement bearing almost an identical title (‘Seek peace and pursue it’) on 
October 12, 1989.224 In October 1990, more than 100 civil society organisations led by the 
National Peace Conference (NPC), People’s Caucus, and the MSPC, Churches (Catholic and 
Protestant) and Muslim organisations crafted a declaration ‘Towards a National Vision for 
Peace’ -  the broadest consensus and synthesis on issues affecting peace.225 Despite many 
attempts to initiate exploratory talks to re-open negotiations during the Aquino period peace 
remained elusive. In the meantime, individual church leaders were involved to varying degrees 
in the formation of ‘zones of peace’ particularly in Cantomanyog, Candoni in Negros Occidental 
(next chapter) and in Tulunan, North Cotabato.226 The local residents declared these areas as ‘no 
war zones’ despite the objections of the military and the NPA. Owing to the objections of the
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220 Ibid., 13.
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military officials, the CBCP unfortunately did not endorse the ‘peace zones,’ although some 
bishops supported it.228 People’s participation in the peace processes defined a constituency for 
peace, the single most important outcome in all these efforts.229 Thus people’s participation in 
peace issues became an important expression of their citizenship. The peace advocates 
proactively participated, offered their own agenda of peace apart from those of the government 
and the rebels. The peace movement, however, was not able to translate its influence into votes 
in the 1992 and 1998 elections.
Immediately after his accession to power, President Fidel V. Ramos renewed calls for 
peace and reconciliation. In his State of the Nation address on June 30, 1992, peace and security 
was considered ‘the first urgent problem.’230 He granted amnesty to those who applied for it 
during the time of the Aquino administration, released 13 NDF leaders, established the National 
Unification Commission (NUC) and lobbied for the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law 
(Republic Act No. 1700) which would legalise CPP and other underground movements.231 The 
NUC was an executive-legislative unit created on September 1, 1992, headed by former 
COMELEC Commissioner Haydee Yorac and Bp. Fernando Capalla, a CBCP representative, 
who was later elected as its Vice-chairperson. Although political persecutions continued,232 the 
repeal of the Anti-subversion Law was an opening for many communist rebels to relinquish the 
revolution and enter partisan politics or civil society movements for political contestations.
The CBCP issued a pastoral statement on January 25, 1993 manifesting its all-out endorsement 
for the peace process and in particular for the NUC, amid threats of withdrawal from peace talks
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coming from the Left.234 Although the NUC succeeded in negotiating a peace deal with the 
military rebels, it failed to make a settlement with the NDF.
President Joseph Estrada’s commitment to peace was dismal, despite the rhetoric. Eager 
to win over the NDF, Estrada set a deadline in his peace talks with the rebels. When the peace 
talks were suspended, Cardinal Sin in a pastoral letter of March 1, 1999, offered to mediate 
between the two parties but went unheeded. The peace talks were finally shelved on May 27, 
1999 after the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) (see further below). As a 
result, the NDF pulled out of the peace talks with the government. With the breakdown of talks 
between GRP-NDF, an all-out counter-insurgency campaign resumed. In August 2000, Estrada 
reactivated the notorious the CAFGUs of some 10,000 members from Christian vigilantes. 
Historically, many Christian vigilantes were driven by religious fanaticism and anti-communism 
which made them likely recruits to the counter-insurgency campaigns of the military. Although 
the CBCP was critical of these right-wing groups, individual Catholics including some landed 
families in Negros supported their anti-communism crusade (widely defined to mean those who 
opposed the military’s counter-insurgency approach to end the armed conflict). Some of these 
vigilante movements, at times espousing extreme sectarian ideas, were used by the Marcos 
government to fight against Muslim rebels. Meanwhile, Estrada resumed a thoroughgoing 
military approach to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and thus dampening any hope for 
peaceful settlement in Mindanao during his watch.
In another development, after the breakdown of the GRP-NDF talks and shortly before 
the impeachment proceeding against President Estrada, on December 6, 2000, a peace agreement
234 ‘Pastoral statement o f the CBCP on peace-building,’ in Pastoral Letters, Pedro Quitorio III ed. (Manila: CBCP, 
1995), 786-789; see also Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Daily Report: East Asia, ‘Church urges 
action on “fundamental issues”, ’ 25 April 1993, 44.
235 Jaime Cardinal Sin, ‘Pastoral Appeal: A Plea for dialogue, an appeal for prayer,’ 01 March 1999, in Nestor C. 
Cerbo, ed., On the way o f  truth: a compilation ofpastoral appeals and statements during the 25 years o f  His 
Eminence Jaime L. Cardinal Sin as Archbishop o f  Manila, March 18, 1974 -  March 18, 1999 (Manila: Archdiocese 
Office for Research and Development, 1999), 511-512.
236 Amando Doronila, ‘CAFGUs and human rights,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 02 August 2000, 9.
237 Ibid.
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was concluded in haste between GRP and RPMP-RPA-ABB (Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng 
Manggagawa -  Pilipinas [Revolutionary Party of Workers - Philippines] -  Revolutionary 
Proletarian Army -  Alex Bongcayao Brigade), a breakaway faction of the CPP-NDF-NPA. This 
deal was concluded in the town of Don Salvador Benedicto (northwest of Bacolod City), a 
political turf of well-known Estrada ally Eduardo Cojuangco. Bp. Camilo Gregorio as a 
member of the GRP Panel did not sign the document presumably because he was no longer the 
bishop of Bacolod Diocese at that time.239 As a gesture of goodwill, President Estrada released 
political detainees mostly from the RPMP-RPA-ABB.240 Civil society groups criticised the 
‘areas controlled’ by armed RPMP/RPA/ABB, the lack of consultation with the people, the role 
o f Cojuangco in the peace deal, and hasty conclusion of the agreement.241 In the post-Estrada 
period, civil society sectors urged the Macapagal administration for a re-negotiation of the peace 
deal.242 Nonetheless, the issues raised by the civil society groups remained unresolved. The 
resignation of the newly installed Bishop of Bacolod, Vicente Navarra, as a committee member 
of the peace panel diminished the credibility of the peace deal in which the Church and civil 
society organisations demonstrated no wish to participate.
The Church’s involvement in the peace initiatives with the Cordillera People’s Liberation 
Army (CPLA)243 and with various politicised military factions244 that nearly toppled the
238 Alcuin Papa and Carla P. Gomez, ‘Hopes high for Negros peace,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 September 2001,
4.
239 See ‘Peace Agreement between the Government o f the Republic o f the Philippines and the 
Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/AlexBongcayao Brigade,’
6 December 2000, Quezon City.
240 Hannah A. Papasin, ‘Fortich softens stand on Erap,’ Sun Star Daily - Bacolod, 13 December 2000, 1 & 6.
241 ‘Letter to Honorable Eduardo Ermita,’ Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, 09 March 1999.
242 Papa and Gomez, ‘High hopes for Negros peace.’
243 For details o f the peace negotiations see Abrino Aydinan, ‘Negotiating for peace in the Cordilleras,’ in Ending 
the armed conflict: peace negotiations in the Philippines, ed. Emmanuel C. Lallana (Quezon City: University of the 
Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University o f the Philippines Press, 1992), 43-54; 
Coronel-Ferrer and Requiza, eds., Options fo r  p ea ce ..., 6-7; Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino “miracle” and the 
Philippine Churches,’ 22-23.
244 Riedinger claims that a ‘silent coup’ had taken place during the Ramos period after military officers were given 
key government positions. See Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups,’ 194-196.
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democratic regime was marginal. The peace settlement with the rebel soldiers (RAM-SFP- 
YOU) was perceived to accommodate largely the demands of the military renegades.245
4.6.2 The Church and the US bases, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
Tied in to the question of peace and national sovereignty was the presence of the US military 
bases and troops in the country. Towards the end of the Aquino administration, the government 
reviewed the presence of the US bases in the Philippines which was set to expire in 1991 246 
President Aquino, feeling the pressure from the US, wanted to keep the bases.247 The Church 
hierarchy did not have an official stand on the issue,248 but the AMRSP repudiated the US 
military presence in the country. They maintained that the US bases ‘endanger rather than 
enhance the security of the Philippines.’249 In addition, they viewed the terms of agreement as 
‘one-sided’ favouring the US government.250 With the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, Subic Naval 
base and Clarke Air Force base were severely damaged. Considering the extent of damage, the 
US authorities were not as enthusiastic as before about keeping them. In 1991, the Philippine 
Senate eventually voted to reject the agreement for an extension of their stay in the Philippines.
Estrada tried to revive American military presence in the Philippines by lobbying for the 
ratification of the VFA, although he voted against the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. 
Interestingly enough, the bishops opposed the VFA after being ambivalent about US military 
bases during the Aquino period. The bishops may have realised that the country was far more 
secure at this point than before when it hosted the US bases. The assumptions (premised on Cold
245 Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 49.
246 Of the five military facilities in the country, two were most crucial: Subic Naval base, the largest naval base 
outside o f the US, and Clark Air Force Base, the command centre of the Thirteenth US Air Force. These bases were 
‘a major storage centre for US nuclear weapons’ although as a matter o f policy these were unconfirmed by US 
officials. See Clark et al., Right-wing vigilantes and U.S. involvement report o f  a U.S. Philippine fact-finding 
mission to the Philippines..., 11.
247 Ibid., 12.
248 NCCP-RDO, ‘Philippine Churches in the search for peace,’ 144.
249 AMRSP, ‘On the U.S. military presence in the Philippines,’ in Dawn over darkness: paths to peace in the 
Philippines, ed. Ed Garcia (Quezon City: Claretians Publications, 1988), 111.
250 Ibid., 112.
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War discourse) behind having the US bases did not hold water anymore as far as the bishops
were concerned. Over time, the Church leaders as a whole became more sceptical about the
benefits of having a new form of US military presence in the country. On March 9, 1999,
CBCP-NASSA issued a statement rejecting the VFA:
The VFA is not about peace and security. It is a ploy to ensure the ‘forward deployment’
strategy of the US by enforcing its globalisation policies in the Asia-Pacific region it
violates the constitutional ban on nuclear weapons; it surrenders the sovereignye 1
jurisdiction ofRP laws and courts....
The statement further urged the people to join the March 11, 1999 rally as the Senate deliberated 
on the issues around the VFA. Signature and information campaigns were launched by NASSA 
through its network, the social action centres. As early as mid-January 2001, 741,084 signatures 
were collected from local Churches, Catholic Church establishments and organisations, and 
Protestant Churches, excluding those that came from non-church establishments and civil society 
organisations. Cardinal Sin added his opposition to the VFA in his homilies and
9 5^statements. He deplored the ‘vagueness’ of the terms in the agreement making it suspect and 
‘contrary to the Gospel of peace.’254 Nonetheless, public opinion remained highly favourable to 
the approval of VFA.255 On May 27, 1999, the Senate voted an overwhelming 18-5 to ratify the
9 * •treaty. The bishops in their post-ratification statement vowed to pursue the case in the
9^ 7Supreme Court and monitor the conduct of the VFA.
251 CBCP-NASSA, ‘Statement against the VFA: A call to the Join Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and on National Defense and Security to reject VFA,’ available from 
http://www.cbcp.net/nassa/livab.html. 09 March 1999.
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4.6.3 Church peace initiatives in Muslim Mindanao
In Mindanao, efforts were made to strike a deal with the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) in September 1986 when President Aquino met Nur Misuari, the MNLF chairperson, 
despite objections from the military.258 Although peace negotiations with the MNLF in 1986- 
1987 failed, the government kept an informal ceasefire with the secessionist movement.259 
Bishop Fernando Capalla, then from the Diocese of Iligan criticised the government for the 
exclusion of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), initially a splinter group of MNLF, from 
the talks.260 This led Aquino to extend ‘peace negotiations feelers’ to other Muslim groups.261 
Still, the exclusion of MILF from the peace talks paved the way for the resurgence of the armed 
conflict in Mindanao, which to date continues.
During the watch of President Ramos, MNLF rejected initially the creation of the 
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as mandated by the 1987 Constitution 
since according to MNLF this was not what the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 had envisioned.262 In 
this peace agreement, frill autonomy would be granted to 13 provinces in Mindanao. In a 
plebiscite on November 17, 1989, only four out of the thirteen provinces voted to be included in 
the ARMM. Along with the ARMM was the creation of the Southern Philippine Council for 
Peace and Development (SPCPD) which was originally intended as a ‘transitional structure and 
mechanism’ to implement the Tripoli Agreement within the parameters of the 1987 Charter.263 
The SPCPD declared fourteen (originally thirteen) provinces and ten cities as ‘Zones of Peace
258 Rodil provides some background material regarding the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations. See R. B. Rodil, ‘Mga 
aral mula sa nagdaang mga negosasyon sa pagitan ng goberyno ng Pilipinas at ng Moro National Liberation Front,’ 
in Ending the armed conflict: peace negotiations in the Philippines ed. Emmanuel C. Lallana (Quezon City: 
University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines 
Press, 1992), 33.
259 Jose V. Abueva, ‘Strengthening the constituency for peace,’ in in Ending the armed conflict: peace negotiations 
in the Philippines ed. Emmanuel C. Lallana (Quezon City: University o f the Philippines Center for Integrative and 
Development Studies and University o f the Philippines Press, 1992), 12.
260 Youngblood, ‘The Corazon Aquino “miracle” and the Philippines Churches,’ 22.
261 Ibid.
262 Abueva, ‘Philippine democratization and the consolidation of democracy since the 1986 EDSA Revolution..., 
41.
263 Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the crescent moon: rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: 
Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), 54.
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and Development’ and ‘Consultative and Development Councils’ in Mindanao.264 Muslims and 
Christians opposed SPCPD for different reasons. As the opposition among the priests in 
Mindanao stepped up, the CBCP likewise aired its concerns and lamented the lack of 
consultation regarding the creation of SPCPD but nonetheless, after some dialogue, supported 
it.265 The CBCP raised fears about the possible Islamisation of schools, threats against religious 
freedom, separation of church and state, and the issue of equal representation in the Consultative 
Assembly. The SPCPD broadened its constituency by including the indigenous peoples.
On January 30, 1994, the government and MNLF signed a ceasefire agreement ending 
the war that had claimed more than 50,000 lives. Government offers to Misuari proved 
irresistible to him: the SPCPD Chairman post and the opportunity to run unopposed as Governor
9 AQof the ARMM, an office he initially despised. Subsequently, Misuari secured both positions. 
After a year of operation, the SPCPD proved to be ineffective.270 In June 1996, the government 
succeeded in striking a settlement with the MNLF under the aegis of the Indonesian government 
and the support of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), but evidently the broader 
issues of peace and the root causes of the secessionist movements remained unattended.271 
Disgruntled elements of the MNLF disengaged themselves from Misuari and pursued their 
struggle through the MILF.
264 Ibid., Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?..., 50.
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The concerns expressed by both Christians and Muslim leaders arising out of a series of 
drafts of the GRP-MNLF agreement gave impetus to the coming together of some CBCP bishops 
and members of the Ulama League of the Philippines (ULP), headed by Lanao del Sur governor 
Mahid Mutilan, on July 16, 1996. PDSP leader Norberto Gonzales with PDSP animator Fr. 
Romeo J. Intengan SJ initiated this meeting.272 This dialogue eventually led to the creation of 
the Bishops-Ulama Forum (BUF) that had a strong backing from Secretary of Defense Renato de 
Villa.273 President Ramos supported this group and donated some $100,000 from the NUC 
fund.274 Over time, BUF included the participation of Protestant Bishops. BUF conducted peace 
education and advocacy, and supported interreligious dialogue. To dramatise the peace issues, 
the NCCP and CBCP, NASSA and BUF had a peace caravan from Cotabato to Zamboanga and 
back again to Cotabato in Mindanao collecting some one million signatures from both Christians 
and Muslims supporting the peace process.275 Nonetheless, some of the ulama members of 
MILF who did not belong to Mutilan’s group rejected the ULP branding it ‘as a 
counterinsurgency tool o f the government.’
In sum, despite some of its limitations, the Catholic Church was generally engaged in 
peace issues in the post-authoritarian Philippines, comparable with the peace efforts of some 
Latin American Churches. It was more active in peace brokering during the time of Aquino, 
compared with the period of Ramos and even less during Estrada’s abridged presidency. It was 
a crucial actor in the 60-day ceasefire in 1986 between the government and the NDF, the first 
since the insurgency movement started in 1968. It assisted in framing a peace agenda (linking 
peace with comprehensive social reforms) it offered to the government and the NDF; the
272 Intengan interview, 29 June 2002.
273 Ibid.
274 Vitug and Gloria, Under the crescent m oon..., 151.
275 Interview with Bishop Roman Tiples, Former PIC Bishop of Negros and former Chairperson o f the National 
Council of Churches of the Philippines, 09 April 2001, Valladolid, Negros Occidental..
276 Vitug and Gloria, Under the crescent moon..., 153.
152
government and the MNLF. It persistently pressed the government and the NDF to re-negotiate 
whenever talks collapsed. It conducted peace education in Mindanao through the BUF.
Three factors contributed to the peacemaking efforts of the Church. First, the demise of 
the authoritarian period created a euphoria signalling the inauguration of democracy. People 
were in the mood to give peace a chance. Second, the Church, even before Aquino was 
catapulted to power, had developed a positive relationship with her during the Marcos years. 
Aquino sought the help of the Church which constantly stood by her government 
notwithstanding its failures in social reforms. Third, peace as intimately linked to authentic 
human development was undoubtedly a church mission in keeping with the Catholic social 
teaching of the Church (e.g., Pacem en terris [‘Peace on earth’] and Populorum Progressio), 
Vatican II and post-Vatican II documents. Specific articulations of their 10-point peace agenda
7 7 7are contained in the CBCP’s statement ‘Seek peace, pursue it.’ Fourth, in many peace 
initiatives of the Church, its partnership (church ad extra) with other church groups (e.g.,
NCCP), and with peace advocates and organised groups in civil society (e.g., MSPA) proved 
vital in enlarging the peace constituency.
The acquiescence of church leadership, ambivalence towards, and in some cases, 
endorsement (except AMRSP and some members of the clergy and bishops) of the ‘total war’ 
approach of the Aquino administration, the government’s use of the vigilante movements, and 
the position Aquino took in the retention of the US bases weakened its resolve to promote peace. 
Divisions within the Church leadership in dealing with the policy shift towards ‘total war’ in the 
Aquino government, the use of vigilante groups, and the executive position in favour of the 
retention of the US bases affected hierarchy-lay interaction and church-civil society partnership. 
These concerns were in accord with US foreign policy in dealing with the insurgency movement
277 CBCP, Catholic Bishops ’ Conference o f  the Philippines..., 224-225.
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in the Philippines.278 Given the rifts within the hierarchy and the Church at large, the Church’s 
position was naturally fragmented causing inaction and often creating an obstacle to lay 
participation (church ad intra) and partnership (church ad extra) with civil society.
4.7 The Church and human rights advocacy
Democratisation is not only a question of regime change, but also entails the operation of 
democratic institutions and the exercise of citizenship that protects human rights.279 By 
continuing its involvement in human rights issues beyond the transition period, the Church along 
with civil society actors challenged the political institutions and actors (including armed groups) 
to address human rights violations and uphold the primacy of law in settling disputes.
The church-military relations after the Church-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC) 
broke up in 1983 did not substantially improve under the Aquino administration. Mutual distrust 
between the two parties continued. The harassment and persecution of church personnel 
particularly of the lay people were perpetrated by the military or by vigilante movements notably 
between May 1986 and January 198 8.280 In some instances the harassment included the clergy 
such as in the Diocese of Bacolod where the military spread allegations that 35 priests were party 
members of the CPP.281 The military continually accused some of the church establishments of 
being infiltrated by the Left. On this point, the Church agonised and remained divided on how to 
deal with the allegation in 1987 that NASSA was infiltrated by the Left.
The human rights record of the military remained deplorable despite the fact that 
constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements were made to curb abuses. From 1986 to 
1991, TFD claims that 19,854 politically motivated arrests, 1,016 extrajudicial executions
278 Clark et al., Right-wing vigilantes and U.S. involvement report o f  a U.S. Philippine fact-finding mission to the 
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279 Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation, 93-96; Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, 
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(‘salvagings’), and 426 disappearances occurred.282 During the martial law period, from 1977 to 
1986, TFD notes that 21,883 political arrests, 2,491 extrajudicial executions and 709 
disappearances were reported.283 In general though, human rights condition slightly improved 
during the Aquino administration compared with the Marcos regime. ‘Salvaging’ had noticeably 
dropped from a monthly average of 22.65 (1977-1986) to 14.62 (1986-1991) since then.284 
Further, in most of these arrests during the Aquino administration, the political detainees were 
not held as long as they had been during the days of Marcos.285 Although the use of torture was 
frequently reported, unlike during the martial law period, many of these abuses were not 
institutionally designed in government policies but logical consequences of a highly politicised 
military coupled with a lacklustre political will of the governing elite.286
The CBCP in its July 12, 1988 statement ‘Solidarity for peace,’ condemned the use of 
violence by both the military and rebel forces.287 It further appealed to the parties concerned to 
end the war claiming that ‘violations of fundamental human rights are simply related to the 
bigger problem of war and its causes.’288 The CBCP statement on July 11, 1989, decried ‘the 
manipulative use of human rights violations,’ that is, ‘the reprobation and publishing by one 
political bloc of violations of human rights not specifically to put a stop to them (despite the 
rhetoric) but merely to blacken the political image of the other.’ The statement charged that 
human rights issues became highly politicised and ideological rather than focusing on its ‘human 
and moral concern’ as the CBCP saw it.290
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During the time of President Ramos, the Church’s involvement in human rights 
diminished steadily. The CBCP hardly made a statement as regards human rights violations. 
Ramos attempted to abolish the CAFGUs in 1993 and managed to collect 3,600 weapons out of 
some 11,200 from 558 armed groups.291 Private armies from some prominent people, however, 
still continued to operate. Violations of human rights including detention of political prisoners 
persisted during the Ramos administration, although considerably lower in number compared
• • 909with previous administrations.
In the period of President Estrada, the Church, human rights groups (e.g., FLAG, Saligan, 
etc), and other civil society organisations were vigorously involved in the anti-death penalty 
campaign.293 Despite appeals for clemency by the international community including the 
Vatican, European Union (EU), Canada, Amnesty International (Al), Estrada was determined to 
carry out capital punishment.294 The CBCP issued a primer on abolition of death penalty 
claiming that there is ‘no moral necessity’ for its imposition on heinous crimes.295 The Church 
conducted a massive education and information campaign. It organised prayer vigils during the 
legal review of death penalty cases and execution of those convicted of heinous crimes, and 
engaged the legislative and executive bodies of the government to review its imposition.296 The 
Church aligned itself with human rights groups (e.g., FLAG) and together fought vigorously for 
a stay of execution of those on the death row. Estrada, at the height of the impeachment 
proceeding, decided to commute the death sentence of those convicted in the spirit o f the Jubilee
291 Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups,’ 191-192.
292 Diokno, ‘Peace and human rights,’ 100; FBIS, ‘Says “political prisoners” still exist,’ 22 June 1993, 42.
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Year 2000, but this was perceived to soothe relations with the Catholic Church which was 
leading the campaign to oust him from office. The death penalty issue deeply divided not only 
the country as a whole but also the church-civil society synergy: the Church, human rights 
groups and other civil society organisations versus the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption 
[VACC] and Citizen’s Crime Watch. With the backing of 81% Filipinos,297 it was clear that the 
much of the laity did not go along with the position of the hierarchical leadership. In both cases, 
contestations affected adversely church ad intra and ad extra linkages.
Through the years, the Church’s understanding of human rights has greatly expanded 
from a strictly political nature (e.g., state repression and abuses) during the democratic transition 
years to non-political cases (e.g., peace, death penalty, land eviction, migrant workers). The 
CBCP’s December 1998 statement on human rights (the first one since the time of President 
Aquino), contained ‘civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to 
development.’298 In the same statement, the CBCP affirmed the rights of migrant workers, 
indigenous peoples, women and children.299 In several cases, the Church along with civil society 
actors urged the political actors (not only the State) to respond to the crying need for human 
rights protection. In so doing, the Church was reinforcing the rule of law based on the 1987 
Charter. But in the case of the anti-death penalty campaign, its moral position was a crucial 
element in the debate challenging the death penalty law which was reinstituted in 1993 during 
the Presidency of Ramos.
4.8 The Church and charter change (cha-cha) initiatives
Two Charter change campaigns were launched in the post-authoritarian period: one during the 
time of Ramos and the other during Estrada’s watch. Both were perceived widely as attempts to
297 Mahar Mangahas, ‘Opinion polls on death penalty,’ Manila Standard, 08 January 1999, 14.
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undermine the democratic features of the 1987 Constitution. In both cases, perhaps more 
intensely during the Ramos administration than during the Estrada government, the Church 
including its conservative elements and pro-democracy civil society groups stood shoulder to 
shoulder to oppose the cha-cha campaigns.
4.8.1 Ramos’ Charter change (cha-cha)
In September 1995, a draft constitution (to replace the 1987 Constitution) of around thirty-five 
pages was exposed by constitution expert Fr. Joaquin Bemas SJ.300 The draft was believed to 
have been the handiwork of the National Security Council (NSC) headed by General Jose T. 
Almonte, a close adviser of President Ramos.301 Almonte persistently denied the allegation. The 
draft contained anti-democratic elements such as the weakening of accountability of the 
executive branch to the Congress, the suspension of habeas corpus in cases when public safety is 
threatened and the absence of any provision curtailing periods of martial law.302 The whole 
constitutional reform debate then centred on the contentious provision in the 1987 Constitution 
which curbed the duration of office for the members of the executive and legislative branches.303 
The 1987 Charter did not allow the president to extend his or her single term of office which was 
six years. The spirit and intent of this prohibition was based on a lingering ‘fear of a repetition 
of the Marcos phenomenon.’304 The members of the Senate were limited to two consecutive 
terms with six years per term. The members of the House of Representatives were allowed three 
terms of three years each.
Ramos successfully projected himself as a hardworking economic manager and enjoyed 
relatively high public satisfaction levels.305 Buoyed by auspicious economic growth in the
300 Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups...,’ 203.
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Southeast Asian region from 1993 to 1997, GDP posted an annual average growth of 4.5% and 
per-capita income increased by an average of 2.6% annually.306 The percentage of families 
under the poverty line was reduced from 40 in 1991 to 32 in 1997. Proponents of cha-cha
• 1AOargued on the strength of Ramos’ achievements as an economic manager. Thus the people 
should decide on whether or not he be allowed to run for the same office beyond the 
constitutional limits. The People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernisation and Action (PIRMA, 
meaning sign/signature) led the movement to amend the constitution. PIRMA led the Alliance 
of Concerned Citizens for Empowered Social System (ACCESS), a movement of 40 pro-cha-cha 
NGOs.309 On June 23, 1997, PIRMA initially submitted to the COMELEC some 5.6 million 
signatures in aid of the ‘initiative and referendum’ clause in the Constitution so that an 
amendment could be pursued.310 With the popularity of Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada 
soaring high, he would be the likely successor of President Ramos, a scenario feared by many 
supporters of Ramos.
The CBCP on March 20, 1997, issued a pastoral statement declaring the 
‘inopportuneness’ of Charter change.311 The CLP likewise believed that Charter change
• •  ^iinitiatives were ‘suspect of political and governmental manipulation.’ A much stronger CBCP 
statement was released in August claiming that the real motive of Charter change was ‘addiction 
to power.’313 Suspicions abounded that Ramos was orchestrating the movement covertly.314 
While he denied he was seeking another term of office, the key leaders in PIRMA, in the 
legislative and executive branches supporting the move, were closely identified with him.
306 Montinola, ‘Parties and accountability in the Philippines,’ 130.
307 Ibid. There is basis to believe that the figure is a generous estimation of poverty reduction in the Philippines 
considering the change o f poverty level measurement employed at this time.
308 Miriam Grace A. Go, ‘PIRMA: dead three times over; will it rise again?’ Politik 42(2), (November 1997), 39.
309 Ibid., 38.
310 Ibid.; Riedinger, ‘Caciques and coups...,’ 204.
311 ‘Pastoral statement on charter change,’ The CBCP Monitor 1(5), 16 March 1997, 3.
312 ‘Laity also against charter change,’ The CBCP Monitor 1(5), 16 March 1997, 3.
313 ‘Addiction to power is the real issue behind Charter change moves -  CBCP,’ The CBCP Monitor 1(17), 31 
August 1997, 12.
314 Jonathan Thatcher, ‘Church, business turn on Ramos,’ The Business Daily, 06 September 1997.
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Additionally, he did not attempt to dissuade them from pursuing it nor did he categorically state 
that there would be no constitutional amendment before the 1998 elections.
PIRMA’s petition to the COMELEC seeking its assistance for a signature campaign was 
rejected by the Supreme Court on March 19, 1997, and subsequently confirmed with finality on 
June 10, 1997.315 The rules for ‘initiative and referendum’ as provided for in the 1987 Charter 
had not been passed by the Congress and so the legal mechanism was inadequate for this 
purpose.316 Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, the campaign shifted to convoking the Congress 
making it into a Constituent Assembly.317 Public opinion of various sources was largely against 
Charter change. Two separate surveys, namely, SWS and Asia Research Organisation, indicated 
60 to 69% opposition.318
The Churches (Catholic and Protestant) along with pro-democracy civil society actors 
(NGOs/POs, business sector) intensified their campaign nationwide. El Shaddai, while confident 
that Ramos would step down as President, did not want to provoke the Church or the State. They 
held a rally staying neutral.319 Cardinal Sin issued two pastoral letters. The first one released on 
July 3, 1997 warned against convoking the existing Congress as a Constituent Assembly as this 
merely showed ‘aggrandizement of certain persons and political dynasties...’320 The other letter 
was an appeal to support the mobilisation on the National Day of Protest, September 21, 1997,
‘j ' j  1
the 25th anniversary of the declaration of martial law. The date of the rally was a timely 
occasion to remind the Filipinos of the death of democracy. The AMRSP joined in the chorus 
that rejected cha-cha and supported the September 21 mobilisation. Despite a heavy
315 Go, ‘PIRMA...,’ 39.
j16 Bemas, A Living Constitution..., 194-196.
317 Alan Alegre, ‘Dirty dancing with democracy,’ Politik 4(2), (November 1997), 43-44.
318 Giselle Barretto-Lapitan, ‘The Church and the Philippines,’ Intersect, 12(4), (May 1997), 25.
319 Gorospe-Jamon, ‘The El Shaddai Prayer Movement..., 90.
320 Sin, ‘Pastoral appeal: “Let us uphold the dignity of the constitution”, ’ 03 July 1997 in Cerbo, On the way o f  
truth...'1 444.
321 Sin, ‘Pastoral invitation: “Collegial protest against the charter change”,’ in Cerbo, On the way o f  truth..., 462- 
463.
322 ‘AMRSP and Mission Partners’ statement against charter change,’ September 1997.
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downpour, some 600,000 people gathered in Rizal Park, Manila, led by former President Aquino, 
a key Ramos supporter during the 1992 elections, and Cardinal Sin, two prominent figures of 
People Power I.323 The Left (e.g., BAYAN) contributed in mobilising their constituents for this 
campaign, although they rejected the Charter in 1987. This was the biggest protest assembly and 
the broadest representation of political groups in the post-Marcos era.324 To dramatise their 
formation, 50 representatives (including former President Aquino and Cardinal Sin) coming from 
12 sectors, 10 national social movements and 8 political parties signed a ‘Multisectoral Covenant 
for Freedom and Democracy,’ but unfortunately the unity fizzled out after the issue subsided.325 
An Ecumenical Prayer Service conducted by leaders from different religious groups was 
followed by a celebration of the Mass. Similar gatherings nationwide were also held to protest 
the cha-cha campaign. In Cebu, Cardinal Vidal, convenor of the 5th Visayas Region Pastoral 
Assembly, issued a statement rejecting cha-cha and raising fears of a ‘new oligarchy and of 
another dictatorship’ in the offing.326 Sixty-five dioceses nationwide held some form of protest 
rally.327 These rallies involving a million people merely confirmed the strong opposition 
registered in public opinion.328 As a result, President Ramos was pressured to back down.
Hours before the massive September 21 rally in Rizal Park, Ramos categorically assured the 
public that there would be no cha-cha before 1998.329 The Church in partnership with civil 
society organisations once again demonstrated its capacity to influence and mobilise the people 
in safeguarding the democratic gains of People Power I. Thus Amando Doronila concludes that 
‘The rallies (anti-cha-cha protests) further proved that outside of the State, the Church is the only 
social force capable of mobilising public opinion and protest against any regime.... ’ The
j23 Pinches, ‘Elite democracy, development and people power: contending ideologies and changing practices in 
Philippine politics,’ 104 & 116.
324 Alegre, ‘Dirty dancing with democracy,’ 45.
325 Ibid.; ‘People power alive in anti-cha-cha rallies,’ The CBCP Monitor 1(9), (08 September 1997), 3.
326 Vidal, ‘Statement against charter change.’
327 ‘People power alive in anti-cha-cha rallies.’
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
330 Amando Doronila, ‘Pulling back from the brink,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 September 1997, 9.
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Church appeared to be the only organisation which could fill in the political gap created by a 
bankrupt party system, but only when it was allied with civil society.
4.8.2 Estrada’s Constitutional Correction for Development (CONCORD)
President Estrada likewise attempted to tamper with the Charter, but using the economic 
development card. In his State of the Nation Address on July 26, 1999, Estrada openly declared 
his intention to change the constitution through CONCORD to accelerate economic 
development. Estrada initially planned to convene the Congress into a constituent assembly for 
the approval of economic provisions and then set up the constitutional convention to address the 
political reforms.331 This was interpreted to mean removing the ‘Filipino-First Policy’ in the 
constitution.332 For others, the economic motivation was simply a veneer over a dreaded 
political intent: lifting the presidential term cap.333
Opposition to Estrada’s CONCORD was mounted quickly by the Protestant and Catholic 
Churches and civil society actors including the Left. CBCP President Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz 
declared that the Charter amendment ‘does not augur well for the redemption o f the Filipino as a 
people.’334 The Archdiocese of Manila, led by Cardinal Sin, mobilised its flock in a multi­
sectoral rally on August 20, 1999.335 The timing could not be any better since August 21 marked 
the assassination of Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino in 1983. Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Sin once 
again led this grand mobilisation.336 Meanwhile, Ricardo Cardinal Vidal and fifty-eight bishops 
from the Ecumenical Bishops Forum (EBF), consisting of Catholic and Protestant bishops were
j31 Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘Estrada proposes two-step cha-cha,’ 10 August 1999,
332 Romel Bagares, ‘No to pol reforms, yes to foreign ownership,’ The Philippine Star, 12 December 1999, 1 & 5. 
The ‘Filipino-First Policy’ means that the majority o f land ownership is in the hands o f the Filipinos. The 
constitution allowed 60% ownership o f land to Filipinos and 40% to foreigners. Estrada’s CONCORD wanted 
100% ownership of land by foreigners.
333 Amando Doronila, The Fall o f  Joseph Estrada: the inside story (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc., and Makati 
City: Phililippine Daily Inquirer, 2001), 45.
334 ‘CBCP President urges vigilance, wisdom in dissent; assails new Cha-Cha moves,’ The CBCP Monitor 111(16), 
15 August 1999, 3.
335 Jaime L. Cardinal Sin, ‘Vigilance is the price o f freedom,’ Archbishop o f Manila, Villa San Miguel, Archdiocese 
of Manila, 12 August 1999.
j36 Sandy Araneta, ‘Sin to join Cory in August 20 rally,’ The Philippine Star, 31 July 1999, 1 & 6.
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united in resisting moves to amend the constitution.337 Cardinal Vidal urged the faithful to show
-2 'J O
their opposition on August 20 in unity with the other Churches. Archbishop Orlando B.
Quevedo OMI, wrote a pastoral letter for his own See in Cotabato:
My fundamental objection to Constitutional change is to the dominant economic 
philosophy behind the changes for economic reform. This philosophy is called neo­
liberal capitalism. Its instruments are liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation.
Neo liberal capitalism is at the very root of the phenomenon of globalisation. Its
' l ' l Q
motivating force is profit. It is materialistic.
Quevedo’s misgivings of a neo-liberal agenda in Estrada’s CONCORD was one position within 
the Church. Other bishops concurred with Quevedo’s rejection of CONCORD for other and 
similar reasons. The Church, however, made it clear that it was not against amending the 
Charter as such since the Constitution is not perfect.340 Nationwide rallies on August 20 were 
held simultaneously. In Manila, some 70,000 people led by ex-President Aquino and Cardinal 
Sin congregated at the heart of Makati, the business hub in Manila.341 Outside Metro Manila 
around 160,000 people joined the rallies.342 The Diocese of Bacolod held the biggest provincial 
protest assembly with about 60,000 participants led by Bishop Emeritus Fortich.343 Estrada 
appeared unfazed by mounting protest. He attended a gathering of El Shaddai members who 
were celebrating the birthday party of Brother Mike Velarde in Rizal Park, the same day that the 
national rallies where held. However much it was insisted that the birthday party attended by
700,000 people was not a political event for Estrada’s CONCORD, it came across as a counter 
force to compete with the Makati crowd led by former President Aquino.344
337 Froilan Gallardo and Blanche Rivera, ’58 bishops unite, says no to Erap Charter,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 01 
August 1999, 1 & 14.
338 Ibid., 14.
339 Orlando B. Quevedo OMI, ‘No to constitutional change: a moral stand,’ The CBCP Monitor, 111(17), 29 
August 1999, 12.
340 ‘CBCP clarifies its stand on Charter change,’ The CBCP Monitor 11(26), 03 January 1999, 3.
j41 Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘We’re not afraid,’ 21 August 1999, 1 & 18.
342 Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘160,000 rally outside Metro,’ 21 August 1999, 6.
343 Ibid.
344 The Philippine Daily Inquirer claims the crowd was 300,000. See Stella O. Gonzales, ‘They’re threatened by 
changes,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer 21 August 1999, 1 & 18.
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President Estrada set up the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reforms (PCCR), 
headed by former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, to conduct a study on Charter change, but this 
only bred suspicions that its findings would be changed to favour the administration’s position.
As expected, PCCR, except for three members, recommended to the President to ease constraints 
on land and key business ownership, but per instruction of Estrada, set aside political reforms.345 
In the meantime, an SWS survey in June showed that 86% of the people polled were against 
constitutional amendment.346 Clearly, PCCR’s recommendation went against public opinion.
On September 21, the 27th anniversary of the proclamation of martial law, a number of 
mass mobilisations, led by militant groups and church-supported organizations, took place in 
Metro Manila and 31 provinces and cities.347 The Church in partnership with civil society was a 
key protagonist in the campaign against CONCORD. In Manila, following the instruction of 
Cardinal Sin, the pealing of the Church bells signalled a noise barrage to protest Estrada’s 
CONCORD.348 Meanwhile, Estrada’s popularity (net performance) in opinion polls plunged 
from +60 in September to +28 in October to an all-time low of +5 in December 1999.349 With 
mounting opposition against CONCORD and declining popularity of the president, Estrada 
shelved the project for good, although he still believed that CONCORD was the solution to the 
economic woes facing the country because by providing incentives to foreign investors (e.g., 
100% land ownership), in his view, this would attract more foreign investments and jobs.350
345 Bagares, ‘No to pol reforms, yes to foreign ownership.’
346 Martin P. Marfil and Nereo C. Lujan, ‘Narvasa body open to junking Cha-cha,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 
August 1999, 1 & 18. Pulse Asia Inc., conducting a national survey in the first-half o f September 1999 concluded 
that 42% were against CONCORD, 32% were agreeable provided only in a ‘big crisis or emergency’ while only 
25% were amenable to constitutional change if  the citizens wanted it, see Stella O. Gonzales, ‘Survey says Erap 
popularity down,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 October 1999, 1.
47 Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘We must never forget,’ 22 September 1999, 1& 16.
348 Ibid.
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In sum, in both anti-Charter change campaigns, the Church factored in these protest 
movements through its pronouncements (bishops’ pastoral letters, either collectively or 
individually; homilies), its exhortation to the faithful to join the rallies, its mobilisation of church 
organisations, parishes and BECs, and its persistent criticisms levelled against the Ramos and 
Estrada administrations. In both anti-Charter change cases, the response of the lay to the 
promptings of the Church hierarchy revealed a meeting of minds between the leaders and the 
members (hierarchy-laity interaction) as shown in the number of people that joined the rallies 
nationwide and the massive public objection registered in surveys. In both cases the pro­
democracy civil society groups including the Left, stood side by side with the Church (church- 
civil society nexus) in the protest movement all over the country. The participation of the laity 
and civil society validated the church leadership’s correct reading of the sentiments of the 
people. Like the defence against military coup attempts, peace advocacy, electoral involvement, 
these anti-Charter change mobilisations were experiential lessons constructing the meaning of 
citizenship. Citizenship was actualised in the vigilance of the people against attempts to erode 
the democratic gains won following the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Citizenship was 
tied closely to the survivability and sustainability of democracy.
4.9 The Church and People Power II
The ouster of President Estrada (from January 15 to 20), dubbed as People Power II by some 
political observers, was a much more complex phenomenon than the People Power I that 
initiated a regime change in 1986. First, Estrada, unlike Marcos, had a huge electoral mandate 
(winning nearly 40% of the vote in a ten-way contest with significant support mostly from the 
poor). He was a populist President that the masa (masses) could identify as their leader. Second, 
there was a broader elite consensus in People Power I compared with People Power II. Estrada 
had a strong backing from the elite including former Marcos-linked business magnates Eduardo 
Cojuangco and Lucio Tan while the business sector was largely against him. The Church, from
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its leaders down to its members, was fragmented with regard to the ouster of Estrada. Third, 
civil society organisations were likewise divided. The anti-Estrada civil society forces were 
typically middle class while the pro-Estrada groups were mainly coming from the urban poor 
communities and the organisations that benefited from his administration. And fourth, while the 
interest articulation and lobbying of groups may be seen as a democratic impulse during the 
Estrada crisis, this opened debates about the assumptions of direct democracy (e.g., people 
power) and raised concerns about the limits of democratisation.
Unlike previous post-authoritarian presidents, no honeymoon period was given to the 
Estrada government at least as far as the media, the business sector and the Church were 
concerned. Not long after his inauguration in 1998, upon the request of the Marcos family, 
President Estrada allowed the burial of the Marcos remains at the Libingan nang mga Bayani 
(National Heroes Cemetery).351 This was tantamount to giving ex-President Marcos a hero’s 
burial. The media, business groups, civil society actors and the Church rallied and pressed the 
government to change its plan. The tension eased when the Marcos family withdrew their 
request.352 Still, Estrada, riding on a huge net performance of at least +60 from September 1998, 
a couple of months after he assumed the Office of President, maintained his high popularity until 
he reached the end of his first year as President.353 Estrada had impressive net satisfaction 
ratings in his first year of office: +61 net satisfaction in November 1998, +67 in March 1999 and 
+65 in June 1999.354
Estrada’s pro-poor rhetoric was never translated into a coherent and comprehensive 
programme. The presidential Cabinet appointees were a combination of known former NDF key 
figures like DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, Technical Education and Skills Development
351 President Marcos died in Honolulu in 1989 and his embalmed body lies in an air-conditioned crypt in his 
hometown in Northern Luzon
352 Doronila, The Fall o f  Joseph Estrada..., 33.
353 Mahar Mangahas, ‘From juetenggate to People Power 2: the SWS surveys of public opinion,’ Social Weather 
Stations presentation materials, 16 February 2001, 15.
354 Mangahas, ‘Public Satisfaction with governance in the Philippines..., 15.
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(TESDA) Director Edificio de la Torre and former political allies of Marcos led by Executive 
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora. This betrayed deep cleavages in political orientation and in 
government policies. The National Anti-Poverty Commission’s (NAPC) thrust to target and 
alleviate poverty of the one hundred poorest families in every province and city was criticised by 
NGOs/POs and business groups ‘for its tokenism and vulnerability to political favouritism.’
Growing signs of inept leadership, the return of Marcos-era cronies and nepotism, lack of 
a coherent and comprehensive programme addressing poverty, among others, eroded Estrada’s 
formidable political capital: his popularity.356 The Office of the President was already tarnished 
by questionable deals, corruption, and moral and political issues which were reversing 
democratic gains accumulated during the Aquino and Ramos administrations. Unlike Aquino 
and Ramos, Estrada was known to have exceptionally few cabinet meetings. Presidential chief 
of staff Aprodicio Laquian was sacked from office after revealing the President’s persistent 
drinking sessions with his ‘midnight cabinet’ (friends and political supporters).357 More talks 
about corruption in the government and its inability to address the problems of poverty circulated 
in the media.358 This weakened people’s confidence in him and pressed him to form the 
‘Economic Coordinating Council.’359 In late 1999, Karina Constantino-David, the 
administration’s housing chief was the first to resign as a member of the Estrada cabinet after a 
close associate of the president was appointed as a presidential housing adviser without any 
accountability.360 The investors’ confidence and peso value relative to the US dollar also
355 Mary Racelis, ‘New visions and strong action: civil society in the Philippines,’ in Funding virtue: civil society 
aid and democracy promotion, eds. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Crothers (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 180.
356 Racelis, ‘New visions and strong action...,’ 180.
357 Alexander Magno, ‘Philippines: trauma of a failed presidency,’ Southeast Asian Affairs (2001), 256.
358 These included Presidential Adviser Mark Jimenez’s suspicious deals, the reluctance on the part of the 
government to pursue business tycoon Lucio Tan’s $500 million tax evasion case; accusations o f former SEC 
Chairperson Perfecto Yasay Jr. that Estrada was interfering in a case concerning the alleged manipulation o f the 
stock market involving Dante Tan, a close associate of the President; the disclosure o f well-respected Good 
Shepherd nun Christine Tan, the Philippine Charity Sweepstake Office Directress (PCSO), regarding charity funds 
of $10.5 million being diverted for the use o f the Estrada family. See Today, ‘Key events in President Estrada’s 
impeachment trial,’ 20 January 2001, 4; Doronila, The fa ll o f  Joseph Estrada....
359 Magno, ‘Philippines....’
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correlated with the declining Estrada popularity.361 Investors’ confidence and peso value 
likewise fell with Estrada’s declining poll ratings.
The National Peace Conference (NPC), meanwhile, held national consultations with 
different sectors from late 1999 to around mid-2000 as regards the growing crisis besetting the 
presidency. In June 2000, Akbayan!, a key player civil society organisation, fired its opening 
salvo calling for the resignation of the President. This was the first clamour for resignation 
among the political groups.363 The following month came the expose of the Philippine Centre 
for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) concerning the discrepancy between Estrada’s declared 
assets and his acquisition and renovation of luxurious mansions in Manila and Baguio for his 
family and mistresses. As the Church leadership was still ‘studying the situation’ from August 
to September, NPC started exploring the possibility of impeaching the president.364 This group 
would eventually become a key player in the revival of Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino 
(KOMPIL II, Congress of Filipino Citizens). KOMPIL II, a broad and loose aggregation of 
more than 100 organisations and 1,000 individuals, was reconvened on October 29, 2001.365 In 
KOMPIL II, Former President Aquino was the keynote speaker. Fr. Robert Reyes from the 
Archdiocese of Manila, was one of the KOMPIL convenors and a crucial liaison between the 
Archdiocese of Manila and civil society groups.366 St. Paul Chartres nun Rosanne Mallilin, 
Executive Secretary of NASS A was also an active participant in KOMPIL. Although no formal 
linkage was made between the Church and civil society, the presence of Fr. Reyes and Sr. 
Mallilin provided a vital connection linking the Archdiocese of Manila and the CBCP to
361 Amando Doronila, ‘ Estrada’s fate to be decided by falling economy,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer 04 December 
2000 , 1 & 20 .
362 John J. Carroll, ‘The Church, State and People Power,’ Intersect 16(2), (February 2001), 8-11.
363 Anna Marie A. Karaos, ‘Not mob rule,’ Intersect 16(2), (February 2001), 14.
364 Ibid., 13 & 15.
365 Claudeth Mocon, ‘KOMPEL reconvenes, this time vs. Estrada,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 October 2001,1 & 
10. The first KOMPIL, a broad coalition of protest groups from the Left to Moderates, was set up in January 1984 
which represented civil society in its opposition against the Marcos regime.
366 Interview with Fr. Robert Reyes, University o f the Philippines (UP) Diliman Parish Priest, Quezon City, 08 
February 2001.
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KOMPIL II.367 Much of this linkage was built on informal ties which church and civil society 
organisations had developed through the years and frequently reactivated particularly on pressing 
issues like this.368 KOMPIL II together with BAYAN, the politicos in the opposition and the 
Council of Philippine Affairs (COP A) created the Multi-sectoral Opposition in the Resign-
- j / r Q
Impeach-Oust (RIO) campaign against Estrada.
On October 2, a damning revelation of Ilocus Sur Governor Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, his 
former close associate, linked President Estrada to anomalous jueteng370 payoffs of $8 million 
and $2.6 million from tobacco excise tax.371 In the wake of this grave expose, Cardinal Sin and 
the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila issued a statement on October 11 
declaring:
In the light of all the scandals that have besmirched the image of the Presidency in the 
last two years, we stand by our conviction that he has lost the moral ascendancy to 
govern. Without meaning to preempt the results of the investigation about the jueteng 
issue and corruption case, we believe that in the spirit of delicadeza372 and for the good 
of the people, he must relinquish his office and turn it over to his constitutional 
successor. 73
The Cardinal was clearly passing his judgment on the basis of moral values but which had 
profound political consequences. The Church’s statement, although civil society protagonists 
had already started organising for the ouster of Estrada, was the first official position coming 
from a national Organisation. The following day, although somewhat belatedly, Vice-President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
367 Mallilin interview; Interview with Joel Rocamora, Executive Director, Institute o f Popular Democracy (IPD), 
Quezon City, 22 February 2001.
368 Ibid.
j69 Karaos, ‘Not mob rule,’ 15.
370 ‘Jueteng’ is an illegal numbers game which is widespread in the Philippines. Bets are collected by designated 
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systematic starting from the lowest political unit to the national level, and involving an ordinary collector to 
powerful figures in society (military, high ranking public official, private individual). Gov. Singson was involved in 
this business until he spilled the beans.
371 Doronila, The fa ll o f  Joseph Estrada, 4.
372 Sense o f propriety.
373 Jaime L. Cardinal Sin, ‘On the way o f truth,’ A Pastoral Statement of the Presbyteral Council pfthe Archdiocese 
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169
Development (DSWD), a cabinet position. From then on, she became the unifying symbol of 
the opposition against Estrada. On October 13, the AMRSP called for the resignation o f ‘the 
highest officials’ of the land implying that Macapagal-Arroyo was also suspect, echoing the 
position of other groups including Sanlakas.374 This position, however, was drowned in the 
more dominant clamour for Estrada’s resignation. On October 20, Archbishop Quevedo, CBCP 
President seconded Cardinal Sin’s position.375 The NCCP and the Council of Ulamas (Islamic 
leaders) also joined Cardinal Sin’s clamour for Estrada’s resignation.
The Catholic Church held a huge prayer rally at the EDSA Shrine, Mandaluyong, on 
November 4, 2000 led by Cardinal Sin and former president Aquino. Sin in his speech called 
for Estrada’s resignation on the basis of the widespread immorality that had plagued the office
'inn
of the president. He declared: ‘Resignation will be good for your (Estrada) soul.’ Some
80,000 to 100,000 were mobilised making it the largest anti-Estrada rally during his 
presidency.379 Anti-Estrada civil society forces from the Right, Centre and Left of the political 
spectrum backed the prayer rally. The CBCP, backing Cardinal Sin’s call, issued a statement 
enjoining the faithful to join prayer rallies which would be staged in the dioceses throughout the 
country.380 In many provinces and cities including Baguio City, Nueva Vizcaya, Pampanga, 
Bulacan, Bacolod City, and Iloilo City, similar prayer rallies were organised by the Church.381
Nevertheless, the cracks within the Church were visible among and between the bishops 
and lay organisations. CBCP President Archbishop Quevedo’s statement which supported 
Cardinal Sin’s appeal for Estrada’s resignation was not a collegial statement binding all the
374 ‘Resignation for impartial investigation,’ Statement o f the Association o f Major Superiors in the Philippines and 
its Mission Partners on the recent event in our country, 13 October 2000. Sanlakas is composed of multi-sectoral 
and multi-organisational groups that broke away from the RAs (reaffirmists o f CPP tenets).
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members, unlike the CBCP statement issued in February 1986. Only about a third of all the 
Philippine bishops were actively involved in the campaign to oust Estrada.382 The Archbishop of 
Cebu, Cardinal Vidal remained sympathetic to Estrada and avoided calling for his resignation to 
the dismay of parishioners in Cebu.383 Bishop Teodoro Bacani, a Manila Auxiliary bishop and 
El Shaddai spiritual director, Bishop Camilo Gregorio, and others supported Estrada. Brother 
Mike Velarde, leader of El Shaddai, aligned his flock with Estrada although a some El Shaddai 
members, such as some leaders in London, signed a letter calling for his resignation. By 
contrast, Couples for Christ, a middle class Catholic charismatic group, became a key player in 
KOMPIL II.384 These divisions within the Church affected its internal dynamics (Church ad 
intra) and its interaction with civil society (Church ad extra). Although many groups in the 
Church formed partnership with anti-Estrada civil society organisations, the Church failed to win 
the support of pro-Estrada organisations and many urban poor communities. NGO community 
organisers of some urban poor organisations in Manila were seen marching with the anti-Estrada 
camp while the communities they organised joined the pro-Estrada rallyists.
Lawmakers from both Houses started shifting alliances. House Speaker Manuel Villar, a 
key Estrada ally, made history when he withdrew his allegiance to Estrada and brought with him 
40 members of Congress, surpassing the required number (73) to impeach the President.385 He 
subsequently approved and sent the impeachment resolution of the House of Representatives to 
the Senate. In this way, President Estrada became the first Philippine President to be impeached 
by the House of Representatives. On December 7, the Senate impeachment trial began amid 
massive street protests beginning with a Mass presided over by Cardinal Sin and culminating in
382 John J. Carroll, ‘Civil society, the Churches and the ouster o f Erap,’ in Between fires: fifteen perspectives on the 
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the ‘Jericho March’ around the Senate.386 The number of rallyists was disappointing since they 
only mobilised some 70,000 when they expected a million to get the military to withdraw its 
loyalty from Estrada.387 The ‘Jericho March’ rally was mainly a civil society initiative with the 
support of the Church. The mobilisation nearly clashed with pro-Estrada support groups, 
coming mostly from poorer classes which was also a sizable contingent. In the meantime, an 
economic downturn also put pressure on Estrada.
The Senate trial was televised nationwide making Filipinos more aware of the 
allegations that Estrada was linked with and yet at least half of the senators maintained their 
position in favour of Estrada. Conviction of President Estrada required 2/3 of the votes of the 
Senate members. It was increasingly clear that the Senators loyal to Estrada would acquit him 
eventually. This suspicion was quite evident in their refusal by a vote of 11-10 on January 16 to 
open a second envelope, submitted in evidence in the case against the President, containing the 
Estrada documents detailing $63.5 million he amassed during his presidency.388 This figure 
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be achieved by lawful means given his declared 
assets of $690,000.389 The Senate vote, after a long, heated, and passionate deliberation sealed 
his imminent acquittal but triggered an uproar in the Senate Gallery, the immediate walk-out of 
the prosecution team, and the indefinite suspension of the trial. That same night, the 
demonstrators started trooping to the EDSA Shrine, a symbol of People Power I in 1986, upon 
the call of Cardinal Sin to express their indignation in prayerful vigil. The following day,
EDSA was closed to traffic and people started arriving in droves.
386 ‘Jericho March’ echoed a biblical event when the Jews were marching around the walls o f Jericho. When the 
horn was blown, the walls collapsed. The demonstrators were instructed to march around the Senate and at the 
moment when the horn would be blown, they were to shout so that the members o f the Senate will hear their 
clamour for justice. They were not, however, allowed to march around the Senate as one group but only in groups 
o f 500.
387 Carroll, ‘Civil society, the Churches, and the oust o f Erap,’ 242. A conservative estimate o f the crowd was 
placed at 25,000.
388 For more details see Doronila, The Fall o f  Joseph Estrada, 149-167.
389 Brook Larmer and Mahlon Meyer, ‘The Return o f people power,’ Newsweek 29 January 2001, 10.
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At EDSA, KOMPIL II organised a 24-hour programme of songs, dances, speeches, and 
other forms of entertainment as the crowd steadily increased with the coming of people from 
nearby provinces. The Church, on the other hand, provided spiritual services to enhance the 
morale of the protest assembly. On January 19, the AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes and 
Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado resigned and recognised the new administration of Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo. Philippine National Police (PNP) Director Panfilo Lacson, a staunch 
Estrada ally, had no choice but to resign when his deputy and regional commanders likewise 
withdrew their support.390 Elements of the military secured his office and threatened arrest if he 
resisted. This accelerated the mass resignation of the entire Estrada cabinet.
On January 20, in the wake of Estrada’s refusal to leave the Presidential Palace 
immediately, civil society groups and key personalities from the Left, Right and Centre decided 
to proceed to Mendiola to pressure him to leave Malacanang.391 Cardinal Sin, for fear that lives 
may be endangered, did not want the EDSA crowd to march to Malacanang, the Presidential 
Palace. The leaders of anti-Estrada civil society organisations, on the other hand, were bent on 
proceeding to the Presidential Palace. However, after an agonising discussion, civil society 
organisations at this point parted ways with the Cardinal and proceeded to the Presidential 
Palace to press Estrada to resign and leave the official seat of authority. The move was a 
gamble but proved effective, otherwise Estrada would have been granted a 5-day grace period 
which could have engendered political uncertainty.392 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took 
her oath of office before Chief Justice Hilario Davide at the EDSA Shrine. In a national survey, 
61% accepted Arroyo as the new president while only 22% did not accept her.393 Meanwhile, 
by February, Estrada’s net trust rating nose-dived to -12 in the entire country, although he still
390 Carl H. Lande, ‘The Return of “people power” in the Philippines,’ Journal o f  Democracy 12(2), (April 2001), 95.
j91 Lisandro Abadia, ‘To march or not to march: only in the Philippines,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 02 March 2001, 
1 & 7.
392 Cathy Yamsuan, ‘It’s 13-0 for Gloria: Supreme Court cites Angara diary as basis for Erap resignation,’ 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 03 March 2001. 16.
393 AJBS-CBN/SWS, ‘Survey on people power 2 and the change in the presidency,’ 2-7 February 2001, 50.
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had significant sympathy from the poor.394 Estrada, however, refused to admit the legitimacy of 
the Arroyo administration. On March 2, 2001, the legal question was finally laid to rest by the 
Supreme Court which voted 13-0 in favour of the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration.395
Although the legitimacy of the Arroyo government was recognised swiftly by the 
international community, some political observers were critical of the mobilisation calling 
‘People Power II’ as ‘a defeat for due process’, ‘a civilised mob rule’, and sarcastically as ‘rich 
people power.’396 Others, however, argued that political establishments in the Philippines are 
weak and when the people were robbed of their constitutional rights, they were left with no
'X Q7further option but to press the government to correct the wrong done to them. ‘People Power’ 
afterall is enshrined in the 1987 charter when it declared that the Philippines is not only a 
republican, but also a democratic state whose ‘Sovereignty resides in the people and all 
government authority emanates from them.’398 As a democratic state, provisions for direct 
democracy are in place (e.g., ‘initiative and referendum’ to amend the constitution, voting out 
incumbent local officials, etc.) to complement the representative form of government.399 The 
Supreme Court, arguing on the principle of salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the 
people is the supreme law), confirmed the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo’s ascension to the 
Presidency in its 13-0 ruling favouring the legitimacy of the Arroyo presidency.400 Former 
Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bemas argued that ‘while it (people power) ousted a 
President, it preserved the existing legal order.’401
394 Ibid., 28.
395 Yamsuan, ‘It’s 13-0 for G loria....’
396 Seth Mydans, ‘People power 2: not the same glow,’ Today, 06 February 2001, 1; Anthony Spaeth, ‘Oops, we did 
it again: ousting presidents by revolution has become a bad national habit,’ Time, 29 January 2001,22); Lande, ‘The 
Return o f “people power” in the Philippines.’
397 See Mydans, ‘People power 2 . . . , ’ 10; Amando Doronila, ‘ EDSA II worries Western Media,’ Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 31 January 2001, 1 & 14.
398 The 1987 Constitution o f  the Republic o f  the Philippines, 1; Joaquin G. Bemas, ‘’’People power” in the 
charter,'Today, 14 February 2001, 8.
399 Ibid.
400 Yamsuan, ‘It’s 13-0 for G loria....’
401 Bemas, ‘’’People power” in the charter.’
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There were reports, culled from an informal conversation between the Ambassador to 
the Holy See and an officer of the Secretariat of State, that the Vatican did not support the 
political involvement of the Philippine Church.402 Nonetheless, the Apostolic Nunciature 
denied this rift claiming that ‘The Holy See...is in absolute harmony and solidarity with the 
Catholic Bishops of the Philippines.’403 Vatican support gave legitimacy to the national 
Church’s involvement, an important recognition that what they were doing was in accord with 
the thrust of the Vatican leadership.
Estrada and his son, former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, were arrested on April 25. 
The following day, Estrada’s supporters assembled at the EDSA Shrine to protest their arrest. 
This protest assembly was covered by TV station Net 25 and Radio DZEC (both INC-owned) 
and supported by a host of pro-Estrada senators and former government officials.404 Former 
PNP Director Lacson, on the second day of the protest, told the protesters: ‘Victory is nearly 
ours.’405 On the eve of May 1, 2001, amid coup rumours, the protesters stormed the Presidential 
Palace. Although this mobilisation had the support of politicians and business people loyal to 
Estrada, his sons JV Ejercito and Jude Ejercito, key leaders of Estrada’s political base and many 
INC and some El Shaddai members, it betrayed a profound discontent of the masa which the 
ruling elite have over the years neglected.406
Amando Doronila, a well-respected political observer, posed some questions about 
certain assumptions of ‘people power’ and underscored its ambivalence in a democratising 
polity.407 Democracy (as defined in this study) in Philippine politics is generally vibrant, but 
evidently it was not intended primarily to address the issues around class relations. The ‘People
402 ‘Press release of the Apostolic Nunciature,’ Manila, 19 December 2001.
403 Ibid.
404 Doronila, The fa ll o f  Joseph Estrada..., 220-246
405 Ibid., 279.
406 Ibid., 220-246
407 Amando Doronila, ‘Beyond Edsa and people power,’ available from 
http://www.inq7.net/opi/2002/feb/22/text/opi amdoronila-1 -p.htm. 26 November 2002.
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Power IIP protests dramatised profoundly the betrayal of the cause of the poor. The Church too 
reflected on this event and realised the deep gulf that existed between them and the poor -a  
contradiction of the very vision they opted for at PCP II: to be a church of the poor.
4.10 Concluding remarks
Compared with the Church during the authoritarian period, it must be said that the post­
authoritarian Church as an actor was well positioned in Philippine society. A relatively high 
public confidence in the Church gave it some leverage to deal with democratic issues. Although 
post-authoritarian democracy in the Philippines has been described as ‘stable, but low 
quality,’408 it is said to have greater democratic impulse than its regional counterparts such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia.409 Sustaining democracy was a more complex task than its initiation 
during the Marcos years. The emergence of church actors that were anti-Catholic (INC and 
fundamentalist movements) and those that grew out of the Catholic fold (El Shaddai and Opus 
Dei), inheriting a politicised military, the proliferation of civil society organisations of different 
political persuasions, the complexity of the political atmosphere (e.g., during Estrada crisis) to 
name a few, complicated the Church’s contributions in democracy building. Using Diamond’s 
definition of democracy (see Chapter One), one could argue that the Philippines in general 
fulfilled the requirements of a democratic polity. Democratisation in this sense largely focused 
on asserting civilian supremacy over the military (e.g., anti-military coup campaigns), propping 
up the electoral system, participation of organised groups (e.g., peace building, promotion of 
human rights, anti-charter change mobilisations) and pressing for government accountability 
(Estrada crisis), but the run-up to the ouster of Estrada and the competing protest mobilisations 
of People Power II and ‘People Power III’ revealed the fragility and limits of the country’s 
democratic project. Class tension was evident in the two mobilisations, an issue that a pluralist
408 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: democracy or less (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), 201-243.
409 James Putzel, ‘Why has democratization been a weaker impulse in Indonesia and Malaysia than in the 
Philippines?’ In Democratization, eds., David Potter et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 240-263.
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view of democracy (such as Diamond’s definition) does not seek to resolve. Nevertheless, the 
Church’s democratic contributions must neither be simply dismissed nor overstated. On this 
note, three lessons can be deduced from the narrative of the Philippine Church in the post­
authoritarian period.
First, following the argument posed in the previous chapter more than ever the Church 
demonstrated that indeed it was an actor with its own agenda in democracy building, and not 
simply acted upon by the conditions of the times. This point connects well with Mainwaring 
and Wilde’s observation regarding many local Churches in Latin America during the transition 
period when they assumed a position in society ‘both as actor and as acted-upon.’410 In post- 
Marcos era, the Philippine Church continued its role ‘as actor and as acted upon.’ As was 
mentioned in the concluding section of Chapter Three, the Philippine Church in the post­
authoritarian setting was not merely protecting its own corporate interests as Gill’s ‘rational- 
actor model of behaviour’ would want to propose to explain the politics of Churches in Latin 
America, although admittedly it did on some occasions.411 The church-led and church- 
supported initiatives and interventions were foremost in the Church’s democratic agenda. These 
were in keeping with the thrusts of the social teaching of the Church, Vatican II, and PCP II, 
although these attempts to reform the Church did not settle competing interpretations regarding 
its public role in Philippine society or the ecclesiological divides among church groups. But for 
pro-democracy groups within the Church, their interventions found a theological base and 
energy from these ecclesiological thrusts, thus curtailing the reactionary tendencies of many of 
the Church’s agencies. Evidently the Church did not rest content in the inauguration of 
democracy as in the defeat of the Marcos military dictatorship. It had to ensure that democracy 
would survive and work. Its support for the 1987 Constitution was a commitment to democracy 
and the primacy of law over patronage and clientelism. Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the
410 Mainwaring and Wilde, ‘Progressive Church in Latin America...,’ 1.
411 Gill Rendering unto Caesar...-, Gill, ‘The Economics o f evangelization.’
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Charter, it contained strong democratic features: encouragement and recognition of NGO/PO 
roles, safeguards against authoritarianism, provisions on human rights and social justice. The 
Church’s endorsement and lobby for the ratification of the Charter, the defence it put up for the 
constitutional government when it was threatened by a string of military coup attempts, its 
resistance against self-serving attempts to amend the Charter, all these reveal the Church’s 
unwavering stance to defend the fledgeling democracy. Its human rights advocacy and peace 
efforts together with peace advocates and civil society organisations, particularly during the 
period of Aquino and partially during that of Ramos, sought a concept of peace not merely in 
terms of cessation of hostilities but dealing squarely with issues breeding the armed conflict.
The Church played a key role in ensuring that the first ceasefire between the military and 
communist rebels would be observed despite some violations. Although the peace efforts were 
partially successful, the formation of a peace constituency arose from peace consultations, 
education and mobilisations. This peace constituency was the single most important outcome of 
these peace processes. Electoral outcomes did not, however, indicate that the peace 
constituency was able to translate its influence into actual votes for candidates with a clear 
peace agenda. Nonetheless, the Church’s involvement in electoral reform through PPCRV and 
VOTE-CARE factored in curbing anomalies in the electoral exercises in the 1990s, especially in 
the 1992 and 1998 elections. Purging the electoral list, voters’ education, presence in polling 
places, poll watching, monitoring vote canvassing, and assistance to NAMFREL’s OQC were 
the main contributions of the church-based electoral watch movements. Voters’ political 
education, however, remained seasonal, practically only during election periods. The 
perception that individual church leaders were campaigning for certain political candidates 
diminished its credibility as a non-partisan Organisation, although CBCP remained neutral 
during the elections. Finally, its active involvement in the resign-impeach-ouster of President
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Estrada attempted to push the process of democratisation to include good governance and public 
transparency.
Second, the strength of the Church’s interventions and impulses hinged largely on 
hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) and church-civil society linkage (church ad extra) 
in their explicit or implicit form. The variety of doctrinal orientations (e.g, on property rights, 
extent of the Church’s public involvement) and pastoral strategies of actors within the hierarchy 
(e.g., CBCP, AMRSP) and the laity (e.g., charismatic movements, BECs, Opus Dei) was often 
shaped by disparate class and power relations. Thus building a broad consensus of church 
position as in church ad intra meant constant negotiation and deliberation within and between 
the hierarchy and laity. Clearly Vatican II and PCP II did not solve completely opposing 
differences and tendencies within and between parties. Church ad intra was a complex process. 
A trying moment for the Church ad intra dynamics was the relationship between the hierarchy 
and El Shaddai. Despite the designation of Bishop Bacani and priests in the movement as 
spiritual directors, this did not prevent El Shaddai from taking political options (e.g., tacit 
support for Ramos’ cha-cha, and Estrada’s Presidency) directly opposing the view of the Church 
hierarchy. Nonetheless, a positive church ad intra provided a climate of participation within the 
Church by ensuring that the laity (organisations and individuals) had a voice in church 
proceedings and decisions. In turn this internal interaction shored up another level of linkage 
involving civil society actors.
Church-civil society partnership, whether cast in formal or informal ties, had its origins 
as far back as in the 1930s when the popularisation of the Catholic social teaching started. This 
was buttressed further by Vatican II and PCP II (see Chapter Three). Evidently, Church-civil 
society nexus was neither sufficient to construct democracy nor was the ‘network of ties’ largely 
located in civil associations as Putnam would claim.412 Rather, this church-civil society linkage
412 Putnam, ‘Bowling a lone....’
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had definite political meaning and orientation carried out by both actors.413 By supporting the 
ratification of the 1987 Charter and defending a fragile democracy against coup plotters, the 
Church aligned with the laity (people) and with civil society organisations in their continuing 
struggle to deepen democratisation. Arguably the Church’s linkages (hierarchy-laity interaction 
and church-civil society partnership) widened the sites of participation of actors within the 
Church and without. These linkages enhanced its capacity and role as an actor in 
democratisation particularly in peace issues, anti-Charter change campaigns, electoral watch 
projects, and public accountability leading to the ouster of President Estrada. In their advocacy 
for peace, the Church worked with peace activists and civil society groups in engaging the 
government and the rebels for a lasting peace settlement. The fact that the Church was part of, 
not above, the peace constituency plainly shows that it was deeply inserted in the struggle of its 
people to achieve meaningful and lasting peace. The two anti-Charter change campaigns 
demonstrated tight partnership with civil society organisations (Church ad extra) in defending 
the constitution against self-serving motivations to undermine its democratic character. The 
participation of people in these protest assemblies nationwide simply indicated that the Church’s 
reading of the situation reflected the concerns of the people (hierarchy-laity interaction). 
Church-based electoral organisations (PPCRV and VOTE-CARE), whether formally or 
informally, struck partnership with civil society groups (e.g., NAMFREL and IBP), despite 
some tensions between and among themselves. PPCRV and VOTE-CARE being initiated and 
led by lay people and supported by the hierarchy are fine exemplars of hierarchy-laity 
interaction. The exercise of citizenship appears in all these to be a most important binding force 
connecting the Church’s leaders with the faithful (laity) and with civil society organisations.
The leaders of civil society organisations realise the importance of church network
413 See Putzel, ‘Accounting for the “dark side” o f social capital....’
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(organisations, BECs, parishes, and institutes), but at the same time the Church sees that without 
civil society groups broad coalitions and alliances, much of its involvement is quite limited.
Nevertheless, there had been divisive issues that challenged the church-civil society 
nexus, particularly on population, divorce, women and gender issues where public opinion 
showed opposing views from the position taken by the Church. The decision of the leaders of 
civil society actors to march to Mendiola to press ousted President Estrada to resign and vacate 
the Presidential Palace against the view of Cardinal Sin, betrayed the independence of the 
former when all throughout the campaign the two were often been moving in close partnership.
Likewise, there had been occasions of weak church ad intra and ad extra: ambivalent 
positions with regard to the vigilante movement, counter-insurgency campaign of the 
government, and the US military bases. All these diminished the Church’s appeal as 
peacemaker. In these areas of church ambivalence, invariably there was hardly any significant 
consultation with the laity (lack of hierarchy-laity interaction) and interaction with civil society 
groups (lack of church-civil society nexus). This seems to suggest that both these linkages 
(hierarchy-laity interaction and church-civil society partnership) are intimately connected with 
each other. The Church’s roles in democracy building would not have made much impact 
where either one of the two is lacking. The Church exerts more influence by speaking from 
within the laity and civil society groups rather than making pronouncements at them. This shift 
is pivotal if the Church commits itself to democracy building where it is no longer the ‘voice of 
the voiceless’ but simply just one voice in a plurality of voices.
The pluralistic view of democratisation as defined at the beginning of this chapter 
evidently has limits in the Philippine context (e.g., ‘People Power II’ and ‘People Power III’). 
Although mass mobilisations have become vehicles of interest articulation and representation, in 
the case of the Estrada crisis, fragile democratic institutions were sidelined and the class divide 
manifested itself dramatically in the conflict. It appears then that democratisation in the
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Philippines has not sufficiently addressed acute social inequality. A vibrant civil society 
movement does not necessarily guarantee the closing of a class divide in a democratising polity.
Third, the Church’s roles in democracy building have invariably focused on engaged 
citizenship. The Church’s commitment to human rights has gone beyond the conventional 
definition (e.g., state abuses) to include a wide range of issues (e.g., peace, death penalty, right 
to development, migrant workers, etc.). Citizenship is neither simply understood as a set of 
obligations of individuals to the State nor legal entitlements of individuals alone, but also 
necessitates free and responsible fulfilment of obligations of citizens to the State and society.414 
Citizenship is not only a status, but inevitably includes active engagement.415 The 
mainstreaming o f ‘people power’ in the 1987 Charter (e.g., role of NGOs and POs) and the 
Church’s roles in the civil society enabled citizens to become agents involved in the democratic 
enterprise. Evidently the Church was instrumental in fashioning a quality of engaged 
citizenship through its campaign for the ratification of the democratic Charter, its mobilisation 
of the people to defend a fragile democracy besieged by military coup attempts, its contributions 
to the formation of a peace constituency, its support for political education (e.g., candidates’ 
forum) during and in between election periods, its commitment to electoral reform, its 
mobilisation for people’s participation in the anti-Charter change campaigns, and its role during 
the Estrada crisis -these enabled people to deepen their understanding and practice of 
citizenship. Citizenship in this regard can erode the prevalent practice of bossism, clientelism 
and patronage relationships which typify Philippine politics.416
414 Diokno, ‘Becoming a Filipino citizen ....’
415 Jones and Gaventa, ‘Concepts o f citizenship...,’ 5.
416 Sidel, Capital, coercion and crim e....
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Chapter Five
The Diocese of Malaybalay and post-authoritarian democracy building: 
an activist Church or civil society animator?
‘...we do not make distinctions in the people’s exercise of co-responsibility, dialogue and participation as a 
people o f God and as citizens of the Philippine republic. The practice of their Christianity cannot be 
separated from the exercise o f their citizenship.’ Bp. Francisco F. Claver SJ1
Chapters three and four set in motion the Catholic Church’s narrative as a democratic actor in 
Philippine society. The next two chapters provide local cases of the Church’s roles in 
strengthening post-authoritarian democracy. These local experiences are intimately connected 
with the national Church and the macro political context of the times. In this chapter, three main 
arguments are set out. First, hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) in the Diocese of 
Malaybalay broadened the participatory space within the Church and increased the local 
Church’s resolve in dealing with democratic issues. Second, positive interaction between the 
Church and civil society (church ad extra) enhanced the former’s capacity to engage the State 
and society in enhancing democracy. Third, the local Church was deeply engaged in 
environmental protection, the promotion of human rights including rights of indigenous peoples 
and national political issues. Involvement in these issues brought about a new awareness and 
practice of citizenship favourable to enhancing democracy. To strengthen these arguments, this 
chapter will firstly present the general background of the Diocese of Malaybalay. Secondly, it 
will explain the factors that shaped the Church’s political involvement during the authoritarian 
period. Thirdly, it will briefly describe the transition of leadership in the local Church. Fourthly 
it will narrate and analyse the main lines of political engagements of the Church in the post­
authoritarian period. Finally, it will conclude the presentation and discussion.
1 Francisco F. Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization of the prelature,’ in Quinquennial Report: 
Prelature o f  Malaybalay, Prelature of Malaybalay: Malaybalay, 28 December 1975, 29.
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5.1 General background of the Diocese of Malaybalay
The Diocese of Malaybalay comprises the whole province of Bukidnon, excepting Malitbog and 
including the municipality of Wao, Lanao del Sur, southwest of Bukidnon and Buda (Bukidnon- 
Davao boundary) in Davao (see Figure 4 next page). It occupies the north central area of 
Mindanao. Bukidnon is a landlocked area of 829,378 hectares of fertile agricultural land 
characterised by rugged mountains, extensive plateaus of varying heights, marked by deep and 
wide canyons, and rolling landscape.2 Evidently, the early signs of Christianisation show that 
evangelisation, initiated by the Spanish Recoleto friars and later pursued by the Spanish Jesuits, 
started as far back as in the middle of the 19th century.3 The Post-World War II period saw a 
more sustained, systematic and intensive evangelisation in Bukidnon led by the American 
Jesuits. By 1975, baptised Catholics were 86% of the whole populace of around 528,000.4 
Bukidnon, like all of Mindanao, used to be under the ecclesiastical territory of the Diocese of 
Cebu until 1865, under the Diocese of Jaro until 1910, under the Diocese of Zamboanga until 
1933, and under the Diocese of Cagayan de Misamis (presently Cagayan de Oro) until April 25, 
1969 when the Holy See declared the creation of the Prelature of Malaybalay.5 The first bishop, 
Francisco F. Claver SJ, was installed on September 4, 1969 as the Prelate Ordinary of 
Malaybalay. By then, the influence of Vatican II (1962-1965) was already beginning to make 
inroads in the Church’s identity and mission in the modem world. Like many local Churches in 
the Philippines and all over the world, the late 1960s and early 1970s marked a profound change 
in the prelature’s pastoral strategies and priorities. During the watch of Bishop Claver (1969 to 
1984), the Prelature of Malaybalay (later to be elevated in 1982 to the status of a diocese)
2 Province Planning and Development Office -  Bukidnon (PPDO-B), ‘Socio-economic profile 2000,’
Malaybalay, 2000, 8.
3 Miguel A. Bemad, ‘The Malaybalay Diocese,’ in Diocese o f  Malaybalay, 25th Anniversary Silver Jubilee ’94, 
Malaybalay, Diocese o f Malaybalay, n.d, 1. See also Miguel A. Bemad, ‘The Jesuit exploration ofPulangi or 
Rio Grande de Mindanao 1888-1890,’ Kinaadman VI (1984), 149-190.
4 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization o f the prelature,’ 1975, 1.
5 Bemad, ‘The Diocese o f Malaybalay,’ 1-2.
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became one of the most politically progressive local Churches in the Philippines. It was one of 
the first of the local Churches to respond to local challenges which inevitably were linked to 
national and international issues at a time when most local Churches in the Philippines were still 
clarifying their stance regarding the NSS ideology of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
5.2 The factors shaping the local Church’s roles under the authoritarian regime
The scope of this study makes it difficult to deal extensively with the Bukidnon Church during 
the time of Marcos. Nonetheless, it is important to identify the significant factors that influenced 
the direction of the local Church’s involvement during the years of dictatorship and beyond. In 
this regard, five significant factors are well worth citing: the Vatican II renewal, the authoritarian 
context, lay participation and the rise of small Christian communities, a young local Church, and 
the courageous leadership of Bp. Claver.
The first important factor in the progressive radicalisation of the Church in Bukidnon, 
like many local Churches all around the globe, was the universal renewal in Vatican II (see 
Chapter Two). The Church documents issuing from Vatican II, Synod of Bishops (1971), Papal 
Social Encyclicals from Rerum Novarum (1891) to Centisimus Annus (1991), de-privatised 
Christian moral imperatives and underpinned ecclesial engagement in public affairs particularly 
those that involved human dignity, social justice and total human development. In themselves, 
these do not constitute democratisation, but they enabled the people to become more aware of 
their human rights and participate in pushing for political democracy. As was explained in 
chapters one and two, the aggiornamento, that is, the updating of the identity and mission of the 
Church in contemporary times, set out by Vatican II, provided a theological framework that 
fuelled the trajectory of the religio-political role of the local Church in Bukidnon.
The Vatican II renewal interacted with the brewing socio-political, cultural, and 
economic conditions of the province and the country. This second factor, in good measure,
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helped to redefine the pastoral thrust of the Bukidnon Church. The declaration of martial law in 
1972 signalled the suppression of civil liberties and brought about extensive militarisation in the 
Philippines including Bukidnon. Militarisation and insurgency seemed to correlate positively in 
Bukidnon, that is, more militarisation meant more insurgency. The prelature’s radio station 
DXBB and the weekly mimeographed newsletter Ang Bandilyo (The Towncrier) were both 
suppressed in November 1976 and January 1977 respectively. DXBB, started in 1971, reached 
80% of radio listeners in Bukidnon while Ang Bandilyo, which began in 1972, circulated some 
3,600 copies to all parishes in the diocese including the government offices.6 The local Church 
was consequently charged with subversion and rebellion. Both cases were eventually dismissed 
for lack of solid evidence. The height of church persecution was the killing of Fr. Godofredo 
Alingal SJ on April 13, 1981 by hired gunmen linked to a local goverment official in Kibawe, 
south of Bukidnon.
Jesuit missionary Vincent Cullen reports that the lumad (indigenous peoples) became 
increasingly marginalised and displaced due to land expansion and at times land grabbing 
activities and harassment by propertied families and huge agri-business (usually multinational 
companies like Del Monte, Nestle, San Miguel Corporation, etc.) and commercial firms 
operating in Bukidnon —mostly with the blessing of the national leadership.7 Cullen’s estimation 
in 1975 shows that the lumad comprised one-fifth of the population in the province with the 
Bukidnons (‘people of the mountains’ or Higa-onons) in the north numbering around 528,000 
and the Manobos in the south about 30,000.8 The lumad were and still are the most vulnerable
6 Joseph I. Stoffel, and Agustin L. Nazareno, ‘Communications media center et al.,’ in Quinquennial Report: 
Prelature o f  Malaybalay, Malaybalay: Prelature o f Malaybalay, 1975, Appendix B, 35-38; Interview with 
Revicca I. Aquino, News and Public Affairs Officer, Malaybalay, 21 May 2001.
7 Vincent Cullen, ‘Report on the situation o f the cultural minorities in the Province o f Bukidnon,’ in 
Quinquennial Report: Prelature o f  Malaybalay, Malabalay: Prelature o f Malaybalay, 1975, Appendix E, 49-55.
8 Ibid., 49; Francis C. Madigan, ‘Mindanao inland province,’ Book I, Cagayan de Oro: Xavier University, 
RIMCU, 1969, 43.
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group of people in the province owing to their displacement from their ancestral domains, abject 
poverty, lack of education, being susceptible to cultural prejudice and many other forms of 
harassment. Compounding the political climate was the issue of underdevelopment in the 
region. Widespread poverty affecting at least 70% of the people made the poor vulnerable to 
disease, and malnutrition.9 The local Church in Bukidnon was confronted with all these harsh 
realities. It took a bold stance by denouncing political repression, social injustice, and 
announcing its words of hope and comfort. Given the gravity of the socio-political, cultural and 
economic issues, the Church became aggressively involved in challenging the excesses of state 
power. Bp. Claver stood firm in his resolve to promote social transformation while not 
succumbing to the armed rebellion of the underground Left.10 Nonetheless, a few members of 
the clergy, religious and lay leaders actively collaborated with the CPP-NDF-NPA.11 This 
created some internal tensions within the local Church which persisted in the 1990s. There were 
attempts to influence and dominate Ang Bandilyo, DXBB, BECs and recruit membership from 
church people, but this eventually ceased.12
A third factor in the radicalisation of the Church in Bukidnon was the emergence of lay 
participation (see below) and BCCs. Claver clearly drawing from the Vatican II documents, 
equated the new formulation of ecclesiology with the Church as ‘people of God.’13 This is a 
critical departure from the prevailing notion that the Church is mainly the hierarchy (bishops, 
priests and religious). The post-Vatican II ecclesiology is understood to comprise both the lay 
people (organised and individuals) and hierarchical leadership, and their mutual interaction. Such 
interaction is crucial in building consensus as within the hierarchy and the laity are differences,
9 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization o f the prelature,’ 1975, 2.
10 Interview with Fr. Calvin H. Poulin, Former Vicar General, Prelature of Malaybalay, Cagayan de Oro, 09 
June 2001.
11 Interview with Norberto Amora, Lay leader o f the Diocese of Malaybalay, Malaybalay, 18 August 2001.
12 Ibid.; Interview with Loquias Rebecca, Former Diocesan Chancellor, Malaybalay, 05 May 2001.
13 Claver, ‘Quinquennial Report...,’ 1975, 28.
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varying pastoral inclinations and organisational interests that at times compete with each other. 
Although changes within the Bukidnon Church were not uniform, by and large, a significant part 
of its leadership and organised groups (e.g., BCCs/BECs) were vibrant, dynamic, discerning, and 
responsive to the issues of the times.
Lay participation was evident in the training and commissioning of the Barrio Apostles, 
later to be renamed as Alagad (community lay leaders). Taking its cue from the Rural Congress, 
held in the Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro in 1967, the Prelature of Malaybalay sought to de­
centralise church presence and activity by going to the barrio (village).14 The barrio was 
typically a peripheral political area which was often neglected or cut off from ecclesiastical reach 
coming from the sentro (centre), or poblacion (town centre). Hence the name given to lay 
leaders was Barrio Apostles . This move was a significant departure from ‘town-centred 
Catholicism’ which was a dominant ecclesiological scheme before Vatican II.15 The alagad 
were, and still are, liturgical presiders in the weekly katilingbanong pag-ampo (community 
worship). The alagad were typically male, married, between 25 and 40 years old and a resident 
of the community they served.16 They were sent to their own communities to preside over 
Sunday community worship (when no priest is available), conduct biblical studies, and facilitate 
social analysis to clarify and respond to community issues. It is said that by 1981, there were 
more than 600 active alagad, not to mention over a thousand women and men (catechists, 
community organisers, and other church workers) who many a time assumed their functions.17 
The alagad also served as ‘agents of contact’ between the local community and the different 
prelature offices.18 In effect, the formation of small Christian communities in the 1970s, under
14 BEC Commission, ‘Formation guide: basic ecclesial community (BEC),’ Malaybalay: Diocese of  
Malaybalay, BEC Commisssion, 2nd edtion, 1996, 3-4.
15 Ibid., 4.
16 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization of the prelature,’ 1975, 44.
17 Francisco F. Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization of the prelature,’ in Quinquennial Report: 
Prelature o f  Malaybalay, Malaybalay: Prelature o f Malaybalay, 30 December 1981, 20.
18 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization of the prelature,’ 1975, 44.
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the leadership and guidance of alagad, became the starting point of Gagmay’ng Kristohanong 
Katilingban (GKK, Basic [Small] Christian Communities or BCC) or more commonly known as 
Kristohanong Katilingban (Christian community).
The alagad were instrumental in the formation of GKKs which later became known as 
GSKs (Gagmay ’ng Simbahanong Katilingban or Basic Ecclesial Communities or BECs). GKKs 
were mainly kapilya-(chapQ\) based or neighbourhood organisations in the 1970s and 1980s.
The shift from GKK (BCC) to GSK (BEC) was made in 1983 through the Mindanao-Sulu 
Pastoral Conference V (MSPC) in an effort to make it plain that these small communities are 
ecclesial entities and not aligned with or extensions of any ideological groups. BECs have 
evolved in different forms and sizes, but in general they are essentially lay-led, community- 
based, bible-centred praying groups, and responsive to local and national issues. BECs are 
liturgical (stressing worship and prayer), developmental (largely concerned with socio-economic 
livelihood projects), and liberational (emphasising social and political change).19 These 
categories do overlap, but in general, while many of the Bukidnon BECs can be said to be 
liturgical, the liberational BCCs had immense influence in the post-authoritarian period.20 The 
role of facilitators is extremely crucial to ensure that ideas are evoked from the members and not 
imposed; that a community plan of action is consensually arrived at and not manipulated; that 
members actively participate and not remain passive. BEC concerns could be put forward 
through parochial zones, that is, clusters of nearby chapels within a section of a parish. In some 
cases, issues were brought to parish-wide discussion and action. If there was still no resolution, 
then it was brought to the level of the prelature or diocese. Thus BECs became zones of interest
19 Interview with Fr. Mariano Chia, Parish Priest o f Archangel St. Michael, Linabo, Diocese of Malaybalay, 16 May 
2001; Interview with Fr. Venancio Balansag, Jr., BEC Desk Coordinator, Malaybalay City, Diocese o f Malaybalay, 
02 May 2001.
20 Ibid. Chia, however, claims that during his term (1989-1993) as BEC Coordinator, 50% of the parishes employ 
the liberational approach o f BEC (Chia interview, 16 May 2001). This, however, does not mean that all BECs within 
the parish are liberational.
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articulation and representation. In this sense, BECs paved the way for a participatory and 
democratised Church.21 The growth of BECs in many ways institutionalised and mainstreamed 
lay participation in the life of the local Church in Bukidnon.
The laity in Bukidnon are varied. Many lay individuals do not belong to any of the 
church groups and others are occasionally practising Christians. But the groups that exercise 
some influence in the local Church can be classified accordingly. To illustrate this variety, a 
simplified ecclesiological spectrum of organised groups may help at this point.22
Figure 5: Ecclesiological spectrum of Church groups in the Diocese of Malaybalay
•   •
BCCs/BECs Charismatic groups KoC/CWL,
Marian groups
(Liberational - Developmental - Liturgical) (Traditional groups)
The conservative groups (e.g., Knights of Columbus (KoC) and Catholic Women’s League 
(CWL), Marian organisations) are known for their traditional and devotional practices, and 
adherence to some church teachings in the pre-Vatican II days (e.g., primacy of personal 
sanctification and eternal life, withdrawal from the world, church constitution as essentially the 
hierarchy). Overall, they would much rather see the Church leaders focus on ‘spiritual’ aspects 
of Christian faith rather than being actively involved in temporal affairs (e.g., social justice, 
political issues). A good number of traditional local elite politicians are associated with the 
conservative groups. They were staunchly anti-communist and critical of the Church’s 
involvement in politics. The charismatic groups evolved in the 1970s. Collectively as a group,
21 Interview with Bp. Francisco F. Claver, Former Bishop of the Diocese of Malaybalay and former Exeuctive 
Director ofN A SSA , Quezon City, 13 January 2001.
22 Based on BEC Commission, ‘Formation G uide....’
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they don’t share the traditional practices of the conservative groups. Nevertheless, their 
tendency to shy away from political involvement and social justice issues appear to make them 
depoliticised, although some charismatic groups were politically involved in some post­
authoritarian political mobilisation. Rather than accentuate devotional practices, charismatic 
movements stress the importance of bible study, healing ministry and personal conversion.
BECs range from liturgical, developmental to liberational, but on the whole, one would see them 
as participatory, more oriented to the study of the bible, sharing of lived experience, and 
involvement in issues affecting their communities. The members of the clergy are generally 
supportive of BCCs (liturgical, developmental and liberational) while some give importance to 
the traditional and charismatic groups.
Closely connected to lay participation is the fact that Bukidnon was a particularly young 
Church during the authoritarian period and arguably still is at present. This then is the fourth 
factor which made the Church more flexible and attuned to local needs and issues. The sharp 
increase of migration to Bukidnon is noticeable from 1948. These migrants (dumagats, i.e., 
coming from coastlands) came from ‘Misamis Oriental, Bohol, and Cebu’ while others from 
Iloilo, Negros Island and Luzon took advantage of President Ramon Magsaysay’s resettlement 
programmes in the 1950s.23 Others were pre-war migrants from the province who returned 
gradually to Bukidnon to reclaim their homesteads after the American bases folded up. The in- 
migration continued until the 1960s.24 From a population of 63,400 in 1948, it soared to 414,700 
in 1970.25 This constitutes a 654% increase in population growth, caused largely by the massive 
in-migration during that period. Intensive evangelisation by American Jesuits and massive in­
23 Madigan, ‘Mindanao inland province,’ 40; Interview with Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, SJ, Bishop o f the Diocese 
of Malaybalay, Malaybalay, 24 May 2001.
24 Madigan, ‘Mindanao inland province,’ 40.
25 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization o f the prelature,’ 1975, 1.
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migration in the province happened almost simultaneously after World War II.26 The presence 
of a sizable number of migrants in the province meant that people were adaptable in cultural 
practices, including their religiosity and their understanding of being part of a faith community. 
Unfortunately, the influx of migrants carried with it a downside effect: the displacement and 
exploitation of the lumad in Bukidnon.
As a young Church, Bukidnon was considered a mission area of the Archdiocese of 
Cagayan de Oro, prior to 1969. Its local clergy only started to emerge in the late 1960s. Local 
diocesan priests typically come from the province of Bukidnon while the religious priests in
9 7general were mostly foreigners or non-Bukidnon Filipinos. The table below suggests the 
gradual emergence of a local (diocesan) clergy in Bukidnon.
Table 1: Number of Clergy in the Diocese of Malaybalay28
Year Diocesan Religious Total
1975 7 33 40
1981 20 26 46
1989 32 29 61
2000 50 18 68
Note: The Religious are mostly Jesuits, a few Scarboros and Benedictines (contemplatives).
From 1975 to 2000, the diocesan clergy posted a gain of 43 priests while the religious (Jesuits, 
Scarboros and Benedictines) diminished by 15. Claver notes that in 1975, religious priests to
90diocesan clergy was approximately 5 to 1. In 2000, twenty five years after, this ratio is almost 
reversed. This steady upsurge of diocesan clergy was a crucial development in terms of the 
localisation of the Church. Despite this increase of diocesan clergy, in 1995, ‘Catholics per
26 Madigan, ‘Mindanao inland province,’ 40.
27 Diocesan priests are directly under the resident bishop and they generally remain in their diocese. The 
members o f the religious congregations (or simply known as religious), although they work with and for the 
bishop in his diocese, by virtue o f their religious vows, can be moved out of the diocese and sent elsewhere by 
their Superiors.
28 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization o f the prelature,’ 1981, 3; CBCP, 1989 Catholic Directory 
o f  the Philippines (Manila: Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines and Catholic Trade Inc.), 393-397; 
2000 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines (Quezon: CBCP and Claretian Publications), 139-142.
29 Claver, ‘Quinquennial Report...,’ 1981, 20.
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priest’ ratio was 16,405:1, one of the highest among the local Churches in the Philippines.30 
Indeed lay participation was a pressing need in the diocese.
Being a new local Church, Bp. Claver invited a host of clergy members and nuns from 
other congregations and dioceses.31 The influx of religious sisters made possible the formation
'X'Jof the Religious Sisters of Bukidnon (RSB) composed of about 15 congregations. In particular, 
a few of the Religious of the Good Shepherd Sisters (RGS) were steeped in BCC organising and 
quite involved in human rights advocacy through TFD.
In the 1970s, NGOs were gradually emerging in the Bukidnon. Apart from TFD, the 
Community Organisation of the Philippine Enterprise (COPE), church-linked NGOs like the 
Tribal Filipino Apostolate (TFA) and the Share and Care Apostolates for Poor Settlers (SCAPS) 
were some of the NGOs that operated in the province. These NGOs linked up with the Social 
Action Center (SAC)and the Legal Aid Bureau of the Church in many of their activities and 
programmes.34 No single NGO in the province had influence without linking up with the Church 
at that time when civil society groups were still growing in Bukidnon.
As a young Church, the Catholics were open to new ways of faith practices and Christian 
living that were responsive to the needs of the locality. Its creation as a prelature in 1969 further 
bolstered its own identity as a distinct Church entity with a life of its own and not just an adjunct 
or mission area of the Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro. From 1969 onward, the prelature charted 
its own course of Church involvement in ways that became truly responsive to Bukidnon, first 
and foremost, and then to the situation in Mindanao and the whole of the Philippines.
30 CBCP Research Office, 1985 to 1995 Statistical profile o f  the Catholic Church in the Philippines, 5.
31 Locquias interview, 05 May 2001.
32 Ibid.
33 Personal communication with Dominiano Esta, Assistant Bukidnon Institute o f Catechetics, Diocese of 
Malaybalay, 21 August 2001.
34 Interview with Atty. Rube S. Gamolo Legal Aid Bureau lawyer, Malaybalay, 11 May 2001.
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Finally, the fifth factor in the radicalisation of the Bukidnon Church consists of the 
courageous leadership of the prelature by Bishop Francisco F. Claver SJ. He was bom in 
Bontoc, Mountain Province on January 20, 1929, joined the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) on May 
30, 1948, was ordained as a priest on June 18, 1961 and finally as bishop on August 22, 1969 
after Vatican II.35 He finished his doctoral studies in anthropology at the University of Colorado 
in 1969 while assuming the leadership of the Prelature of Malaybalay.36 His background, being 
a native from Bontoc, a Jesuit, and an anthropologist, probably played a crucial influence in the 
leadership and vision which he shared with the Church of Bukidnon. He was one of the very 
few church leaders in the early 1970s who dared to challenge the military abuses and the 
authoritarian state of President Marcos. A staunch critic of the Marcos government, he was 
denied a couple of speaking engagements abroad in 1977 by the same government. Very dear to 
him was his insistence on active lay participation in the life of the Church based on three
- ID
principles: involvement, dialogue, and co-responsibility. Mechanisms of consultation were set
in place so that participation and constant intercommunication were mainstreamed in the life of 
the Church. Among these mechanisms that Claver instituted which have persisted to this day 
are: quarterly meeting of priests, Alagad general meetings, Sisters’ Conference, priests-sisters 
(religious) meeting every year, deanery (aggregation of nearby parishes) meeting, annual 
Prelature (Diocesan) General Assembly which included the lay people, parish councils, and the 
katilingbanong pag-ampo (community worship) which became a springboard for the emergence 
of BEC.39 These meetings had a way of institutionalising modes of interaction and consultation 
which to date remain operative in the diocese. It is said that Claver, in running meetings, insisted
35 1989 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines, 393; Philippine Province, Catalogus Provinciae Philippiniae 
Societatis Iesu 2002, 06 October 2001, 103.
j6 Poulin interview, 09 June 2001.
37 Mary T. Fitzpatrick, Bishop Francisco F. Claver, SJ, 1972-1990: on the local Church (Manila: De La Salle 
University Press, Inc.), 6-11.
38 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization o f the prelature,’ 1975, 28-29.
39 Claver, ‘Pastoral administrative and organization of the prelature,’ 1981, 5-7.
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that the procedure not simply limit itself to a consultative, but develop a deliberative manner of 
decision-making.40 Lay people were expected to deliberate and forge a unified consensus in 
decision-making, if possible, and he wanted people to be responsible for decisions they made.41 
Claver ensured a relatively shallow hierarchical structure in church governance by minimising 
unnecessary layers of authorities or ecclesiastical titles (e.g., Monsignor). By ensuring a 
participatory Church, Claver shored up church ad intra internal mechanisms favourable to lay 
empowerment and involvement.
In addition, the growth of the local diocesan clergy was also attributed to Claver’s 
leadership. Among other things, the establishment of a local seminary was a major priority in 
Claver’s early administration of the prelature.42 When Claver resigned on September 14, 1984 as 
bishop of Malaybalay, most of the parishes started by the Jesuits had already been taken over by 
local diocesan clergy. In addition, he strongly proposed that a diocesan bishop should succeed 
him. This he got in the person of Bp. Gaudencio B. Rosales. All this was foremost in the mind 
of Claver: that the diocesan clergy and lay participation would be central in the localisation of 
the Church in Bukidnon.43 This was another way of empowering the locals to chart the course of 
their Church in Bukidnon. Claver’s legacy lives on in the diocese today. The succeeding bishops 
of the diocese, Bp. Gaudencio B. Rosales in 1984 and Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana SJ in 1994, 
pursued largely, with some modifications, the general thrust and guiding ecclesiological 
principles envisioned by Bp. Claver.
The factors cited in the foregoing are obviously interwoven. To understand the role of 
the Diocese of Malaybalay in the post-authoritarian period, these factors have much to offer.





These paved the way for the Church’s post-authoritarian religio-political involvement in the lives 
of its people in Bukidnon.
5.3 Church leadership in transition
Bp. Gaudencio B. Rosales, appointed coadjutor (assistant with right of succession) bishop of 
Malaybalay on June 9, 1982, eventually succeeded Bp. Claver on September 14, 1984. Bp. 
Rosales, bom in Batangas City on August 10, 1932 was ordained a diocesan priest on March 23, 
1958 and became auxiliary bishop of Manila archdiocese on October 28, 1974.44 Bp. Rosales 
claims that his diocesan background was probably a positive factor that fostered deep 
camaraderie with the local clergy, religious and lay people.45 His priestly training background, 
having been schooled at Jesuit-run San Jose Seminary in Manila for eleven years was probably 
an aid in making the transition and leading a See which had a fair amount of Jesuit influence 46 
Perceived as ‘fatherly’ by many priests,47 Bp. Rosales basically maintained and pursued the 
major thrusts of the diocese particularly in terms of lay participation, formation of BCCs and 
responsiveness to justice issues. When he took over the diocese in 1984, he had already 
familiarised himself with the diocese, local language, social condition, and culture in Bukidnon 
having stayed for two years in Bukidnon as coadjutor bishop. The different commissions, 
programs, and apostolates were up and running.
When President Corazon C. Aquino rose to power in 1986, the Diocese of Malaybalay 
welcomed the event with great rejoicing and hope, but not without anxieties. Although the 
Aquino administration ushered in a new democratic era, many of the problems besetting the 
province and the nation during the Marcos years were still prevalent: massive poverty,
44 1989 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines, 393.
45 Quinquennial Report o f  the Diocese o f  Malaybalay, Malaybalay: Diocese of Malaybalay, 1990, 15.
46 Interview with Bp. Gaudencio Rosales, Former Bishop o f the Diocese of Malaybalay, Lipa City, 11 July 
2001 .
47 Quinquennial Report o f  the Diocese o f  M alaybalay..., 1990-1994, 15.
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marginalisation and displacement of the lumad, rapid deforestation, graft and corruption in the
government, patronage politics, and land distribution. The diocese at this point was relatively
stable with a fair amount of clarity regarding its apostolic vision for the Church in Bukidnon.
The gradual de-militarisation and declining armed rebellion waged in the countryside provided a
fragile climate of peace and stability.
On May 13, 1991, the diocese re-opened its radio station (DXDB) with a more powerful
reach of 10,000 watts than its erstwhile DXBB.48 Bp. Rosales shared much of the vision and
pastoral priorities that his predecessor had for the diocese. The apostolic vision of the diocese
articulated in 1985 and approved by the General Pastoral Assembly in 1989 still remains
effective to date.49 In a nutshell it states:
The total human and Christian development of the human person through the building 
and strengthening of the small ecclesial communities, alive in their faith in God -through 
an identification with Jesus Christ, Lord and Saviour, lived in the concrete through a 
witness of truth, justice, peace and love.50
This apostolic vision was an articulation and development of the pastoral orientation of the local
Church during the time of Bp. Claver. Thus the transition between the two local bishops was in
general smooth. Nonetheless, he inherited continuing ecclesiastical rift within the Church
between the moderates and a few members of the clergy who were aligned with the cause of the
armed groups.51 Over time, however, the conflict diminished considerably in the wake of the
decline of the movement in the early 1990s.52
48 ‘Profile: DXDB -  AM ,’ Malaybalay, n.d.
49 BEC Commission, ‘Formation guide...,’ 15.
50 Quinquennial Report o f  the Diocese o f  Malaybalay 1990-1994, 15-16; In Cebuano, the diocesan apostolic 
vision reads: Malangkobon, tawhanon ug kristohanong kalamboan pinaagi sa pagtukod ug paglig-on sa 
gagmay ’ng simbahanong katilingban buhi sa ilang pagtuo sa Ginoo pinaagi kang Hesukristo ang Ginoo ug 
manluluwas nga gipay-an sa konkreto nga kinabuhi pinaagi sa pagsaksi sa hustisya, kamatuoran, kalinaw ug 
gugma. See BEC Commission, ‘Formation guide,’ 15.
51 Amora interview, 18 August 2001.
52 Ibid.
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Under the watch of Bp. Rosales, the Diocese of Malaybalay focused on two important 
targets that strengthened its internal resource and external involvement: spiritual formation and 
environmental advocacy. Both today remain a visible legacy of his leadership. As regards the 
latter, through the leadership of the Church, Bukidnon became the first and the only province in 
the Philippines to date that has lobbied successfully for a total log ban within its territory. It was 
the first province to draw public attention to the alarming rate of deforestation not only of its 
region but also of the whole country. As a result, its most significant contribution to democracy 
building is the initiation of environmental citizenship where constituents had enormous influence 
over environmental policy and practice in the province and in the country. All these have their 
small beginnings in the protest movement in Halapitan, the poblacion (town centre) in San 
Fernando, Bukidnon in 1987.
5.4 Forests protection in San Fernando: the emergence of environmental citizenship
The Municipality of San Fernando is located in the southeastern part of Bukidnon bounded by 
Cabanglasan and Malaybalay to its north; Valencia and Quezon to its west; and Davao del Norte 
to its east and south. The total land area of the municipality is 77,527 hectares comprising 24 
barangaysP In the early 1970s, eight out of eighteen logging companies operating in Bukidnon 
had been cutting trees in San Fernando.54
The Catholics were only 47.42% or 16,147 of the municipal population while the rest 
mainly belonged to various Protestant denominations (UCCP, Southern Baptists), INC and a 
variety of twenty fundamentalist sects (e.g., Universal Brotherhood, Iglesia sa Dios sa Amahan 
[Church of God the Father], Four-Square Gospel Church).55 The percentage of Catholics in San
53 Ruth M. Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection: the case of San Fernando, Bukidnon’ (MA thesis, 
Ateneo de Manila University, 1992), 25.
54 Ibid., 30.
55 Ibid.; Karl M. Gaspar, A P eople’s option: to struggle fo r  creation (Quezon City: Claretians Publications,
1990), 26.
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Fernando was relatively low considering that it is close to half the average figure on the province 
level. Catholics in Bukidnon around that time were placed at 79.5% or 564,782 out of 710/754.56 
Some 28.86% of San Fernando’s population were lumad (although some of them were already 
baptised Catholics), and numerous non-Catholic religious groups accounted for the relatively low 
percentage of Catholics in the area.57 Still, Catholics were the single largest group of faithful and 
were extremely influential in the area. Their influence was further buttressed by their affiliation 
with the GKK (the early form of GSK or BEC) and the personal involvement of their parish 
priest Patrick Kelly, and his assistant, Charles Gervais, both Scarboro Fathers.58
5.4.1 Origins of the protest movement
The protest movement in Halapitan, San Fernando was not entirely a novelty. On October 21, 
1981, the locals formed Pagbugtaw sa Kamatuoran (PSK, To be Awakened to the Truth) and 
successfully opposed the construction of a dam in Pulangi River which potentially could displace 
30,000 people including inhabitants of San Fernando.59 The members of PSK were mostly GKK 
affiliated.60 By conducting sessions on the adverse effects of the dam; organising the people; 
sending letters of petition to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), the main proponent 
of the project; the proposal was shelved. PSK became inactive until it was revived in 1987 to 
resist further cutting of trees in San Fernando.
In 1987, Fr. Kelly invited the Iligan-based Redemptorist Mission Team (RMT), led by 
Redemptorist priest Emmanuel Cabajar, to set up GKKs in the parish along the lines of the 
diocesan apostolic vision.61 While a number of non-Catholics sympathised with PSK but did not
56 1989 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines, 393.
57 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection....’ 30.
58 Interview with Diomedes A. Demit, Bukidnon 13 member, Valencia, 07 May 2001.
59 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection. . . , ’ 31; Karl M. Gaspar, et al., Behind the growing trees: an 
evaluation o f  the San Fernando Integrated Forestation Project (Davao City: Kinaiyahan Foundation, Inc.,
1994, xv.
60 Gaspar, A P eople’s option . ...
61 Rosales, Dency, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he d iedfor  (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1997), xvi.
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support the cause, most non-Catholics opposed their advocacy chiefly because it was a Catholic
initiative.62 Seminars on environment awareness were conducted in the Catholic kapilyas
• •  •  •(chapels) and the prayer sessions were not sufficiently inclusive of non-Catholics. All these
were enough to discourage non-Catholics from attending. Further, intense rivalry among the
religious groups prevented the believers from rising above their differences to respond to local
issues.64 The GKKs inevitably had to come to terms with environmental issues that were
affecting the whole community. RMT offered ecological awareness seminars, biblical
reflections and liturgical expressions that lent religious legitimacy to environment protection.65
This increased GKKs’ capacity to advocate and protect the forests near them. In addition, Fr.
Kelly and Fr. Gervais in their homilies during liturgical services and meetings with GKKs
pressed home the need for collective action to protect their environment from being further
denuded.66 Thus they were not simply reacting against the threat of environmental catastrophe.
Rather, their struggle became a faith expression, duly informed by biblical sources and
environmental issues.
The environmental threat in San Fernando was a microcosm of the larger threat that
Bukidnon was facing. The Environmental Research Division (ERD) described the state of
deforestation in Bukidnon in the late 1980s in this way:
Over the past 25 years there have been 18 logging concessions active in Bukidnon and 
the adjoining areas. In 1989 they were allowed to cut 891,430 cubic meters of wood.... 
The remaining forest cover of Bukidnon is less than 25% of the total province area which 
is about average for the country as a whole.... However, more than half of this forest is 
logged over. Only 4.0% primary dipterocarp forest and 7.7% mossy forest is left in the 
province. These last stretches of dipterocarp are now being logged.67
62 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 31; Gaspar, A People’s option, 25-26.
63 Ibid., 25 & 45.
64 Ibid.
65 Gaspar, A P eople’s option, 53.
66 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
^Environmental Research Division (ERD), ‘Fasting for our forest: a case study for concerned citizens o f the 
environment,’ (Quezon City: Manila Observatory, ERD, December 1989), 5.
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Although this was the sorry state of the province at that time, the issue had not yet been tackled 
on a province-wide level either by the government or by the Church and private organisations. 
Environmental degradation and flooding, as a result, were a real threat to the locals since 65% of 
the population derived their incomes from agricultural crops and livestock farming. The 
situation in San Fernando sparked a conflict for the province as a whole to face squarely.
5.4.2 First picket: municipal advocacy
Persistent logging operations, particularly of the Caridad Cabahug-Almendras (CCA) Enterprises 
and El Labrador Logging Company, Inc., led the PSK in May 1987 to petition the Community 
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and furnished a copy to the (PENRO), 
asking the two local Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) offices in the 
province to stop the logging companies from operating in the area.69 When no satisfactory 
answer was given, they petitioned President Aquino and furnished another copy to DENR 
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran Jr., to halt their tree cutting activities.70 DENR officials claimed 
that they could not revoke the concession given.71 The following month, PSK members decided 
to set up a blockade to deter the CCA trucks from transporting the logs. The first human 
barricade of about 30 people was formed on July 20, 1987 along the main road and the number 
of people increased over time varying from 100 to 200 everyday.72 A total of 20 kapilyas 
(communities of 500 to 700 people), aside from those in the barricade taking different shifts, 
were involved.73 This enabled a twenty-four hour vigil by different GKKs, keeping watch one
68 PPDO-B, ‘Socioeconom ic profile,’ 17.
69 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 33.
70 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
71 Ibid.
72 For more details see Gaspar, A P eople’s option..., 18-40; Jun Abla, Defending the forest: a case study o f  San 
Fernando Bukidnon, Philippines (Davao City: Kinaiyahan Foundation, Inc., 1990); Robin Broad and John 
Cavanagh, Plundering paradise: the struggle fo r  the environment in the Philippines (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California, 1993), 56-72.
73 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
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after another, day and night. The Acting Mayor74 and some of his Municipal Council members 
supported the picketers.
On the ninth day of the protest assembly, a counter-picket fronting the municipal hall was 
organised by the Manobo datus (chieftains) and leaders of the logging company workers with the 
support of CCA.76 These datus received a monthly allowance of Php 1,000.00 ($20.00) and 
other concessions from CCA.77 During the counter-picket, the datus and labour leaders criticised 
the picketers, Fr. Kelly and the Acting Mayor. The acronym PSK assumed another meaning in 
one of their slogans: Pari Sinugdan sa Kasamok (The priest is the origin of trouble).78
On the twelfth day of the blockade, after Fr. Kelly celebrated Mass at the barricade, the 
Philippine Constabulary started dispersing the crowd by beating the picketers with rattan
70truncheons, including pregnant Clarita Escoto, the parish secretary. Scores of picketers 
sustained bruises and cuts. Not to be spared from beating was the statue of Our Lady which was 
held by picketers.80 The people tried to protect and surround Kelly who was then singled out and 
abducted by the police.81 The picketers decided to accompany him in a dump truck that took him 
to Malaybalay. He was not detained, however. In Malaybalay, he was released immediately 
after a brief interrogation— a clever strategy to disband the picket line.82
CCA Enterprises filed charges against the picketers. Picketers were tagged by the 
military as rebels having links with the NPA, although no such accusations were brought to 
court.83 A damage claim of $90,000 was filed by CCA against the picketers, although this was
74 Acting local officials (commonly known as ‘Officer-in-Charge’) were appointed by the national government 
after the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) was dissolved by President Aquino. These officials held 
their positions until the local officials were elected in 1987.
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dropped in exchange for the withdrawal of people’s claims arising from the physical injuries and 
forest denudation.84 In the meantime, PSK members sought help from DENR through Secretary 
Factoran. They had already linked up with the Institute on Church and Social Issues (ICSI), a 
Jesuit social research institute at the Ateneo de Manila University campus, and the Manila 
Chronicle, a national newspaper. Both lobbied for media exposure and pressure. ICSI had a 
natural affinity with Bukidnon, a Jesuit Mission District. It also had columnists who were 
writing for the Manila Chronicle. These ties facilitated the diocese’s linkage with other external 
institutes and NGOs. Factoran’s response to the situation was swift. He sent his lawyer to assist 
the picketers during the preliminary hearing in Malaybalay. The people of San Fernando 
demonstrated their firm resolve to stop logging operations within their municipality by attending
o r
the hearing. Both local government officials and church leaders were present at the hearing. 
Provincial Governor Ernesto Tabios sent four dump trucks to transport the people from San 
Fernando to Malaybalay.87 At this hearing, the people from San Fernando sought the 
termination of the Timber License Agreement (TLA) of CCA enterprises that entitled them to 
harvest 40,000 has. of trees in Bukidnon.88
By way of a follow up, from September 2 to 5, 1987, a delegation of GKK members from 
San Fernando, accompanied by Fr. Kelly went to DENR’s main office in Quezon City.89 Bp. 
Rosales joined the group in a meeting with Secretary Factoran and Undersecretary Victor 
Ramos. DENR granted the group’s request that they investigate the damage caused by unabated 
logging operations.90 The result of the on-site investigation validated the claims of the
84 ERD, ‘Fasting for our forest...,’ 12.
85 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 34.
86 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
87 Ibid.
88 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 34.
89 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church de diedfor, 25.
90 Ibid., 26.
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inhabitants of San Fernando. This and other consultations in effect paved the way to an 
indefinite termination of the CCA’s TLA in January 1988.
The CBCP for its part, prompted by the events in San Fernando and the increasing threats 
on the environment, issued a pastoral letter ‘What is happening to our beautiful country?’ on
January 29, 1988.91 The letter affirmed that ‘to work for justice and to preserve the integrity of
• * 00 •creation are two inseparable dimensions of our Christian vocation....’ The following year, the
AMRSP released a statement ‘Choose life -  or death,’ (basically following up the CBCP 
statement) and acknowledged the ongoing environmental struggle in Linabo and San Fernando, 
two Bukidnon municipalities.93 The MSPC bishops in January 1989 endorsed a total log ban in 
the Province of Bukidnon.94 Evidently, San Fernando succeeded in elevating a local issue to 
become part of the national consciousness.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Council), led by Governor Tabios, supported 
the total log ban in Bukidnon. In April 1988 the council passed Resolution No. 88-216 
addressed to President Aquino which sought ‘to ban all logging operations in the Province of 
Bukidnon.’95 Although the newly elected local council in San Fernando did not share this view, 
it was no mean feat for the Provincial local government considering that in many cases the local 
government officials aligned themselves with elite interests.96
5.4.3 Second picket: Provincial advocacy
After the cancellation of the CCA logging franchise, logging operations of the El Labrador 
Logging Company in the east (Cabanglasan, San Fernando and parts of Agusan del Sur),
91 ‘What is happening to our beautiful land: a pastoral letter on Ecology,’ available from 
http://www.cbcponline.org/documents/1980s/1988-ecologv.html. 21 February 2003.
92 Ibid.
93 AMRSP, ‘Choose life -  or death,’ in Dawn over darkness..., ed., Ed Garcia, (Quezon City: Claretian 
Publications, 1988), 103-105.
94 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died for, 59.
95 Cited in Gaspar, A P eople’s  option..., 114.
96 Ibid.
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Narideco Incorporated in the south, and Timber Industries of the Philippines Incorporated (TIPI) 
in the west (Talakag and Pangantucan) spread rapidly.97 By 1988, PSK became the 
Nagpakabanang Katawhan sa San Fernando (NKSSF or Concerned People of San Fernando) 
that remained vigilant in their determination to protect their forest. Early that year, NKSSF, in a 
petition to DENR, pressed for the cancellation of El Labrador’s TLA.98 CENRO acted on their 
petition and investigated the accusations raised by NKSSF. On November 27, 1988, there being 
no response after several months of waiting, the group from San Fernando picketed PENRO, the 
Provincial office of DENR.99 The following day, after the celebration of Mass at the cathedral, 
the people carried placards that contained protest messages such as ‘Stop armalite logging,’ 
‘Cancel logging permits of El Labrador,’ ‘End all illegal logging,’ and so on.100
Aside from church people, local government officials, business groups, students, and 
civic groups joined the protesters.101 More than 300 people from seven municipalities 
(Cabanglasan, Dagumbaan, Impasug-ong, Linabo, Malaybalay, San Fernando, and Valencia) 
showed up.102 Although the figure was fewer than the people from San Fernando had expected, 
the representation of different municipalities showed that the advocacy had strong support from 
the provincial (local) government. The picketers blocked Sayre Highway, the national road, in 
Sumpong, Malaybalay whenever trucks loaded with logs were passing through. A total of
1HTtwenty-three trucks were stopped by the picketers. The protesters then picketed and pitched 
their toldas (tents) near the local DENR and PENRO offices from November 28 to December 7,
97 Rosales, Fr. SaturNeri and the Church he diedfor, 58.
98 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 35.
99 Vicky Aquino, ‘Picket against logging continues,’ Central Mindanao Newswatch Daily, 1st week of  
December, 1998, 1.
100 Ibid.
101 Gaspar, A p eo p le ’s option..., 144-145.
102 Aquino, ‘Picket against logging companies, 1.
103 Vicky Aquino, ‘Picket batok lagging temporaryong gi-undang,’ Central Mindanao Newswatch Daily, 1st 
week of December 1998b, 1 & 8.
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1988.104 In a dialogue with DENR Region X in Cagayan de Oro City, the people lobbied for an 
immediate and complete halt to all logging activities, whether legal or illegal, in Bukidnon.105 
They further pressed for the closure of lumberyards that processed ill-gotten logs and the 
implementation of reforestation programs.106 In effect these demands were calling for a total log 
ban in the province of Bukidnon which local DENR officials could not decide upon. Governor 
Ernesto Tabios left for Manila and sought an audience with DENR Secretary Factoran.107 As a 
result of this meeting, Factoran promised to a dialogue with them. On the strength of this 
assurance, the picket line was lifted on December 7. Furthermore, El Labrador’s logging 
operation was momentarily suspended, and later cancelled indefinitely.109
True to his word, Secretary Factoran visited Malaybalay on December 28, 1988 along 
with DENR Undersecretary Victor Ramos and DENR Region X officials. He met the provincial 
and local government officials, led by House Representative Violeta Labaria, Governor Tabios 
and Mayor of Malaybalay Reginaldo Tilanduca, church leaders, the people of Bukidnon and the 
picketers in a dialogue in Malaybalay.110 The meeting was generally positive, although not all 
the demands were met. The good news was that Factoran declared the cancellation of logging 
concessions given to CCA Logging Enterprises and El Labrador which was operating at a critical 
watershed in Nala, San Fernando.111 The bad news was that the total log ban for Bukidnon was 
not granted. Nonetheless, Factoran challenged the people to protect and nurture their 
environment which would then be vacated by these companies. If the people were successful in 
this effort, he himself would push for the complete cessation of logging activities not only in
104 NASSA News, ‘Anti-logging in Bukidnon,’ XXV(6) (December 1988), 4-5.
105 Ibid.
106 Aquino, ‘Picket batok lagging temporaryong gi-undang,’ 1988, 8.
107 NASSA News, ‘Anti-logging in Bukidnon,’ 5.
108 Ibid.
109 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 35.
110 Aquino, ‘Si Factoran mibisita sa Bukidnon,’ Central Mindanao Newswatch Daily (2nd week of December 
1998), 1.
111 NASSA News, ‘Anti-logging in Bukidnon,’ 5.
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•  1 10 •Bukidnon, but the whole of Region X (basically Northern Mindanao). Finally, he acceded to a 
request to form a monitoring team drawn from DENR officials, local government officials, 
church people and local community representatives to conduct investigations on logging 
activities in the affected areas.
5.4.4 Hunger strike at the DENR National Office: national advocacy
Two weeks after the dialogue with Factoran on January 10, 1989, Bp. Rosales wrote to Senator 
Heherson Alvarez, Senate Chairperson on the Environment Committee, pressing for a legislation 
to put an end to wanton logging activities and a total cessation of logging operations in 
Bukidnon.114 On January 27, 1989, nineteen (arch)bishops mainly from Mindanao endorsed the 
plea of Bp. Rosales on behalf of the Diocese of Malaybalay.115 Since the dialogue with Factoran 
in December 1988, illegal logging activities still persisted, although relatively fewer than before. 
In general, the monitoring team established by Factoran ignored community reports on illegal 
logging practices.116 Local DENR investigations were hardly carried out because the checkpoints 
were not placed in strategic positions.117 Sadly, some locals of San Fernando, including the 
newly elected mayor, started engaging in tablon (flitches) and rattan cutting and trading.118 Once 
again the vigilance of the community was tested. Compounding the problem was the fact the 
logging activities continued stealthily in Bukidnon and nearby provinces.
Fr. Kelly in a meeting in Little Baguio, San Fernando challenged the people to consider 
expanding the forests protection advocacy beyond the municipality of San Fernando and the 
province of Bukidnon.119 This triggered the group to consider another level of advocacy that
112 Aquino, ‘Si Factoran mibisita sa Bukidnon.’
113 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 36.
114 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he d iedfor , 59.
115 Ibid.
116 Peter Walpole, ‘The DENR fails to do homework,’ The Manila Chronicle, 1 June 1989, 4-5.
117 Ibid., 4.
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included forests protection not only of Bukidnon but the entire country. This campaign, seen as 
an opportunity to raise national ecological awareness, sought an immediate total log ban for the 
country.120 To dramatise their campaign, a hunger strike was staged in Manila. The fasters, 
known as ‘The Magnificent 13’ or ‘ The Bukidnon 13,’ pitched their tolda (tent) near the DENR 
main office.121 Kelly accompanied the group to Manila on September 23, 1989. Fasting began 
that day. Secretary Factoran and his staff were on hand to welcome the fasters. The hunger 
strike was not directed at Factoran’s handling of the environment issues, although it was public 
knowledge that he was not in favour of a total commercial log ban,122 but intended to press the 
government to address the environmental problems.
The advocacy was supported not only by the Diocese of Malaybalay. Like the municipal 
advocacy in San Fernando, it had the full backing of the local elite such as Socorro Acosta, 
Violeta Labaria, Jose Zubiri, Governor Ernesto Tabios and the local council.124 Equally 
important was the linkage and support it got from various NGOs, the media, and civil society 
groups. ICSI became the organisational base of its advocacy.125 COPE, a community organising 
NGO which was already operating in the diocese in the 1970s, coordinated efforts from various 
NGOs like Haribon Foundation and Lingkod-Tao Kalikasan (LTK, Servant-Person Nature), 
Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center (LRC), the media, religious groups such as the 
AMRSP, Simbahang Lingkod ngBayan (SLB, Church Servant of the People) and Gomburza, 
and many other groups.126 As in the EDS A peaceful revolution, AKAPPKA provided spiritual
121 The fasters were Clarita Escoto, who became the informal spokesperson for the group, Antoneitta 
Bongcayao, Serry Pardo, Mila Gastador, Roger Guimba, Aliena Agudolo, Asuncion Rodinas, Apolinar Rama, 
Emma Sanggutan, Jose Quino, Diomedes Demit, Rodolfo Superioridad, and Agapita Recullo. All hailed from 
San Fernando, Bukidnon and were members o f GKK. See Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died for, 
58.
122 Broad and Cavanagh, Plundering paradise...., 66.
123 Esquillo, ‘Community action on forest protection...,’ 37.
124 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died for, 59.
125 Ibid., 58.
126 Ibid., 58-59; ERD, Fasting for our forest..., 24 & 29.
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sessions for non-violent militant action as the fasters prepared for their advocacy.127 Clearly at 
this point, the Diocese of Malaybalay had support from some local and national officials, 
national NGOs and civil society actors involved in environmental issues. Its partnership with 
these groups increased media exposure, national projection and pressure, sustained the hunger 
strike, and provided moral and logistical support.
The Mass was celebrated everyday by Fr. Kelly. It held a press conference which was 
well attended. Media exposure was quite extensive, notwithstanding competition from the news 
coverage on the visit of US Vice-President Dan Quayle in Manila and the death of former 
President Marcos on September 28, 1989.128 Their cause grabbed the attention of lawmakers 
both in the Senate and the Lower House who were already crafting legislation on the protection 
of forests. President Aquino was kept aware of the issues and was thought to be sympathetic to 
the cause. Bp. Rosales, for his part, wanted to be with the fasters, but the ongoing strike at San 
Isidro College, a diocesan school, prevented him from leaving the diocese.129 Jesuit scholastic 
and environmental scientist Peter Walpole, then part of ICSI, played a crucial role in the 
dialogue between the fasters and DENR officials that eventually broke the impasse.130 On 
October 4, 1989, the 8th and last day of fasting, NKSSF and DENR struck a mutually agreed 
Seven-Point Agreement.131 Key provisions in the Seven-Point Agreement included the 
recruitment of 20 volunteers as forest guards in their locality; a promise to declare a total log ban 
in Bukidnon after proper endorsements were made by both government and church leaders; the 
assignment of one lawyer to assist NKSSF in legal cases; and the reforestation of its area.132
127 Ibid., 30
128 Ibid., 26.
129 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he diedfor, 27.
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Problems, however, arose in the implementation of the Seven-Point Agreement. First, 
the lawyer assigned to assist the locals proved to be ineffective and irresponsive to persistent 
reports of illegal logging activities.133 Second, although the deployment of 20 volunteer forest 
guards was initially effective, after a few months, the funds arrived late and finally stopped by 
January 1991.134 Third, the reforestation project was only partially successful due to a lack of
i  'y c
social preparation. Planting of trees was not properly done on slopes. Fourth, and probably 
the most crucial, the internal conflict within the newly established Kapunungan sa Pagpanalipod 
ug Pagpalambo sa Kinaiyahan (KPPSK or Organisation for the Protection and Development of 
the Environment) which succeeded NKSSF sharply divided the organisation and the community 
it represented.
Nevertheless, these triple feats that the people of San Fernando achieved from the first 
picket in 1987, the second picket in 1988, and finally the third one in 1989, proceeding from 
municipal, to the provincial and finally to the national level of advocacy had their humble 
beginnings in the GKKs that were formed by RMT and supported by Fr. Kelly. In these varying 
levels of advocacy, a number of significant lessons can be derived. Firstly, the capacity of the 
GKK experience to engage advocacy campaigns in various levels (local, provincial, and 
national) was greatly enhanced by hierarchy-laity interaction. Here, Fr. Kelly’s role as a liaison 
between hierarchical leadership and the GKK was of cardinal importance. GKK’s cause fitted 
well into the diocesan apostolic vision. It earned the massive support of the other GKKs, the 
diocesan leadership, and later included the MSPC and CBCP bishops. Secondly, the support of 
the local politicians, except the newly elected local officials in San Fernando, was a major boost 
to environmental advocacy. The Provincial Council Resolution urged President Aquino to halt
133 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
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logging activities in the Province of Bukidnon. Thirdly, church-civil society partnership was 
undoubtedly another factor that strengthened the movement. Links with NGOs (e.g., ICSI, 
COPE, Haribon Foundation, LTK, AKKAPKA, etc) and the media (The Manila Chronicle) 
proved to be extremely vital. The diocese by itself could not have emboldened its resolve to 
fight it out in the national arena. In many of the struggles of the local Church in Bukidnon, the 
Church’s position was greatly increased through interaction with NGOs and civil society 
formation. The local Church then was perceived not as an ‘initiator or orchestrator, but as an 
active source of reference and reflection.’136 Fourthly, the GKKs were successful in raising 
ecological and environmental awareness and, more importantly, drawing an environmental 
constituency in ways which no other group has done at this point in post-authoritarian 
Philippines. In a sense, the San Fernando experience initiated the people into an understanding 
and practice of environmental citizenship. In this sense of citizenship, rights no longer are the 
preserve of individuals as in civil, political, and social rights but also of the collective body since 
environmental issues affect all the inhabitants. Thus environmental rights are as crucial as the 
other basic rights. Adherents of this new citizenship are constituents coming from GKKs, 
lumad, local officials, church leaders, civil society organisations, the local elite, and the people 
of Bukidnon with the support of national NGOs and establishments.
Environmental concerns from now on would figure prominently in government policies 
and electoral agenda in Bukidnon. In a pastoral letter in preparation for the 1992 elections, Bp. 
Rosales reminded people to vote for candidates who oppose environmental destruction and do 
not profit from clearing the forest.137 But despite the bishop’s insistence and voters’ education 
conducted by PPCRV, it seems that the Church did not make much influence. For one, logging 
company lawyer Nemesio Beltran who fought against the San Fernando barricade was elected
136 ERD, ‘Fasting for our forest...,’ 30.
137 Gaudencio Rosales, Pastoral letter, Malaybalay: Diocese of Malaybalay, 02 May 1992.
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Vice Governor138 while Carlos Fortich, who was not sympathetic to environmentalists, became 
Governor. This betrays a weakness in the local Church’s influence over the voting public. On 
the other hand, a few environment-friendly politicians (Zubiris and Acostas) were elected to 
Congress and local public offices,139 but whether or not they were elected on the basis of their 
environmental concerns is a subject worth further enquiry.
5.4.5 Beyond advocacy and protest: the formation of KPPSK
The formation of KPPSK which was duly registered at the SEC (for legal recognition) was a 
logical choice to implement the Seven-Point Agreement. The emergence of this NGO, no longer 
church-based, was both a gift and a burden to the people of San Fernando. First, as members 
were no longer limited to Catholics it meant that non-Catholics could affiliate and be active 
participants in environmental campaigns. Second, its legal status enabled the organisation to 
strike contracts for reforestation and other environmental projects. Third, the organisation was 
fully autonomous with its own constitution and by-laws.
Nevertheless, these benefits had costly repercussions. First, KPPSK was still in its infant 
stage as participants, not any more as protesters or people’s organisation (PO), and already 
tasked to work as a partner in environmental management. Naturally they were not used to 
organising an environmental NGO, let alone implementing a reforestation scheme. They were 
tasked to be the screening committee for the recruitment of workers in the Muleta-Manupali 
Watershed Development Project (MMWDP), after some $336,000 was released for the project. 
KPPSK was not comfortable with its new role which inevitably meant good news for the 
recruited and bad news for the rejected.140 Without intending to, its role turned out to be a most
138 Demit interview, 07 May 2001.
139 Personal communication with Virgil Estrada, Project Coordinator, The Philippine Eagle Foundation, 27 
October 2002.
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divisive one for the community. Second, the project managers of MMWDP failed to draw more 
participation from the workers.141 Both the management and KPPSK could not stop tabloneros 
(small-scale logging).142 Third, KPPSK’s dissociation from the Church did not sit well with 
some of its members who were used to parish support and the GKK way of proceeding. In 
addition, the departure of Fr. Kelly and the RMT, who moulded the first GKKs, from the parish 
marked a new beginning. Issues arose during this transition period which both the new church 
leadership and the nascent KPPSK did not sufficiently address. These developments speak of 
the fragility of church-based NGOs and the transition to their autonomy may require some 
attention from church leaders and support agencies (e.g., donors). And fourth, compounding 
these issues was the clash of personalities among KPPSK’s key leaders and members. Many 
disgruntled members perceived the formation of a monopolised core leadership within 
KPPSK.143 The core leaders, on the other hand, felt they were misunderstood, abandoned and 
ostracised by the local community.144 This eventually resulted in the polarisation of KPPSK, and 
finally the disengagement of many members from the organisation. Out of 140 KPPSK 
members, only 20 were considered active.145 To date, KPPSK still exists but is no longer the 
organisation that the whole community used to claim as theirs.
The shift from protest to participation was not an easy one as far as KPPSK (originally 
the GKK in San Fernando) was concerned. It is one story to advocate an environmental issue 
and quite another to be competent in environmental programmes. Still, environmental 
citizenship must come to terms with competence particularly in shaping environmental 
policies.146 Karol Edward Soltan defines competent citizenship as ‘knowledge, motives, ideals,
141 Gaspar, A p eo p le ’s option, 37-39.
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abilities, and skills..., required for successful participation in governance’147 or, in this case, the 
shaping and implementation of environmental policies. For environmental citizenship to be 
effective and competent, it involves a whole range of skills, organisational capacities, knowledge 
and enabling mechanisms to fashion environmental policies and run programmes. Competent 
citizenship does not automatically happen after a long period of advocacy as it also requires that 
the State is strong enough to respond challenges raised by the citizenry.
5.5 Deepening conflict and dilemma in environmental citizenship
Despite and perhaps owing to the impending plan to declare a moratorium on commercial 
logging activities in Bukidnon province, felling of trees continued stealthily and rapidly. The 
citizenry’s clamour to declare a logging moratorium intensified the year after the Seven-Point 
Agreement was reached between the DENR and NKSSF. From the Diocesan General Assembly 
to deanery and parish levels discussions on dwindling forest reserves were held. To many people, 
a total log ban seemed the only way out. The Diocesan Pastoral Coordinating Council (DPCC), 
the parish council counterpart in the diocese-wide administration along with various NGOs met 
with Bp. Rosales on March 28, 1990. In this meeting, they decided to coordinate actions and 
press for a complete moratorium on logging operations in Bukidnon: an information campaign 
(through Sunday homilies, BEC discussions, DXDB and Ang Bandilyo) to educate the people, 
signature petitioning for a total log ban, public hearing and mass action.148 Bp. Rosales in a 
letter dated March 14, 1990 warned President Aquino that if nothing is done to curb logging in 
Bukidnon ‘our people will go out to the streets soon.... to stop those logging trucks from 
bringing down those logged timber.’149 In a pastoral letter on April 5, 1990, he explained the
147 Karol Edward Soltan, ‘Introduction: civic competence, democracy and the good society,’ in Citizen competence 
and democratic institutions, eds, Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan, (University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
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issues surrounding the campaign for a total log ban in Bukidnon.150 He urged the people that if a 
total log ban were not declared in Bukidnon, the people should be ready for mass action in the 
province.151 By far, this was his strongest appeal to the people to express their indignation 
against environmental neglect on the part of the government. Rosales wrote another letter to 
DENR Regional Executive Director Jose Gapas who was supportive of the thrust of the diocese, 
but did not get enough backing from higher DENR officials.152 In the meantime, a public 
hearing, was set on April 26-27, 1990 and a province-wide mass action on May 10.153 The pulpit 
and the DXDB radio station appeared to be effective means of raising consciousness and 
educating the people. BECs discussed the issues in their weekly meetings. Every week tens of 
thousands of people signed the petition calling for a log ban in the province.154 Evidently at this 
point the environmental constituency was growing stronger and bigger. DENR’s Mindanao and 
Visayas Regional Head pleaded with Bp. Rosales to stop the campaign and the legal action, but 
the campaign had gone full steam ahead.155 Finally, on April 30, 1990, DENR Secretary 
Factoran sent a telex message declaring a permanent logging ban in the entire province of 
Bukidnon.156 On May 22, 1990, Bp. Rosales was deputised as a forest officer of the DENR with 
authority 4to detect/investigate violation of forestry laws and regulation... to arrest even without 
warrant any person who has committed, is committing or is about to commit in their presence.... 
to seize/confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offence and the forest 
products cut, gathered or removed by the offenders....’137 The absence of implementing 
guidelines and the terms of the log ban created a host of unresolved issues: how was the order to
50 Gaudencio Rosales, ‘Pastoral letter,’ Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malaybalay, 05 April 1990.
51 Ibid.







be enforced? who was to ensure compliance with the order? how long would the total log ban 
be imposed? Nevertheless the order was noted and promulgated to the general public, to the 
great delight of the people. Although the specificities of Secretary Factoran’s order remained 
vague, the people were only glad to hear that logging activities in Bukidnon were now 
considered illegal. Thus Bukidnon made history by being the first, and only province to date, to 
be declared a commercial logging-free province in the Philippines. In the Southeast Asia region 
this case is probably the only one in environmental politics whose outcome was lobbied for
1 f  o
intensely and successfully by a local Church.
Part of the ambiguity of Factoran’s order meant that somebody had to ensure compliance. 
DENR could neither provide additional forest guards nor was the local government equipped to 
do it. The law enforcers were inept and helpless in the face of the loggers and at times military 
officers were in connivance with the loggers.159 The bishop obviously could not enforce this task 
all by himself. After a personal communication with the DENR Secretary, the deputisation was 
extended to 45 priests and deacons of the diocese o f Malaybalay on September 11, 1990,160 
although not all priests assumed their role as forest guards.
The idea of conferring upon priests police powers came from DENR, and not from the 
Church, claimed Bp. Rosales.161 Some twenty of those deputised were then given a seminar by 
DENR staff regarding their functions as forest guards. German Catholic aid agency Misereor 
released funds to equip the priests-foresters with 15 VHF portable radios.163 Within weeks after 
the seminar, priests started apprehending those engaged in transporting illegally cut trees.
158 See Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren, eds., The Politics o f  Environment in Southeast Asia: resources and 
resistance (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Michael J. G. Pamwell and Raymond L. Bryant, eds., 
Environmental change in South-East Asia (London and New York: Routlege, 1996).
159 Rosales, Fr. Satur Neri and the Church he diedfor, 64 & 108.
160 Ibid., 64-65;
161 Rosales interview, 11 July 2001.
162 Rosales, Fr. Satur Neri and the Church he died for, 66.
163 Ibid., 73.
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Vehicles used for transporting the logs were likewise impounded. Priests together with their 
parishioners or GSK members were effective in curbing illegal log harvesting. First, priests, 
unlike many arresting officers in the military or police, did not accept lagay (bribery). Second, 
priests in general still commanded some respect from truck drivers. Trucks usually stopped 
when they were flagged down, but in some cases, they were blocked. Third, the backing from 
the community, aside from the deputisation of DENR, gave force to effect the confiscation of 
logs and impounding of vehicles. Naturally this caused stiff opposition from the loggers.
Threats against some priests started to surface in late 1990. Among those threatened 
were Frs. Cerino Bargola, Danilo Paciente, Nery Lito Satur, and Mariano Chia.164 For his part, 
Fr. Satur, parish priest of Guinoyoran, had confiscated loads of ill-gotten logs and lumber in 
Guinoyoran and Valencia.165 Cases were subsequently filed against the illegal loggers by the 
government. On October 14, 1991, Fr. Satur was gunned down, but catechist Jacquiline Lunzaga 
who was with him backriding his motorbike was allowed to run. Preliminary investigation 
alleged that Datu Domia and his men had a hand in his killing, but the case did not prosper.166
Messages of international solidarity for the Diocese of Malaybalay and condemnation of 
Fr. Satur’s death came from Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, President of the Pontifical Council 
(COR UNUM); Monsignor Norbert Herkenrath, Secretary General of the German Catholic 
Bishops’ Commission, Misereor, Achen; and Fr Brian Swords, General Superior of the Scarboro 
Fathers and others.167 These statements are an indication of the positive contribution that the 
Diocese of Malaybalay has given particularly to environmental protection.
The death of Fr. Satur did not diminish the thrust of the diocese. The forest guard priests 
continued their tasks until the harvesting of trees declined. Fr. Bargola later was granted
164 Chia interview, 16 May 2001.
165 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died fo r , 74
166 Rosales interview, 11 July 2001. For more details see Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he diedfor, 81.
167 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died for, 106-107.
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permission by the bishop to leave the country as his life was seriously threatened by those who 
resisted the campaign of the diocese.
The deputisation of priests in a diocese as foresters with police powers is the first ever in 
the history of the Church in the Philippines, and probably in the whole world. The positive side 
of this deputisation is the official recognition of the government of the good work that the 
diocese was pursuing. A few members of the clergy had quiet misgivings about this scheme as
• * 1 Aftthey found it difficult to reconcile being as a pastor and a policeman at the same time. Bp. 
Rosales was fully aware of its terrible consequences. He himself admitted, ‘the priesthood and 
police powers did not mix well.’169 Nonetheless, the helplessness of the government officials, 
the ineffective government agencies (DENR, CENRO, PNP, AFP, judiciary), the stakes of some 
military officials who were many a time in collusion with illegal loggers, and the wanton illegal
1 7filogging activities left them with no other option but to take up the task. While the 
authorisation of priests as foresters was criticised by loggers and even by a few ecclesiastical 
leaders in Mindanao, some bishops were sympathetic to the cause of the Bukidnon Church.171 
Bp. Emeritus Claver showed his sympathy in this way: ‘There is only one word to describe their 
option: ‘Desperation! Or, as moralists would put it, the last resort.’172 Given the helplessness of 
the situation, the Church had to take up the task of enforcing the law protecting the environment, 
at least in the short run. Indeed the option taken curbed logging operations considerably. In very 
few extreme cases, a couple of priests were carrying guns and a group of armed lay people
168 Interview with Fr. Pablo Salengua, Indigenous People’s Apostolate (IPA) Coordinator, Diocese of  
Malaybalay, Valencia, 13 July 2001.
169 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died  fo r , 65.
170 Ibid., 108; Rosales interview, 11 July 2001.
171 Ibid.
172 Rosales, Fr. Neri Satur and the Church he died for, 65-66.
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escorted their priest during operations in Sinayawan.173 Bp. Rosales was generally opposed to 
such an arrangement, but was thought to have tolerated it.174
The deputisation of priests as forest protectors, however, was not an ideal arrangement in 
the long run. Firstly, Secretary Factoran’s order to assign police powers to priests meant that 
environmental law enforcement was now effectively in the hands of the clerics, and this was 
relieving the government, particularly its law enforcers, of their culpability. This arrangement, 
although effective in environmental protection, masked a serious problem: the corruption of the 
law enforcers. Law enforcers were also suspect in the logging activities, but nothing was done to 
enhance their police powers and prosecute the corrupt officials. Secondly, on the part of the 
Church, adding police powers to priests raised issues regarding their role as pastors. But even as 
law enforcers, Attorney Gamolo himself claims that deputisation of priests was not the ideal 
arrangement since they were not trained as such.175 Nonetheless, as an emergency measure, the 
deputisation of priests-foresters in the short run at least, restored the primacy of law (total log 
ban) and deterred the logging of trees.
5.6 Forest protection barricades from Wao to Malaybalay: from church-led to church- 
supported advocacy
In the post-PCP II period, the local Church in Bukidnon has deeply embedded environmental 
advocacy in its pastoral vision. The Diocesan General Pastoral Assembly, the Priests and 
Religious Assembly, and Deanery meetings were periodically held in ways that continually 
evaluated and updated the diocese’s pastoral thrusts and priorities along the lines of PCP II. 
Towards the end of 1992, Bp. Rosales was appointed archbishop of Lipa and thereafter installed. 
Fr. Medardo ‘Dards’ M. Estaniel, for the time being, became the apostolic administrator of the
173 Interview with Fr. Medardo Estaniel, former Apostolic Administrator and former Social Action Director, 
Diocese o f Malaybalay, Malaybalay, 18 June 2001.
174 Ibid., Chia interview, 16 May 2001.
175 Gamolo interview, 11 May 2001.
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diocese until the espicopal ordination and installation of Fr. Honesto Ch. Pacana SJ as the third 
bishop of Malaybalay on March 24, 1994. Bp. Pacana joined the Jesuits on June 20, 1951 and 
was ordained a priest on June 10, 1965.176 He founded the Bukidnon Institute of Catechetics 
(BIC) in 1969 in the same year when he set foot in Bukidnon as assistant parish priest in 
Malaybalay. He became Rector of St. John Vianney Theological Seminary from 1991 to 1994. 
Bom in Cagayan de Oro City on January 22, 1933, Bp. Pacana is considered as the first 
Mindanao-born cleric to be ordained bishop. He served as the chairperson of CBCP’s Episcopal
1 7 7Commission on Culture (ECC) for three terms since its foundation in 1994.
Logging issues continued to disturb the diocese even after the declaration of the total log 
ban in the province. This time the issue is not within the province, but within the diocese. In 
ecclesiastical terms, the municipality of Wao in Lanao del Sur is part of the diocese. In political 
division, however, Lanao del Sur belongs to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM). While a total log ban was still effective in Bukidnon, the Church argued that cutting 
of trees in Calaga Range, Lanao del Sur could potentially affect its inhabitants. In 1995, the 
adverse effects of TIPI’s logging operations in the municipalities of Bumbaran and Wao, Lanao 
del Sur (southwestemmost parts of Bukidnon) had been felt by nearby places. In particular,
• 1751Kalilangan suffered heavy flooding on two occasions m 1995. Lack of forest cover due to 
heavy cutting of trees was pointed to as the main cause of the flooding. On behalf of the 
delegates of the Priests and Religious Assembly, Bp. Pacana wrote a letter on November 29, 
1995 addressed to DENR Secretary Victor Ramos about the environmental condition in Wao.
176 Philippine Province, Catalogus Provinciae Philippinae Societatis Iesu 2001, 06 October 2001, 110.
177 CBCP-ECC is directly involved in concerns and issues around the Indigenous Peoples Apostolate (IPA). 
See CBCP-ECC, ‘Church initiates in promoting intercultural dialogue in Mindanao,’ (Manila: CBCP-ECC 
[Episcopal Commission on Culture], 2000), 28.
178 Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, Letter to President Joseph E. Estrada, Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malaybalay, 25 
February 1999.
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He called for the cancellation of TIPI’s TLA and a logging ban for the provinces of Lanao del 
Norte and Lanao del Sur.179
In the meantime, the BECs were given seminars on environmental awareness as part of 
their formation programme from 1996 to 1998.180 The parish priest of Wao, Fr. Cosme Damian 
‘Ming’ Almedilla was constantly engaged with his parishioners, particularly the BEC members 
and the SAC-Wao, with regard to this logging issue. His presence and interventions from the
1 o  i
back stage proved very effective in building consensus. Fr. Almedilla was always present in 
meetings and therefore there was no need to consult him since he was as involved as anybody 
else in the deliberations. He was ably assisted by Edna Espinosa, the SAC-Wao chairperson.
On December 25, 1998, some 7,153 concerned citizens many of whom were parishioners 
or BEC members in the parish of Wao signed a letter addressed to President Joseph E. Estrada, 
once again, seeking the cancellation of TIPI’s TLA and the imposition of a total log ban in the 
ARMM.182 This letter was further bolstered by Bp. Pacana in a letter on February 25, 1999, 
addressed to President Estrada on behalf of the 250 delegates of the Diocesan Pastoral General 
Assembly.183 Bp. Pacana pointed out the seriousness of TIPI’s logging activities since it was 
affecting the watershed area of Lake Lanao from which 70% of electric power in Mindanao is 
sourced.184 DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles sent a memorandum on April 14, 1999 to DENR 
Regional Executive Directors of the different regions concerned stipulating the temporary 
moratorium on logging activities within ARMM, excepting those TLA holders without reported
179 Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, ‘Letter to DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,’ Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malybalay, 29 
November 1995.
180 SAC-Wao, ‘Chronology o f events o f the campaign for total log ban,’ n.d.
181 Interview with Edna Espinosa, SAC-Wao chairperson, Camp Phillips, Bukidnon, 23 June 2001.
182 Diocese o f Malaybalay, ‘Letter to President Joseph E. Estrada: demand for the cancellation o f the Timber 
License Agreement o f the Timber Industries o f the Philippines Inc., Total log ban in the ARMM,’ Malaybalay, 
Diocese of Malaybalay, 25 December 1998.
183 Pacana, ‘Letter to President Joseph E. Estrada,’ Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malaybalay, 25 February 1999.
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violations.185 Nonetheless, this memorandum was revoked on June 11, 1999. The following 
day, the parishioners of Wao [later known as Lihok (Action)-Wao] through the leadership of 
SAC-Wao finally decided to launch a protest human barricade in Panang, Wao to put an end to 
the transport of logs from Wao to Bukidnon and then Cagayan de Oro City.186 To sustain this 
protest movement, SAC-Wao built a broad formation of anti-logging advocates which became 
the Coalition Against Logging in Lanao (CALL). These environmental advocates included a 
wide range of representation from various sectors: church people, students, green activists, legal 
experts, indigenous peoples and other NGOs.187 Pro-logging groups backed by loggers also 
staged their counter-protest barricade. In the meantime, several letters were sent to DENR 
Secretary Cerilles.188 Some 15 media practitioners made an on-site investigation on July 22, 
1999.189 Four teams of inspectors investigated the alleged violations of TIPI, but the teams 
recommended that TIPI can continue its operation since the licensee did not grossly violate the 
TLA conditions.190 The Regional Director of DENR then allowed TIPI to continue its 
operations.191 Bp. Pacana led the clergy of Bukidnon in a dialogue with Secretary Cerilles on 
July 29, 1999.192 The following day, SAC-Wao struck a tactical alliance with Task Force 
Macajalar (TFM), an environmentalist NGO based in Cagayan de Oro City.193
With TFM, they moved their advocacy to the Congress. From September 13 to 24, 
representatives of SAC-Wao and TFM lobbied at the Senate and the House of Representatives,
185 Central Mindanao Newswatch Daily, ‘Cerilles orders to stop timber transport from ARMM, 1st week of May 
1999; 1 & 4; SAC-Wao, ‘Chronology of events o f the campaign for total log ban.’
186 Espinosa interview, 23 June 2001.
187 Hilda Hablado and Mel Velez, ‘Zubiri averts possible violence between anti-logging protesters and Wao 
Mayor’s group,’ Central Mindanao Newswatch Daily, 1st week of August 1999; 1 & 4.
188 Balansag interview, 02 May 2001.
189 Hablado and Velez, ‘Zubiri averts possible violence between anti-logging protesters and Wao Mayor’s 
group, 1.
190 Hilda Hablado, ‘Let the logging licensee continue its operation -  Pascual,’ Central Mindanao Newswatch 
Daily, 3rd week o f August 1999, 1 & 4.
191 Ibid.
192 SAC-Wao, ‘Chronology o f events of the campaign for total log ban,’ n.d.
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while the ‘Inventory-Investigation’ was going on.194 While in Manila, they also sought an 
audience with Cardinal Sin to gain more support from the Archbishop of Manila. Meanwhile, to 
avert bloody confrontation with a counter-protesting group of pro-TIPI, the Wao barricade was 
lifted on September 28, 1999.195 Nonetheless, the report of the ‘Inventory-Investigation’ 
recommended that logs can be transported, but without the signatures of Fr. Almedilla and Fr. 
Francisco Montecastro, a Jesuit parish priest of Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City.196 Both were 
initially party to this investigation. On October 27, Secretary Cerilles lifted the ban on log 
transport.197 Seeing no end in sight, SAC-Wao formed a partnership with the People’s Alliance 
for Change (PEACE), another multisectoral coalition based in Bukidnon.198 These alliances 
(with PEACE and TFM) were vital in putting pressure against logging transport in Cagayan de 
Oro and in Bukidnon. The advocacy was gaining strength. Meanwhile, Fr. Almedilla and Edna 
Espinosa both received death threats.199 When it became too much for the former to bear, Bp. 
Pacana eventually transferred him to another parish towards the end of the year.
When all the negotiations failed, a blockage of logs being transported was set up in Wao, 
but this was easily dispersed. After overcoming the barricade in Wao, another blockade was set 
up on November 28, in Maramag, close to the Southern Bukidnon Hospital. At this juncture, 
PEACE, Lihok-Wao, BECs, lumad, and various NGOs, were at the forefront of the movement. 
Ex-priest Vicente Abroguena, PEACE Chairperson, maintains that Bp. Pacana did not want the 
Church leadership to be at the forefront of the protest movement.200 Instead the Church assumed 
a supportive role, backing up the protest movement by means of logistical support, volunteers
194 Ibid.
195 Espinosa interview, 23 June 2001.
196 SAC-Wao, ‘Chronology o f events of the campaign for total log ban,’ undated.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
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who picketed in the barricade, celebration of Masses, religious presence, the media (through 
DXDB) and legal aid.201 Some 200 people composed of lumad, PEACE members, BECs and 
other church people in Maramag obstructed the transport of logs. Although they knew they 
were going to be dispersed the following day, they did not expect that the police dispersal units 
of about 300 would come early next morning.203 The barricade in Maramag was dispersed at 
2:00 early morning on December 10, 1999. Scores of protesters were hit by truncheons. The 
dispersal was legally sanctioned. A Sheriff presented the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 
but its validity applied only to Maramag.204 It was then decided that they set up more barricades 
along Sayre Highway particularly in Valencia and Malaybalay, the two most populated areas in 
Bukidnon. The barricade in Valencia was overcome without difficulty. The one in Aglayan 
(South Malaybalay) was likewise removed easily, but the one in Kalasungay (North Malaybalay) 
held the 23 truck loads of logs at bay on December 16, 1999.205 About 200 picketers in 
Kalasungay held the barricade while court litigation was going on.206 On January 24, the loggers 
were forced to drop their logs because the condition of the trucks was deteriorating.
Long before the stalemate in Kalasungay, both TIPI and the protesters had traded court 
cases against each other. Cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals and finally to the Supreme 
Court that finally decided in favour of the protesters. The court ruled that the TRO issued in 
Marawi had no validity (outside of Lanao del Sur) in Bukidnon where the logs were held up.207
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The trucks were finally impounded and logs worth $270,000 were confiscated and placed under 
the custody of the government.208
The Wao to Malaybalay forest protection advocacies were instructive on a number of 
scores. First, like the position of Fr. Kelly in San Fernando, Fr. Almedilla and SAC-Wao 
chairperson Edna Espinosa were crucial links to the broader church leadership in the diocese 
(e.g. Bp Pacana) and the wider Philippine Church (e.g., the CBCP, MSPC, Cardinal Sin). 
Hierarchy-laity mutual interaction certainly boosted the Church’s campaign.
Second, the role of the Church leaders was beginning to shift, from one that principally 
led the cause to one that took a more supportive and enhancing role. The protest was initially 
church-led in the parish of Wao, but as the momentum gained support, the Church leadership 
formed a partnership with PEACE, Lihok-Wao, TFM and other NGOs taking the lead role, while 
the church hierarchy took on a supportive role. These civil society groups formed a natural 
alliance with the Church because environmental concerns were a shared interest among these 
groups. The involvement o f some church people in these groups also facilitated the 
collaboration. Ex-priest Vic Abroguena and Fr. Jun Balansag were the leading figures in 
PEACE. Edna Espinosa was SAC coordinator and key leader in Lihok-Wao. Additionally, the 
issue of environmental protection was a mutual concern of the Church and civil society actors 
dating back to the San Fernando advocacy. Bp. Pacana insisted that civil society groups be at the 
forefront of the struggle, not that the Church was afraid or ambivalent, but because he wanted to 
explore another level o f advocacy that would give NGOs their rightful political space in people’s 
participation and protest.209 Although to some extent this was reflected in the case of Bukidnon 
13, now that civil society groups have started to emerge, the Diocese of Malaybalay was quite 
conscious of its own niche in advocacy and protest movements. By doing this, Bp. Pacana recast
208 Saburao interview, 22 May 2001.




new ways of church intervention which were in support of, or in partnership with civil society, 
and no longer as the sole political actor in democracy building. In this new found partnership 
with civil society, the Church contributed to mobilising its constituents (BEC members, parishes, 
schools), logistical support (food, transportation), the media back up (DXDB), and sheer 
presence in the barricades. The leaders of civil society groups, on the other hand, found
o i npartnership with the Church very engaging and positively empowering.
Third, the successful environment protest movement once again proved that an 
environment constituency was still a strong and influential force in environment policies and 
practices even beyond the territory of Bukidnon. Malaybalay’s anti-pine tree cutting advocacy in 
1997 and 1998 is another display of its environmental protection lobby. But once again the 
constituency has limited its involvement in environmental advocacy. The formation of this 
environmental constituency marked the beginning of a new citizenship that enabled interest 
articulation, representation and participation through organised groups. Fragile state apparatuses 
(e.g., the judiciary, local and national executive branches of the government) and the democratic 
institutions for settling environmental contestations were tried, challenged and tested. Indeed 
Bukidnon’s civil society actors did not simply assert environmental rights of the people, but they 
also engaged the legislators in framing an environmental policy (e.g., a total log ban) for the 
country. Albeit the attempt was unsuccessful, these initiatives were concrete ways of restoring 
confidence in democratic institutions, strengthening the civil society network and exploiting 
democratic space, actions which were not possible during the authoritarian period. Nonetheless, 
translating the environmental constituency into electoral votes was another matter. Moreover, 
environmental citizenship was not enough in implementing policies. Competent citizenship 
was equally needed, but this presupposes that the State likewise has the capacity to implement
210 Ibid.
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such policies. The inability of the State to enforce the law (e.g., involvement of the military in 
logging, ineffective police force) partly militated against the very institutions that would have 
responded to environmental issues. Thus, a strong and competent citizenship needed an equally 
strong state.
5.7 Commitment to human rights
In the 1987 Charter, the promotion of human rights and social justice are key provisions (see 
Chapter Four). Many of these provisions were eventually translated into legislative bills. In 
many cases, violations of human rights, especially those which are protected in the 1987 Charter, 
continued beyond 1987, and thus challenging the rule of law.211 Conventionally received 
wisdom argues that the primacy of law in post-authoritarian context is important if not essential 
in a democratic regime.212 Corruption, clientelism and patronage politics are an indication that 
the laws are not in place or adequately enforced. A democratic regime, therefore, subjects the 
State or any non-state actor to the legal framework.
The Diocese of Malaybalay in the post-authoritarian period was deeply committed to 
making the legal framework operate, giving the law its rightful place in a democratic polity. The 
rights pursued and waged in these cases are no longer anchored on individual rights, but 
expanded to include collective entitlements, including agrarian reform beneficiaries and the 
indigenous peoples (IPs). Even when laws had been passed regarding agrarian reform and the 
IPs, the people concerned still needed to assert their rights within the legal framework and press 
for the implementation of these laws.
A crucial instrument in the diocesan advocacy of human rights was its Legal Aid Bureau 
(LAB), thanks in part to the consistent financial backing of Misereor. Like many local Churches
211 See Chapter Four for discussion on death penalty and the limits o f ‘rule of law.’
212 Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, eds., The (un)rule o f  law and the 
underprivileged in Latin America, eds., Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999.
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in the Philippines, the legal aid component of its diocesan programme was politicised at the 
inception of martial law. The LAB in the diocese began in 1971 when Fr. Vincent Cullen SJ was 
the Social Action Director. Atty. Rube S. Gamolo was its lawyer and has since then occupied 
the office until the present day. Atty. Gamolo assisted COPE community organisers (COs). 
SCAPS and TFA were involved in many of their para-legal trainings and actual cases of human 
rights violations.213 Gamolo reports that during the authoritarian period, for the most part, they 
handled cases pertaining to human rights violations as consequences of ‘rampant militarisation 
resulting in hamletting and displacement from their homes’ due to the conflict between the 
military and the NPA.214 Many a time, LAB linked up with legal agencies such as the FLAG, 
IBP, Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), and Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).215
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) reports that post-authoritarian cases of human 
rights violations in Bukidnon ranged from 4 cases in 1993 to 89 in 1989.216 From 1988 to 1992 
(partly during the Aquino administration) the average number of cases per year registered at 30.6 
while from 1993 to 1998 (Ramos administration), the annual average reported cases dropped to 
8.3.217 This simply shows, as in the national trend, a declining incidence of reported human 
rights violations pertaining to civil liberties.
In the post-authoritarian period, LAB handled four main tasks. The first task was the
9 1 Ractual work on court cases. On the average, some 120 to 150 cases were tackled every year. 
Sixty to seventy five percent of the cases were alleged criminal offences, that is, harassments
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0 1 Qagainst tenants and farm-settlers, while the rest were civil cases. Most, if not all, of the 
diocese’s court cases were either assisted or handled by the legal aid office. The second task was 
the para-legal educational training seminars. COPE’s COs in Bukidnon were in many cases also 
trained in para-legal advocacy by LAB during the martial law years.220 Para-legal sessions 
continued beyond the authoritarian period. These seminars were typically weekend sessions, 
running for two to three weekends, at times literally under the trees. These para-legal 
seminars were complemented by three times a week radio programs by Atty. Gamolo himself.222 
These sessions inevitably helped to empower the local communities in documenting cases and 
asserting their legal rights. The third task was providing other legal services such as legal 
advice and notary services to its clients. Finally, LAB established links with regional and 
national cause-oriented groups advocating judicial reforms.
LAB played an instrumental role in the legal defence of the church workers, lumad, and 
poor farmers particularly those who did not have access to mainstream legal services. The legal 
aid enabled the poor to have their cases heard even as far as the Supreme Court. In some 
instances, out-of-court settlements were pursued. In many cases, by participating in court 
litigations and winning court cases, it had an unintended effect of restoring confidence in the 
judiciary which for many years was a source of frustration for the marginalised poor. Thus the 
legal aid office buttressed the primacy of the law, albeit some laws were not fair to the poor. 
Further, by conducting para-legal training seminars, the clients became more conscious of their 
rights as citizens within a democratic framework. These are but some indications of the 
Church’s commitment to human rights and the primacy of law in the democratisation of
219 Rube S. Gamolo, ‘Accomplishment report o f the Legal Aid Bureau of the Diocese of Malaybalay from June 
1, 1991 to June 30, 1992.’
220 Gamolo interview, 11 May 2001.
221 Rube S. Gamolo, ‘Legal Aid Bureau accomplishment report: July 1, 2000 -  December 31, 2000.’
230
Bukidnon. In this direction, the Bukidnon Church was a crucial local actor in expanding the 
notion of human rights to include collective rights of the farmers and indigenous peoples. The 
two cases presented herewith demonstrate this point more specifically.
5.7.1 Agrarian collective rights : the struggle of the Mapadayonong Panaghiusa sa Lumad
Alang sa Dantlag (MAPALAD, Progressive Unity of Natives for the Future) farmers
The MAPALAD case was not simply a local issue in Bukidnon but it also represented the plight 
of the lumad and poor farmers seeking land ownership under the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program (CARP). The MAPALAD issue was a litmus test of the government’s 
commitment to implement land reform. Due to the significance of the case, national NGOs took 
on board the issue with some support from the diocese. Thus the MAPALAD advocacy was an 
attempt to enforce the rule of law. Further, it was a political opportunity to assert the farmers’ 
formal rights embedded within the legal framework.
The MAPALAD farmers (mostly Higa-onons) were issued a Certificate of Land 
Ownership covering an area of 144 hectares in San Vicente, Sumilao municipality, Bukidnon on 
September 25, 1995 by the DAR.224 The Norberto Quisumbing Sr., Management and 
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC) in cooperation with the Bukidnon Agro-industrial 
Association (BAIDA), a project of the provincial governor, moved swiftly to seek land 
conversion on this rich agricultural area to make it an agro-industrial site.225 DAR repeatedly 
rejected their petitions in 1994 and 1995 in favour of the 137 MAPALAD farmers who would be 
CARP beneficiaries.226 Provincial Governor Carlos O. Fortich envisioned BAIDA to produce 
‘an Industrial Park; Specialized Education Center for vocation skills..., Commercial,
224 Mariano V. Nava, ‘Case study on the MAPALAD campaign: winning when one is in the right,’ Cagayan de 
Oro City, 12 January 1997.
225 Lina Sagaral Reyes, ‘FVR violated own order in Bukidnon Carp case?’ Sun Star Cagayan de Oro, 19 July 
1997; 1 & 19.
226 Nava, ‘Case study on the MAPALAD campaign...,’ 3.
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Recreational and Entertainment Areas; Affordable housing; Hotels & Ledges; Agricultural 
Products Processing Center & Light to Medium Scale Manufacturing.’227 This vision, he 
claimed, would accelerate development in the area and provide more jobs to the locals. Fortich, 
on behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA, appealed to the Office of the President pressing for the land 
conversion of the contested area.228 As a result, DAR’s decision was overturned by President 
Ramos’ Executive Secretary Ruben Torres in 1996. DAR sought a reconsideration of the 
decision. In the meantime, NQSRMDC filed a court case against DAR and MAPALAD 
farmers.229 The court then issued an order prohibiting the farmers from entering the disputed 
area.230 The farmers defied the prohibition but were evicted by armed guards led by cashiered
O'X 1Col. Alexander Noble within two days when they occupied it on July 16, 1997. Secretary 
Torres in his memorandum in March 1996 had granted the land conversion.232
Secretary Torres’s pattern of land conversion was no secret to agrarian reform advocates. 
By October 1997, seven cases had been exposed to the public.233 Clearly the MAPALAD’s case 
was not isolated but a trend curbing efforts to implement the CARP. The farmers dramatised 
their claim by staging hunger strikes in front of the DAR main office in Quezon City and in its 
regional office in Cagayan de Oro City on October 9, 1997.234 The strikers broke their fast on 
the 28th day. On November 7, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos forged a ‘win-win’ formulation 
where 100 hectares will go to the MAPALAD farmers and 44 to NQSRMDC.235 The Supreme 
Court, however, reversed President Ramos’ formulation. After many appeals, the Supreme Court
227 Ibid.
228 Carlos O. Fortich, ‘Letter to His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos,’ 03 November 1997.
229 Nava, ‘Case study on the MAPALAD campaign...,’ 3.
230 Ibid., 3-4.
231 Lina Sagaral Reyes, ‘Torres ignored Ramos win-win solution,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 October,
1997b; 1; Ma. Ceres P. Doyo, ‘Bukidnon CARP awardees could lose land, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 09 
October 1997, 9
232 Reyes, ‘Torres ignored Ramos win-win solution, 1.
233 Bp. Francisco Claver, ‘Letter to His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos,’ 06 October 1997.
234 Reyes, ‘Torres ignored Ramos win-win solution, 1 & 20.
235 Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, ‘Has not my soul grieved for the poor? Pastoral Letter.’ Malaybalay: Diocese of
Malaybalay, 01 June 1998.
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ruled with finality on August 19, 1999 in favour of the NQSRMDC.236 By this time President 
Joseph E. Estrada had succeeded President Ramos. The MAPALAD farmers and the Task Force 
MAPALAD felt disappointed at the new DAR Secretary Horacio Morales’ suggestion to relocate 
the farmers and how in general the government dealt with them.237 To date, there are no signs 
that the land is being converted as an agro-industrial site that BAIDA envisioned. In July 2001, 
there was an attempt of the landowner to sell the land to the local government, but the incumbent 
Provincial Governor refused the offer.
The MAPALAD case betrayed serious cleavages within the local and national church 
leadership, quite unlike the other campaigns of the diocese. The MAPALAD farmers sought the 
help of the Diocese of Malaybalay through Bp. Pacana. The bishop readily offered his backing 
through pastoral letters, an information campaign, and through moral, legal, logistical, and 
spiritual support. Fr. Balansag likewise gave similar moral and spiritual boosting to the farmers. 
Nonetheless, the influence of Governor Fortich, Mayor Baula and the Quisumbings seemed to be 
dominant in the area. The parish priest of Sumilao, Fr. Filemon Ares Jr., and most parish lay 
leaders of the MAPALAD farmers did not support the cause of the farmers. The parish priest at 
one point dissuaded the farmers from entering the Quisumbing property. Fr. Ares’ relatively 
close association with his parishioners and some local officials (who endorsed Fortich’s position) 
probably factored in his decision to withdraw his support for the farmers. The locals (including 
many lay leaders and parishioners) supported BAIDA’s promise of development in the area 
because that would potentially mean more jobs and income for the local area. The conflicting 
position of the Church undermined the diocese’s overall support for the farmers. The
237 Lina Sagaral Reyes, ‘Reversal o f fortunes for Mapalad farmers,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 October 1998, 
18; AR Now, ‘The People’s campaign for agrarian reform (AR) now network press statement,’ 26 August 1999.
238 Balansag interview, 25 July 2001.
239 Interview with Rene Pinas and Peter Tuminhay, MAPALAD officers, Sumilao, Bukidnon, 26 July 2001.
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Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro and other NGOs picked up the advocacy during the hunger 
strike in Cagayan de Oro City. Seeing the issue as a critical test of land reform, various regional 
and national NGOs, POs, academic communities, and concerned citizens became involved. The 
media coverage was very extensive and, by and large, sympathetic to the cause of the farmers. 
Church groups in the Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro, Archdiocese of Manila and other church 
leaders, including Cardinal Sin and other religious groups issued their statements of solidarity 
with the fasters and made known their unqualified support for the MAPALAD farmers.240
A controversial allegation against the hunger strike was the accusation that not all of the 
hunger strikers and MAPALAD farmers were genuine beneficiaries of agrarian reform. 
Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, CBCP President, and Sr. Rosanne Mallilin, Executive Secretary of 
NASS A, although both were supportive of CARP in principle, were thought to have held that not 
all of the MAPALAD fasters were real beneficiaries.241 While this is true, the non-beneficiaries 
were farmers themselves, relatives or acquaintances of the hunger strikers, who sympathised 
with the MAPALAD farmers as they shared the lot of the beneficiaries.242 They joined the 
protest hoping that a favourable decision for the MAPALAD farmers may also be applied in 
their case.243 Thus despite its repeated pronouncements urging the government to enact and 
implement the land reform bill, sadly the CBCP did not issue any unequivocal statement of 
support.244 Cardinal Sin was nearly led to believe the same position were it not for the report 
given him by Fr. Joel E. Tabora SJ.245 Cardinal Sin eventually decided to visit the fasters and
240 Interview with Raul Socrates Banzuela, Philippine Agrarian Reform Foundation for National Development, 
PARFUND Executive Director, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, 26 July 2001.
241 Ibid.
242 Nava, ‘Case study on the MAPALAD campaign...,’ 1.
243 Ibid.
244 The CBCP, however, in a statement commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, recognised in passing the plight o f many struggling farmers like the MAPALAD farmers who 
became victims of ‘land conversions in the name of development. ’ See ‘A Pastoral letter on human rights,’ 
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openly supported their cause. This reveals that the national church leadership, like the local 
Church in Bukidnon, was not wholly convinced of the worthiness of the MAPALAD issue. The 
internal cracks within the national and local church leadership weakened the overall church 
support for the advocacy of the MAPALAD farmers.
The MAPALAD’s case, unlike the Bukidnon 13 of San Fernando, was mostly an 
advocacy of national and regional agrarian NGO groups and other religious organisations beyond 
the Diocese of Malaybalay. In terms of the pluralist view of democracy used in this study, the 
MAPALAD case illustrated that democracy is alive in the Philippines. The Church (although 
not collectively) and many NGOs tried to use the avenues for participation and lobbying within 
the legal framework. This in itself was a democratic impulse, but democratisation has its own 
limits. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the agrarian reform law legitimised the claim of 
the landowners. Once again, not everything that is legal (or interpreted as legal by authorities) 
addresses fundamental rights. Democratisation, as defined and used in this study, does not 
necessarily respond to unequal power relations between classes. Nonetheless, two important 
gains were achieved in this struggle: national consciousness of the agrarian reform issue leading 
to the enactment of the agrarian bill the following year and the use of the agrarian issue as a 
national electoral issue.246 Further, this case demonstrated that it was possible to lobby for the 
collective rights of the farmers as the legal beneficiaries of land reform. Despite the failed bid to 
claim ownership of the land, Bp. Pacana summarised the ‘victory’ in this way: ‘the MAPALAD 
farmers have awakened the whole country to related issues by their protest action and hunger 
strike that disturbed the conscience of the nation.’247






5.7.2 The installation of Quezon Manobo Tribes Association (QUEMTRAS)
The local Church’s involvement with indigenous peoples dates back to the mid-1950s when Fr. 
Vincent Cullen SJ started working with the lumad covering places like Impasug-ong, Kalabugao, 
Kalugmanan, Zamboanguita and Cabanglasan for more than 30 years. He initiated many 
community-based programmes such as literacy and numeracy campaigns, socio-economic 
projects, social analysis sessions, prayer-medic programmes and community organising work.249 
Involvement with the lumad was subsequently mainstreamed in the diocese through the TFA and 
later the Indigenous People’s Apostolate (IPA). One offshoot of the community organising work 
of Fr. Cullen was the establishment of a federation of tribal association, or simply known as 
Nagkahiusang Tribo sa Lumad sa Bukidnon (NATRILUBU, United Tribes of Lumad in 
Bukidnon). This huge federation of 16 tribal associations was formalised in 1999.250 The 
diocese through IPA played a key role in the formation of this lumad federation in Bukidnon.251 
By virtue of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and 
Regulations (IRR) and the lobbying of NGOs and support of the Church, QUEMTRAS, a 
NATRILUBU member, was installed as rightful owners and occupants of their ancestral lands.
Like the case of MAPALAD, the QUEMTRAS advocacy was intended to press home the 
rights (including the right to development) of the lumad within the confines of the law. 
QUEMTRAS is a group of Manobo communities in Quezon municipality that sought to recover 
their ancestral territory which they claimed as theirs back in the 1920s.252 Migration of 
lowlanders coupled with the creation and expansion of the Bukidnon Sugar Corporation
248 Arsenio C. Jesena, ‘Social Action Center (integrated program),’ in Quinquennial Report: Prelature o f  
Malaybalay, Malaybalay: Prelature of Malaybalay, 1975; 42.
249 Cullen, ‘Report on the situation o f the cultural minorities in the Province of Bukidnon.’
250 Salengua interview, 13 July 2001.
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(BUSCO) led to the displacement of the Manobos in the 1970s. In 1983, President Marcos 
granted Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreements (AFFLAs) to Silangan Investors and 
Management Inc., Rang-ay Farms Inc., and Escano Hermanos Inc., which were either controlled 
or owned by Marcos cronies: Roberto Benedicto, Manuel Nieto Jr., and Alfredo Africa.253 
Although these firms were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government 
(PCGG) in 1988, they continued to operate under the administration of Pablo Lobregat, Nieto’s 
son-in-law.254 The cronies paid only ‘50 centavos per hectare a year for 25 years and renewable 
for the same number of years.’255 These AFFLA areas were Manobo ancestral territories.
On August 5, 1988, DENR Secretary Factoran cancelled the AFFLAs on the bases of, 
first, a complaint letter from Fr. Efren M. Estaniel, parish priest of Quezon; second, the report of 
the Bureau of Forest Management and the Ministry of Natural Resources concerning the leased 
area; and third, the gross violation of the terms and conditions of AFFLA (e.g., planting 
sugarcane instead of tree farms) by the lessees as reported by the Ministry of Natural Resources 
in Region X. Motions of reconsideration were repeatedly filed by the parties involved but 
DENR rejected their pleas. When pleas were brought to court, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 
in Malaybalay issued in 1993 an order to DENR maintaining the status quo, that is,
QUEMTRAS could not as yet reclaim the contested land.257 In the meantime, dialogues, 
negotiations, advocacies, and mobilisations built up.
QUEMTRAS, representing four groups of Manobo tribes led by Datu Carlito Anglao, 
was organised in 1990. These groups were fragmented and were only united shortly before
253 Joey R. B. Lozano, ‘Bitter fate in sugarland: Marcos cronies rule Manobo country,’ Philippine Daily Inquirer 
reprint in its 23 and 24 September 1999 issues, 3.
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QUEMTRAS’s installation on March 21, 2001.258 Despite their differences, they became a 
legally recognised organisation when it was registered at the SEC on July 13, 1994. The 
following month, it started to apply for its Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) 
through the PSTFAD (Philippine Special Task Force on Ancestral Domain).260 CADC meant 
legal recognition that the indigenous community petitioning for it can manage, occupy, and
claim the territory as its own. At least 300 families were applicants of CADC whose original
1 (\ 1claim was more than 12,350 has. and later reduced to 2,093 has. of land by DENR. There was 
no let up in their advocacy to obtain their CADC. The height of this advocacy was a 45-day 
picket by QUEMTRAS at the DENR national office and a dialogue with Cardinal Sin to 
influence government officials to act on their claim. On June 5, 1998, DENR granted CADC 
number 135 to QUEMTRAS covering 2,093 has. of land mainly the sugar plantations falling 
under the AFFLA areas.262 The support groups in their advocacy in Manila included the 
Australian agency Community Aid Abroad (CAA), the Philippine Association for Intercultural 
Development (PAFID), the Partnership for Human Rights and Development (PAHRD), SAC, 
TFD and LRC.263 Evidently, the Diocese of Malaybalay proved that it could be a good team 
player as one of the actors in this advocacy working collaboratively with the other groups.
Nonetheless, QUEMTRAS was not allowed to settle and use their claimed land since the 
case was put under status quo by the RTC in 1993. Negotiations and dialogues followed towards 
the end of 1998 until mid-1999, but to no avail.264 The first attempt to reclaim the land was on 
August 10, 1999, but the members of QUEMTRAS were blocked. They stayed in the Municipal
258 Interview with Celso M. Manlangit, PAHRD Community Organiser (CO), Team leader o f Broad Inter­
alliance Support for QUEMTRAS, Quezon, Bukidnon, 29 May 2001.
259 Rendon, ‘QUEMTRAS case analysis.’
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gym and after 15 days they again attempted to penetrate the area, but were resisted by armed 
men. In desperation, QUEMTRAS erected some 305 shanties and tents near the road in 
Silangan. On December 15, 1999, they made a third attempt to reclaim their land since they 
were pressed by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Municipal 
Mayor to vacate their shanties and tents. Armed company guards shot to death two members of 
QUEMTRAS. After the burial of their dead, QUEMTRAS moved to a rented settlement area 
provided by the Mayor.266
On May 3, 2000, former DENR Secretary Factoran filed a case seeking the dismissal of 
the civil case which maintained the status quo of the AFFLA areas. The RTC in Malaybalay 
dismissed the 1993 civil case on July 3, 2000 and thereby removed any legal obstacle for 
QUEMTRAS’s reclamation of their ancestral territory. Although the occupants resisted vacating 
the land, through PAHRD, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the 
National Peace Forum (NPF), local government of Bukidnon, the Diocese of Malaybalay and 
Task Force QUEMTRAS, the Manobos were installed by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa 
along with Cabinet officials on March 14, 2001 in Silangan, Butong, Quezon.267 President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo flew in later in the day to accept formally the installation of 
QUEMTRAS. In the post-installation period, the Broad Inter-alliance Support for QUEMTRAS, 
a coalition group, was set up precisely to address post-installation issues of the Manobo 
communities in Quezon. Various government and non-government agencies (e.g., Land Bank of 
the Philippines, NCIP, DENR, DSWD, SAC, etc) were involved in this comprehensive project to 
ensure a workable support system for QUEMTRAS.268
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The local Church in Bukidnon was involved in many levels and phases of the 
QUEMTRAS struggle to occupy their ancestral land. The first concrete contribution was the 
complaint letter of Fr. Efren M. Estaniel which drew attention to the issue of the ancestral land 
claim of the Manobos. Another contribution was the persistent involvement of Fr. Diosdado 
Tabios, parish priest of Quezon, in the cause of the Manobos. Fr. Tabios sat and reflected with 
them in their meetings. He launched an information campaign (e.g., his homilies at Mass, 
meetings with parish organisations) linking the celebration of the Jubilee Year with the theme 
‘return of the land’ for the Manobos.269 His parish was involved in the literacy program through 
the Family Life Apostolate; negotiations with PAHRD which was the advocating and organising 
body, and with various NGOs and government agencies; and coordination of emergency and 
welfare operations while QUEMTRAS was not allowed to occupy their land.270 Fr. Tabios was 
also instrumental as a link person between the Manobos and the NGOs, and between the people 
and the bishop. Bp. Pacana assured the people of the diocesan support seeing that their struggle
9 7  Iwas within the horizon of the diocesan apostolic vision. He wrote a number of letters to 
DENR Officials and high ranking government officials and lobbied for QUEMTRAS’s interests. 
SAC was also engaged in various levels of advocacy with other NGOs in Bukidnon and in 
Manila.272 Partnership with other NGOs notably PAHRD was partly facilitated by the presence 
of Fr. Tabios as its board member and Fr. Cirilo Sajelan, then the parish priest of Maramag, as 
the board chairperson.
The Church was also involved in the installation Suminao Higa-onon Tribal Association 
(SUHITRA), another member of NATRILUBU, but not in the same way or extent that it did in 
the case of QUEMTRAS. The Church’s contributions in SUHITRA were mainly seen in moral
269 Interview with Fr. Diosdado Tabios, Parish Priest o f Nuestra Senora del Pilar, Quezon, Bukidnon, 29 May
2001 .
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and logistical support. Of notable importance were Bp. Pacana’s letters of representation 
addressed to DENR and other government officials seeking provision for basic necessities when 
the natives were displaced from their land and immediately after SUHITRA’s installation.
5.8 The Bukidnon Church and national political issues
The Diocese of Malaybalay was involved in a host of national issues that tended to undermine 
democratic gains in 1986. These issues included electoral reform, attempts at changing the 1987 
charter in 1997 and 1999, and the mobilisation during the Estrada crisis. In many of these cases, 
the Church was conscious of the plurality of actors involved in the movement. Its modes of 
positive interaction (mobilisation, animation and partnership) with civil society forces saw action 
in these national issues.
5.8.1 Electoral reform involvement
The Diocese of Malaybalay was particularly involved in the 1992 and 1998 synchronised
presidential, congressional and local elections, as were many local Churches in the country. Bp.
Rosales issued a pastoral letter on May 2, 1992, a week before the May 11 elections analysing
the prevailing political culture and how martial law politics had ruined the nation.274 He further
exhorted the faithful to vote for just and trustworthy candidates, that is, those who represented
people’s aspirations for a prosperous nation, those who did not take advantage of the economy,
those who were environment-friendly, and God-fearing. On the issue of the environment, the
bishop urged the people in this way:
Vote the candidate that will not accede to the destruction of the environment. Vote the 
candidate that will not enrich oneself at the expense of wood and rattan and other 
products of the forest, but [vote] the one who envisions the importance linking people
272 Manlangit interview, 29 May 2001.
273 PARHD, ‘SUHITRA: trends and developments,’ Imapasug-ong: Philippine Alliance for Human Rights and 
Development, n.d.
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and environment where it promises good life for the youth today and the coming 
future.276
It is interesting to note that environmental protection, for the first time, became an electoral 
issue, although the timing of the pastoral letter was late since the elections were just a week 
away. It was indeed an attempt to mobilise an environmental constituency for an electoral 
exercise. Whether or not this was actually translated into votes is another matter.
PPCRV was the diocesan electoral watch group since NASSA’s VOTE-CARE came late 
in Bukidnon.277 Fr. Medardo Estaniel was the provincial coordinator of PPCRV and acting 
provincial chairperson of NAMFREL.278 Fr. EstaniePs leadership in both electoral watch groups 
eliminated possible tensions between the two, unlike in other provinces of the country. While 
this, no doubt, was good for PPCRV-NAMFREL partnership, in terms of lay empowerment, it 
was not an ideal arrangement. At any rate, some 6,000 PPCRV volunteers were recruited to 
assist the conduct of the elections. The alagad who had links with BECs were instrumental in 
the recruitment of the volunteers.279 These volunteers were not limited to poll watching, but 
included logistical support (supply of food, communication network, transportation, etc.). The 
volunteers were able to cover all o f the parishes in the diocese. PPCRV volunteers were 
mainly engaged in pre-election tasks. The whole of Bukidnon was divided into three districts 
and each had a priest-coordinator: Central District (Fr. Medardo Estaniel), Northern District (Fr. 
Danilo Paciente), Southern District (Fr. Mariano Chia). As early as November 1991, 
preparations were underway. PPCRV sponsored two Speakers’ Bureau Seminars where key
276 Ibid., translated from the original text in Cebuano: Botohi ang kandidato nga wala modityog sapagkadaot sa 
atong kinaiyahan. Botohi ang kandidato nga dili mahaylo sa ganansya sa kahoy ug uway ug uban nga 
produkto sa kalasangan, kundili kadtong nagatan-aw sa kabililhon tali sa tawo ug kinaiyahan diin nagasaad ug 
maayong kinabuhi alang sa mga kabataan karon ug sa umaabot.
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persons in every parish were trained to conduct voters’ education seminars in their respective 
parishes.281 In turn the parish leaders tapped the alagad to replicate voters’ education seminars 
in the barrios.282 PPCRV assisted NAMFREL’s OQC. Before the election day, candidates 
signed a ‘covenant’ committing themselves to peaceful, honest, and clean elections. Estaniel 
maintains that the conduct of the elections in Bukidnon was relatively peaceful compared with 
other provinces.283 The Diocese of Malaybalay was recognised by NAMFREL as one of the 
local Churches in the Philippines that was able to deliver 100% electoral returns for 
NAMFREL’s OQC.284 Since many of the NAMFREL volunteers were also members of 
PPCRV, it would be fair to say that both NAMFREL and PPCRV were able to monitor and 
tabulate electoral results in all o f the voting precincts in the province. This also shows that both 
had some form o f presence and involvement in all polling areas. Nonetheless, as were many 
cases in the country, post-elections political education follow up was not sustained.
In the 1995 elections, the diocese was not as involved as in the 1992 elections. In the 
1998 presidential elections, the PPCRV and NAMFREL once again formed a partnership. 
VOTE-CARE was placed under the PPCRV network. The PPCRV operation in the 1992 
elections was replicated in the 1998 elections making it easier for the organising team to revive 
the system they employed in the past.285 The activities included voters’ education at all levels 
(diocese, parish, barrios), recruitment of volunteers, resource mobilisation on election day, 
assistance to NAMFREL’s OQC, coordination with COMELEC, and so on.286 PPCRV had 
more logistical support on election day than they had in the 1992 elections.287 PPCRV recruited
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and mobilised 5,500 volunteers.288 The slight drop of 500 volunteers from 1992 can be 
explained by two factors. First, some volunteers became partisan in the 1998 elections as in 
many cases in the country.289 Second, the 1998 elections, unlike the 1992 elections, were 
perceived to be less critical in the sense that people did not see much challenge in it compared to 
the 1992 elections.290
In the overall canvassing of votes in Bukidnon, Joseph Estrada was second to Emilio 
Osmena, a rather exceptional trend where in most provinces (including those in the Visayas and 
Mindanao where Cebuano is spoken widely) Estrada was on top.291 Osmena, a native from
tli 9Q9
Cebu, collected only 13.8% of the total votes cast and ranked 4 m the overall national result. 
Church leaders in Bukidnon suspected that their voters’ education (which was critical of Estrada)
901 #
somehow did play a small part in this political outcome. As m 1992, the 1998 synchronised 
national and local elections were generally peaceful. Some incidents of vote buying and dagdag- 
bawas (vote padding and shaving) were reported in the elections of 1995 and 1998, but there was 
hardly any election-related violence reported.294 Indeed the local Church took the leading role in 
the 1998 elections. District coordinators were held by the same priests who assumed the 
positions in 1992 elections.
A few lessons are worth noting in the local Church’s participation in the electoral 
exercise. First, hierarchy-laity interaction figured prominently in the 1992 and 1998 elections. 
This is evident in the massive participation of the alagad and BECs in mobilising people from
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recruitment of volunteers, to voters’ education and electoral watch activities. Nonetheless, there 
was heavy priest leadership (e.g., priests-coordinators in three PPCRV districts, and overall 
supervision of both PPCRV and NAMFREL),295 which was not the case in many dioceses. 
Second, the Church and civil society organisations linkage as in the partnership of PPCRV and 
NAMFREL was equally an important one that made the involvement of the electoral watch 
movements more coordinated and effective. A big factor in this synergy was the able leadership 
of Fr. Dards Estaniel who assumed a leadership position in both groups, although this was not 
necessarily good practice in terms of lay empowerment. Third, an attempt to translate the 
environmental constituency into actual votes was initiated by the bishop in his pastoral letter, 
although belatedly since the elections were very close. Indeed the local Church attempted to 
initiate the people to an awareness of environmental citizenship, that is, making the environment 
an electoral agenda, but beyond the initiation was another matter.
5.8.2 Anti-charter change campaigns
The first attempt to change the 1987 constitution was during the time of President Ramos in 
1997. The People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernisation and Action (PIRMA) initiative 
coupled with some supporters in the congress betrayed some suspicion that the President was 
covertly supportive of the scheme to enable him to run again for public office. The CBCP made 
a statement declaring that such a move betrayed ‘unabashed greed for power’ by proponents of 
the Charter change rather than a selfless motivation to serve the people’s interests.296 Bp. Pacana 
for his part re-echoed the sentiments raised by the CBCP is his pastoral letter:
I ask that our people pray and discern as to what course of action to take. If after a
process of discernment, they agree with the stand of the CBCP or the diocese, let them
295 PPCRV, ‘Report o f the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV)....,’ 1998, 3-4.
296 ‘Addiction to power is the real issue behind Charter change moves -  CBCP,’ The CBCP Monitor 1(17) 
(1997), 12.
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come out and be counted and make public their protest against any move towards 
Constitutional changes.297
Bp. Pacana was keenly sensitive not to impose his views on the faithful. Thus he invited the
people to make their own considered judgment and if it was in line with that of CBCP, then they
should go public about their sentiments. The main thrust of the diocesan campaign against
Charter change was information dissemination through radio DXDB, homilies at Mass, BEC
discussion, and other public forum. Signature campaign and rallies were held in various
parishes in the diocese.299 The culmination of the campaign was the mobilisation of the people
in the public plaza of Malaybalay City. Civil society organisations and the Church led the
mobilisation of some 1,000 people in the rally.300
The second attempt to tamper with the 1987 charter was during the time of President
Estrada in 1999. Again a similar campaign was launched. After the CBCP position was known,
the diocese also came out with its own supporting the stand of the latter. This information
campaign was similar to the first one, viz., the use of the DXDB radio station, BEC discussion,
pastoral letter, homilies at Mass. A signature campaign was launched and rallies were conducted
in various parishes apart from Malaybalay.301 Students from San Isidro College, a diocesan
school in Malaybalay, joined the two thousand protesters in the public plaza.302
5.8.3 Mobilisation during the Estrada crisis
The movement to oust Estrada was a complex phenomenon (see Chapter Four). While it proved 
that the plurality of forces in Philippine society was vibrant, the failure of the Senate to address
297 Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, SJ, ‘Pastoral letter on charter change,’ Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malaybalay, 10 
September 1997.
298 Interview with Nestor N. Villanueva, Social Action Center staff, Diocese o f Malaybalay, Malaybalay, 31 
July 2001.
299 Ibid.
300 Saburao interview, 22 May 2001.
301 Villanueva interview, 31 July 2001.
302 Saburao interview, 22 May 2001.
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the issue, the fragmentation of the elite and masses, the class divide that typified the pro-Estrada 
and anti-Estrada groups, all these revealed the limits of democratisation in the Philippines. 
Interestingly, unlike in Manila and other provinces, in Bukidnon, the pro-Estrada groups were 
not able to mobilise and the local Church, in general, was solidly behind the anti-Estrada 
campaign. Like many places in the country, the movement to force President Estrada either to 
resign, face impeachment or be ousted was gaining in its momentum in Bukidnon in October 
2000 following the expose of jueteng scandal by Governor Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson. A broad 
multi-sectoral group, People’s Alliance to Remove Erap (PARE-Bukidnon) was convened. Fr. 
Jun Balansag was one of the convenors of PARE-Bukidnon and the bishop’s link person to civil 
society. It issued a strong statement on October 22, 2000 calling for the resignation of the 
president, 11 days after Cardinal Sin and the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila 
made a categorical pronouncement that President Estrada has lost ‘moral ascendancy to 
govern.’303 PARE-Bukidnon’s clamour was further strengthened by the Church when on Octber 
25, 2000 Bp. Pacana echoing the pastoral letters of Cardinal Sin and the CBCP, called for the 
resignation of President Estrada ‘as soon as possible to forestall further disarray in the 
country.’304 A huge multi-sectoral protest rally was organised in Malaybalay on December 17,
2000. Approximately 25,000 people joined the Estrada Resign Movement rally in Rizal Plaza.305 
Then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, former House Speaker Manuel Villar and 
Batangas House Representative Ralph Recto were among the guests. Lakas-NUCD local 
politicians led by former House Representative Jose R. Zubiri mobilised local officials and their 
supporters from 17 municipalities and 2 cities of Bukidnon. At this rally, Vic Abroguena,
303 Jaime Cardinal Sin, ‘On the way o f truth. A  Pastoral statement o f the Presbyteral Council o f the 
Archidiocese o f Manila,’ 11 October 2000.
304 Bp. Honesto Ch. Pacana, ‘Pastoral letter,’ Malaybalay: Diocese o f Malaybalay, 25 October 2000.




provincial chairperson o f ‘JEEP ni Erap’, announced his resignation as its head and declared his 
intention to join the campaign to press for his ouster.307 The support and leadership of the 
Church was quite visible notwithstanding some anxieties of church leaders that the mobilisation
TORcould be used by the politicos for their own interests. Bp. Pacana gave a solidarity message. 
The UCCP minister Pastor Arturo Villadiez delivered mainline Protestants’ solidarity statement.
The gathering at Rizal Plaza was the biggest political protest assembly in the history of 
Bukidnon. The local Church with civil society actors and local government officials were key 
actors in this political mobilisation. Like the mobilisations in the two anti-charter change 
campaigns, the Church more than ever became conscious of its supportive role by enabling civil 
society actors including PEACE and PARE-Bukidnon to organise, mobilise and educate the 
people regarding the issues affecting the life of the nation.
5.9 Conclusion
The Diocese of Malaybalay case demonstrates several key lessons for an understanding of the 
local Church’s roles in building democracy. The first lesson pertains to the interaction between 
its leadership (bishops and clergy in particular) and membership (e.g., BECs, lay organisations). 
Given the different approaches and doctrinal tendencies within its leadership and the variety of 
BECs (liberational, developmental and liturgical) and lay groups (charismatic and traditional 
organisations), consensus building through constant negotiation and deliberation was essential. 
Traditional organisations (e.g., KoC) were generally resistant to social transformation whereas as 
the BECs were the main proponents of a participatory church. The Church leadership dealt 
extensively with the BECs (particularly those that stressed the development and liberational
307 PARE-Bukidnon, ‘December 17 Bukidnon anti-Erap rally successful,’ Malaybalay, n.d. ‘JEEP (Justice, 
Economy, Environment and Peace) ni Erap’ was an electoral campaign vehicle o f President Estrada. It remained 
active as a tool o f information and as a political machinery for during his incumbency.
308 Ibid.
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approaches) much more than the traditional and charismatic groups. Thus the constant 
interaction between the two bodies is not only desirable but necessary to reduce internal 
contradictions and increase the local Church’s internal mechanism of participation. This 
enhanced the local Church’s potency in constructing and deepening democracy. In this way, the 
local Church was not simply the hierarchical leadership alone nor the lay people (as organised 
communities, BECs, or organisations) by themselves as some writers in the literature would 
imply,309 but the constant intercommunication between and within the two entities through 
formal and informal mechanisms of consultation, deliberation, and participation. The dynamic 
interaction between the two had tremendous influence within many of its mobilisation and 
advocacy campaigns: forest protection in San Fernando Bukidnon leading to the total log ban of 
the province; environmental protection from Wao to Malaybalay; commitment to human rights 
including agrarian collective rights and indigenous peoples’ rights leading to the installation of 
QUEMTRAS and SUHITRA; national issues crucial to democratisation such as the national and 
local elections, anti-charter campaigns, and the movement to press President Estrada either to 
resign, be impeached or ousted. Unlike the experiences of many progressive dioceses in Latin 
America where the hierarchy and BECs drifted to nearly political inactivity in the post­
authoritarian period (see Chapter Two), the Diocese of Malaybalay continued to struggle with 
some modest success in democracy building.
Some factors facilitated hierarchy-laity interaction in Bukidnon. Firstly, the role and 
vision of the three bishops, that is, Claver, Rosales and Pacana, made possible a continuity in the 
diocesan apostolic vision and pastoral strategy. Their appointments seem to be an exception to 
the general tendency of the Vatican leadership to rein in political activities of the universal
309 Gill, Rendering unto Caesar. ..; Lehmann, Democracy and development in Latin America...; Haynes, 
Religion in third world politics....
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Church.310 While these bishops had differing emphases, their core ecclesial themes remained 
constant: hierarchy-laity communion, lay participation, and building of BECs. Claver laid the 
foundations of the Church’s initiatives in building democracy (lay participation, kapilya-based 
BCCs, promotion of social justice and social transformation). Rosales injected spiritual 
formation and initiated environmental citizenship. Pacana pushed for more institutionalisation 
and participation of BECs. Underpinning all these was the ‘people of God’ ecclesiological 
project of Vatican II. In the experience of some Latin American countries, the appointment of 
conservative prelates was evident in the local and supra-national ecclesiastical units creating 
some internal tensions.311 In Bukidnon, the two bishops who succeeded Bp. Claver, although 
moderates in many respects, were definitely not prepared to retreat from the public sphere. 
Bishops Rosales and Pacana followed through the vision set by their predecessor Bp. Claver.
Secondly, the involvement of parish priests like Fr. Kelly in San Fernando, Fr. Tabios in 
QUEMTRAS’s installation, Fr. Almedilla with SAC leader Edna Espinosa in Wao proved vital 
in maintaining that link between the bishop and the organised lay communities. They also 
served as an important connection to the parish and diocese at large, and to various provincial 
and national NGOs. They were not simply activists but more importantly crucial animators in 
the local community. In the case of the MAPALAD farmers, however, this was the missing link 
in their advocacy. Fr. Ares, the farmers’ parish priest, and the alagad, were opposed to their 
cause. This, together with the cracks within the national church leadership, weakened the 
Church’s advocacy on local and national levels.
Thirdly, the BECs provided important enabling structures that mainstreamed lay 
participation and democratised the local Church. Post-authoritarian bishops Rosales and Pacana
310 See Cleary and Stewart-Gambino, Conflict and competition...', Daudelin and Hewitt, ‘Church and politics in 
Latin America. ’ Swatos, Religion and democracy in Latin America.
311 Mainwaring, ‘Democratization, socioeconomic disintegration, and the Latin American Churches after 
Puebla.’
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were singularly devoted to the proliferation and development of BECs, unlike many of their local
 ^1 9counterparts in Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, Chile, and others. In the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, 
Brazil, for instance, W. E. Hewitt explains that part of the deactivation of CEBs was due to lack
*5 I ' j
of hierarchical support in the post-transition period. Nonetheless, the Bukidnon Church 
continued to earn auspicious backing from the hierarchical leadership particularly the bishops.314
The second lesson relates to the Church’s readiness to interact (mobilise, animate, create 
partnership) with a young civil society in Bukidnon. This interaction was most pronounced in 
environmental advocacy, commitment to human rights specifically those which relate to 
collective and indigenous rights, electoral reform participation, and various national issues 
impinging on democracy. The partnership with civil society involved actors from the local to 
national and international civil society organisations. This partnership was enhanced by a 
number of factors. Firstly, the weaknesses of political institutions and the government and quasi- 
government agencies created serious flaws in the bureaucracy that led to a crisis of public 
confidence in the very building blocs or political institutions on which democracy depended. In 
the case of the environment issue, government officials, law enforcers, DENR (both PENRO and 
CENRO), legislative body and so on were ineffective in curbing illegal logging. A similar lack 
of enforcement of political institutions is evident in the case of the protection of human rights, 
advancement of IP and agrarian reform issues even when these found places of cardinal 
importance in the 1987 Constitution. Secondly, some priests took on key leadership positions in 
these civil society groups (e.g., Fr. M. Estaniel in NAMFREL, Fr. Balansag in PARE-Bukidnon,
312 Hewitt, ‘Religion and the consolidation o f democracy in Brazil...; Cavendish, Christian base communities 
and the building o f democracy.... Claver interview, 13 January 2001.
313 Other factors include the internal conflict between the conservatives and the progressives, the 
institutionalisation o f BECs, and the democratic climate in Brazil. Hewitt, ‘Religion and the consolidation of 
democracy in B razil...,’ 54-55.
314 Claver interview, 13 January 2001.
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Fr. Tabios in PAHRD). Although PPCRV was heavily led by clerics in the 1992 and 1998 
elections (not desirable in terms of lay empowerment) this facilitated a positive interaction 
between church groups and independent civil society organisations. Thirdly, the Church and 
civil society actors shared concerns in dealing with issues affecting democracy such as those 
which relate to the environment and the indigenous peoples. These issues provided a focus on 
the trajectory of church involvement in the post-authoritarian period, a scenario that many BECs 
in post-transition Brazil and Chile did not encounter because of withdrawal of hierarchical
T 1 f
support and the lack of focused a agenda.
Fourthly, the bishops of Bukidnon, particularly Bp. Pacana, were more than ever 
conscious of the rightful space that civil society agents have in democracy building. The Church 
was clearly disposed to such partnership by taking on a supportive role, although it still had 
tremendous influence in their involvement and at times it tended to take the leading role. Fifthly, 
many young civil society organisations in Bukidnon were either strongly influenced by the 
Church or they saw the Church as a potential ally in strengthening democracy. COPE, SCAPS, 
PEACE, Lihok-Wao, PAHRD, PARE-Bukidnon and others had priests or lay leaders who were 
actively involved in their operations so that the partnership with the Church came naturally.
The third lesson concerns the Church’s contribution to the initiation of citizenship in the 
locality. A first variant of citizenship revolves around environmental rights, the most important 
contribution of the Diocese of Malaybalay in post-transition democracy building. Environmental 
citizenship is a growing interest in the literature on democratic and development studies.316 The 
Diocese of Kidapawan likewise tried to form an environmental constituency along with the 
protest movement against the construction of geothermal project in Mount Apo in Mindanao, but
315 Cavendish, ‘Christian base communities and the building o f democracy,’ 88.
316 See Jeff Haynes, ‘Power, politics and environmental movements in the third world,’ Environmental Politics, 
8(1), (Spring 1999), 222-242; Hartley Dean, ‘Green citizenship,’ Social Policy and Administration, 35(5),
(2001), 490-505.
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the priests who represented the religious establishment were perceived as divisive and 
troublemakers by the people of Sabayan (an Obo-Manobo village). Thus the environmental 
constituency did not prosper in ways that happened in Bukidnon. The beginnings of 
environmental citizenship can be traced back to the San Fernando advocacy. The local Church 
in Bukidnon was shaping knowingly or unknowingly an environmental constituency who would 
have active participants in environmental policies, advocacies, and practices in the province and 
in the national sphere. Although the deputisation of priests was not ideal in strengthening 
political establishments in the long run, it had an immediate effect of curbing logging of trees 
and projected the seriousness of environmental degradation that the province was threatened 
with. Environmental citizenship was an outcome not simply of the issues that presented 
themselves but because of the environmental education in the BECs, ecology-focused spirituality 
(although this mainly assumed a Catholic form), pastoral exhortation of the bishop and priests 
who acted as foresters, and the death of Fr. Satur who offered his life for the cause of 
environmental protection. The CBCP, MSPC, and AMRSP elevated the issue beyond the 
province by issuing statements in support of the protest movement.
Evidently, the narrative of environmental engagement in Bukidnon veered away from 
Lela Gamer Noble’s understanding of environmental activism in the Philippines where ‘activists 
perceive that damage to the environment is resulting in intolerable or disproportional costs, so 
that stopping its causes -  whatever their benefits -  is better than suffering their consequences.’318 
The Bukidnon experience had multidimensional motivations for waging their environmental 
stmggle apart from the threat of environmental degradation. It was informed by Vatican II, PCP
317 Albert Alejo, Generating energies in Mount Apo: cultural politics in a contested environment (Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2001), 44-79.
318 Lela Gamer Noble, ‘Environmental activism,’ in NGOs, civil society, and the Philippine state: organizing 
fo r  democracy, eds. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Gamer (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 
1998), 212-213.
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II, and ecology-centred education and spiritual sessions. The statements of CBCP, MSPC, and 
AMRSP affirmed that the struggle in Bukidnon was within the Church’s mission.
As part of environmental citizenship, the local Church attempted to make environmental 
issues part of the electoral agenda in 1992 in Bukidnon. Whether or not they were able to 
translate this concern into actual votes is debatable. The struggle to have a total log ban imposed 
on the province of Bukidnon is a clear indication that the people were not simply inhabitants of 
the land, but truly citizens who exercised their rights in the care and protection of the 
environment. Subsequently any attempt to degrade the environment such as the harvesting of 
pine trees in Malaybalay and the felling of trees in Wao were met by instantaneous opposition by 
the Church and civil society actors. This case argues strongly that BECs do instill a political 
culture that is compatible with engaged citizenship. This confirms Hewitt’s insight of CEBs in 
speaking of their political contributions in the Sao Paulo Archdiocese in Brazil: these potentially 
‘create a citizenry more acutely aware of its political rights and duties.’319 Nonetheless, what 
appears to be a challenge for the Church and civil society actors is how to shift from 
environmental citizenship (mainly on advocacy) to competent citizenship (including skills, 
informed interventions, programme management). The shift from being environmental users to 
shapers in social policy is extremely crucial and often a road less travelled by citizens.320 The 
failure, for instance, of San Fernando’s KPPSK in an attempt to shift from protest to 
participation is one such example. Thus far local Church’s advocacy largely hinges on a rights- 
based approach to environmental protection and may need to be more proactive and effective in 
practicing citizenship in everyday life. Still, if one were to follow the belief that in the
319 Hewitt, ‘Religion and the consolidation o f democracy in Brazil...., 46.
320 Cornwall and Gaventa, ‘From users and choosers to makers and shapers...;’ Elizabeth Jelin, ‘Citizenship 
revisited: solidarity, responsibility, and rights,’ in Constructing democracy: human rights, citizenship, and 
society in Latin America, eds Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (Boulder, Colorado and Oxford: Westerview 
Press Inc., 1996), 106-107.
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experiences of environmental groups in the developing world ‘failures outweigh successes,’ the 
Bukidnon case deserves the accolade like the Indian Chipko movement.321
A second variant of engaged citizenship is evident in the diocese’s attempts to restore 
confidence in the rule of law and the judicial system through its legal aid programmes. Since the 
early 1970s, the diocese has a fairly long tradition and practice of ensuring that the poor become 
aware of their rights and have access to legal aid. Para-legal training of COs, BEC members, 
human rights awareness and advocacy, legal representation in courts, and the like were attempts 
to restore confidence in the rule of law and the judicial system, although the legal framework did 
not always protect fundamental rights. The Church’s commitment to human rights allowed the 
Church to widen its engagement with non-state entities (e.g. occupants of ancestral domains) as 
human rights violators, not only the State and its agencies. Restoring confidence in the rule of 
law was also evident in the diocese’s mobilisation to oppose the two attempts to change the 1987 
Charter, particularly Ramos’ cha-cha.
A third variant of citizenship is the broadening of the concept of individual human rights 
to include the collective rights of MAPALAD farmers (e.g., implementation of agrarian reform) 
and those (e.g., right to development) of the indigenous people. This level of mobilisation and 
lobbying for collective rights can be gleaned from the local Church’s initiation of environmental 
citizenship in San Fernando and later in Wao. The people, not simply as individuals, had a 
collective right to protect the environment from further degradation. While theorists have often 
argued the primacy of law in a democratic polity, too often universal rights, whether civil, 
cultural, economic, political or social, have been constructed for individuals and not for a 
collective body as in indigenous peoples.322 The local Church’s insistence that the MAPALAD
321 Haynes, ‘Power, politics and environmental movements in the third world,’ 223.
322 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Indigenous rights: some conceptual problems,’ in Constructing democracy: human 
rights, citizenship, and society in Latin America, eds Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, (Boulder, Colorado 
and Oxford: Westerview Press, Inc., 1996), 141-159.
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farmers be treated as collective beneficiaries of the agrarian reform programme and that 
QUEMTRAS and SUHITRA be awarded their ancestral claims and subsequently installed in 
their proper domains shows its commitment to the promotion of their collective and indigenous 
rights as provided for by the Philippine law. Applying citizenship to indigenous peoples is 
increasingly a topical domain in current literature as others have shown. The local Churches 
in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala and Mexico were part of the network of alliances that 
participated in shaping a form of citizenship compatible with indigenous movements.324
Finally, a fourth variant of citizenship pertains to the local Church’s political education 
and electoral reform involvement during the elections of 1992 and 1998. This reinforced public 
confidence in the electoral system, a necessary condition for any democracy to operate.
Although there were still reports of dagdag-bawas in the 1998 elections, Bukidnon was one of 
the most peaceful among the electoral areas. The fact that it delivered 100% electoral returns of 
its OQC meant that practically all the voting places were covered by PPCRV and NAMFREL. 
Once again the alagad and BECs were important players in this electoral enterprise.
Nonetheless, one main problem, as in most, if not all, of the political education campaigns of 
PPCRV and VOTE-CARE, was the lack of follow up in the post-election period.
These variants of citizenship (articulation and representation of environmental rights, 
restoring confidence in the primacy of law, human rights, electoral reform, see Chapter One) are 
some of the crucial building blocs of democratisation in the Philippine context. The Bukidnon 
experience shows a vibrant citizenship, partly due to the role of the Catholic Church and the civil 
society protagonists. Sustaining the momentum of this citizenship is another thing. In addition, 
engaged citizenship requires a strong local and national state to produce a more profound impact 
on democratisation.




The Diocese of Bacolod: a tale of democratic engagement or disengagement?
‘To everyone of good will, do not be afraid and take a chance on peace. Our longing for genuine 
and lasting peace we believe is not a disappointment by our apparent failure. We will 
continue to cry to high heavens to pray: Lamb o f  God, you take away the sins o f  the world, 
grant us peace . At the same time, we will work for peace in the manner of a courageous and 
united action.’ --Bishop Antonio Y. Fortich1
Perhaps no other local Church in the Philippines, the Archdiocese of Manila excepting, has 
received as much national and international attention as the Diocese of Bacolod in Negros 
Occidental While some have attempted to describe and explain the struggles of the Diocese of 
Bacolod against political repression, all of these story lines either touch upon the time of Marcos 
or scantily cover the post-authoritarian period.2 Following the main direction of this study, three 
arguments are adduced in this chapter. Firstly, the strengths or weaknesses of the Diocese of 
Bacolod in constructing post-authoritarian democracy swivel around the axis of hierarchy-laity 
interaction (church ad intra). When operative, this linkage induces and consolidates people’s 
participation. Secondly, the potency of the Church as an actor in democratisation significantly 
hinges on its connection with civil society (church ad extra). These two linkages enhance the 
efficacy of political outcomes of the Church as an actor. Like the Diocese of Malaybalay, much 
of its capacity to create and sustain democratic gains depends to a large extent on these terms. 
Thirdly, despite the growing internal rifts that racked the local Church, the Diocese of Bacolod’s 
most significant contribution to democracy building was its role in forming a constituency 
anchored on peace and social justice. Thus an engaged citizenship with a peace agenda emerged 
amid armed conflict in the province.
1 Antonio Y. Fortich, ‘No to violence: a pastoral letter on the civilians’ rights to live and freedom,’ Diocese of 
Bacolod, 07 September 1987.
2 See Alfred McCoy, Priests on trial: Father Gore and Father O ’Brien caught in the crossfire between 
dictatorship and revolution (Victoria: The Dominion Press -  Hedges and Bell, Penguin Books, 1984); Niall 
O’Brien, Revolution from the heart (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1992); Niall O’Brien, Island o f  tears, 
island o f  hope: living the Gospel in a revolutionary situation. (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 1994); 
Violeta B. Lopez-Gonzaga, The Negrense: a social history o f  an elite class (Bacolod City: University of St. La 
Salle, Institute for Social Research and Development, 1991).
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This chapter is divided into five main sections: a brief historical sketch of the Diocese of 
Bacolod, an examination of the factors that affected the local Church’s roles during the 
authoritarian period, an investigation of the transition within the diocese, a description and 
analysis of the main lines of engagement (or dis-engagement) of the diocese, and a conclusion. 
When appropriate, a comparison between the Diocese of Bacolod and the Diocese of Malaybalay 
will be made.
The Diocese of Bacolod in many ways shares with the struggle of the Diocese of 
Malaybalay, yet in other respects, it is quite different. The Diocese of Bacolod was the first to 
be radicalised in the Visayas region and one of the most progressively involved local Churches 
in the Philippines during the Marcos period. Like Malaybalay diocese, it was one of the first 
local Churches to challenge the authoritarian State after the imposition of martial law in 1972. 
Among the local Churches in the Philippines, its political trajectory is probably the closest to the 
experience of many of the Latin American dioceses beyond the authoritarian period.
6.1 Origins: people and the Catholic Church
Negros, a boot-shaped island, is in the western part of the Visayas. The early Spanish explorers 
named the whole island Tsla de los Negros’ (Land of the Negroes) owing to the presence of the 
short and black natives called ‘Negritos.’3 Unlike Bukidnon whose ethnic population constitutes 
about 20% of its population up until the 1970s, the Negritos have largely disappeared as a 
distinct ethnic populace in Negros,. Some isolated remnants in the mountainous areas of the 
island remain. Most of them have been assimilated, by force or inducement, by the more 
dominant and pervasive Negrense culture, a product of intermarriages with various nationalities.4
J Lopez-Gonzaga, The Negrense.., 3 & 8.
4 Ibid., chapters one and two.
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As early as 1734, Negros was a military district with Ilog as its first capital. Later the 
capital moved to Himamaylan and finally to Bacolod in 1849.5 Rapid influx of migration from 
nearby provinces such as Antique, Capiz, Cebu and Iloilo began in 1855 when Negros gradually 
transformed itself into a monocrop sugarland regime and paved the way for its entrance into the 
global economy. By 1865, Negros became a ‘politico-military province.’ Population growth 
was on the rise in Negros accompanied by rapid capitalist expansion. In 1890, Negros 
Occidental became a distinct province from Negros Oriental (facing Cebu).8 Negros Occidental 
was constituted politically as a province much earlier than Bukidnon whose provincial status 
emerged in 1907 and whose migrants started to populate the area only in the 1950s. Negros 
Occidental covers a total land area of 7,926,607 hectares.9 Seventy-eight percent of its 
population of 2,434,186 speak Hiligaynon or Ilonggo and some 21% use Cebuano.10
Initial evangelisation of Negros was led by the Agustinians in early 1556,11 although a
few contacts happened between the Spanish conquistadores and natives before that.12 The
Recollect Fathers along with the secular clergy pursued the task of evangelisation from 1606
1 ^until 1638 when it was taken over by the Jesuits. The Jesuits remained in Negros until 1769, 
when their suppression as a religious order reached the island.14 With the expulsion of the 
Jesuits, the Domincans took over while waiting for the coming of the diocesan clergy.15 The 
secular clergy administered the island until 1848 when the Recollect Fathers took charge of
5 Provincial Planning and Development Office -  Negros Occidental (PPDO-NO), ‘Socio-economic profile: 
Province o f Negros Occidental,’ Bacolod City, 1998, 1.
6 Lopez-Gonzaga, The N egrense..., 14-19.




11 Quinquennial Report, Bacolod: Diocese o f Bacolod, 1985-1989, 53.
12 Modesto P. Sa-onoy, A B rief history o f  the Church in Negros Occidental (Bacolod City: Bacolod Publishing 
House, 1976), 9-13.
13 Quinquennial Report, 1985-1989, 53
14 Sa-onoy, A brief history o f  the Church in Negros Occidental, 19.
15 Ibid.; Sa-onoy, A Brief history o f  the Church in Negros Occidental, 19-23.
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Negros.16 From 1865, Negros Island was part of the Diocese of Jaro until the creation of the 
Diocese of Bacolod on July 15, 1932.17 Bp. Casimiro M. Lladoc served as the first bishop of the 
diocese from June 23, 1933 until his death in 1951.18 Bp. Manuel Yap, a well-known Scripture 
scholar, succeeded him on May 29, 1952. Three years later, the Diocese of Dumaguete was 
created covering the whole province of Negros Oriental while the Diocese of Bacolod 
encompassed Negros Occidental. Bp. Yap died in 1966, a year after Vatican II was convened.19 
The following year, Bp. Antonio Y. Fortich was installed as the resident bishop of the diocese.
In 1987, the diocese was partitioned into three local Churches: the Diocese of San Carlos 
(Northeast), the Diocese of Kabankalan (South), and the Diocese of Bacolod in the middle (see 
Figure 6 next page). By all indications then, the Diocese of Bacolod is much older than the 
Diocese of Malaybalay whose emergence as an autonomous local Church only started in 1969. 
Traditional groups and religious practices are more deeply entrenched in the Bacolod diocese 
compared with the Malaybalay diocese. Nonetheless, massive poverty and oppressive labour 
conditions made the area a fertile ground for political activism. Like the Diocese of Malaybalay, 
Roman Catholicism has the biggest religious adherents consisting of 87% of its population.20 
From 1918 to 1948, the Aglipayans (Philippine Independent Church, PIC) declined considerably 
losing some 23.3% of its membership.21 By the 1980s, PIC claimed only 5.30% of the 
province’s population.22 The Catholic Church leadership in Negros Occidental, with few 
exceptions since the time of the conquest, has not only been identified with the wealthy 
landowners but benefited from its alliance with the landed gentry.
16 Ibid.
17 Quinquennial Report, 1985-1989, 53.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economicprofile..., 1998, 7.
21 Sa-onoy, A B rief history o f  the Church in Negros Occidental, 95-96.
22 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economic profile..., 1988, 12
23 Lopez-Gonzaga, TheNegrense....
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Figure 6: Ecclesiastical map of the Diocese of Bacolod
V ictorias
Diocese of San Carlos
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Bacolod North
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Source: 2000 Directory o f  the Philippines (Quezon City: CBCP and Claretian Publications, 2000), 8- 
13. Map drawn by Jerry P. Masayon with the assistance o f Ernesto C. Tajones, August 2001.
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6.2 Conditions that shaped the local Church’s roles during the authoritarian period
A number of factors led to the radicalisation of the Negros Occidental Church. These factors 
involved the reforms set out by Vatican II, the progressive deterioration of the socio-political and 
economic situation in Negros during the years of dictatorship, the ascendancy of Bp. Antonio Y. 
Fortich as the third Bishop of the Diocese Bacolod, the rise of BCCs, and finally the influence of 
the revolutionary Left.
6.2.1 Vatican II reforms: church renewal begins
Vatican II was followed by a vital papal social encyclical Populorum Progressio which insisted 
that genuine international development requires social justice.24 Populorum Progressio further 
gave impetus to the National Rural Congress, a Vatican-sponsored program intended to realise 
the aspirations enshrined in the papal encyclical. For both Malaybalay and Bacolod dioceses, 
the National Rural Congress was a crucial point of departure in the Church’s public involvement. 
Bp. Fortich established the Social Action Committee which in turn organised the National Rural 
Congress in September 1967 in Bacolod City.25 It was held a year ahead of the Latin American 
Medellin Conference indicating that the reforms in the Diocese of Bacolod were relatively ahead 
of the times. Rome sent a prelate to act as its representative. Bishop Mariano G. Gaviola was 
sent by Julio Cardinal Santos from the Archdiocese of Manila to represent him.26 The Rural 
Congress was a critical watershed in the life of the diocese since at this juncture the local Church 
decided to turn its gaze to social issues and sought ways to alleviate the lives of the poor. In 
the congress, resolutions were fashioned and intended to push for social reform in line with
24 Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio (On the development of peoples) available from 
http://www.osispm.org/cst/pp.htm. 27 March 2003.
25 Interview with Fr. Ireneo R_ Gordoncillo, Former Social Action Center Director, Diocese of Bacolod, 
Bacolod, 06 April 2001.
26 O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope..., 38.
27 Interview with Fr. Niall O’Brien, Columban missionary in the Diocese of Bacolod, Navan, Ireland, 16 July 
2002.
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Populorum Progressio. Inevitably, the congress raised the expectations of the participants. 
Various programs and initiatives arose directly or indirectly in the wake of the Rural Congress: 
land transfer of agricultural church lands in Himamaylan; the creation of the Social Action 
Center (SAC) which was headed by Fr. Luis Jalandoni; establishment of Dacongcogon Sugar 
and Rice Milling Cooperative, Rice and Com Cooperative, Kaisahan (United) Farm Settlement 
Cooperative in Candoni; setting up of a cottage industry of cheap clothes for workers (Rainbow 
Sewing Foundation); launching of TV and radio stations; the emergence of Khi Rho, a 
movement of Christian students; formation of the National Federation of Sugar Workers 
(NFSW) through Fr. Edgar S. A. Saguinsin and Jesuit Fr. Hector Mauri after initial attempts to 
organise the labourers through the Federation of Free Workers (FFF) failed; the erection of the 
diocesan Legal Aid Office; Labour Union Education Project, credit unions; and the issuing of a 
pastoral letter safeguarding the rights of the workers.28 These initiatives were initially 
developmental in that they were aimed at socio-economic welfare of the people. Over time, 
however, some of these programmes bore a more political content and purpose.
6.2.2 Socio-political and economic context
The province of Negros Occidental is known as the sugarland of the Philippines. Since it 
became part of a global enterprise in the mid-nineteenth century, it has maintained a semi-feudal 
agrarian structure in a generally monocrop economy and largely it remains so to date. From 
1950s to 1980s, the province yielded an annual produce of some 60% of the nation’s sugar
90 •output. In 1990, 180,984 hectares were given to the production of sugarcane which yielded 
55% of its total crop production.30 The boom and bust of the sugar industry depended in good
28 Ibid., 40; ‘Primer: Basic Christian Community (Community Organizing),’ Diocese of Bacolod, Diocesan 
Pastoral Center, Bacolod, November 1989.
29 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economic profile..., 1998, 2.
30 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economic profile...., 1991, 56; PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economic profile..., 1988, 56
263
measure on the international price of sugar and the local cartelisation of sugar production. The 
sharp decline of the global price of sugar in 1984 and 1985 coupled with the cartelisation of the 
industry through the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA) and Philippine Sugar 
Commission (PHILSUCOM) under Roberto S. Benedicto, a known Marcos crony, caused severe 
starvation and malnutrition in the province.31 The United Nations International Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), at the time of the sugar crisis, claimed that 82% of the children in Negros were 
malnourished.
Labour relations were acutely biased against the sugarcane labourers, both the dumaans 
(old inhabitants) and the sacadas (migrant workers from Antique). The former were settled and 
part of the parish life, having attached themselves as peasants working in the farm, while the 
latter were transient farmers working only on the basis of their contracts with the contratistas 
(recruiting agents) of haciendas. In 1976, the peak of sacada inflows and sugar boom during 
that decade, around 0.9% of the province’s population, that is, 16,255 sacada workers reportedly 
joined the workforce, but the figure has steadily declined.33 In 1986, sacada inflows registered a 
low 0.16% of its populace, that is, 3,528 workers.34
The expose of Jesuit scholastic Arsenio Jesena in 1969, describes poignantly the 
dehumanising condition of the sugarcane workers. Reflecting on his experience as a sacada 
worker in Negros he wrote: ‘I saw the injustice of it all, and I began to understand why the 
Communists are Communists.’35 He asked the sacadas if they would join the Communists if
T Athey come and their answer to the question was, ‘Yes.’ Translated in four international 
languages and appeared in leading newspapers in Australia, Europe and the United States, this
31 Lopez-Gonzaga, TheNegrense..., 98-103.
32 Economist, ‘Oh, for the old Cadillac days,’ 343(8021) (14 June 1997), 45.
33 PPDO-NO,‘Socio-economic profile..., 1998,9.
34 Ibid.
35 J.J. Jesena, ‘The Sacadas o f Sugarland,’ in Yapee 2 (Quezon City: Sterling Points, 2000), 152.
36 Ibid., 153.
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report accentuating the systemic exploitation of workers gained national and international 
publicity.37 This drew down the ire of the hacenderos and planters. The expose grabbed the 
attention of the local Church. The sacadas in due course became an icon of exploitation in 
Negros.38
The agricultural sector holds the bulk of the workforce with roughly 54% of the
population deriving income from agricultural employment, 11% less than that of Bukidnon.39
Like Bukidnon, landholding is limited to a few. Some 3.8% of the landed class own and control
72.4% of the total landholdings.40 The unemployment rate from 1986 to 1995 ranged from 5.2%
to 10%.41 Given its heavy dependence on seasonal agricultural employment, particularly sugar
planting and harvesting, underemployment posed a chronic problem.
Acute unfair agrarian relations did not escape Pope John Paul II’s notice when he visited
Negros in 1981. He argued in his speech that agrarian relations must be anchored on justice and
fair distribution of the fruits of the land:
Because the land is a gift of God for the benefit of all, it is not admissible to use this 
gift in such a manner that the benefits it produces serve only a limited number of 
people. It is not admissible that in the general development process of a nation there 
should continue to exist the injustice whereby progress worthy of man does not reach 
precisely those people who live in the rural areas, who in sweat and toil make the land 
productive, and who must rely on the work of their hands for the sustenance of their 
family.42
The message took a swipe at the wealthy hacenderos and planters who could do something 
to address injustice done to workers. In the same speech, Pope John Paul II further affirmed 
the dignity of labour and reminded the landowners and planters that they
37 Ibid., 160.
38 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
39 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economic profile..., 1998, 17.
40 Violeta Lopez-Gonzaga, Elias P. Patriarca, Jr., and Glenn Dennis J. Tan, People empowerment and 
Environmental Management: the Pumuloyo experience in Negros Island (Bacolod City: Institute for Social 
Research and Development, University o f St. La Salle, 1994), 2.
41 PPDO-NO, ‘Socio-economicprofile..., 1991, 46.
42 Acta Apostolicae Sedis, ‘Message o f John Paul II on the occasion o f his visit to Bacolod City,’ 73 (1981), 
373-380. 376.
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should not be guided in the first place by economic laws of growth and gain, nor by 
the demands of competition or selfish accumulation of goods, but by the demands of 
justice and by the moral imperative of contributing to a decent standard of living and 
to working conditions which make it possible for the workers.. .to live a life that is 
truly human and to see all their fundamental rights respected.43
Clearly the Pope was critical of wealthy sectors of Negros society whose profits were often
accrued from labour exploitation. Although in the same speech, he criticised the armed struggle
approach to rectify acute social injustice, his insights concerning the dignity of labour did not sit
well with the landed elite of Negros. They suspected that Bp. Fortich had a hand in the Pope’s
speech and accused the bishop of inciting war.44
6.2.3 Antonio Y. Fortich: bishop of the poor
The appointment of Msgr. Antonio Y. Fortich, then the Vicar General, as the third bishop of the 
Diocese of Bacolod was an important landmark in the reform of the Church in Negros 
Occidental. He was bom in Dumaguete on August 11, 1913 to a wealthy landed and sugar- 
milling family that had sugarcane workers.45 The plight of these struggling workers did not 
escape his notice when he was growing up. As he was reflecting on his vocation to become a 
priest, he said to himself: ‘I would also dedicate my life to the hacienda workers.’46 He studied 
at Jesuit-run San Jose Seminary in Manila for his training in philosophy and theology. He was 
ordained priest on March 4, 1944 and designated bishop of Bacolod Diocese on January 13, 
1967.47 Fortich in the 1960s promoted Barangay Sang Virgen (Virgin of the Barangay), a local 
devotional Marian organisation dominated by the poor, and the Cursillo movement which
43 Ibid., 377.
44 James McCaslin, The Columban Fathers in the Philippines, Negros: 1950-1990, (Manila: Missionary of 
Society o f St. Columban, Vol. 4, 2000), 93.
45 Alan Berlow, D ead season: a story o f  murder and revenge in the Philippine island o f  Negros (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1996), 90.
46 Interview with Bp. Antonio Y. Fortich, Third Bishop o f the Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod, 01 March 2001.
47 Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f the Philippines, 1986 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines (Manila: CBCP, 
1985), 45.
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captured the hearts of the rich hacenderos.48 Ironically, most of these rich hacenderos lobbied to
the Papal Nuncio for the appointment of Fortich as bishop in Bacolod.49 The news of his
appointment was then met with a sense of euphoria particularly by the rich. Fr. Niall O’Brien
describes the support of the hacenderos given to the new bishop of Bacolod:
They (the rich hacenderos) presented to the bishop-elect with (sic) a new black 
Mercedes Benz. It was air-conditioned and had patrician-looking white covers fitted 
to the seats. Bottles of twelve-year-old Johnny Walker and Chivas Regal were stacked 
up in the bishop’s house.50
When he started speaking out against unjust labour relations, many of the rich hacenderos
disengaged with him, although some of the elite pursued his vision. His relationship with
President Marcos, in the early years of his episcopate, was congenial. President Marcos offered
him a loan of $340,000 for the sugar milling factory in Daconcogon which is still functioning
currently.51 He convinced President Marcos to sell to the Church the machinery held by the
government-owned Philippine National Bank (PNB).52 His appointment, however, had a
specific mission from the Pope. The Papal Nuncio intimated to him on the day of his episcopal
ordination on February 24, 1967 that Pope Paul VI appointed him as bishop of the diocese ‘to do
something for the poor of Negros.’53
If the Diocese of Malaybalay had the bold vision of Bp. Claver, the Diocese of Bacolod
had the pastoral and charismatic leadership of Bp. Fortich. Both were courageously committed
to the Vatican II reforms particularly the Church’s involvement in issues around human dignity,
social justice and peace. The installation of Fortich as the new bishop was timely for the much
48 Victorino A. Rivas, ‘Bishop Antonio Y. Fortich: Bishop o f the poor and man of peace from Negros Island,’ 
unpublished.
49 O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope. . . ,31.
50 Ibid.
51 Fortich interview, 01 March 2001.
52 McCaslin, The Columban Fathers in the Philippines, Negros, 1950-1990, 41.
53 O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope..., 37-38.
267
awaited reformation of the local Church since it occurred two years after the completion of 
Vatican II in 1965.
Bp. Fortich’s commitment to peace and social justice was resolute. He was a victim of 
harassments intended to thwart the Church’s peace and justice thrust. On January 15, 1985, the 
bishop’s house was burned down by members of Kristiano Kontra sa Komunismo (KKK, 
Christians Against Communism).54 The perpetrators escaped scot-free. He survived an 
assassination attempt on April 28, 1987 when a hand grenade was hurled at his residence, the 
Domus Dei.55 The bishop was unscathed. The following month, some 200 priests, nuns and lay 
leaders staged a 3-day fast and prayer protest against the persecution of the Church in the person 
of Bp. Fortich and the slow pace of the investigation.56 Nonetheless, the police investigation did 
not yield any conclusive finding.
Before Fortich retired in 1989, the diocese celebrated the first Diocesan Pastoral 
Congress for Priests in November 11-15, 1985; and the second in November 10-14, 1986, 
otherwise known as the Priests’ Pastoral Congress II. The first congress in 1985 reviewed the 
social involvement of the Church at the height of anti-Marcos sentiments.57 This congress led to 
the establishment of BCCs as a diocesan vision and imperative. The second Congress focused 
on an analysis of the post-authoritarian situation and provided a pastoral framework for an 
understanding of the priestly vocation committed to social transformation.
54 PCPR, That we may remember, (Quezon City: Promotion of Church People’s Rights, 1989), 68.
55 Carla P. Gomez, ‘200 priests, nuns go on three-day fast,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 19 May 1987.
56Ibid.; Carla P. Gomez, ‘60,000 join Mass for peace,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 24 November 1987, 1 & 2.
57 Interview with Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, former Vicar General, Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod City, 05 April 
2001 .
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6.2.4 The Basic Christian Communities (BCCs): towards a participatory Church
The Columban missionaries who had contacts with the Maryknollers initiated BCCs in Negros in 
the early 1970s.58 In 1974, the lenten renewals/ay Kapwa (offering to people) made critical 
inroads in making church people become more aware of their social responsibility to the poor.59 
The following year, Panimbahon (community worship) became popular in areas where priests 
were not available for liturgical service. Panimbahon was a crucial starting point of the BCC 
movement in Negros.60 The high point of BCCs in the diocese during the authoritarian period 
was the well-known arrest, detention and court trial of the Negros Nine in 1983-84.61 Three 
priests and six lay leaders were accused of the ambush-killing of Mayor Pablo Sola of 
Kabankalan.62 Evidently this was a trumped-up charge, as in the end the case was dropped after 
much pressure from the local, national and international communities, particularly from Ireland 
and Australia where two of the nine detainees, Fr. Niall O’Brien and Fr. Brian Gore, originated 
respectively. Members of BCCs took turns in giving food and encouragement while the accused 
were detained in the provincial jail in Bacolod City.
Niall O’Brien, a foremost Columban BCC practitioner in Negros, cites five key elements 
characterising the BCC movement: sharing of resources whether it be in terms of time, treasure 
or talent; collective decision-making ensuring participation and empowerment; oriented towards 
social justice; promotion of healing and reconciliation; and communal prayer (panimbahon) 
which is primarily rooted in biblical scriptures. BCCs in Negros are essentially small, about 20




61 McCoy, Priests on trial....
62 The priests were Fr. Niall O’Brien, Fr. Brian Gore, Fr. Vicente Dangan, and the lay leaders were Jesus 
Arzaga, Peter Cuales, Lydio Mangao, Geronimo Perez, Ernesto Tajones and Conrado Muhal. See also Niall 
O’Brien, Seeds o f  injustice: reflections on the murder frame-up o f  the Negros Nine in the Philippines from the 
Prison Diary o f  Niall O ’Brien (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 1985).
63 O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope..., 127-129.
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to 30 families, and geographically close to one another. A further important dimension of BCC 
is their communion with their pastor.64 This provides a crucial link between the local 
community and the diocese. With the assistance of the local pastor, in general, BCCs could 
respond to local issues without having to wait for the approval from the bishop.
BCC-CO (cum community organising) was and still is the more dominant mode of BCC 
practice in Negros, although there was an attempt in the 1980s to introduce a traditionalist 
BCC.65 The Share and Care Apostolate for Poor Settlers (SCAPS), in the early 1970s, had a 
hand in the community organising (CO) aspect of the Negros BCC.66 The CO component 
involves issue-based community action as an essential aspect of BCC. BCC-CO consists not 
only of organising communities on the basis of territorial proximity, but also extends to the 
formation of various sectoral groups, such as workers, farmers, women, cultural communities, 
and so on.67 The first National BCC-CO conference was convened by NASSA and SCAPS in 
Cebu City in 1978, two years after BCC in Negros was formalised.
BCCs were not a monolithic movement in the diocese. A tiny segment of moderate 
BCCs represented by some Columban Fathers espoused non-violent but militant action inspired 
by the philosophies of Mahatma Gandhi, Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King.68 Dialogue 
within BCCs regarding the use of armed revolution as a means to correct social injustice 
persisted, indicating that there were differentiations within the movement.69 Nevertheless, BCCs 
many a time aligned themselves with the political line of CPP-NDF. For instance, BCCs in the 
elections of 1986 and most in 1992 boycotted the electoral exercise following the official CPP-
64 Ibid.
65 Antonio Y. Fortich, ‘Instruction on the Basic Christian Community (BCC) Primer,’ 18 February 1987; see 
Chapter Three concerning BCC-CO.
66 Empestan interview, 13 March 2001.
67 Jovito Litang Jr., BCC-CO: a national pastoral strategy, in ‘A National consultation of BEC promoters on the 
social concern o f Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines’ Tagaytay City, June 18-21, 1996, 41.
68 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
69 McCoy, Priests on tr ia l...’, O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope....
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NDF line. Some members joined the armed struggle at the height of militarisation from 1978 to 
1980. Sweeping suspicions that the BCCs in their entirety were infiltrated by the Left led to the
•  • • 7 nsummary execution of members by military and para-military units.
At its inception in mid-1970 up to the Diocesan Pastoral Congress for Priests (DPCP) in 
1985, the implementation and practice of the BCC was left largely to the parish priest or priest 
in-charge. The BCC thrust then was priest-centred. In addition, its pastoral strategy was 
unfocused owing to the lack of a coordinating body to link the various BCCs and to provide 
training and guidelines in promoting BCCs.71 In 1985, following the DPCP vision to mainstream 
BCC as a diocesan imperative, Fr. Romeo E. Empestan was appointed BCC Coordinator. His 
pastoral team was subsequently tasked to promote the growth of BCCs in the diocese. Before 
the partitioning of the diocese into three in 1987, the Diocese of Bacolod had a very high 81% or 
73 out of 90 parishes and chaplaincies which had BCCs.72 The total membership (active and 
inactive) was estimated at 192,23 5.73 The extent of BCCs operating actively was not uniform. 
Some parishes were more involved than others. In 1989, 74.5% or 38 out of 51 parishes and 
chaplaincies had BCCs with a general membership of 84,596 or 10.2% of the total Catholic 
population in the diocese.74 Fr. Empestan claims that BCC was steadily declining in the diocese 
after the February 1986 revolution.75 The new Aquino government created some democratic 
space which diffused an all-out conflict with the State unlike during the time of Marcos. In 
1996, 10 years after the restoration of democracy in the Philippines, the Diocese of Bacolod 
could only boast of a general BCC membership of 12,936 or 1.8% of the total population.76




74 Ibid.; 1989 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines, 53. This appears to be a very generous estimation since the 
figure includes non-active members.
75 Empestan interview, 13 March 2001
76 Another way o f expressing the estimation is 34.6% of the total number of parishes and chaplaincies had 
existing BCCs. ‘BCC General Assembly,’ Diocese o f Bacolod, Bacolod, 30 November 1996.
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A few factors explain the decline of BCCs/BECs in the diocese. First, the lack of 
hierarchical support during the time of Bp. Gregorio (from 1989) affected the growth and quality 
of BCCs/BECs (see next section). Nonetheless, O’Brien claims that while Gregorio did not
77encourage BCCs, he did not stop them from expanding. He gave more attention to the 
traditional and renewal communities and those under the Lay Organisations, Movements, and 
Associations (LOMAS).78 Second, the decline of BCCs/BECs was a universal phenomenon in 
the 1980s and 1990s. With the diminishing significance of liberation theology in Latin America, 
BCCs/BECs likewise suffered similarly, particularly the BCC-CO model employed in the 
diocese.79 The decline of the underground Left in the Philippines, particularly its split in early 
1990s in the aftermath of the collapse of the Socialist bloc in Europe, further undermined the 
BCC movement in Negros which had considerable Marxist influence. Third, like many 
countries in Latin America and Africa, the restoration of democracy in 1986 dissipated a 
common enemy which for years was the Marcos regime. The democratic space offered by the 
Aquino government weakened the resolve of BCCs’ anti-state stance and ushered in another 
form of engagement with the government.80 The people in general adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ 
attitude with regard to the new democratic government.81 They were willing to give the Aquino 
government a chance. Thus many underground activists, both in Negros and in the whole 
country, surfaced and left the movement. Finally, the conflict-model or issued-based 
BCCs/BECs in the diocese needed some rethinking in the light of a democratising state and 
society. BCC-CO model, one which the diocese adopted, largely operated on the basis of 
community issues and thrived on conflict. In the post-authoritarian context, creative engagement
77 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
78 Interview with Ignacio Javellana, Lay leader o f San Antonio Abad Parish, Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod, 04 
April 2001.
79 See Chapter Two. It is commonly held that liberation theology provided a theological framework for the 
BCC movement. See also Levine, Popular voices in Latin American Catholicism , 45.
80 Empestan interview, 13 March 2001.
81 Ibid., O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
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with the State rather than just antagonism is needed. The BCCs/BECs needed to participate in 
development schemes not merely to protest; to deliver services and not just to criticise the State.
Like the Malaybalay diocese, the BCCs/BECs in the Bacolod diocese institutionalised lay 
participation because of their connectedness with grassroots communities. They became sites of 
interest articulation and representation, and crucial links to the parish and the diocese, and the 
civil society groups. While the Diocese of Bacolod stressed issue-based and sectoral organising 
through its CO component, the Diocese of Malaybalay pursued a more parish-based pastoral 
form of BECs. The lack of church leadership support in the latter and the fragmentation of the 
underground movement affected the momentum of BCC/BECs in Negros while in Bukidnon the 
BECs continued to be vigorous and active owing to the invariable support given by the bishops.
The PCP II Church dropped the term ‘BCC-CO’ in favour o f ‘BEC’ to put across the 
ecclesial dimension of these small communities and to dispel suspicions that BCCs were aligned 
with ideological groups.82 This debate gained currency not only in the national but also in the 
local Church in Negros. Although the Diocese of Bacolod started using the term BEC with some 
misgivings, it tacitly understood BEC to embrace the BCC-CO model.83
6.2.5 Dancing with the insurgency movement
Bp. Fortich often likened the oppressive condition in Negros to a social volcano waiting for its 
massive eruption if left unattended.84 In Negros, progressive politicisation of the local Church 
correlated positively with the insurgency movement. When the underground Left was on the rise 
in the mid-1970s and 1980s, the Church was also increasingly becoming politicised.
Nonetheless, when the movement declined in the early 1990s, its political involvement in the 
diocese likewise diminished pari passu. Economic exploitation and political militarisation
82 Picardal, Basic Ecclesial Communities in the Philippines..., 90-95.
83 Empestan interview, 13 March 2001; Fortich interview, 01 March 2001.
84 Ibid.
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swelled the ranks of the armed NPA regulars in the province. At the height of the insurgency 
campaign prior to the underground movement split in 1990s, the armed regulars of NPA 
controlled five organisational districts in Negros.85 Each district had one company, about 80 to 
120 armed combatants.86 The NPA was particularly strong in Candoni, Hinoba-an, Ilog, 
Cauayan, Kabankalan and Sipalay (CHICKS) in southern Negros.
Some elements in the Church actively collaborated with or at least were sympathisers in 
the cause of the underground Left. Former SAC Director, Fr. Luis Jalandoni, a scion of a landed 
family in the province, was the first among the Negros clergy to go underground. He became a 
leading key figure in the NDF and CPP collective leadership over the years. Six other priests 
from the diocese joined the underground movement, where only Fr. Benjamin E. Escrupulo and
o7
another priest in San Carlos Diocese left the movement to go back to the priestly ministry. A 
few others in the clergy and the religious were part of or closely aligned with the ‘church sector’ 
in the movement.88 Aside from the members of the clergy, scores of BCC members joined the 
underground movement. In the meantime, a number of sympathisers from both the clergy and 
lay people particularly those coming from BCCs supported the cause of the CPP-NPA.
Thus the extent of clerical and laity involvement in the underground movement in Negros 
was much deeper than in Bukidnon. Particularly during the authoritarian period, the Left had a 
strong influence in the Diocese of Bacolod. Confronted with the same harsh social reality and 
acting on parallel strategies, there was a thin divide separating the activists in the Church and the 
underground movement. A number of BCCs, however, maintained their activist stance but
85 Interview with Fr. Benjamin E. Escrupulo, Former Parish Priest o f Immaculate Conception, Talisay, Diocese 
o f Bacolod, Bacolod, 09 March 2001.
86 Ibid. This estimation does not include underground non-combatants, above ground sympathisers, NDF 
cadres and active card bearing members of the CPP.
87 Ibid., The other priests who joined the underground movement included Fr. Francisco Fernandez (Chair of 
NDF - Negros), Fr. Sol Fuentespina (NPA Front Committee Chairperson, Fr. Rufino Gaenga (Secretary of the 
Central Party Committee), Fr. Alan Abadesco, and Fr. Vicente Pelobello (Head of Regional United Front).
88 Ibid.; McCaslin, The Columban Fathers in the Philippines, Negros: 1950-1990, 76-77.
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•  •  • * • RQwithout subscribing to armed rebellion in confronting social injustice. Bp. Fortich and many 
others in the clergy likewise maintained an activist stance but did not endorse the armed struggle 
while respecting the decision of some clergy and lay people who joined the movement.90 
Nonetheless, in Negros, it was only the Left which had a vast network of mass organisations and 
invariably the most organised group which was profoundly engaged in the struggle of the poor. 
Seeing no other seriously involved group in the upliftment of the condition of the poor, some 
church elements maintained links with the underground Left.91 This collaborative attitude 
persisted in the post-authoritarian period. Resolution number 3 of Part III in the Priests’ Pastoral 
Congress II in 1986 spelled out its policy in dealing with the underground movement:
‘Resolved, that we take no condemnatory but dialogical stance towards the CPP-NPA while we 
reject some of the philosophical assertions of Marxism concerning man, society, and religion.’ 
When the Church launched its peace initiatives in the post-authoritarian period, the Church 
leadership started to take up a critical public stance against CPP-NPA’s armed resistance, 
although a few elements in the Church continued to justify the armed struggle waged by the 
revolutionary Left.93
The armed Left’s influence and attempts to infiltrate church groups and agencies during 
the martial law period were much more extensive in Bacolod diocese than in Malaybalay 
diocese. A lot more clergy members and lay leaders were actively involved in the revolutionary 
movement in Negros than in Bukidnon. In the post-authoritarian period, quite a few of the 
clergy in Negros remained sympathetic to the revolutionary movement while in Bukidnon such 
sentiments petered out.
89McCoy, Priests on trial...', O’Brien, Island o f  tears, island o f  hope...,
90 Interview with Bp. Camilo D. Gregorio, Former Bishop of the Diocese o f Bacolod (1989-1999), Bacolod, 31 
March 2001; Fortich interview, 01 March 2001.
91 Rivas interview, 05 April 2001.
92 Priests Pastoral Congress II, ‘The Priest as a witness and an apostle for social transformation,’ Diocese of  
Bacolod, Sacred Heart Seminary, Bacolod, November 10-14, 1986. Emphasis mine.
93 Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, ‘Churchfolk may opt for armed revolution,’ Bacolod, 11 December 1996, 2.
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In sum, Vatican II, along with its post-conciliar social teachings; the ascendancy of Bp. 
Fortich as bishop of the diocese; the gravity of the socio-political and economic problematic in 
Negros, prominence of BCCs coupled with the Church’s interaction with the extreme Left 
realigned the trajectory of its political involvement in the authoritarian period. These interrelated 
factors provided the setting of the local Church’s role in the post-authoritarian context.
6.3 The local church in transition
The transition that occurred in the Diocese of Bacolod was much more complex than the one in 
the Diocese of Malaybalay. Three factors are important in explaining this complexity. First, the 
Diocese of Bacolod’s territory and ecclesial influence was reduced in 1987 following division of 
the diocese and as a result the creation of the Diocese of Kabankalan and the Diocese of San 
Carlos. The bishops installed in Kabankalan (Bp. Vicente Navarra) and in San Carlos (Bp. 
Nicolas Mondejar) were not known for their political involvement. Unlike the young and less 
progressive Bukidnon Church which was steadily growing, the Negros Occidental Church had 
become enormous and highly politicised. Although Bp. Fortich had sought this division,94 it is 
believed that the Vatican leadership wanted to curb the growing politicisation of the diocese.95
Second, a more crucial factor in the transition was the appointment of Bp. Camilo D. 
Gregorio. He succeeded Bp. Fortich, on May 27, 1989 and formally installed as the fourth 
bishop of the diocese on July 26, 1989.96 Bp. Gregorio was bom in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija 
(Northern Philippines), on September 25, 1939. He was ordained priest on December 1, 1963 
and then bishop on March 29, 1987. He earned his philosophical and theological training at the
94 Fortich interview, 01 March 2001.
95 Interview with Fr. Edgar S. A. Saguinsin, Renewal and Lay Formation Center Director, Diocese o f  
Bacolod, Bacolod City, 04 April 2001. However, Msgr. Victorino Rivas, then the Vicar General to Bp. 
Fortich, believes that there was no Vatican intervention to curtail the local Church’s political 
involvement (Rivas interview, 05 April 2001).
96 1989 Catholic Directory o f  the Philippines, 53.
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University of Santo Tomas Central Seminary.97 He got his licentiate and doctorate in Sacred 
Theology in Rome. He got a degree in Masters in Educational Administration at Fordham 
University. After his studies abroad, he was assigned in a minor seminary while doing some 
parish work. After his assignment to San Pablo Seminary in Baguio City, he became the 
President of the College of Immaculate Conception. In 1984, he was assigned as assistant 
secretary in the Apostolic Nunciature during the administration of Archbishop Bruno 
Torpigliani. Before becoming bishop, most of his priestly ministry was devoted either to 
academic training, teaching or administration with very little parish pastoral experience. His 
first assignment as bishop was in Cebu City, before going to Bacolod City.
Gregorio knew very little about the diocese although he was forewarned about the 
‘excesses of liberation theology’ in the local Church.98 He received a warm welcome on his 
installation as bishop of Bacolod.99 The LOMAS, particularly the ‘renewal communities’ 
coming mostly from rich and middle class background, were particularly delighted with the new 
bishop since, as they say it, they were not given much attention during the time of Fortich.100 
Gregorio in an effort to affirm that there are other variants of ecclesial communities within the 
Church, dealt with the charismatic organisations extensively. Bp. Gregorio emphasised spiritual 
input, much to the delight of the renewal communities. This was perceived by many clergy and 
lay leaders as an identification with the rich and not with the poor, a regression of what Fortich 
stood and fought for.101
O’Brien recalls that in Bp. Gregorio’s first conference with the clergy, he thought it was
i noan excellent theological piece that set his apostolic vision. While he mentioned the
97 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
98 Ibid.
99 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Fortich work lauded; Gregorio welcomed,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 27 July 1989, 1 & 2.
100 Javellana interview, 04 April 2001.
101 Saguinsin Interview, 04 April 2001; Interview with Fr. Jose A. Silverio, Former Parish Priest o f San Antonio 
Abad Parish, Diocese o f Bacolod, 29 March 2001.
102 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
277
importance of BCCs, he argued for more spiritual development which he feared was getting 
sidelined by the social thrust of the diocese.103 Initially, the presbyteral (council of priests) 
meetings were open and regularly held but in less than a year the mood started changing.104 Bp. 
Gregorio’s relationship with some priests turned sour. According to Gregorio, there was a 
segment of the clergy that wanted to ‘control all programmes of the diocese...according to their 
model of the Church...so very little allowance is given to the bishop of the place.’105 Eventually, 
the meetings became more focused on internal affairs even when pressing external events were 
affecting the diocese, less dialogical and more adversarial and confrontational until the meetings 
became fewer and fewer.106
The pastoral strategies, leadership styles and personalities of Bp. Fortich and Bp. 
Gregorio were in quite striking contrast. Fortich gave priority to BCCs/BECs, Gregorio gave 
importance to LOMAS, particularly the renewal movement. Fortich’s meetings sought 
consensus building while those of Gregorio were directive and he had the last say. Fortich’s 
style of administration was hands-off, while that of Gregorio was hands-on. The former stressed 
justice and peace issues while the latter focused on spiritual concerns.
Third, the rise of fundamentalist groups correlated with the growth of charismatic 
communities in the diocese. The charismatic organisations consisted of the Couples for Christ, 
Youth for Christ, Bukas-Loob sa Diyos (Generosity to God), Brotherhood of Christian Business 
and Professionals, Peace Fellowship and other covenant communities. These communities 
mushroomed in the Diocese of Bacolod as a counterforce to the fundamentalist groups which 
started attracting the ordinary laity out of the local Church. The renewalist groups in LOMAS
103 Ibid.
104 Interview with Dimitri A. Gatia, Presbyteral Council member, Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod City, 06 March 
2001 .
105 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
106 Gatia interview, 06 March 2001.
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were lay-led, trans-parochial, and nationally based. These groups were typically middle-class, 
charismatic in orientation, concerned with spiritual development and less politically inclined.
Evidently then, the local Church in Bacolod became increasingly complex and diverse. 
The hierarchy became more polarised between those who were more concerned with spiritual 
development (e.g., Gregorio and renewal communities) and those who pursued the peace and 
justice thrust of Bp. Fortich. A few members of the clergy were independent, that is, they were 
neither completely with the pro-Fortich nor with the pro-Greogorio group. This divide was also 
reflected within the laity which was much more acute in Bacolod diocese than in Malaybalay 
diocese. The traditional groups in Bacolod diocese (e.g., Barangay sang Virgen, KoC, CWL) 
and BCCs (progressive and traditionalists) continued in the post-authoritarian period, while 
charismatic communities were gaining a foothold. The rise of groups like Christian Family 
Movement (CFM) whose leaders were actively involved in peace issues was also an important 
development. A simplified ecclesiological spectrum may be able to illustrate this complexity.
Figure 7: Ecclesiological spectrum of Church groups in the Diocese of Bacolod
•  •
BCCs CFM LOMAS
(Progressives Moderates) (Charismatic groups Traditional groups)
[.Barangay sang Virgen, KoC, CWL]
Pro-Fortich clergy Independent clergy Pro-Gregorio clergy
These groups had varying, and at times overlapping, doctrinal and pastoral tendencies. The 
progressive BCCs pushed for a radical interpretation of liberation theology and Catholic social 
teaching (e.g., preferential option for the poor, social justice, comprehensive land reform), and 
were openly aligned with the NDF. The moderate BCCs were inspired by Ghandi’s active non­
violent spirituality, but did not differ much with the progressive BCCs in terms of their justice 
orientation. CFM was a middle class initiative that promoted family values but its members
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adopted a reformist view of social change and moderate Catholic social teaching (e.g., sharing of 
resources with the poor, solidarity, moderate land reform). Although many of them were open to 
liberation theology, they did not go as far as the progressive Left in the political alignment. The 
LOMAS had charismatic groups that stressed spiritual renewal and personal conversion and 
traditional groups that underscored the importance of sacramental celebration, maintained 
devotional practices (e.g., novenas) and, in some cases, preserved pre-Vatican II spirituality 
(e.g., primacy of salvation of souls). The more traditionalist groups of LOMAS (Barangay sang 
Virgen, KoC) were generally supportive of the counter-insurgency campaign and extremely 
protective of property rights (e.g., anti-comprehensive land reform). Given a deeply divided 
leadership and intensely competing church groups, hierarchy-laity interaction was much more 
complex in the Diocese of Bacolod than in the Diocese of Malaybalay. Although the laity in 
Malaybalay was likewise differentiated, its hierarchy and laity were not as fragmented and 
deeply divided as in Bacolod.
6.4 The path to peace: a road less travelled
The peace initiatives in the Diocese of Bacolod were an attempt to restore confidence in 
democratic institutions and processes and, in this way, to make democracy ‘the only game in 
town.’107 In this condition, democracy, according to Linz and Stephan, ‘becomes routinized and
1 Oftdeeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life ’ Violence and armed
conflict threatened democracy in the post-authoritarian Philippines, particularly in Negros. The 
Diocese of Bacolod along with civil society groups advanced the cause of peace in the province 
and to some extent on the national scene. Bp. Fortich’s role as peacebroker, either as the 
incumbent or retired Bishop of the See of Bacolod, was crucially important, be it at the
107 An expression used by Guiseppe di Palma and subsequently adopted by Linz and Stephan. See Linz and 
Stephan, ‘Problems o f democratic transition and consolidation..., 5.
108 Ibid.
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provincial, regional or national level. Fortich was acceptable to all the stakeholders of peace: the 
CPP-NDF-NPA, the government, civil society groups and the people. Bp. Fortich dared both the 
government and military, and the NPA to stop the armed violence and address the root causes of 
the insurgency problem. On December 10, 1986 he was chosen to lead the National Ceasefire 
Committee (NUC) which monitored the ceasefire agreement between the government and the 
NDF. On that very day in Bacolod, some 100,000 people showed up to celebrate the much 
awaited national ceasefire, the first since the insurgency movement began in late 1969.109 The 
rousing welcome of rebels betrayed the people’s massive clamour for peace which was long 
overdue in Negros Island. For its part, the Bacolod diocese engaged both the government and 
the CPP-NDF-NPA in promoting a negotiated peace agenda. After the failure of the national 
peace talks in January 1987, President Aquino gave full backing to retired Bp. Fortich to lead the 
regional peace panel for Western Visayas in February 1987.110 Nonetheless, the new post­
authoritarian role of the Church in peacemaking and keeping was not always understood by the 
military and some government officials, and was held suspect by the CPP-NPA leadership.
6.4.1 The National Eucharistic Year: initiating a peace constituency
In launching the National Eucharistic Year (December 8, 1986 to December 8, 1987), the CBCP 
issued a pastoral letter entitled ‘One bread, one body, one people’ to highlight the importance of 
the event.111 Prompted by the themes of peace, justice and unity in this pastoral letter, the 
Bacolod diocese celebrated the National Eucharistic Year focusing on the concerns of the 
CBCP.112 The Eucharistic year consisted of liturgical celebrations and educational seminars
I 11throughout the province to unite the people for lasting peace.
109 The Visayan Daily Star, ‘Cheering crowd welcomes rebels,’ Bacolod City, 11 December 1986, 1 & 2.
110 N. R. Leonardia, ‘Cory gives Fortich special mission: in search for peace,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 19 
February 1987, 1 & 2.
111 CBCP, Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f  the Philippines..., 97-107.
112 The Visayan Daily Star, ‘Diocese to launch Eucharistic year,’ Bacolod City, 05 December 1986, 2.
113 Ibid.
281
In the meantime on September 7, 1987, Bp. Fortich issued a pastoral letter after the failed
coup d ’etat on August 28, 1987.
In our province, in particular, we have been witnesses to the merciless killings of 
unarmed civilians caught in the middle of armed encounters between the CPP-NPA 
and the military or as a result of their tactical operations.... we wish to be able to 
dispel this threatening and terrible nightmare by proclaiming once again at the top of 
our voice the ABSURDITY OF VIOLENCE and the ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF 
PEACE.114
Fortich was critical not only of the military rebels who plotted against the government. He used 
this occasion to denounce violence wrought by the armed conflict between the military and the 
NPA rebels. Clearly at this point, he was delineating, in no uncertain terms, the Church’s 
position vis-a-vis the military and the CPP-NPA, and thus dispelling the suspicion that he was 
identified with the underground Left.
Culminating the Eucharistic year was the erection of the Tent City at the Sacred Heart 
Seminary grounds in Bacolod city. People from various parts of the province stayed in tents for 
one week while attending the Eucharistic Congress for Peace, joining the pilgrimage, and 
participating in the diocesan-wide Mass led by Bp. Fortich.115 The Congress had two parts: one 
for youth (November 16-18) and the other for adults (November 19-21). Delegates of the 
Congress passed 13 resolutions which urged the Church to support land reform, demilitarisation, 
nationalism and sovereignty, political education, participatory democracy and partnership with 
the government on genuine development among other things.116 A few of these resolutions were 
captured in the placards of the participants: ‘Land reform the answer to rebellion’, ‘rice not
117arms.’ On November 22, 1987, despite the rain, some 60,000 people, rich and poor alike, and 
125 priests led by Bp. Fortich celebrated the Mass which capped the Eucharistic Congress.118
114 Bp. Antonio Y. Fortich, ‘No to violence: a pastoral letter on the civilians’ right to life and freedom,’ Diocese 
of Bacolod, Bacolod City, 07 September 1987.
115 ‘Come to the tent city and experience the Eucharist,’ Bacolod City, November 16-22, 1987.




Earlier on, groups had staged a 3-day pilgrimage starting from Hinigaran, La Carlota and 
Manapla.119 Indeed the Eucharistic Congress showed the broadest mass mobilisation and 
advocacy of peace constituents in post-authoritarian Negros. In this sense then, the Church was 
a crucial actor in mobilising a constituency of peace advocates who equally pursued justice and 
development. This peace constituency later would be the leading group in various peace 
campaigns and initiatives like the peace zone in Cantomanyog.
6.4.2 The Cantomanyog peace zone: an initiative from below 
and strengthened from above
When peace talks between the government and rebel groups collapsed in 1988, various local 
peace initiatives were tried. Peace awareness, education and advocacy persisted and gained 
prominence at the height and decline of Operation Thunderbolt, a military offensive in April 
1989 against the CPP-NPA in Southern Negros. Brigadier General Raymundo T. Jarque was 
appointed Negros Island Command (NICOM) Chief. Soon after his appointment, the NPA 
assaulted a military detachment in Caningay killing and injuring scores of soldiers.120 This led to 
a massive military assault on the CHICKS area (part of the Kabankalan diocese from 1987). The 
NPA presence and influence in these areas were particularly strong. Heavy bombing of 
Caningay began on April 23, 1989. With five infantry battalions sent around the CHICKS area, 
the operation was extensive, sustained and heavy.121 The military, as part of their counter­
insurgency campaign, aided the proliferation of vigilante groups such as Bantay Banwa (People 
Wake up), the anti-communist and anti-land reform Movement for an Independent Negros 
(MIN), religious fanatical sects, and CAFGUs which were supported by some rich planters to
119 Ibid., 1.
120 Lito Zulueta, ‘Church’s hand of charity tied in strife-torn Negros,’ The Manila Chronicle 29 May 1989, 1.
121 Alfred W. McCoy, ‘The Restoration of planter power in La Carlota City, in From Marcos to Aquino: local 
perspectives on political transformation in the Philippines, eds. Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, 
(Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press and Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 140.
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protect their haciendas.122 As a result, some 35,000 people were displaced causing the deaths of 
around 800 children in an evacuation area who died of natural illness brought about by their 
displacement.123 By May 7, 1989, the affected areas, including Cantomanyog, were virtually 
uninhabited. The devastating military operation had the full backing of the Provincial Governor 
Daniel L. Lacson and of President Corazon C. Aquino.124 In an effort to flush out the rebels, the 
operation lasted until June 1989. In this context of persistent armed conflict, the idea of peace 
zones emerged.
Bp. Fortich was a pioneering church leader who inspired, popularised, and advocated the 
notion of zones of peace as an imperative in war-torn Negros. In brief, the creation of peace 
zones hoped to ‘enable the civilians....to live in peace in a certain territory declared as a “zone of 
peace” and recognized as such by the warring forces;....enable the civilians....to work on their 
livelihood without fear of being harassed by the combatant; .. .give opportunities to the people 
in the “zone of peace” to attain total human development.’125 Fortich had hoped that the zones 
of peace could be introduced in the various conflict-laden areas of the country and thus reduce 
the incidents of armed conflict.126 His proposal was later taken, endorsed and proposed by some 
bishops to President Aquino, although no such support was given collectively by CBCP.127 The 
bishops supportive of ‘Peace Zones’ chose Negros Occidental as an experimental area which 
later could be replicated in every province where there was armed conflict.
122 LCFHR, Vigilantes in the Philippines..., Chapter III.
123 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002; The local papers estimated some 200 children who died. See The Manila 
Chronicle, ‘Church hits military crackdown in Negros,’ 03 July 1989, 3. O’Brien’s estimate seems more 
credible since he personally conducted the survey while the journalists in Negros tended to sympathise with the 
Operation Thunderbolt.
124 Interview with Rafael Coscolluela, Former Provincial Governor o f Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, 26 
March 2001; Interview with Daniel L. Lacson, Former Provincial Governor o f Negros Occidental, Bacolod 
City, 28 March 2001.
125 ‘Zone o f Peace: a concept,’ 1st draft for discussion, n.d.
126 The Philippine Star, ‘Bishop calls for rural peace zones, 09 May 1989, 1 & 7.
127 CBCP, Catholic Bishops ’ conference o f  the Philippines: letters and statement, 1984-1990 (Quezon City: 
Cardinal Bea Institute, 1990), 197.
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Nominated by European and American organisations for the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, Bp. 
Fortich envisioned the creation of zones of peace as neutral grounds to ‘humanise the conflict,’
• • * 1^ 0 #
that is, to free areas from armed conflict so that civilians can get on with their lives. Fortich 
dared the military and the rebels: ‘We are tired already of all this fighting. If you want to fight, 
you fight beyond this zone in order not to involve the innocent people.’129 This idea was 
perceived by critics as naive and simplistic. Some military officers thought this was providing a 
sanctuary for the rebels who were on the run.130 Nonetheless, Fortich persisted in his campaign
and inspired sitio (sub-barrio unit) Cantomanyog, in the municipality of Candoni, Southern
1^1
Negros Occidental to reinvent its own idea of sona sa paghida-et (zone of peace). The
residents of Cantomanyog, albeit part of the Diocese of Kabankalan, maintained links with the
Diocese of Bacolod through its parish priest Fr. Rolando ‘Rolex’ Nueva.
The community of Cantomanyog migrated in 1959 from Igbaras, Iloilo under the
leadership of Tay Loring who invited 40 heads of families to Cantomanyog. Of this number,
1five left eventually and thirty-five settled permanently. They cleared the forest and 
subsequently land was awarded to them. In 1960, their families followed them and settled with 
them in Cantomanyog. These families were in some way related to each other by blood or legal 
affinity. They thrived on subsistent farming planting rice, sugarcane, root crops and raised their 
own farm animals.133
Cantomanyog used to belong to Kaisahan (United) Farm Settlement Cooperative, a pilot 
project of the diocese directed by Fr. Luis Jalandoni who had just returned from his studies in
128 Paul Richardson, ‘Caught in the crossfire in the violent Philippines,’ The Philippines, IV(3), January 1989,
2 .
129 The Philippine Star, Bishop calls for rural peace zones, 7.
130 Ibid.
131 Interview with Fr. Rolando Nueva and Corazon Eliseo, Former Parish Priest o f Candoni and Cantomanyog 
lay leader respectively, Kabankalan, 16 March 2001.




Germany. The Bacolod diocese sent a chaplain to the settlement area even though Cantomanyog 
was under a parish priest.134 O’Brien believes that Kaisahan sowed the seeds of lay 
empowerment and human integral development among the peasants in the area including 
Cantomanyog.135 Apart from this influence, BCC was another big factor in the community life 
and action in Cantomanyog. It was introduced in the area m 1975. They had a regular 
panimbahon (community worship) every week and in some occasions the parish priest came to 
celebrate Mass with them. Aside from the regular panimbahon, they had weekly meetings which 
tried to respond to community issues. The Cantomanyog residents, among many others, were 
adversely affected and displaced by the military assault on NPA enclaves in April 1989 during 
Operation Thunderbolt. At the time of military operation, there were about 68 families in 
Cantomanyog. The evacuees went to Haba Elementary School in Candoni and stayed there until 
the first week of June 1989 when the evacuees, numbering about 27 families, started returning to 
Cantomanyog.137 The military refused to guarantee their safety. But rather than remain in the 
camp, they decided to go back.138 Dealing with the violent conflict between the NPA and the 
military was then a central agenda of the community. Fr. Nueva, then parish priest of Candoni 
that included Cantomanyog, was actively engaged in the struggle of the community to declare 
and advocate their own version of sona sa paghida-et (zone of peace).139 Indeed the community 
made a declaration of their area as a zone of peace on December 26, 1988, but this did not gain 
any publicity or substantial support from the local Church civil society groups. It was thought 
that a re-declaration with the support of organised groups would highlight the issues of peace.
134 O’Brian interview, 16 July 2002.
135 Ibid., also Nueva and Eliseo interview, 16 March 2001.
136 O’Brian interview, 16 July 2002.
137 Cantomanyog cursory interviews, 17 March 2001.
138 Nueva and Eliseo interview, 16 March 2001.
139 Cantomanyog cursory interviews, 17 March 2001.
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To draw more attention to the (re)declaration of the zone of peace, a five-day campaign 
known as the Peace Caravan was initiated and led by the Catholic Church and supported by the 
PIC and civil society groups; namely, Pax Christi, Negros Priest Forum (NPF), People’s Power 
for Enlightenment and Commitment for Sovereignty and Truth (PENTECOST), Broad 
Initiatives for Negros Development (BIND), Bulig Foundation, Paghiliusa sa Paghida-et 
Negros, (PsPN, Unity for Peace), a Bacolod City-based peace NGO, and Peace Zone Advocates 
in Negros (PEZAN), a multi-sectoral formation of peace activists in Negros.140 These civil 
society groups had a close affinity with the Church, not simply because the clergy, religious, and 
lay people were members of these organisations, but primarily because of their commitment to 
peace and justice in Negros, although ideologically they were differentiated. The church-civil 
society partnership was anchored on a shared vision for Negros based on peace and justice.
The island-wide (comprising Negros Oriental and Negros Occidental) peace campaign 
started on February 13, 1990 at a Mass which was held at the Queen of Peace Church in Bacolod 
City. Thirty priests, including Bp. Emeritus Fortich led the Mass celebration. Bp. Camilo 
Gregorio in his homily exhorted the people to rally behind the themes of unity, forgiveness, 
reconciliation, justice with love.141 Although he along with Bp. Fortich blessed the peace 
caravan, he remained suspicious that the Left was out to use the campaign for their political 
ends.142 The perceived silence of the hierarchical leadership, except Bp. Fortich, betrayed 
cleavages within the local Church as regards the peace campaign.143 Bp. Fortich, on the other 
hand, following the CBCP position maintained that the campaign was a timely response to 
President Aquino’s ‘Decade of Peace (1990-2000)’ declaration.144 Some local elite and
140 Ang Kristianong Katilingban, ‘Negros: a caravan for peace,’ 4(1), May 1990, 4-6; Interview with Cesar 
Villanueva, Executive Director, World Futures Studies, St. La Salle University, Bacolod City, 09 March 2001.
141 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Peace trek moves north; rallies held,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 14 February 1990, 1.
142 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
143 Simon Peter Gregorio, ‘A Negros sito fights for peace,’ Intersect 5, (June 1991), 10-11.
144 Ang Kristianong Katilingban, ‘Negros.. . , ’ 4.
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hacenderos supported the peace caravan, secretly and overtly.145 Forty vehicles with about 500 
participants joined the caravan.146 They first headed to the north where a rally was staged in 
Escalante, the site of the well-known massacre in 1985, killing 21 people and injuring scores of 
civilians.147 Later in the afternoon, they arrived in San Carlos City where some 1,000 people 
awaited them at the plaza.148 The signing of the scroll of peace led by Bp. Nicolas Mondejar of 
the Diocese of San Carlos, San Carlos City Mayor Tranquilino Carmona and its Chief of Police 
Captain Demetria capped the day’s events.149 The following day, the caravan trekked to Bais 
City in Negros Oriental. Along the way, anti-communist and anti-peace placards read: ‘Don’t 
deceive us with your zones of peace,’ ‘Down with communism,’ ‘Don’t disturb Negros 
Oriental.’150 They arrived in Dumaguete City, capital of Negros Oriental at around 3.30 pm. At 
the central plaza, Bp Fortich read the CBCP pastoral letter, ‘Seek peace, pursue it’.151
The big event in the peace caravan was on February 16, the planned day for the
declaration of the peace zone in Cantomanyog. The peace caravan was held up by barricaders
backed by the military under General Raymundo Jarque at Barangay Haba, some three
kilometers from Cantomanyog. Negotiations were pursued by peace advocates led by Bp.
Fortich to allow the caravan to proceed to Cantomanyog but failed. There were some 2,000
barricaders including residents and evacuees, and some 150 rebel surrenderees and people
recruited from other places as far as Sipalay and Cauayan.152 These barricaders denounced the
1peace zone project and church leaders as communists. Seeing no breakthrough in the impasse,
145 Empestan interview, 13 March 2001.
146 The Visayan Daily Star, ‘Weeklong caravan begins,’ 13 February 1990, 1-2.
147 Gomez, ‘Peace trek moves north, rallies held, 2
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 The Visayan Daily Star, ‘Peace caravan in Oriental moving to Sipalay today,’ 15 February 1990, 1.
151 Niall O’Brien, SSC, ‘Zone o f peace declared in the Philippines,’ Pax Christi USA, XV(2) (Summer 1990), 
18.
152 Ma. Theresa Marcelo, ‘Peace zone declared,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 17-18 February 1990, 2.
153 Ibid.
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the peace campaigners celebrated Mass after which Natividad Epulan, a Cantomanyog resident,
read the zone of peace declaration. Their declaration read:
We desire peace and quiet that will last so that we can develop our lives and 
livelihood. The prevalence of peace is a necessary condition if we are going to 
confront poverty and injustice. In short, we desire to have peace, prosperity of people 
based on justice.154
Thus Cantomanyog became one of the first peace zones in the Philippines.155 The Cantomanyog 
community sought a model of development which was rooted injustice, but this would not be 
possible without peace. It was never endorsed by the military, and the local government, or by 
the rebel returnees or the CPP leadership. For the military, this was merely a strategic ploy of 
the NPA who were on the run because of persistent military attacks.156 Peace havens were seen 
as obstacles to their all-out war with the rebels. In the minds of the local government leaders, the 
lack of consultation and their exclusion in the peace campaign rendered the whole project void 
from the very start. The Municipal Mayors’ League, whose membership of 19 mayors, 
unanimously endorsed a resolution criticizing the creation of peace zone chiefly because they 
were not consulted in the peace plan.157 But since they were actively engaged in the counter­
insurgency campaign that endorsed a total war policy, they were unlikely to be sympathetic to 
the cause of peace espoused by the residents of Cantomanyog. For the rebel returnees like the 
Brotherhood of Organized Resignees from CPP in Negros (BORN), it was a CPP/NPA ploy to 
gain belligerency status under international law, divide the clergy in Negros, protect the NPA 
and manipulate the outcome of this peace initiative. For the CPP leadership, the establishment
154 ‘Pamat-ud sa pagtukod sang isa-ka sona sang paghidaet’ (‘Declaration concerning the establishment of a 
zone for peace’), December 26, 1988. Translated by Antonio Moreno with the assistance o f Niall O’Brien. 
Full text in Section 2, Appendices.
155 There were other peace zones in the country which grew out o f different contexts. These included the ones 
in Tulunan, North Cotabato, in Sagada, and in Bangilo, Malibcong, Abra.
156 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Mayors oppose zones o f peace,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 13 February 1990, 2.
157 Ibid., 1 & 2.
158 Arman Pelayo Toga, ‘Peace zone promotes conflict?’ Today, 23 February 1990, 3.
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of the peace zone militated against the revolutionary struggle waged in the countryside, although 
some local NPA regulars and NDF sympathisers were open to this initiative.159
While the Diocese of Bacolod played a crucial role in supporting and advocating for the 
struggle of Cantomanyog to launch its own version of peace zone, ultimately it was the 
persistence of the BCCs that made their area free from armed conflict.160 The idea of a peace 
zone was not imposed from above by the ecclesiastical authorities, neither was it engineered 
solely by peace advocates but essentially initiated by the community and supported by the 
Church leadership and civil society actors.161 The residents relentlessly talked to and persuaded
armed groups from both sides to respect their declaration. They confronted their respective field
1
commanders when a violation was reported. And this was done repeatedly and persistently 
until 1993 when armed groups were no longer seen in the area. Although Cantomanyog and 
Fr. Rolex Nueva were not part of the Diocese of Bacolod, it cannot be denied that the influence 
of Kaisahan (to which Cantomanyog used to belong), the flow of chaplains that ministered to 
Kaisahan, and the BCC movement were made possible, thanks to the support of the diocese. 
O’Brien believes that the language of the declaration shows some similarities with the idea of 
total human development and justice thrust characteristic of the Kaisahan project of the diocese 
in the 1970s.164 Moreover, at the time of the (second) declaration of the peace zone, the support 
extended by the Bacolod diocese and civil society organisations expanded the projection of the 
advocacy, despite some misgivings on the part of Bp. Gregorio.
159 Maria Serena I. Diokno, The 1986-1987 Peace Talks: a reportage o f  contention. (Quezon City: University 
o f the Philippines, Center for Integrative and Development Studies and the UP Press), 92-94; The Philippine 
Star, ‘Bishop calls for rural peace zones,’ 09 May 1989,1.
160 Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.
161 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002.
162 Nueva and Eliseo interview, 16 March 2001.
163 Ibid.; Cantomanyog cursory interviews, 17 March 2001.
164 See Appendix 2 in Appendices; O’Brian interview, 16 July 2002.
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One view argues that the peace zone failed as envisioned. The creation of the peace zone 
was not so much due to the persistence of community to negotiate with the armed groups, but 
because of the gradual withdrawal of the NPA in the area.165 The gradual withdrawal may well 
have been a factor, but the sightings of armed NPA in the area showed that they were not just 
phasing out of the scene.166 Thus the people’s declaration, matched with relentless action to 
persuade the combatants to withdraw from the place, was crucial in averting further violence.
The community’s efforts were a deterrent factor in the continued operations of the armed groups. 
In addition, Cantomanyog envisioned peace where development of the people was founded on 
justice.168 Peace was not simply the absence of violence, but necessarily included genuine 
development. This was further affirmed when Cantomanyog became a recipient of the Aurora 
Quezon Peace Award in 1991.169 The government for its part awarded a development fund 
($100,000) to Cantomanyog.170 The money was used to widen the road connecting sitio 
Cantomanyog to Candoni municipality, strengthen the community cooperative project and other 
related programmes.171 All these could not have happened if both the military and the NPA 
simply withdrew without purposive community action ensuring peace and development.
The Cantomanyog experience was not replicated in ways that Fortich envisioned and 
neither did it influence the creation of other peace zones. Fortich’s version of a peace zone was 
the inspiration, but it was the people who initiated and gave it a human face.172 Even before the 
5-day island-wide peace caravan was launched, Cantomanyog had already declared their area as
165 Gordoncillo interview, 06 April 2001.
166 Cantomanyog cursory interviews, 17 March 2001.
167 Nueva and Eliseo interview, 16 March 2001.
168 ‘Pamat-ud sa pagtukod sang isa-ka sona sang paghidaet,’ Cantomanyog, Negros Occidental, 26 December 
1988.
169 Nueva and Eliseo interview, 16 March 2001.
170 As part o f confidence building measure, the development funds were also given to the other peace zones (see 
footnote 155, same chapter). President Ramos declared seven peace zones as Special Peace and Development 





conflict-free zone on December 26, 1986, but it did not gain sufficient public attention. 
Nonetheless, it was the community that relentlessly engaged the parties involved, both the 
military and the NPA. Thus it was basically an initiative from the local BCC residents 
themselves with the assistance of their parish priest Fr. Nueva to formulate their own version of 
sona sa paghida-et (zone of peace).173 He frequently visited Cantomanyog. His presence and 
participation proved pivotal in empowering the locals to create their own version of the peace 
zone. Additionally, he was a key liaison to the larger local Churches (Diocese of Bacolod and 
Diocese of Kabankalan) and the peace advocates.
The Cantomanyog peace zone became a living symbol of the aspirations of peace 
advocates and the citizens. Former Negros Occidental Governor Rafael Coscolluela claims that 
the campaign ‘proved that there was a peace constituency....by a good number of people’ owing 
largely to the initiative of the BCC in Cantomanyog coupled with the support of the Diocese of 
Bacolod along with other peace advocates.174 The mobilisation showed plainly that the peace 
had a sizeable following which was not simply to be dismissed. In the declaration of 
Cantomanyog’s peace zone, at once the peace initiative from below (Cantomanyog) and peace 
advocacy from above (church leaders, peace advocates) intersected to address issues spawned by 
armed conflict. The Church’s role in orchestrating a multi-sectoral peace caravan proved that it 
could form partnership with civil society. It is rather unfortunate that the Cantomanyog 
experience was not replicated as Bp Fortich had intended, although other peaces zones in the 
country sprang up from different conditions. It is equally unfortunate that the peace 
contingency was not sustained beyond the barricade in Cantomanyog. Peace advocacies after
173 Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.
174 Coscolluela interview, 26 March 2001.
175 There was an attempt to replicate the experience in Barangay Bantayan, Kabankalan but it was largely 
centred on its proponent Fiscal Rolando Parpa, with very little community participation and empowerment, if  
any. See Avelyn Z. Agudon, ‘Second peace zone in south declared,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 27 October 
2000, 1 & 4.
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the collapse of the government and NDF negotiations were left to local government and church 
leaders with very little involvement from the peace contingency.
Various peace advocacies of the diocese continued since the retirement of Bp. Fortich as 
Bishop of Bacolod on January 31, 1989, but it did not have as much support from peace 
advocates as before. In the wake of the stalled national peace talks, both Bp. Gregorio and retired 
Bp. Fortich pursued local peace talks for the province of Negros Occidental. On September 25, 
1991, Governor Daniel Lacson announced a 10-day ceasefire in Negros, the first province in the 
Philippines to attempt a voluntary ceasefire.176 For this purpose, a Peace Committee was set up 
which included Bp. Gregorio and retired Bp. Fortich. The committee sought ways and means to 
engage the rebels to go back to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, this was utterly rejected by 
NDF-Negros sensing that it was a ‘vile scheme to divide-and-rule. ’177 Notwithstanding some 
reported skirmishes between the military and the NPA, and the rejection of the offer of local 
peace talks by the NDF, the local ceasefire was extended for another 10-day period.178 Despite 
repeated appeals by the Peace Committee to convince the NDF to engage the local peace 
negotiations, no progress was made. The diocese made more attempts in local peace talks in 
1992 through the ex-priests who joined the underground movement, but to no avail.179 In 1999, 
after the failed national peace talks, local talks were relentlessly pursued, but then again failed 
for the same reason that the NDF wanted comprehensive talks, not local peace initiatives. 
Complicating the situation of armed conflict was the persistent counter-insurgency campaigns of 
military and para-military units (often supported by the landed elite) that only bred more 
violence and suspicion about the trustworthiness of the government.
176 Carla P. Gomez, ‘10-day Negros ceasefire starts,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 25 September 1991, 1 & 14.
]77 Ibid., 14.
178 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Ceasefire extended for 10 more days,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 04 October 1991, 1 & 2.
179 Eric T. Loretizo, ‘Gregorio wants Fortich’s help,’ Today News- Views, 15 September 1992, 1.
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In sum, all these peace initiatives starting from the National Eucharistic Year (1986- 
1987) up until 1999 did not just simply fall by the wayside. The peace campaigns sent strong 
signals to the government that the military approach to the problem was not the solution and to 
the CPP-NPA that the revolution being waged was not really pro-poor as the poor were the ones 
caught in the firing line. The formation of a peace constituency made it clear that the citizenry 
had as much stake in the peace process as the government and the rebel forces. Sustaining the 
peace movement was altogether another matter when the national leadership from both the 
government and the NDF failed to reach any agreement.
In many ways, the San Fernando and Wao experiences in the Bukidnon Church are 
comparable to the Cantomanyog case in Negros. First, both cases engendered the formation of 
an awakened and informed citizenry committed to environmental protection (Bukidnon) and 
peace (Negros). Evidently a new wave of citizenship emerged which was firmly resolved to 
make democracy work given the fragility of the political institutions.
Second, both cases started their political awakening through the BCC and with the 
inspiration and accompaniment of their parish priests, Fr. Kelly (San Fernando) and Fr.
Almedilla with Edna Espinosa (Wao) for Bukidnon Church and Fr. Nueva for Negros. These 
leaders played crucial roles as link persons in their respective dioceses. Here, church ad intra 
dynamics (hierarchy-laity interaction) played an important role despite some indications of 
profound internal cracks in the leadership and laity of the Diocese of Bacolod.
Third, the hierarchical leadership addressed these local issues. In Malaybalay diocese, it 
was Bp. Rosales’ leadership that propped up the cause of San Fernando, and Bp. Pacana for the 
Wao advocacy. This once local issue eventually became the whole concern of the diocese, 
province and the whole nation. In Bacolod diocese, it was mainly Bp. Emeritus Fortich who 
championed the peace advocacy, although to a limited extent, it had the blessing of Bp. Gregorio 
and Bp. Vicente Navarra who had ecclesial jurisdiction over Cantomanyog, part of Kabankalan
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diocese. Gregorio’s ambivalent support showed division in the hierarchical leadership.
Similarly, some bishops endorsed the peace zones and local peace initiatives in Negros, although 
the CBCP was not wholly convinced of the peace zones. In the case of Bukidnon, the CBCP and 
MSPC collectively endorsed the environmental advocacy in San Fernando culminating in the 
issuance of the first pastoral letter on the environment.
Fourth, local and national civil society organisations in both cases were crucial actors in 
the protest movement. Church-civil society linkage proved vital in the formation of peace and 
environmental constituencies. While the Diocese of Malaybalay succeeded in their lobby for a 
total log ban in the province, but frustrated in the national advocacy, the Diocese of Bacolod 
failed to press for the cessation of armed hostilities in Negros aside from Cantomanyog. Part of 
the difficulty in the local peace processes in 1987 to 1990 was the resistance of the CPP-NDF, 
the continued operation of para-military units often propped up by the military and at times by 
the landed elite, and the opposition of local and provincial officials to go along with the peace 
advocates, whereas the environmental advocacy in Bukidnon, except the advocacy in Wao, had a 
strong endorsement from local and provincial officials, and the sympathy from the national 
government through DENR. The only opposition against the total log ban was mainly from the 
logging companies and a small band of locals and lumad who worked for the companies.
6.5 Human rights advocacy and restoring the primacy of law
Human rights advocacy in the Diocese of Bacolod many a time affirmed the primacy of the legal 
framework (rule of law), although in some cases when the law did not safeguard fundamental 
rights (e.g., death penalty), the law was challenged. The local Church’s commitment to human 
rights included the provision of legal counsel in court cases, legal education and advocacy, 
documentation of human rights violations, and securing the release of those unjustly detained. In 
all these areas, the Legal Aid Office (LAO) of the diocese in coordination with Social Action
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Center (SAC) was the leading agent. LAO, set up in 1969, was initially funded by Trocaire, an 
Irish funding agency, through the mediation of the Irish Columbans in Southern Negros 
Occidental.180 The Columbans for some time covered half of the budget for the LAO.181 
Attorney Francisco Cruz, then one of the two lawyers, continued his legal services till its closure 
in 1999. In the mid-1970s, two norms were laid out in accepting cases: first, ‘the case should 
involve social problems such as those involving labour, landgrabbing, squatters...and those 
involving misconduct of public officials....,’ and second, ‘the people involved are poor....’182 
Services offered by the LAO covered representation in court cases, public notaries, legal advice, 
weekly para-legal training sessions on human rights education and advocacy, and legal 
documentation for at least five years in the mid-1980s covering the areas Kabankalan, 
Himamaylan, Sipalay, and other places upon request.183 In many cases, the lawyers had to go to 
detention centres where suspects were illegally detained, interrogated and at times tortured, to 
seek their immediate release.184 While these courts were ordinarily beyond the reach of poor 
people, at the very least LAO opened the avenue for the poor to seek legal contestation not only 
in lower courts but even in the highest tribunal such as the Supreme Court. Court decisions, 
however, tended to favour the propertied and influential sectors of society.185 The most 
celebrated cases represented by LAO included the internationally known detention of the Negros 
Nine in 1983 and the massacre in Escalante in 1985. When the diocese was divided into three 
local Churches in 1987, LAO continued its services to the Diocese of Kabankalan and the 
Diocese of San Carlos which were no longer part of the See of Bacolod.
180 Interview with Atty. Francisco Cruz, Legal Aid Office Lawyer, Bacolod City, 08 March 2001.
181 McCaslin, The Columban Fathers in the Philippines, Negros: 1950-1990, 61.
182 Atty. Francisco Cruz, Letter to Fr. Rufino Suplido, Jr., Social Action Center Director, Diocese o f Bacolod,
13 September 1975.
183Francisco Cruz, ‘Letter to Fr. Rufino Suplido, Jr., Social Action Center Director,’ Diocese of Bacolod, 09 
January 1976; Interview with Atty. Romeo Subaldo, Legal Aid Office Lawyer, Bacolod City, 27 March 2001.
184 Subaldo interview, 27 March 2001.
185 Francisco Cruz, ‘Letter to Fr. Rufino Suplido, Jr.,’ Social Action Center Director, Diocese of Bacolod, 03 
January 1978.
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As a matter of policy in SAC, cases involving human rights violation of groups or 
individuals identified with the underground Left were separated from the civil and criminal cases 
to shield the Church from being linked to the movement.186 The Free Legal Action Group 
(FLAG) handled the former while the LAO tackled the latter. Lawyers of LAO, however, were 
affiliated with FLAG, so that it was the same lawyers who handled the civil and criminal cases. 
Thus it is very difficult to distinguish how many overtly political cases were dealt with and 
supported by the diocese and how many were handled by FLAG. LAO and FLAG had a tight 
partnership particularly in dealing with political cases. Atty. Cruz reports that the post­
authoritarian period saw a significant rise of land ejection cases.187 Close to half (48%) of all the 
pending cases or about 22 cases on a yearly average from 1986 to its closure in 1999 were court 
litigations linked to land ejection issues.188 The rise of land ejection cases (e.g., relocation of 
Sincang residents below) can be explained by the rapid expansion of the urban centre and the
•  1 fiQ » »repossession of urban sites by landowners and other claimants. In this growing trend, the 
urban poor were most susceptible to land ejection. In 1998, the Philippine bishops took notice of 
this phenomenon and affirmed the right to development as a fundamental human right.190
The conventional argument holds the view that human rights transgressions are largely 
imputed to the establishment (the Philippine government being a signatory of the international 
human rights statutes), but extra-judicial killings were not a monopoly of the government, the 
military or quasi-military agencies. These killings militated further against the already weak 
political institutions including the legal system -  a requisite of a functioning democracy. The
186 Cruz interview, 08 March 2001.
187 Francisco Cruz, ‘Letter to Fr. Ireneo Gordoncillo,’ Social Action Center Director, Diocese of Bacolod, 23 
January 1989.
188 Data extrapolated from the yearly reports of Francisco Cruz to the Social Action Center Director from 1987 
to 1999.
189 Cruz, ‘Letter to Fr. Ireneo Gordoncillo.’
190 ‘A Pastoral letter on human rights.’ Available from
http://www.cbcponline.org/documents/1990s/1998-human rights.html. 21 February 2003.
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killing of Jose Tanpinco Jr., a labour leader and former member of CPP-NPA, in July 1988 by 
suspected members of the NPA sparrow unit illustrates this point. His killing was never 
condemned by BCCs, SAC, TFD, the Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), or by 
any clergy member whose ideological sympathy was with the CPP-NPA.191 Despite a noticeable 
number of victims of extra-judicial killings,192 the Diocese of Bacolod was uneven in 
denouncing such atrocities. The CBCP, on the other hand, unreservedly denounced terrorism 
against those who stood for principled social involvement, and those persecuted as ‘subversives 
by the Right or as informers and “enemies of the people” by the Left.’193 This position was 
affirmed in its subsequent pastoral letters on peace.194
With two to four lawyers serving LAO its operation was much more extensive than in the 
Diocese of Malaybalay which had only one lawyer. LAO and Bukidnon’s Legal Aid Bureau 
have some shared practices and gains. Like the Malaybalay diocese’s legal aid programme, LAO 
made good progress in its attempt to reinvent the justice system as a democratic institution in the 
province. First, its weekly para-legal training and advice given to its clients helped the poor 
become more aware their rights and duties as citizens of the land. Legal education and 
advocacy, like the Bukidnon experience, became a central means of mobilising people in Negros 
and making them more conscious of their understanding and exercise of their citizenship.
Second, by representing the poor whose access to legal contestation is extremely limited, the 
lawyers and staff of the LAO enabled their clients to be participants in the remaking of an 
imperfect judicial system, a key institution in any democratic polity. In this sense, the poor were 
given a voice in the dispensation of justice. As early as 1977, they had already ‘placed the
191 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Ex-CPP members hit movement,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 07 July 1988; 1 & 2.
192 Commission on Human Rights (CHR), ‘Year-end reports (from 1991 to 2000),’ Bacolod Sub-Office, 
Bacolod City.
193 CBCP, Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f  the Philippines..., 45-46.
194 Ibid., 182-183, 197-203, 218-227.
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Highest Tribunal (e.g., the Supreme Court) within the reach of the poor.’195 Finally the attempts 
to release those illegally detained in military and para-military detention centres, not only spared 
the lives of detainees of undue harm, but reinforced the primacy of the judicial institution as the 
proper venue for administering justice and law. Thus the Church was determined to uphold 
human rights within the legal framework, albeit an imperfect one.
6.6 The Relocation of Sincang residents
The relocation of Sincang residents demonstrates the local Church’s resolve to affirm the right to 
development as a basic human right. In 1985, a notice of ejection was served to the community 
of sitio Sincang. The land occupied by the community was a prime commercial lot owned by 
Dr. Antonio Lizares Co., Inc., and later sold to Dynasty Management and Development 
Corporation (DMDC), a subsidiary of Gaisano, Inc. Seeing no assistance from the government or 
from any organisation, the community sought the help of Fr. Tomas Rito, the SAC Director.196 
Upon the recommendation of SAC, LAO handled the court case filed by Lizares Co., Inc., 
charging every resident of violating the anti-squatting law (Presidential Decree 772). This land 
comprised three puroks197 probably close to 300 households consisting of one BCC belonging to 
the parish of St. Joseph.198 Many of the residents had been there since the 1960s. The BCC 
evolved in the 1970s from Barangay sang Virgen. In 1988, another notice of land ejection was 
issued. Negotiations and more court hearings ensued, and still the people were firmly resolved 
in their decision to stay put. A few of the individual residents lost their cases, but LAO 
persistently made motions for reconsideration to delay the demolition until a relocation 
settlement was in sight. The Lizareses offered a resettlement area in the interior portion of the lot
195 Cruz, ‘Letter to Fr. Rufino Suplido, Jr.’
196 Interview with Fr. Tomas E. Rito, Former Social Action Director, Diocese o f Bacolod, Bago City, 03 March 
2001 .
197 Sub-units in a barangay.
198 Interview with leaders o f Sincang residents, Sum-ag, Bacolod City 07 April 2001.
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as the part they were occupying was a prime commercial lot.199 The residents, however, 
maintained their position and refused to be resettled arguing that they had occupied the land back 
in the 1960s. In the meantime, Fr. Rito brought the issue to the attention of newly installed Bp. 
Gregorio who showed keen interest in the amicable resolution of the case. From 1993 when the 
sale of the land became apparent, the new owner, DMDC, offered a lot in Alijis, Bacolod City, 
of 54 square meters per family or a financial compensation depending on the land area they 
occupied.200 Some took the offer but most of them refused to leave. While the legal battle 
intensified, the community sought help from a neighbouring BCC and the parish through 
Columban Father Eamon Gill, their parish priest. A string of mass mobilisations were launched 
by the residents. They first marched in the streets of Bacolod. Next, they picketed the Mayor’s 
office in City Hall, but the Mayor did not side with them.201 They picketed the Hall of Justice 
where the hearings took place to influence the outcome of the court proceeding. On April 15, 
1996, they also picketed Gaisano Inc., to press the management against the eviction and expose 
its unfair labour practices.202 Meanwhile Bp. Camilo Gregorio supported the community and 
used his influence by writing to Gaisano to grant the people’s demands while negotiations were 
underway. Finally the court decided in favour of Gaisano, paving the way for eviction. On 
October 23, 1996, the day of eviction, the community with the help of the other BCCs nearby, 
barricaded their area.204 Assisted by neighbouring BCC/BECs, residents, including children, 
formed a human barricade.205 It was almost a violent encounter between the people and the
199 Leaders of Sincang residents interview, 07 April 2001.
200 Amy Luz U. Catalan, ‘Protest vs. Gaisano,’ Sun Star -  Bacolod, 16 April 1996, 12.
201 Leaders of Sincang interview, 07 April 2001.
202 Ibid.
203 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
204 Leaders of Sincang interview, 07 April 2001.
205 Ibid.
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police together with a demolition team equipped with guns and demolition tools. Frs. Rito and 
Gill, and a few church staff assisted the community in negotiating a peaceful resolution.206
Fr. Rito claims that the presence and negotiation skills of church leaders averted 
bloodshed and forced displacement of the people.207 In the course of out-of-court negotiations, 
an amicable settlement was made. The demolition was suspended to give time for the residents 
to transfer to their new relocation site. It was agreed that Gaisano pay each household 
$200.00.208 They finally were able to find a site in Suma-ag, some 7 kilometers south of the 
heart of Bacolod City. The resettlement site had a total of 18,782 square meters which was just 
enough for some 150 households.209 Each household was given at least 120 square meters. 
Gradually, the residents transferred. By December 1997 they had already settled in Suma-ag.
To celebrate this successful resolution of the issue, a Mass was presided over by Bp. Gregorio 
who gave full backing to the community through its SAC Director and their parish priest.
Three lessons are in order in the narrative of the relocation of Sincang residents. First, 
the continuous interaction between the BCC/BEC and Bp. Gregorio, through Fr. Rito with the 
backing of Fr. Gill, strengthened the determination of the community. This demonstrates what 
has been consistently argued in this thesis: increased hierarchical-laity interaction brings about 
more cohesion, widens the avenue for participation, and deepens the Church’s capacity for 
political engagement. Here, the role of SAC Director Fr. Rito and parish priest Fr. Gill proved to 
be pivotal in initiating and sustaining the struggle and participation. Although civil society 
groups did not figure prominently in this campaign, external support came mainly from the 
parishes and BCC/BECs nearby, and from local politicians through the mediation of Fr. Rito and
206 Ibid.
207 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
208 Leaders o f Sincang interview, 07 April 2001. To avoid the perception that they allowed themselves to be 




Fr. Gill.210 The persistent mass mobilisation and advocacy mounted public pressure for an 
amicable settlement. Thus despite losing the legal battle, the community was able to bargain and 
negotiate from a position of strength in the out-of-court negotiations.
Second, the intervention and support of the Bishop added more weight to the cause of the 
residents. Logistical assistance and judicious use of his influence as head of the local Church 
made an impact on the conduct of the negotiations. Unfortunately, interventions of this kind 
issuing from the bishop were few and far between. Although the community, thanks to the 
BCC/BECs, was relatively organised and socially aware, they still needed external assistance 
particularly legal aid, logistics and organisational support.
Third, once again, the potential of BCC/BECs to initiate and sustain participation and 
advocacy around issues that affected them was evident in this case. Collective decisions were 
arrived at through extensive consultation and participation of members. The BCCs were 
relatively cohesive, although many of them went either to Alijis or Handumanan, nearby places 
within the city. In a sense, collective decision and action flowed inevitably from the BCC.
6.7 Division within the diocese
The internal division that struck the Bacolod diocese adversely affected the local Church’s 
pastoral strategies and priorities. At this juncture, the Diocese of Bacolod’s ad intra dynamics 
failed miserably causing a strain in bishop-priests relationship, and by extension, widening the 
Fortich-Gregorio rift, bishop-laity conflict, division among the priests and among the laity, and 
between priests and lay people. The multi-level internal tensions were a very sad, if not ugly, 
moment in the whole history of the diocese.
These internal conflicts were openly seen in the way the diocese dealt with the refugees 
who moved from the Provincial Administration Center to the Sacred Heart Seminary in Bacolod
210 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
302
City months after the Operation Thunderbolt in 1989. The refugees did not want to leave the 
seminary compound because they did not want to have a repeat of the military-NPA conflict and 
the threat of para-military units and fanatical sects harassing the civilians suspected as NPA 
sympathisers.211 The leaders of conservative groups Barangay sang Virgen and KoC supported 
Bp. Gregorio’s stance that the Left were using the 300 evacuees to halt military operations in 
Southern Negros.212 Some clergymen and lay leaders supported the cause of the evacuees which 
others perceived to be a manipulation and infiltration by the Left.213 Although Bp. Gregorio 
tolerated their stay in the seminary compound, the division between him, some clergy and lay 
leaders, and those sympathetic to the refugees, who had a sizable backing from the clergy and 
lay leaders, deepened and became irreversible.
Compounding the already obvious division between the two bishops was the distrust and 
disdain that each camp had for the other which was already lurking during the time of Fortich. 
Accusations of mishandling of church funds hurled against each other became divisive. Retired 
Bp. Fortich was identified with the other side and further accused of meddling in the internal 
affairs of the Church.214 Both had a sizable following so that the rifts were visible in the whole 
Church, conveniently labelled in terms of ‘leftist’ (Fortich group) and ‘rightist’ (Gregorio 
group). The outcome of this internal rift deeply polarised, if not demobilised to some extent, the 
diocese’s socio-political engagement.
The conflict was most noticeable during the Diocesan Pastoral Congress, a supposedly 
defining moment in the history of the diocese when the local Church would appropriate and 
implement the renewal set out by PCP II and redefine the diocesan pastoral thrust.215 The
211 McCaslin, The Columban Fathers in the Philippines..., 110-111.
212 Ibid. See also The Visayan Daily Star, ‘600 support Gregorio,’ 08 November 1989, 1 & 2.
213 Ibid.
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Congress, much awaited by the local Church, was held from November 15 to 20, 1993. Of the 
346 participants, at least 60% were lay people, the first time in the history of the diocese where 
they participated in a diocesan-wide pastoral planning.216 Gregorio argued that in the Congress, 
the participants were ‘one with the bishop’ meaning that there was ‘ecclesial consensus’ in the 
formulation of the decrees.217 The key to the ‘success’ of the Congress, as Gregorio 
emphatically put it, was that ‘the Bishop had the last say.’218 In the end it was indeed Bp. 
Gregorio who had the last say, but the Congress was hardly a success. Participants were not able 
to connect with the approved decrees as truly theirs.219 More importantly, there was no
•  n(\ •implementation or follow through of the approved resolutions. The leaders o f San Antonio 
Abad parish ignored the Congress decrees but pursued the directives of PCP II. Seven years 
after the Congress, copies of the Congress resolutions were still not distributed.
There were some modifications in the process, claims Ignacio Javellana, the only lay 
member of the Council of the Congress.222 The first level of modification was done by the 
collators who were not moving around enough to capture the spirit behind the group resolutions. 
Then a committee of four (an informal structure of the Congress) synthesised the reports from 
the workshop groups which did not reflect many views in the group sharing.223 Gregorio noticed 
that this small group was manipulating the outcome of the congress.224 Nonetheless, Msgr. 
Victorino Rivas, then the Vicar General, dismissed the existence of manipulation in the 
Congress.225 Finally, the bishop made modifications and injected additional materials in the
217 Bp. Camilo Gregorio, ‘The Diocesan Pastoral Congress o f Bacolod,’ in Acts and Decrees o f  the Diocesan 
Pastoral Congress o f  Bacolod, Diocese o f Bacolod, 1994, 1-4.
218 Ibid.
219 Javellana interview, 04 April 2001; Rivas interview, 07 March 2001.
220 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
221 Javellana interview, 04 April 2001.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
225 Rivas interview, 05 April 2001.
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final decrees.226 Divisive issues included the status of LOMAS, including the renewal 
communities, whether or not these organisations would qualify as BECs since they were not 
based in a particular territory. Another thorny issue was the suspicion that some church funds 
were not properly accounted for, thus raising suspicions that these were probably channelled to 
the underground movement.227 No thorough investigation was conducted and the suspicions 
remained undetermined.
Gregorio later admitted that the Congress did not succeed because there were just too 
many attempts at renewal like the Tertio Millenio Adveniente, a three-year preparation for the 
Jubilee Year in 2000.228 Thus it left no space for the people to internalise the Diocesan Pastoral 
Congress. The main reason, however, was the deep seated conflict that was dividing the diocese. 
Attempts were made through the mediation of Cardinal Sin in 1996 to sort out the crisis but to no 
avail. The internal tiff took a serious turn in November 1999 and the media played up on the 
conflict. Invectives were hurled against each other. Talk about Bp. Gregorio’s resignation was 
rife. On February 24, an open letter signed by 42 priests was addressed to Msgr. Rodolfo 
Pacheco and copies were famished to Bp. Gregorio and the Papal Nuncio, Archbishop Antonio 
Franco, alleging that the root cause of the problems in the diocese was the ‘personality defects of 
the Bishop.’229
Gregorio actually had tendered his resignation on February 1, 2000, but this was 
withdrawn because as he said without explaining ‘so many events took place’ after the supposed 
resignation.230 The accusations and counter-accusations persisted to varying intensity and 
frequency. There was an attempt to forge a dialogue between the bishop and the clergy but after
226 Ibid.; Javellana interview, 04 April 2001.
227 Ibid.; Saguinsin interview, 04 April 2001.
228 Gregorio interview, 31 March 2001.
229 ‘An Open letter addressed to Msgr. Rodolfo Pacheco.’ 24 February 2000. These ‘personality defects’ were 
not explained but the people, particularly the anti-Gregorio camp knew what these were. Silverio interview, 29 
March 2001; Javellana interview, 04 April 2001.
230 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Bishop says he withdrew resignation,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 12 April 2000, 1 & 22.
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the removal of Msgr Victorino Rivas as Vicar General and Fr. Gregorio Patino as SAC Director, 
and a few others, hopes for unity were dashed. In April 2000, Bp. Gregorio finally made public 
his resignation citing health as the main reason. Gregorio admitted later was that it was the 
Apostolic Nuncio who prompted him to resign.231 It was clear, nonetheless, that while the 
bishop was supported by some clergy and LOMAS members in general, he did not enjoy any 
more the confidence of many of the clergy members and lay people. Moreover, the acute divide 
had deepened so much that healing could not be possible under the incumbent leadership.
The division did not stop with the news of Gregorio’s imminent departure. Bp. Antonio 
Fortich, Msgr. Victorino Rivas, Fr. Gregorio Patino and Fr. Renato Bebit received death threats 
on April 28, 2000 prompting a new round of conflict in an already deeply divided diocese.232 
After this incident, the conflict started to stabilise as calls for a united Church intensified from 
within and without. Bp. Gregorio finally left the diocese for Cebu in January 2001, but the 
wounds of division lingered on even while this research was being undertaken. Bishop Vicente 
Navarra, Bishop of Kabankalan, became the Apostolic Administrator of the Diocese of Bacolod 
on September 2, 2000. The following year, he was installed as the fifth Bishop of Bacolod 
diocese.
The internal rift in the diocese, especially at its peak, dealt a severe blow to the Church’s 
capacity as an actor in democratisation. Unlike the Diocese of Malaybalay whose three post- 
Vatican II bishops maintained similar ecclesiological understanding and practice, (e.g., lay 
empowerment, BECs, social justice), the vision and leadership styles of the two post-Vatican II 
bishops in the Diocese of Bacolod differed sharply and to some extent opposed to each other. 
Although the diocese as a whole did not completely demobilise, much of the time and energy
231 Carla P. Gomez, ‘Bishop opts to leave, says it’s for the good o f all,’ The Visayan Daily Star, 14 April 2000,
1.
232 Hanah A. Papasin, ‘Fortich, 3 priests get death threats,’ Sun Star Daily -Bacolod, 29 April 2000, 1 & 6.
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spent by the whole local Church was given to internal squabbles. The ecclesiological thrusts 
represented by Bp. Emeritus Fortich and Bp. Gregorio were competing when they could have 
complemented with each other: emphasis on peace and justice versus spiritual formation; BECs 
versus LOMAS; lay empowerment versus consolidation of hierarchical authority. There was 
very little constructive interaction between Bp. Gregorio and those who were in key positions of 
influence particularly the Vicar General, the BEC Coordinator and the SAC Director. Although 
they were replaced, the ones who occupied the positions did not have the support of the other 
members of the clergy and therefore they were immensely handicapped in such a situation.
Given the acute internal rift within the Church, not only was the hierarchy-laity interaction 
impaired, but the church-civil society nexus was also fragmented. While there was still some 
commitment to partnership, the Church’s engagement with civil society was not workable in the 
long run. Nonetheless, there were a few attempts to forge a creative interaction between the 
Church leadership and local communities. Some exceptionally successful cases are the relocation 
of Sincang residents (earlier discussed) and their response to a few of the national issues that 
supported the nation’s fragile democracy.
6.8 Confronting national issues: a passive-aggressive stance?
Like the Diocese of Malaybalay, the Diocese of Bacolod was not limited to tackling political 
issues within its jurisdiction. It was involved to varying degrees in a number of national issues 
which threatened democratic space gained in 1986. These issues included the national elections 
of 1992 and 1998, the anti-charter change campaign in 1997 and 1999, the anti-VFA position 
and to a limited extent the political mobilisation during the Estrada crisis. The internal conflict 
that was gradually crippling the diocese factored in its partial demobilisation in confronting 
some of these national issues.
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6.8.1 Electoral reform campaign: PPCRV in the diocese
PPCRV officers and volunteers were products of the NAMFREL operation in the 1986 snap 
polls.233 Bp. Fortich was then the Provincial Coordinator of NAMFREL in Negros. Prior to the 
elections in May of 1992, the couple Ignacio and Silvia Javellana made initial contact with the 
PPCRV in Manila. The San Antonio Abad Parish, where the couple belonged, decided to 
spearhead the PPCRV campaign, since a few of their lay leaders were also involved as 
NAMFREL volunteers in the 1986 elections. San Antonio Abad parish was the leading group in 
Bacolod’s PPCRV, although the vicariates of Silay, Bacolod South, and Bacolod North were 
equally active.234 Bacolod Diocese had some 3,000 volunteers covering some 70% to 80% of 
the total number of parishes.235 Like in the Malaybalay diocese experience, NASSA’s VOTE- 
CARE through SAC came later than PPCRV so the diocese decided to use the latter as the 
organisational base while the former provided financial support for their operation.236 The 
volunteers were registered as members of both PPCRV and VOTE-CARE. Fr. Pedro V. Hiponia 
and Fr. Tomas E. Rito coordinated the whole operation. The main tasks included voters 
education through the weekly radio programme, candidates forum where those seeking public 
offices could present their programmes, recruitment of volunteers and conducting training 
seminars in preparation for the elections, sanitising the voters’ registration list, voters assistance 
during election day, poll watching and in some cases assisting the members of the election board 
that supervised the electoral proceeding at the precinct level.237
233 Interview with Teodora S. Cabilso and Gloria A. Melocoton, PPCRV Officers, Diocese o f Bacolod, 18 
March 2001.
234 Ibid.
235 Rito interview, 03 March 2001; PPCRV, ‘Faith and fire....’ Cabilso and Melocoton estimate some 60% to 
70% coverage o f PPCRV in the 1992 elections in the Diocese o f Bacolod (Cabilso and Melocoton interview, 18 
March 2001).
236 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
237 Ibid.; Cabilso and Melocoton interview, 18 March 2001.
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NAMFREL’s OQC did not have many volunteers. Notwithstanding some frictions 
between NAMFREL and PPCRV, the two struck a deal that on election day at 3.00 pm, the 
beginning of counting: the PPCRV volunteers would automatically become NAMFREL 
members.238 Indeed the volunteers had two identification cards, one side was PPCRV and the 
other was NAMFREL. Simply by switching their identification cards in time for poll canvassing 
and OQC, the PPCRV volunteers became NAMFREL volunteers.239
The 1992 elections, the first presidential elections in the post-authoritarian period, were 
generally peaceful, although there were some reports of vote buying.240 Unlike in the Diocese 
of Malaybalay where practically all major elements of the local Church participated in the 
electoral reform, the Left and the BECs in the Diocese of Bacolod, for the most part, boycotted 
the elections, or at the very least they were not enthusiastic about this electoral exercise as some 
did not believe that the elections could transform Philippine society.241 By not participating in 
the electoral exercise, the BECs forfeited their potential contribution to the advancement of 
democratisation, however imperfect it was.
In the local elections of 1995, like many local Churches in the Philippines, the diocese 
was not mobilised. In 1998, however, the diocese was able to recruit 6,023 volunteers more than 
twice the number of recruits in the 1992 elections.242 The BECs this time were involved in the 
PPCRV campaign. In the 1998 elections, the diocese was much more involved and organised.243 
In the reports given by PPCRV Coordinators, a number of polling places were covered 100% by
238 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
239 Ibid.; Cabilso and Melocoton interview, 18 March 2001.
240 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
241 Interview with Fr. Gregorio Q. Patino, Former Social Action Director, Diocese o f Bacolod, 02 March 2001; 
Interview with Ignacio Javellana and Silvia Javellana, Lay leaders of San Antonio Abad Parish, Diocese of 
Bacolod, 04 April 2001.
242 PPCRV, Report o f the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) to the Commission on 
Elections and to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f the Philippines on the conduct of the May 11, 1998 
National and Local Elections.
243 Rito interview, 03 March 2001; Javellana and Javellana interview, 04 April 2001.
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PPCRV volunteers.244 The lowest estimate of PPCRV coverage in one polling place was 80% of 
precincts.245 Once again PPCRV led the pre-election and election day events, while NAMFREL 
maintained its OQC.246
The presence and involvement of PPCRV made some difference in the conduct of the 
elections. PPCRV volunteers monitored and kept a watchful eye on the electoral paraphernalia 
upon their arrival.247 The voters’ education, presence and participation of PPCRV volunteers 
during and after casting of votes minimised potential rigging of elections. In many cases, the 
volunteers’ knowledge of electoral canvassing proved to be helpful to the election board, a good 
number of whom were not familiar with the electoral code.248 In one polling precinct in Bago 
City, the PPCRV volunteers took over the task of the election board because of confusion.249 In 
the town of Don Salvador Benedicto, the PPCRV volunteers were able to lobby for the transfer 
of one election officer whose neutrality was suspect in favour of the incumbent local officials.250 
In another incident, PPCRV organiser Gloria A. Melocoton daringly blocked a vehicle loaded 
with about 30 would-be illegal voters at Andres Bonifacio Elementary School in the central 
vicariate of the diocese.251 This was a classic case of hakot, that is, herding people with the 
intention of making them vote illegally. The electoral code prohibits hakot. With the help of the 
police, the crowd was dispersed. These are a few instances that demonstrate that indeed PPCRV 
made a difference in the 1998 elections, although reports of dagdag-bawas (vote padding and 
shaving), vote buying and a few electoral anomalies persisted during the elections.252
244 ‘PPCRV Coordinators reports on the 1998 elections,’ Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod City, n.d.
245 Ibid.
246 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.
247 Javellana and Javellana interview, 26 March 2001.
248 Ibid.; Cabilso and Melocoton interview, 19 March 2001.
249 Rito interview, 03 March 2001.




PPCRV and NAMFREL partnership saw action in the 1992 and 1998 elections, 
notwithstanding some minor personal frictions among their leaders. This, to some extent, 
occurred at the national level and was reflected in the Diocese of Bacolod. This was virtually 
averted in the Diocese of Malaybalay owing to the leadership of Fr. Medardo Estaniel in both 
electoral movements. As in the experience of Bukidnon, PPCRV handled the voters’ education 
programme, recruitment of volunteers, candidates’ covenant signing, sanitising of voters’ 
registration list, pollwatching, assistance during the election day including NAMFREL’s OQC.
PPCRV’s campaign in 1992 and 1998 had the blessing and support of Bp. Gregorio. The 
CBCP collectively endorsed church involvement in these electoral exercises through its pastoral 
letters. The CBCP endorsement was equally matched with concrete programmes as spearheaded 
by PPCRV and VOTE-CARE, and other church-based electoral groups. As early as February, 
following the lead of CBCP, Bp. Gregorio urged the faithful to support the campaign for ‘an 
enlightened, peaceful, orderly, free and honest election’ by praying and acting in preparation for 
the national and local elections in May.253 A similar support was endorsed by the bishop in the 
1995 and 1998 elections. Work, however, was entirely left to SAC and the PPCRV leaders.254 
Considering the internal rift that was already at work in the diocese, Bp. Gregorio’s support was 
a welcome development, an indication that the local Church had not completely demobilised 
during his time. Unfortunately, the good beginning of citizenship education initiated by PPCRV 
was not pursued further. Citizenship education, an essential ingredient in democracy, was not 
exploited in ways that could have enhanced the citizenry’s participation in good governance and 
in issues affecting the lives of ordinary people.
253 Camilo D. Gregorio, Circular Letter No. 36, Diocese of Bacolod, Bacolod City, 27 February 1993.
254 Cabilso and Melocoton interview, 19 March 2001.
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6.8.2 Anti-charter change {cha-cha) campaigns
Like the Diocese of Malaybalay, the Diocese of Bacolod opposed two separate attempts to alter 
the 1987 constitution, although the second did not have much impact compared with the first.
The first attempt in 1996 was the People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernisation and Action 
(PIRMA) signature campaign with the support of high officials in the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the government. President Ramos, enjoying a relatively high approval rating from 
the public, was clearly ambivalent in his stance regarding cha-cha (charter change) until civil 
society groups and the Church made their opposition clear. The official statement of the Church, 
following the CBCP line, was issued on March 2, 1997 declaring that the underlying motive 
behind the cha-cha project was ‘addiction to power.’255 The statement proposed a three-pronged 
strategy to oppose the cha-cha campaign: information drive, mobilisation, and prayer 
assemblies.256 The 5th Visayas Region Pastoral Assembly, to which Bacolod diocese belongs, 
rejected the cha-cha moves as ‘arrogant ambition of certain legislators’ to perpetuate self-serving 
power.257 In the Diocese of Bacolod, Bp. Gregorio led the Church in opposing the bandwagon 
for cha-cha to enable President Ramos to run again for office as President. Cha-cha clearly 
endangered the already struggling democracy as this would open the possibility of perpetuating a 
politically entrenched presidency as in the case of President Marcos. When the Promotion of 
Church People’s Response (PCPR) contemplated civil disobedience in February 1997, Gregorio 
was supportive of such a possibility ‘only as a last recourse.’258 ‘I myself would march in the 
streets,’ the bishop said.259
255 ‘Addiction to power is the real issue behind Charter change moves— CBCP,’ The CBCP Monitor, 1(17), 31 
August 1997, 12.
256 ‘Bacolod Bishops lead diocese in opposition to charter change,’ The CBCP Monitor, 1(4), 02 March 1997,
2 .
257 Vidal, ‘Statement against charter change.’




A prayer rally on March 26, 1997, Holy Thursday, aimed to parallel the commemoration 
of the ‘Betrayal of Jesus’ and the ‘betrayal of public trust.’ 10,000 Negrenses, mostly middle 
class, attended the rally with other ministers of the PIC and Philippine Baptist Churches.261 On 
September 21, marking the 25 years of the declaration of Martial Law, a prayer rally involving 
different Churches led by the Catholic Church, BAYAN and various civil society groups 
mobilised some 70,000 protesters.262 Like strange bedfellows, Gregorio found himself marching 
in the streets with Leftist groups led by Raymundo Jarque, the army general-tumed-rebel and 
NDF consultant in the peace talks. By far, this was the biggest protest movement in Negros in 
the post-authoritarian period.
The second attempt to alter the 1987 constitution drew mixed reactions. In the planned 
Constitutional Correction for Development (CONCORD) of then President-elect Estrada, Bp. 
Gregorio seemed open to such a move arguing that ‘the CBCP was not against Charter Change 
per se but Charter Change in the light that it would be used to extend the limits on the term of 
(presidential) office.’264 Although this attempt appeared not to be connected with extending the 
term of presidential office, some economic inducements would have been unduly given to 
foreigners making investments in the country. CBCP President Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo 
OMI opposed Estrada’s charter change attempts. According to him, the principle that 
underpinned CONCORD was neo-liberal capitalism that marginalises the poor who were so
260 Nanette L. Guadalquiver, ‘Church slates rally vs. charter change, Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 23 March 1997, 
1 & 15.
261 Julius D. Mariveles, ’10,000 attend rally vs. charter change,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 31 March 1997, 2.
262 Julius D. Mariveles and Avelyn Z. Agudon, ’70,000 join prayer rally,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 22 
September 1997, 1.
263 Ibid., 4.
264 Julius D. Mariveles, ‘Gregorio defends Church stand on Cha cha,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, Bacolod City, 
06 June 1998, 3.
313
often the obvious losers.265 Thus while the CBCP statement opposed charter change, Gregorio 
believed that President-elect Estrada’s CONCORD was not simply a ‘whimsical move.’266
Among and between the Church and civil society groups, there were opposing views 
concerning the costs and benefits of Estrada’s CONCORD. Unlike the first campaign against 
cha-cha, this greatly affected the unity of political actors.267 Although some sectors of the 
Church and civil society groups pressed on with their opposition against the cha-cha attempt in 
1999, it did not have the same impact as in the first campaign. The bishop of the diocese and 
some members of the clergy were visibly absent in the second anti-cha-cha campaign. 
Considering the bishop’s close association with Estrada’s key political backer Eduardo 
Cojuangco, and the sympathy of pro-Estrada clergy members, the Church leadership vacillated 
in its position with regard to the President’s CONCORD.268
President Estrada, on the other hand, had a special regard for Negros Occidental and in 
particular, Bacolod City. Eduardo Cojuangco, his political godfather, has a huge landholding 
and political influence in the province. Bacolod City, with the support of the incumbent bishop 
and a number of clergy, was a source of his spiritual sustenance. His first thanksgiving Mass 
after being proclaimed winner in the 1998 elections was held at the St. Jude Thaddeus Parish, 
Alijis, Bacolod City, certainly a very historic occasion for the city.269 President Estrada was a 
generous benefactor in the rebuilding of the parish church in Alijis. At the Mass, presided over 
by Ricardo Cardinal Vidal, Bp. Gregorio was the homilist. The overwhelming presence and 
support of bishops, clergy members and lay people in Negros showed that Estrada had a sizable 
contingent of support within the local Church, although some would fall out later. This in a way
265 Quevedo, ‘No to constitutional change: a moral stand.’
266 Mariveles, ‘Gregorio defends Church stand on Cha cha,’ 3.
267 Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.
268 Saguinsin interview, 04 April 2001.
269 Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, ‘12 Bishops, over 50 priests to officiate Estrada’s bash,’ 19 June 1998, 1 & 4.
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factored in the hesitation of the Church’s opposition against Estrada’s CONCORD, and 
eventually in the movement to oust him as President. Estrada for his part, at least on two 
occasions during his presidency, visited Alijis to pray and draw some encouragement from his 
supporters.
The diocese’s stance regarding the VFA was another repeat of their involvement in 
Estrada’s CONCORD. The CBCP-NASSA and civil society leaders opposed the VFA as this
9 7  nwas believed to be an affront to the sovereignty of the country. SAC collaborated with the 
PIC leadership and civil society organisations such as Hugpong-Nationalist Alliance and 
BAYAN, but the hierarchy headed by the bishop kept silent on the issue.271 Once again, the 
Church’s involvement as a collective body was undermined by internal problems, and some 
ecclesial support for President Estrada.
6.8.3 Protest movement during the Estrada crisis
During 1999 until mid-2000, the Diocese of Bacolod turned inward, largely preoccupied with the 
internal rift that struck the local Church. The conflict did not end with Bp. Gregorio’s 
announcement that he was stepping down, but persisted even after his departure in January 2001. 
Reeling from the internal division, the diocese tried to bounce back to get itself involved in the 
national crisis in the wake of Governor Chavit Singson’s expose linking President Estrada to 
corruption of unimaginable proportions. At this point, Bp. Navarra had already assumed 
governance of the See of Bacolod as the Apostolic Administrator while the diocese awaited its 
new bishop. Compounding the internal conflict was the support of many parish priests for
270 ‘CBCP-NASSA, Statement against the VFA: a call to the Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and 
on national Defense and Security to reject the VFA,’ available from http://www.cbcp.net/nassa/hvab.html. 14 
February 2001.
271 Julius D. Mariveles, ‘Junk the VFA movement launch today,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 31 August 1998, 1 
& 10.
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President Estrada.272 Consequently, it was the civil society organisations that initiated and led 
the campaign seeking Estrada’s resignation or ouster although church leadership and followers 
joined the campaign later.273
The Negros Occidental - Expel, Remove Actor President (NO-ERAP) fired its opening 
salvo of protests.274 PsPN, the NGO that led the civil society protagonists in the peace zone 
advocacy, was the secretariat of this multi-sectoral organisation. NO-ERAP was chaired by 
Atty. Johnny Hagad through his son Atty. Andres Hagad. Both were former legal aid lawyers of 
the diocese. NO-ERAP was launched on October 18, 2000. It called for a signature 
campaign demanding the resignation of President Estrada. Although key leaders of this group 
including Andres Hagad and Cesar Villanueva were members of the Christian Family Movement 
(CFM), an influential organisation within the diocese, the local Church as a whole was pre­
occupied with the internal conflict.276
A bigger coalition, the Remove Estrada Movement, was organised comprising moderates 
(e.g., NO-ERAP) and leftist organisations (e.g., BAYAN and PCPR).277 It led a massive 
mobilisation on October 25, 2000. Bishop Emeritus Fortich urged the faithful to join the anti- 
Estrada rally, without personally asking for Estrada’s resignation.278 Some 10,000 turned up for 
the rally which was organised in just three days.279 Another rally of 8,000 people was staged on 
November 5 by the Remove Estrada Movement.280 In Negros, civil society forces led the 
campaign for the resignation of President Estrada, although the local Church came much later in
272 Saguinsin interview, 04 April 2001; Interview with Atty. Andres, Chairperson, NO-ERAP (Negros 
Occidental -  Expel, Remove Actor President) and Former legal counsel o f the Legal Aid Office, Diocese of  
Bacolod, Bacolod City, 07 March 2001.
273 Ibid.; Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.
274 Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, ‘NO-ERAP launched; to stage rally today,’ 18 October 2000, 1 & 4.
275 Ibid.
276 Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.
277 Hannah A. Papasin, ‘Repeat EDS A, Remove Erap Movement calls,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 26 October 
2000, 1 & 4.
278 Hannah A. Papasin, ‘ Fortich softens stand on Erap,’ Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, 13 December 2000,1 & 6.
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the campaign. As in the Diocese of Malaybalay, no counter-mobilisation on the part of the pro- 
Estrada supporters was organised in the Diocese of Bacolod, despite the presence of a good 
number of people loyal to the President.
The official leadership of the Diocese of Bacolod, that is, Bp Navarra and the clergy 
members, issued belatedly a statement on the first Sunday of December asking for the 
resignation of the President, although many parish priests and lay people remained supportive of 
President Estrada.281 By then many local Churches in the Philippines had already made their 
own pronouncements seeking the resignation, impeachment and removal of President Estrada. 
The following Sunday, December 10, President Estrada visited St. Jude Thaddeus parish in 
Alijis, Bacolod City where his supporters gathered. Bp. Emeritus Fortich, who at this point, had 
not officially called for his resignation, presided over a Mass for ‘enlightenment, reconciliation 
and peace.’282 At this Mass, after being prompted by Fortich, Estrada made a surprise move by 
releasing political prisoners, most of whom were from the Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex 
Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB), the armed sector of the CPP-breakaway Rebolusyonaryong 
Partido Manggagawa -  Pilipinas (RPM-P, Revolutionary Labour Party -  Philippines), and 
commuting the death sentence of prisoners on death row. Clearly this gesture was a way of 
appeasing the RPM-P group and the Catholic Church’s clamour for his resignation, but it did not 
succeed. On the same day that President Estrada visited Bacolod City, the government signed a 
peace deal with RPM-P-RPA-ABB. The signing ceremony took place in the town of Don 
Salvador Benedicto, a political bailiwick of Eduardo Cojuangco. This raised suspicion that 
Cojuangco brokered the peace deal.284 Peace advocates criticised the deal for its haste and lack
281 Hagad interview, 07 March 2001.
282 Sun Star Daily -  Bacolod, ‘Turn to God, Fortich calls,’ 11 December 2000, 1 & 6.
283 Ibid.
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of consultation and participation by all the stakeholders of peace.285 Critics called for a re­
negotiation of the peace deal. In the post-Estrada period, with the resignation of Bp. Navarra 
from the peace panel, the Church challenged the credibility of the agreement, but nevertheless 
the Macapagal-Arroyo administration supported it.
On the eve of January 1, 2001, Bp. Emeritus Fortich was invited by President Estrada to 
Malacanang Palace, hoping to get the former’s support. Bp. Fortich claimed that he did not 
know what the invitation was all about.286 He along with Manila Auxiliary Bishop Teodoro 
Bacani, believed to be an Estrada sympathiser, led a Mass with the president. There at the
•  ♦ •  0 0 7Presidential Palace, Fortich, in his personal conversation with Estrada, asked him to resign. 
When the impeachment trial resumed in January, Fortich officially went public and asked for the 
resignation of the President.
The internal division in the Diocese of Bacolod was a salient antecedent causing the local 
Church to disengage, partially anyway, from national issues. Nonetheless, the Bacolod diocese 
was still involved in the electoral reform through PPCRV and its partnership with NAMFREL, 
despite BECs’ boycott movement in the 1992 elections; the first anti-Charter change during the 
time of President Ramos, but not during the time of President Estrada; and the campaign for the 
impeachment, resignation, and ouster of President Estrada, although the local Church came late 
to this movement. The alliance of Bp. Gregorio and many of the clergy members with the 
Estrada administration made it difficult to advocate the second anti-Charter change movement 
and to join the campaign to remove Estrada as President of the Republic.
285 Ibid., Villanueva interview, 09 March 2001.




The Bacolod diocese nearly fits the model of post-authoritarian demobilisation of many local
n o o
Latin American Churches as characterised by some writers. Hannah Stewart-Gambino, for 
instance, in her analysis explains three factors that put in context the involvement of the 
Churches: the democratic context following the collapse of authoritarian regimes, the restoration 
of neo-conservatism evidently seen in the appointment of conservative prelates, and the rise of 
Pentecostal communities.289 These factors would appear to be reflected in the Diocese of 
Bacolod. However, in addition to Stewart-Gambino’s reading, the decline of the Left profoundly 
affected the Church’s political engagement. After President Aquino catapulted to power, people 
adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude while many activists abandoned their ideological projects. The 
appointment of Bp. Gregorio as bishop of Bacolod, seen by some as a lobby of the conservative 
Papal Nuncio Archbishop Bruno Torpigliani,290 also reflected the general preference of the
* • ^ Q lVatican with regard to politically active local Churches in Latm America. The proliferation 
too of fundamentalist groups in Negros, equivalent to the Pentecostal communities in Latin 
America indirectly shaped the public role of the local Church. Owing to the rise of 
fundamentalist groups, the LOMAS particularly the renewal and charismatic organisations 
became a counterforce that held at bay the advances of the former.
The tale of Bacolod diocese strengthens the three basic arguments set out in this thesis. 
The first argues that the local Church’s strengths or weaknesses as a democratic actor hinge upon 
hierarchy and laity interaction (church ad intra). Within these two entities are disparate actors
288 Scott Mainwaring, ‘Grass-roots Catholic groups and politics in Brazil,’ in Born o f  the poor, ed. Edward 
Cleary, (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1990), 143-167; Drogus, ‘The Rise and decline of  
liberation theology....
289 Hannah Stewart-Gambino, ‘Introduction....’
290 O’Brien interview, 16 July 2002; Saguinsin interview, 04 April 2001.
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(individual and collective) with varying pastoral approaches and doctrinal proclivities that at 
times were opposed to each other. With the ascendancy of Bp. Gregorio, changes in pastoral 
priorities and directions became apparent. He preferred the traditional and charismatic LOMAS 
to the politicised BECs. Restoring the lines of authority seemed more important to him than lay 
empowerment and participation. Bp. Gregorio reined in social and political involvement and 
focused on spiritual training of the renewal communities. Gregorio’s close alliance with the rich 
members of the renewal communities and with business magnate Eduardo Cojuangco, and 
Fortich’s commitment to peace and justice betrayed clashing class interests within the local 
Church. The tensions in the hierarchy were also reflected in the laity, between the LOMAS and 
politicised BECs. Taken altogether, this often made consensus building a complex task. Despite 
the changing ecclesial and political landscapes, there are some indications that the local Church 
was still engaged in democracy building, albeit uneven in terms of influence and outcome. 
Particularly when the internal rifts were not yet acute and when they collaborated with civil 
society organisations, the local Church remained a critical actor in the defence of democracy and 
advancement of citizenship awareness and practice. This is evident in the way the Church 
supported peace education and the peace zone, the relocation of Sincang residents, the first anti- 
Charter change movement and electoral reform. Although there were already signs of division 
in the diocese (particularly during the peace campaign), hierarchy-laity interaction increased the 
organisational capacity of the local Church to engage the State and society. In these cases, it was 
not only the hierarchical leadership or the local communities by themselves, but the persistent 
interaction between the two that enhanced lay participation, built a broad consensus on issues, 
and represented and articulated interest pertaining to common welfare (e.g., peace, community 
relocation, electoral involvement). Thus the Church’s influence and impact was relatively far- 
reaching.
291 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 13-14.
320
Nevertheless, the diocese had to endure a flawed church ad intra interaction and 
consequently a fragmented partnership with civil society during the moments of internal 
division. This deeply divided hierarchical leadership adversely affected the capacity and 
influence of the Church as a religio-political actor. This was quite evident in the Presbyteral 
meetings, the handling of the military Operation Thunderbolt evacuees in 1989, and the attempt 
at local Church renewal in the Diocesan Pastoral Congress in 1993. The internal conflict was 
also manifest in the following campaigns: the second anti-Charter change, anti-VFA, and the 
resignation and ouster movement against President Estrada. Bp. Gregorio’s close association 
with Eduardo Cojuangco, and his support for President Estrada weakened the resolve of the 
diocese to defend and build democracy. In the case of the ouster of President Estrada, the 
support of many clergy members and lay people together with the internal division in the local 
Church undermined the role of the Church as an agent in democratisation. These instances 
demonstrated deep cleavages within and between the leaders and members of the Church. 
Although some elements of the Church were still visibly engaged, its alliance with civil society 
was weak. The latter took the lead in these advocacies. As a result of this fractured church 
leadership and membership, the quality of mobilisation and participation of the people declined 
considerably.
The internal division with the local Church was a gradual event. In the early period when 
the division was not serious, the Diocese of Bacolod managed to help construct a level of 
citizenship which was linked to peace issues, human rights, primacy of the law, electoral reform 
practices, and the anti-charter change campaign during the time of Ramos. At their peak, the 
internal rifts drastically reduced the Bacolod’s diocese’s capacity as a democratic actor. By 
contrast, the Diocese of Malaybalay enjoyed relative cohesion after two moderate bishops (Bp. 
Rosales and Bp. Pacana) took charge of the see from Bp. Claver. These two bishops basically 
pursued but modified when necessary the ecclesiological thrust of Bp. Claver. In the Diocese of
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Bacolod, church ad intra was much more complex than in the Diocese of Malaybalay. Both the 
hierarchical leadership and lay people were much more fragmented and deeply divided in the 
former than in the latter. On this score, the role of the hierarchical leadership in the Diocese of 
Malaybalay was of paramount importance.
The second argument asserts that the capacity of the Church as a democratic actor 
increases if it interacts positively (mobilises, animates, creates partnership) with civil society 
(church ad extra). As indicated in the foregoing, a strong hierarchy-laity linkage improved the 
condition for church-civil society linkage. Conversely a flawed church ad intra condition 
undermined the capacity of the Church to engage civil society. In the Diocese of Bacolod, this 
church-civil society interaction was a potent force in enhancing people’s participation, 
meaningful interest articulation and representation. This partnership saw action during the peace 
campaign (with PsPN, PEZAN, etc), first anti-Charter change (with BAYAN, etc.), electoral 
reform (with NAMFREL), human rights advocacy (with FLAG) and so on. Like the experience 
in Bukidnon, these ties evolved during the democratic transition period and based on mutually 
shared interest in democratisation. NAMFREL, PsPN, PEZAN, Pax Christi, and other civil 
society organisations saw the Church as an ally in the task of democratisation. They had come to 
trust the Church in this regard. The Church likewise had immense influence and in these 
organisations had key leaders who subscribed to the Catholic social teaching. Church-civil 
society relationship along with hierarchy-laity linkage had a particular focus in democracy 
building. The formation of a new citizenry with a profound sense of public engagement was the 
most important political outcome in the Diocese of Bacolod, as in the Diocese of Malaybalay.
The final argument consists of the most important contribution of the Diocese of Bacolod 
in democratisation: strengthening citizenship. Citizenship has many faces in Negros. Firstly, 
citizenship was rooted in the people’s struggle for peace. Owing to the prominence of retired 
bishop Fortich, the citizenry’s clamour for peace, and the vibrancy of civil society organisations,
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this was one of the first provincial peace initiatives in the country. The various peace education 
programmes during the National Eucharistic Year (1986-1987), the Peace Caravan, support for 
Cantomanyog’s bid to become a peace zone, and other peace initiatives defined a constituency of 
peace advocates in Negros. These peace efforts are in a way small representations of the peace 
initiatives of local Churches in Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chiapas in 
Mexico.292 In these instances, the Church acted as ‘a mediator, moderator or mentor of 
democracy’ as Cleary speaks of the Latin American Churches.
By promoting peace, the Diocese of Bacolod tried to facilitate a favourable political 
climate for democracy building. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan argue that for democracy to be 
regarded as consolidated, the significant actors must desist from turning to violent means to 
challenge the State or to create a non-democratic regime; public opinion should foster the 
primacy of democratic procedures and institutions; and the influential actors, whether 
government or non-government, ought to ‘become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution 
of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.’294 This is akin to Rustow’s ‘habituation phase,’ a moment when political 
actors adopt democratic rules.295 Burton, Gunther, and Higley similarly argue that democracy is 
not consolidated where the significant actors do not accept ‘established political institutions and 
adhere to democratic rules of the game.’296 In this direction, the Diocese of Bacolod along with 
the civil society movement tried to enable the actors to accept the democratic institutions and
292 Jeffrey Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships and democracy in Latin America, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis 
Books, 1998), 9. See also Edward L. Cleary, ‘Conclusion: politics and religion,’ in Conflict and competition: 
the Latin American Church in a changing environment, ed. Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 204.
293 Cleary, ‘Conclusion....,’ 204.
294 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, Problems o f  democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and post-communist Europe (London: The John Hopkins Press), 6.
295 Rustow, ‘Transition to democracy,’ 337-63.
296 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, ‘Introduction: elite transformations and democratic 
regimes,’ in Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
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processes in resolving competing interests. Its work on legal contestations, human rights 
education, use of judicial processes, support for the fragile electoral system, defence against 
attempts (the first more than the second) to change the democratic Charter are clear indications 
of its commitment to make democracy work.
Peace advocacy had a way of fashioning engaged citizenship. The people who 
participated in the peace advocacy ceased to be merely inhabitants of the land and became 
informed citizens who had as much stake in peace issues as the government and the armed 
groups. The peace movement rejected military action and armed rebellion as solutions to 
poverty and underdevelopment. To illustrate this point, Cantomanyog was declared a peace 
zone. This was made possible largely because of the people’s sustained efforts, but at the same 
time this was supported by the Church and civil society. Beyond the declaration of Cantomanyog 
as a zone of peace, the community was able to embark on development and livelihood projects, 
aided by external funding and technical assistance. Peace for Cantomanyog meant not only the 
absence of war, but also the inclusion of participatory development.
If the Bukidnon Church can boast of its environmental constituency, the Negros Church’s 
claim to fame is its peace constituency. In both cases, the local Churches through the 
BCC/BECs were decidedly crucial actors in constructing citizenship making rights not simply 
individual entitlements, but collective claims. Citizenship in this sense does not only concern 
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, but includes environmental and peace rights.
The downside, however, was that the Cantomanyog peace zone was not replicated nor 
did it influence the other peace zones in the country which sprang up. Moreover, despite the 
advocacy for peace, the advocates were not successful in stopping the war in Negros and 
bringing the armed groups back to the negotiating table. Finally, sustaining the momentum of 
this peace constituency is a complex task. After the breakdown of the govemment-NDF peace 
efforts, the peace constituency receded from the public arena.
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Secondly, citizenship was strengthened in the local Church’s commitment to human 
rights. Like the legal advocacy in the Malaybalay diocese, Bacolod’s LAO was committed to 
provide para-legal training seminars, to protect people from illegal detention and to represent the 
poor injudicial cases. This in some sense helped the ordinary people rediscover their rights as 
citizens, individually and collectively. LAO represented the poor in civil and criminal cases, and 
with FLAG, handled strictly political cases. The local Church, through LAO and SAC, was a 
key player in the broadening of the concept of human rights violations to include the right to 
development. The local Church’s involvement (legal contestation and out of court settlement) in 
the relocation of Sincang residents affirmed this right as a fundamental one. In a way, legal 
advocacy tried to reinforce the primacy of law (particularly when it protected fundamental 
rights) and the courts as the arbiter of justice, although many a court decision was skewed to 
favour the propertied and powerful. By making the courts accessible to the poor, it attempted to 
reinvent the justice system, where the poor participated. Through human rights education and 
advocacy, a new mode of citizenship emerged in Negros. The people became more aware of 
their rights, and they exercised these freely. As they opened themselves to legal contestations, 
somehow they were restoring public confidence in the legal and justice system, whose 
respectability was greatly tainted during the authoritarian period. In this way, institutional 
arrangements and the primacy of law strengthened the democratic current as has been argued by
297many writers.
The role of the Church as a defender of human rights stands out as an important 
contribution to citizenship strengthening in Latin America. The Vicariate of Solidarity (Chile), 
Tutela Legal [Legal Defence] (El Salvador), Commission of Peace and Justice (Sao Paulo), 
Justice and Peace Service (Uruguay), Commission for the Defense of Human Rights and the
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Construction of Peace (Peru) are some of the many well-known church establishments and 
organisations of human rights.298 Although smaller in scope, Bacolod’s LAO, like Malaybalay’s 
legal aid unit, comes close to the experience of El Salvador’s Tutela Legal where cases of 
disappearance, torture and human rights violations were investigated.
Thirdly, engaged citizenship saw action in the local Church’s involvement to strengthen 
the electoral system in the 1992 and 1998 elections. The electoral system is a key democratic 
institution which must have the confidence and respect of the citizenry for democracy to work. 
Like the Diocese of Malaybalay and many local Churches in the Philippines, a renewed sense of 
citizenship figured in the Church’s involvement in the post-authoritarian elections. Bacolod’s 
PPCRV’s role in the 1992 and 1998 presidential and local elections brought about a heightened 
sense of participation in the electoral exercise. Prior to election day, voters’ education, cleansing 
of voters’ registration list, mobilising people to vote, and recruitment of volunteers were 
important pre-election programmes undertaken by PPCRV. PPCRV volunteers averted some 
potential rigging of elections, chaos in the voting precincts, and ensured peaceful and honest 
conduct of the elections. Although there were still reports about vote-buying and cheating, 
PPCRV’s contribution to democracy strengthening was rebuilding the public trust in the 
electoral system which was hugely degraded during the authoritarian period. It is unfortunate, 
however, that like the Diocese of Malaybalay and the Churches nationwide generally, no follow 
up was undertaken to pursue the initial citizenship education began by PPCRV with the support 
ofVOTE-CARE.
Finally, citizenship was quite pronounced in the people’s struggle to defend their 
Constitution from alterations that would have reduced greatly its democratic features. The 
Diocese of Bacolod’s role in democratisation was visible in the first anti-Cha-cha campaign
297 Mendez, O’Donnell and Sergio, The (Un)Rule o f  law and the underprivileged in Latin America; Elizabeth 
and Hershberg, Constructing democracy: human rights, citizenship, and society in Latin America.
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during the time of President Ramos. The Church mobilised alongside elements in the MDF and 
civil society to launch the biggest post-authoritarian protest movement in Negros. The Bacolod 
diocese added to the strong national clamour resisting the extension of the presidential term to 
enable President Ramos to run again for office as this would open the way to a deeply 
entrenched and powerful presidency.
A major difficulty though in the Diocese of Bacolod’s practice of citizenship, as in the 
Diocese of Malaybalay, is sustaining its appeal and making it effective beyond confronting the 
issues (e.g., armed conflict, electoral exercise, Charter change, etc). Making citizenship happen 
in everyday life appears to be a challenge for the Church in a democratizing polity. However, a 
strong, effective and competent citizenship needs an equally strong and responsive state.
298 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion: The Philippine Catholic Church - against political tyranny
or genuinely for democracy?
We knew what we were against, and we opposed that fa irly  effectively. It is not nearly so easy to say 
what we are fo r  and so we appear to be dithering, not quite knowing where we want to go nor how to 
get there. Archbishop Desmond Tutu1
In speaking of the mainline African Churches vis-a-vis democratisation above, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu seems to summarise a prevailing impression of the Church’s involvement in the
transition to democracy and a continuing search for direction in the post-authoritarian milieu.2
The Church in many instances, particularly its moderate and progressive elements, demonstrated
its capacity to oppose authoritarian regimes, but there appears to be an ambiguity in its position
in the newly found democratic space. The African Church literature seems to suggest that while
many Churches were against political tyranny, it needs to be convincingly demonstrated that
they are fo r democracy particularly in the post-authoritarian period.3 This thinking is also
reflected in the literature on Latin American4 and Eastern European Churches,5 albeit with some
marked differences. This is the crux of the puzzle on which this study attempted to shed light
using the experience of the Philippine Catholic Church in general and the two local Churches in
particular. Does the Church have a role to play in building post-authoritarian democracy? If so,
in what ways?
A few concepts are vital in this study. As stated in Chapter One, the Church (primarily 
denoting Roman Catholic confession) in its entirety including its organisations is a supra-state 
organisation in that it goes beyond the State and interacts with its own set of ecclesial laws and
1 Kassimir, ‘The Social power of religious organisation and civil society...,’ 77.
? Ibid*
J Ranger, ‘Conference summary and conclusion,’ 22; see also Gifford, The Christian Churches and the 
democratisation o f  Africa.
4 Cleary and Stewart-Gambino, Competition and conflict.. . ; Daudelin and Hewitt, ‘The Church and politics in 
Latin America.’
5 Eberts, ‘The Catholic Church and democracy in Poland;’ Pedro Ramet, ed., Eastern Christianity and politics 
in the twentieth century, Vol. I, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988).
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norms (institutions). The Church is a body of baptised Catholics (hierarchy and laity), with its 
own formalised regulations, sources of religious meaning and identity, and an internal structure 
of proceeding encompassing the Vatican leadership and the lowest ecclesial unit in a village.
The local Church is the diocese, led by a resident bishop and assisted by his priests. Although 
the Church is distinct from civil society by virtue of its supra-state character, individual church 
organisations operate between the State and households, and as such are part of civil society. 
This is an ambiguity in the Church’s relationship with civil society, a fuzzy overlap that 
continues to be unresolved in the literature.
Democracy and democratisation are related concepts employed in this study. Following 
Diamond’s pluralist notion of democracy, three conditions are required: 1) the primacy of 
elected civilian authority over non-elected authorities such as the military, 2) accountability 
(vertically or horizontally) of elected or non-elected government officials, and 3) the 
participation of civil society actors in a pluralistic society.6 Engaged citizenship is viewed as a 
vital ingredient in democracy building. Citizenship is used in this context not only as a status 
arising from one’s membership in a polity, but concerns active participation, the exercise of 
rights (individual and group) and responsibilities in a deliberative process.
This chapter summarises main findings, underscores key issues arising from these 
findings, and illustrates their implications for the Church as a democratic actor. This is done in 
four parts: a presentation of the theoretical construct based on the church-democracy literature, a 
review of the Philippine Catholic Church’s main lines of involvement, a comparative analysis of 
the two local Churches examined in Chapters Five and Six, and a brief discussion of the 
implications of the research for an understanding of the Catholic Church in the Philippines.
6 Diamond, Developing democracy toward consolidation, 10-11.
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7.1 The Church and democracy: towards a theoretical framework of compatibility
The relationship between the Catholic Church and democracy is at once an ancient and recent 
academic interest. Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations in the 1830s about one of the most 
democratic countries in the world (viz., United States) attempted to show the potential 
compatibility between Catholicism and democracy, although the depoliticised theological 
framework (e.g., priest-centred governance, dichotomised body-soul spirituality) that 
underpinned his thinking was a product of his time.7 The Tocqueviallian position connecting 
Catholicism and democracy has partially been eclipsed in the literature over the years.
Following Max Weber’s classic thesis that Catholics (more than Protestants) tend to be pre­
occupied with eternal life and less engaged in capital accumulation, by extension, Catholicism 
was held suspect and deemed incompatible with capitalism and the whole project of 
democratisation.8 In addition, with the advent of secularisation theory in the 1950s and 1960s 
which when followed to the hilt, stipulates the weakening of religion in the face of 
modernisation, Christianity appeared morally and politically a spent force.9 The Weberian thesis 
and the secularisation theory have, however, attracted a flurry of criticisms in the wake of the 
church renewal spawned by the celebration of Vatican II (1962-1965), the Papal Social 
Encyclicals (1891-1991), the Medellin Conference (1968) and the Puebla Conference (1979). 
From these developments sprang local theologies of lived experience: the CEBs in Latin 
America and the BCC/BECs in the Philippine context. Although Vatican II was a European 
initiative, Latin America as a region was first to appropriate it for its own context and construct a
7 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I, 300, 308.
8 Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit o f  capitalism ; Carlos Alberto Torres, The Church, society, and 
hegemony: a critical sociology o f  religion in Latin America, trans. Richard A. Young, Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 1992), 27-37.
9 Peter L. Berger, ‘The Desecularization o f the world: a global overview,’ in The Desecularization o f  the world: 
resurgent religion and world politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 1- 
18.
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theology which motivated people’s struggle for an end to political tyranny and inaugurate a 
season of democracy.10 Progressive political repression, evident in the rise of NSS ideology 
together with the reforms set out by Vatican II, led many local Churches in Latin America, 
Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and some parts of Southeast Asia to challenge the dictatorial 
and centralising tendencies of the State. Thus a renewed interest in the relations between the 
Church and democracy emerged in the wake of the reforms unleashed by Vatican II. The 
reforms set out by Vatican II, however, were uneven as ecclesiological cracks within the Church 
and contentious interpretations of church teachings (e.g., social justice, property rights) continue 
to cause internal contradictions. The Vatican’s apparent predilection for conservative groups 
(e.g., Opus Dei), the ascendancy of right-wing prelates, and the struggle of politicised church 
actors to pursue the task of democratisation particularly in Latin America show marked 
contradictions within the Church in the post-authoritarian period. These tensions have invariably 
inhibited the Church’s capacity as an actor in democratisation. To some extent, this is also 
evident in the narratives of the Philippine Church and the two local Churches.
The literature during the democratic transition views the Church, the moderate and 
progressive elements particularly and some conservatives, as a key actor in many cases in the 
struggle against authoritarianism in Latin America, Africa and some parts of Southeast Asia, and 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe (see Chapter Two). Still, beyond the transition, 
academic interest in the Church and democratisation appears to dwindle. A restored democracy 
raises new issues and therefore invites new strategies and roles for civil society actors such as the 
Church. The challenges are at once both externally-driven and internally-generated. In many 
cases, with the passing away of authoritarian and communist states, the Church leadership has 
restored the lines of central authority. In addition, the Pentecostal movement and fundamentalist 
groups have grown in strength and numbers, and the Socialist bloc in Europe has collapsed
10 See Gustavo Guitifrez, A Theology o f  liberation: history, politics, and salvation, translated and edited,
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causing the break up of political movements influenced by the Left. In the meantime, while 
many civil society actors are adapting to new lines of political engagement, others are 
diminishing. Democratic institutions and procedures are being reconstructed gradually and 
political parties despite their weaknesses are emerging. This is then the moment of 
‘institutionalised uncertainty in certain roles and policy areas’ as Philippe C. Schmitter puts it.11
Nonetheless, this also enables the citizens to participate in constructing a democratic project
1where democracy is ‘the only game in town.’ The emergence of democratic institutions, 
however imperfect they may be, makes it possible for civil society organisations to grow, 
develop, expand, and take on new challenges. Therefore the Church can now hardly speak of 
itself as ‘the voice of the voiceless,’ but simply one among many voices in a pluralistic and 
democratic society. By implication, the Church needs to redefine its roles in the public sphere, 
look through new lenses at its position vis-a-vis the State and society, and to engage with civil 
society organisations, its potential allies in the democratic enterprise.
The proposed framework in this study draws extensively from the democratic transition 
experiences of Latin American Churches whence similarities with the Philippine Catholic 
Church as well as their differences can be drawn. The seminal literature affirms the renewal of 
the Catholic Church beginning with Vatican II, and the shifts in the pastoral orientation of its 
hierarchical leadership that became more sympathetic to the current of political involvement in 
general.13 Huntington’s view on the third wave of democratisation,14 and those who followed 
basically his line of thinking,15 explicitly connect the role of the Catholic Church in bringing 
about democratic transition not only in Latin America, but around the globe with the exclusion
Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1973).
11 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Interest systems and the consolidation of democracies,’ In eds. G. Marks and Larry 
Diamond Reexamining democracy: essays in honor o f  Seymour Martin Lipset. (Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications), 1992, 158.
12 Linz and Stephan, Problems o f  democratic transition and consolidation..., 5.
13 See Vallier, Catholicism, social control, and modernization in Latin America', Sanders, ‘The Church in Latin 
America.
14 Huntington, The Third wave......
15 See Witte, Christianity and democracy in global context', Gruchy, Christianity and dem ocracy....
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of Africa which was then beginning its transition to democracy. The third wave democracies 
were said to be countries that transited from authoritarian and centralised regimes to democracies 
from the mid-1970s.16 This transition was primarily a Catholic movement, Huntington asserts.17 
His treatment of the Church as an establishment, conventionally understood as mainly the 
hierarchy and its macro leadership, however, does not go far enough in presenting the 
complexity of the Church as an actor. Moreover, Huntington locates his analysis mainly during 
the transition period and only tangentially touches upon the post-authoritarian time.
Klaiber’s socio-historical approach linking Churches and democracy in Latin America is 
cognizant of intra-church dynamics such as conservative-moderate-progressive cleavages, the 
various church organisations across the local-national-intemational divide and the issues 
affecting church-state relations.18 Of the roles that the Church played in initiating and building 
democracy, the promotion of human rights and conflict resolution open up possibilities for 
analysing the Philippine Church’s contributions in building democracy.19 Klaiber, like 
Huntington, draws his data primarily from the transition period. Both focus their analysis on 
church-state relations, typical of many writers who limit their scope to the transition period and 
are largely concerned with the Church’s hierarchical leadership. Gifford’s collection of essays 
on Christian Churches in the democratisation of Africa, and Swatos’ religion and democracy
articles, except those that deal with the small Christian communities likewise suffer from the
20same constraints.
A more thoroughgoing view of the Church as a unitary rational actor usually represented 
by the Episcopal leadership is shown by Gill.21 He postulates that the pastoral strategies of the 
Church are many a time articulated by the hierarchical leadership upon whose pronouncements
16 Huntington, The Third w ave..., 72.
17 Ibid., 76.
18 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships and democracy in Latin America.
19 Ibid., 6-11.
20 Gifford, The Christian Churches and the democratization o f  Africa.
21 Gill, Rendering unto Caesar....
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the local communities ultimately rely for official backing.22 Gill seems to view the Church as a 
monolithic and elite establishment, and plays down the input of local communities in informing 
the hierarchical leadership’s pastoral intervention. A similar view of the Church as deeply 
hierarchical is found in Fleet and Smith’s traditional understanding of the hierarchical nature of 
the Church. This is conveniently expressed as ‘the chain of command from pope to bishop to 
priest’ as if the decision-making process were a unilateral action emanating from Rome down to 
the lowest member of the hierarchy.24
A differing interpretation of the Church as actor in democratisation looks at the primacy 
of CEBs or BECs as the ‘popular subjects’ with an ‘ethic of public engagement’ as Rowan 
Ireland likes to put it.25 While not entirely dismissive of the importance of the hierarchical 
character of the Church, the CEBs connection with hierarchical interaction is not given sufficient 
attention. In a similar vein, Lehmann holds a very optimistic view of CEBs’ positive roles in 
democratisation. He refers to this movement as basismo, which m his view is situated locally 
and with very little linkage with the hierarchical leadership.28 Although many writers on CEBs 
see the importance of hierarchical support in general, the interaction between the two actors is 
not treated adequately.29
Briefly, apart from the changing socio-political and religious milieu in which the Church 
finds itself in the post-authoritarian regimes, much of the existing literature conceptualises the 
notion of the Church either in highly hierarchical constructs with minimal linkage with local
22 Ibid., 4-5.
23 Fleet and Smith, Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru.
24 Ibid., 14-15.
25 Ireland, ‘Popular religion and the building of democracy in Latin America....;’
26 Lehman, Democracy and development in Latin Am erica....
27 Basismo refers primarily to the activities o f the comunidades eclesiales de base (CEBs).
28 Ibid.; See also the works of Haynes in Religion in third world politics...', and Religion and politics in 
Africa....
29 See Ireland, ‘Popular religion and the building of democracy in Latin Am erica....;’ Hewitt, Base Christian 
communities and social change in Brazil, Mainwaring and Wilde, The progressive Church in Latin America.
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communities30 or largely in terms of lay communities with hardly any interaction with 
hierarchical leadership.31 For analytical purposes, such distinctions may be important. However, 
if one were to look into the Church’s capacity as a democratic protagonist, such linkage may not 
only be desirable, but necessary. The framework presented in the study tried to rectify this 
fragmented notion of the Church, often cast in terms of the hierarchical element and the 
grassroots movement as if they were, monolithic, separate and competing entities. Drawing on 
Mainwaring and Wilde’s and Kassimir’s concepts of the Church,32 and on the Vatican II’s 
‘people of God’ ecclesiology,33 the Church ad intra condition sees the continuous interaction 
within and between the hierarchical leadership and lay membership (see Chapter Two). The 
differences within and between the two parties in terms of gender, ethnicity and class, and their 
ecclesiological cum doctrinal tendencies necessitate the formation of a broad consensus to ensure 
a wide participation of church actors. To this end, church ad intra enhances a consolidated 
church position and action.
Fleet and Smith’s analysis on the Church as political actor makes a distinction between 
democratic transition and consolidation in Chile and Peru.34 This is an important analytical 
distinction to make: it is one thing to initiate democracy and quite another to sustain it in the long 
haul; a point which Beetham correctly stresses.35 Their study has also drawn us to consider the 
complexity of the internal operations within the Church. They are fully aware of the potential of 
civil society organisations as allies of the Church’s democratic project. This recognition fits in 
well with the concerns raised in this study. Still, they do not examine the Church’s interaction 
with civil society sufficiently to understand their outcomes in strengthening democracy. Thus
30 See Huntington, The third wave...; Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America; 
Church and revolution....
31 Ireland, ‘Popular religions and the building o f democracy in Latin America...;’ Lehmann, Democracy and 
development in Latin Am erica....; Haynes, Religion in the third world po litics....
32 Mainwaring and Wilde, The Progressive Church in Latin America; Kassimir, ‘The social power o f religious 
organisation and civil society....’
33 ‘Dogmatic constitution on the Church,’ 350-432.
34 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru.
35 Beetham, ‘Problems o f democratic consolidation,’ 61.
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church-civil society relations in the post-authoritarian period remain inadequately explored, and 
yet this could be a critical arena for analysing the Church’s roles in enhancing democratisation, 
aside from the oft-used church-state relations dichotomy. A few authors have suggested that 
church-civil society linkage is an instructive lens for seeing lessons about the Church’s roles in 
democracy building, but these have scarcely been dealt with in the post-authoritarian .setting.36
The framework presented in this study seeks to look into church-civil society engagement 
as a way of looking at the Church’s rightful place and potential role in a pluralistic post­
authoritarian society. Three modes of interaction are proposed to characterise this relationship. 
The Church could mobilise (through its pronouncements and use of religious symbols), animate 
by virtue of its high public trust, and form creative partnership (through ties and shared interest 
in democratisation) with civil society in the task of democracy building. Thus the Church could 
likewise be mobilised, animated, and be challenged to seek alliance with civil society forces.
Although a few studies have been conducted to assess the Church’s involvement in 
building democracy in the post-authoritarian period,37 they have not sufficiently addressed 
church ad intra and ad extra dynamics and their explicit connection with citizenship. These two 
linkages are closely connected with each other as the Philippine experience itself attests. A 
strong hierarchy-laity interaction potentially offers church-civil society partnership, and vice 
versa. Conversely, a weak linkage between the hierarchy and the laity fragments the Church and 
loosens its partnership with civil society. Both church ad intra and ad extra widen the 
participatory space not only for the laity but also for non-church and non-state organisations 
(civil society). Both are enabling conditions especially for politically excluded local 
communities and groups that ordinarily have limited access for participation, interest articulation
36 See Gautier, ‘Church elites and the restoration o f civil society in communist societies in Central Europe,’ 
Yun-Shik, ‘The Progressive Christian Church in South Korea,’ Kamrava and Mora, ‘Civil society and 
democratisation in comparative perspective....’
37 See Youngblood, ‘Aquino and the Churches....’; Carroll, ‘Church and state...’; Carroll, ‘Civil society, 
Churches and the ouster ofErap; Casper, Fragile democracies....
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and representation and political engagement. Both strengthen the pluralist and educational 
functions of civil society as proposed by Hadenius and Uggla.38 The pluralist function consists 
of organising, networking, and forming groups to re-define power relations and thus engage the 
State and society in the interest of democracy building. Foley and Edwards describe the pluralist 
function as the associational and mobilisational aspects of civil society.39 The function of 
association is derived from the Tocquevillian contention that the proliferation of organisations in 
society correlates positively with democracy. The art of association, de Tocqueville argues, is 
the ‘mother of action.’40 By implication, this involves interest articulation and political 
participation, a critical element in a democratic regime. The function of mobilisation is drawn 
from the social movement theorists’ idea that unless there are political opportunities facing the 
movement, mobilising structures that enable coordinated actions and collective meanings and 
identities, social movements are unlikely to emerge and develop.41
The educational function of the Church is not explicitly developed in Hadenius and 
Uggla, although they seem to imply that it is connected with engaged citizenship.42 Citizenship, 
however, is multifaceted and its outcomes are manifold. The framework proposed in this study 
views citizenship as a unifying theme of the pluralist and educational functions of the Church 
along with civil society (See Figure 3 on p. 54). Engaged citizenship is exercised in various 
arenas which either make or break democracy (e.g., electoral reform, interest articulation and 
representation, good governance, human rights and democratic culture). The Philippine 
Church’s involvement and participation in these arenas were scrutinised in the national and local 
spheres.
38 Hadenius and Uggla, ‘Making civil society work,... ’
39 Foley and Edwards, ‘The Paradox of civil society.’
40 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 117.
41 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, ‘Introduction....,’ 2-7.
42 Hadenius and Uggla, ‘Making civil society work...,’ 129.
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7.2 The Philippine Church: a democratic actor and civil society animator
Studies of the Philippine Catholic Church during the transition are numerous.43 They do 
recognise the important political outcomes of the Church’s opposition to state hegemony. 
Nevertheless, they scarcely touch upon church ad intra and ad extra dynamics, and the notion of 
citizenship building which are decisive lenses by which the Church’s contributions to democracy 
can be viewed. Other analyses such as those presented by Shoesmith44 and Casper,45 although 
helpful in identifying the different strands of actors within the Church, do not substantially 
connect the Church’s interventions with post-authoritarian democracy.
The Philippine Church’s changing political role was not merely a result of its reaction 
against the authoritarian regime that started persecuting its personnel and institutes. State 
persecution coupled with the Church’s ideas about human rights and democracy stemming from 
the Papal social teaching (from the 1930s) and Vatican II (1960s) (see Chapter Three). 
Nonetheless, these initiatives to reform the Church were not received uniformly by church actors 
(the hierarchy and laity either collectively or individually). The CBCP was generally cautious, 
while AMRSP leadership tended to be more radical in the implementation of Vatican II 
principles. Within the CBCP itself, bishops were categorised as progressives, moderates, and 
conservatives (see 3.2.5 in Chapter Three).46 Tensions between the MSPC bishops and MSPC 
lay secretariat likewise revealed cracks within the Church buttressed by disparate and at times 
competing interpretations of church teaching (e.g., hierarchy-centred vs. ‘people of God’ 
ecclesiology, salvation of souls vs. total human liberation). These tensions persisted beyond the 
authoritarian period. Thus the CBCP’s disengagement from the Marcos regime was gradual but
43 See Kroeger, Human promotion as an integral dimension o f  the Church’s mission o f  evangelization;
Giordano, Awakening to mission; Kinne, The Splintered staff; Youngblood, Marcos against the Church;
Casper, Fragile democracies....; Carroll, ‘Forgiving or forgetting?....’
44 Shoesmith, ‘The Church’
45 Gretchen Casper, ‘The Changing politicization of the Philippine Roman Catholic Church, 1972-1988,’ 
Pilipinas: a journal o f  Philippine studies, 13 (Fall 1989), 43-55.
46 See Youngblood, ‘Structural imperialism...,’ 35-36.
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persistent in that it had to resolve internal contradictions within the organisation. Generally 
though, its relationship with the authoritarian state evolved from one of cautious adaptation and 
accommodation in the early years of martial law, to critical collaboration leading to its 
momentous withdrawal of legitimacy from the incumbent government and conferring it upon the 
pro-democracy groups and movements. The progressive elements of the Church (e.g., AMRSP 
and some individual bishops) were quick to distance themselves from the Marcos regime at the 
inception of martial law and persistently waged their crusade against political tyranny. Many a 
conservative church leader continued to support the Marcos government, although this wore thin 
over the years, particularly after the 1983 assassination of former Senator Ninoy Aquino, a 
rallying symbol of unity for the fragmented opposition.
The Philippine Church, like a good number of transition Churches in Latin America as 
portrayed by some authors,47 was a key protagonist in the emergence of democracy, even when 
some church leaders and members collectively and individually were affected by ideological and 
ecclesiological competition. The roles the Church played in the transition along with civil 
society and political movements were similarly reflected in the struggles of many Latin 
American Churches.
Firstly, the Church gradually committed itself to the withdrawal of moral legitimacy, an 
important political resource of the authoritarian government. This was done by means of the 
Church’s pastoral pronouncements (e.g., pastoral letters, preaching, statements, etc) and its 
programmes of action (e.g., political education, protest assemblies, etc). These pronouncements 
were always consolidated inasmuch as a few bishops and other church leaders continued their 
support for Marcos. The CBCP snap polls statement on the February 14, 1986 assailing the 
government for retaining power without a moral basis represented probably the broadest
47 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships and democracy in Latin America; Keogh, Church and politics in Latin 
America; Swatos, Religion and democracy in Latin America.
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consensus o f the CBCP membership during the authoritarian period. They made sure that their 
pastoral statement was no imposition of their discernment on the people, but a starting point for 
people’s considered judgment vis-a-vis the authoritarian state. The events leading to the 
February 1986 revolution were a fine display of hierarchy-laity (church ad intra) and church- 
civil society (church ad extra) interaction. A tiny segment of the hierarchy was still supportive 
of Marcos, but the CBCP February statement was widely supported by civil society forces and 
the general public.
Secondly, the Church increasingly became involved in human rights issues through its 
organisations such as NASSA, and TFD, and their call to action and official statements 
condemning violations of human rights. Persistent harassment and persecution of the Church 
created a political backlash against the authoritarian state as this adversely affected the people’s 
confidence in the State. Human rights issues, depending on one’s ideological biases (e.g., social 
democrats or national democrats), had a way of differentiating committed church agents in social 
and political transformation and also of mobilising organised groups to confront the State.
Thirdly, the promotion of BCCs enhanced hierarchy-laity interaction. This increased 
people’s appetite for participation within the Church and emboldened their advocacy to 
democratise the State and society. Despite the variety of BCCs, in several cases, the progressive 
BCCs had a significant influence to decentralise the decision-making process of the Church and 
mainstream the participation of lay people.
Finally, the Church was deeply engaged in the socialisation and mobilisation of its 
citizenry. The moderate or progressive sectors of the Church formed partnership with the protest 
movements and organised groups (e.g., FFW, FFF, BBC). The church people, depending on 
one’s ideological proclivity, marched in rallies alongside political groups such as BANDILA or 
BAYAN. Its partnership with NAMFREL, an electoral movement in the 1984 and 1986 
presidential snap polls, proved vital in the protest movement leading up to the events of the
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EDSA revolution. In all these roles, church ad intra and ad extra dynamics inchoately factored 
in the emergence of a new notion of citizenship that ushered in the restoration of democratic 
institutions. Given the variety of doctrinal proclivities and ecclesiological differences between 
and among the hierarchy and laity, consensus building through church ad intra proved not only 
desirable but an imperative if the Church were to make a contribution to democratic outcomes in 
Philippine society. The Church’s interaction with civil society in terms of animation, 
mobilisation and creative partnership likewise demonstrated that church ad extra was an 
essential dimension in bringing about democratisation of the State and society. Although church 
ad intra and ad extra dynamics and practices of citizenship relate to the transition period, the 
Church pursued these further during the post-authoritarian period.
In the post-authoritarian Philippines, the Church was well placed in society enjoying the 
highest trust rating compared with national organisations and establishments.48 PCP II was an 
historic moment in the life of the Philippine Church in that it further appropriated key themes in 
Vatican II (e.g., participation of the laity, social justice), affirmed its intent to promote pro-poor 
pastoral strategy, and envisioned a participatory church through BECs. Despite the continuous 
process to reform the Church, varying pastoral tendencies and doctrinal cleavages continued to 
affect its overall influence as a democratic actor. Catholic charismatic movements (e.g., El 
Shaddai, Couples for Christ) stressed in general personal and spiritual conversion much more 
social transformation. El Shaddai, in some instances, took political choices that run counter to 
the position of the hierarchy. Conservative Opus Dei members emphasised strict observance of 
depoliticised church teaching and reined in the Church’s influence in crafting a social legislation 
(e.g., agrarian reform bill). BECs of varying tendencies (liturgical, developmental and 
liberational) struggled to make the Church participatory and responsive to issues at the local 
level.
48 Mangahas, ‘Who’s afraid o f the Catholic Church?’ 1-2.
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By and large the Church stood by the Aquino government, despite the criticism of the 
latter’s failure to implement the centrepiece social reform agenda (land reform) of the regime 
and its drift to accommodate military interests. The Church supported the 1987 Charter because 
the Aquino government needed legitimacy and the Constitution was deemed the bedrock of 
Philippine democracy. Nonetheless, some of its constitutional provisions were diluted when 
turned into laws (e.g., agrarian reform bill) by a largely conservative Congress. It further 
defended the Aquino administration during a string of attempted military coups that nearly 
toppled the government. It was involved in brokering peace between the government and the 
NDF, and to some extent between the government and the MNLF. In the wake of the failed 
military coups that threatened the fragile Aquino government, the CBCP came up with a 10- 
point agenda for peace in its statement ‘Seek peace, pursue it.’49 The Church relentlessly 
pressed the government and the NDF to return to the negotiating table. The Philippine Church, 
like the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran Churches, and those which were engaged in brokering 
the national accords and dialogues, rightly fits Klaiber’s idea that the Church was not merely a 
neutral player but ‘a protagonist with its own agenda.’50 Its ambivalent position regarding the 
all-out military approach against the insurgency movement, and the use of the vigilante 
movement for counter-insurgency campaigns were counterproductive to its peace building 
efforts. Nevertheless, time and again, when peace talks between the government and the NDF 
collapsed (whether it be during the Aquino, Ramos or Estrada administration), church leaders 
engaged both parties to return to peace negotiations. The CBCP along with the BUF launched 
peace campaigns for peace in Mindanao by promoting Christian-Muslim dialogue.
Aside from peace issues, the Church was actively involved in electoral reforms through 
PPCRV, VOTE-CARE and other church-based electoral organisations. The Church through 
PPCRV and VOTE-CARE formed partnership withNAMFREL, despite tensions among the
49 CBCP, Catholic Bishops’ Conference o f  the Philippines....' 218-227.
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electoral watchdogs. The Church in the local and national electoral exercises proved an 
important institution that sought to restore public confidence in the electoral system. PPCRV 
and VOTE-CARE volunteers reviewed the voters’ list, conducted poll watching, voters 
assistance, and took to task NAMFREL’s OQC. Voters’ political education pressed home the 
importance of the electoral exercise, presented guidelines for the voting public (e.g., voting on 
the basis of political programmes and not on personal popularity or patronage politics), and 
analysed the qualities of a good public servant. Nonetheless, political education, a potential area 
for citizenship building, was not sustained beyond the election period. Perceived or actual 
partisan tendencies of some church leaders by openly endorsing political candidates militated 
against the credibility of the Church as a non-partisan organisation in electoral politics and 
created division within the Church.
In the Charter change campaigns during the time of Ramos (Cha-cha) and that of Estrada 
(CONCORD), the CBCP, AMRSP and various church organisations defended the 1987 
Constitution as they feared amendments would curtail its democratic character. In both cases, 
much of the hierarchical leadership and the laity denounced the Charter change campaigns 
through their statements and protest activities often in partnership with the civil society 
formations from the Left to the Right of the political spectrum. Both anti-Charter change 
campaigns unified deeply divided political actors from differing ideological persuasions, albeit 
for a short while.
The Church’s involvement in the impeachment and ouster of President Estrada in People 
Power II was an attempt to press home the importance of good governance and public 
accountability. The issue was no longer authoritarianism or state repression, but the lack of 
transparency of public officials and the prevalence of corruption that eroded the credibility of the 
Presidency and democratic institutions. The Church was the first national organisation to call for
50 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 265.
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the resignation of Estrada, although an earlier clamour by Akbayan! was made while it was then 
considering its options. The Archdiocese of Manila through Cardinal Sin was the first local 
church to make the pronouncement, and then the CBCP-NASSA, ARMSP, and Catholic 
educational institutes followed suit. It is important to note, however, that the CBCP as a body did 
not issue a collective statement as the bishops were divided about withdrawal of support from 
the Estrada administration. Some bishops and priests continued their support to Estrada 
throughout the impeachment process that was poised in favour of Estrada’s acquittal. It was a 
complex event betraying class divides in the mobilisation and counter-mobilisation of organised 
groups. Civil society was deeply divided between pro-Estrada urban poor organisations and 
anti-Estrada groups generally coming from a middle class background. In Manila KOMPILII, 
BAYAN, Sanlakas, and other forces from the military establishment joined the protest 
movement which had tremendous backing from the Archdiocese of Manila, the CBCP. Many 
dioceses throughout the country held their own protest assemblies and prayer rallies, mobilised 
their people, and joined forces with civil society organisations from the Left to the Right. When 
Estrada’s acquittal seemed inevitable, Cardinal Sin, as in the days of People Power I, signalled a 
protest-prayer assembly at the Shrine of Our Lady along EDSA. This sparked the beginning of 
People Power II leading to Estrada’s departure from the seat of power within 4 days.
Although some analysts doubt that People Power II was a victory for constitutional 
democracy,51 weak political institutions in developing countries such as the Philippines needed 
to be challenged and reformed by the citizenry. The huge level of public confidence in the 
presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (i.e., 61% approval rate as opposed to Estrada’s -12% 
trust rating) a couple of weeks after she assumed office indicates that the people overwhelmingly 
endorsed People Power II, notwithstanding some significant support for Estrada from the poor.52
51 Mydans, ‘People power 2 ..., 1; Spaeth, ‘Oops, we did it again..., 29; Schaffer, ‘Clean elections and the 
“great unwashed”, .... ’
52 ABS-CBN/SWS, ‘Survey on people power 2 and the change in the presidency,’ 50.
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Contrary to the criticisms of some observers of Philippine politics,53 the rule of law prevailed 
when the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Macapagal-Arroyo administration was legal 
and legitimate.54 In addition, ‘people power’ is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution (e.g., 
institutionalisation of NGOs/POs, mechanism for direct democracy), the pillar of Philippine 
democracy.55 In the Philippine constitution, the State being ‘democratic and republican,’ allows 
some option for direct democracy.56 In some critical moments when all existing institutional 
processes have been exhausted, organised participation of the citizenry to correct the 
inadequacies of these institutions is crucial. Nevertheless, during the ‘People Power III’ 
uprising, the fragility of Philippine democracy resurfaced. Despite the years of democracy, 
evidently there were limits to democratisation. Philippine democracy for one has not addressed 
sufficiently the question of class relations. A vibrant civil society implicit in a pluralistic view of 
democracy (such as Diamond’s definition) has certain inherent limitations. Surely there must be 
much more about democratisation than the exercise o f ‘people power’.
The post-authoritarian Philippine Church maintained its moral influence in the public 
sphere. Unlike many Latin American Churches whose leaders were replaced by conservatives 
and a few moderates, which caused acute internal divisions, the Philippine Church in general 
remained politically active. The Diocese of Bacolod, despite internal rifts, struggled to be 
politically involved. Further, the Philippine Church still had the same key leaders (e.g., Cardinal 
Sin) and church organisations (e.g., CBCP, NASSA, AMRSP) that struggled against the Marcos 
regime. The CBCP continued its line of engagement with the State and society. The Church as 
a whole not only had to come to grips with the democratic context, it also had to respond to the 
challenges raised by the INC, fundamentalist groups, and El Shaddai. The hierarchy’s
53 Mydans, ‘People power 2 ...;  Spaeth, ‘Oops, we did it again...;
54 Yamsuan, ‘It’s 13-0 for G loria....’




relationship with El Shaddai at times betrayed a flawed church ad intra interaction despite the 
presence of clerics as spiritual directors.
The Church’s roles in post-authoritarian Philippines include its 1) support for the 1987 
democratic Constitution, 2) defence for the fragile government against the military rebels during 
the time of coups, 3) sustained advocacy for peace and human rights, 4) active protest against 
Charter change campaigns, 5) electoral reform involvement, and 5) mobilisation during the 
Estrada crisis. Despite its own ambivalent positions (e.g., case of the vigilantes, total-war 
approach) and limitations in its interventions (e.g., unsustained political education beyond the 
elections, partisan campaigns for certain political candidates), the Church interventions generally 
made decisive contributions to democracy building. These interventions enhanced the building 
blocs of democratisation (see Chapter One): the primacy of law (e.g., support and defence of the 
1987 Charter, anti-Charter change campaigns), democratic institutions (e.g., peace education and 
advocacy, human rights), interest articulation and representation (e.g., peace agenda, agrarian 
reform), democratic culture (e.g., political education during the election period, protest 
assemblies), and promotion of good governance and public accountability (e.g., the ouster of 
President Estrada). These interventions find their focus in citizenship, a far cry from patronage 
politics that typically weakens democratisation. Citizenship in this way consisted of state- 
imputed rights and ‘institutionally embedded social practices’ arising individually and 
collectively from political identities.57 These experiences had a way of strengthening citizenship 
which was a result of the struggles in the transition period. Citizenship meant a status and active 
engagement. In all these interventions, the church displayed its ad intra and ad extra dynamics, 
making it plain that unless the laity participates and unless it forms meaningful partnership with 
civil society, its avowed political outcomes are difficult to achieve. Church-laity interaction and 
church-civil society nexus were inchoately conceived during the transition period, and became
57 Somers, ‘Citizenship and the place o f the public sphere...’ 587.
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more fully expressed and practiced in the post-authoritarian period. These realities in the macro 
Philippine Church are reflected to some degree in the local Churches under study. In many 
areas, the latter also provide some unique characteristics.
7.3 The Diocese of Malaybalay and the Diocese of Bacolod: tales of local democratic 
feats and failures
The Dioceses of Malaybalay and Bacolod (see Chapters V and VI) by no means represent the 
entire Philippine Church. These cases illustrate the complexity of the Philippine Church at the 
local level. These local cases also interact with the national church leadership, civil society and 
to some extent with the Vatican leadership in Rome. -They shed light on the experiences of the 
macro Philippine Church while making their own specificities. Like the Philippine Church, their 
experiences can be crystallised in three main lessons. These lessons invite further verification or 
challenge in future studies.
First lesson: positive hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) enhances the internal 
mechanism o f participation and encourages productive leadership-membership linkage, thereby 
increasing the Church’s potential as an actor in democracy building.
As was consistently demonstrated in the thesis, the hierarchy and laity, whether in global,
national or local scenarios, had a variety of actors (individual or collective) whose pastoral
strategies and political inclinations were shaped to a large extent by a number of factors:
religious ideas and doctrines, class identification, and ideological proclivities. In both the
Diocese of Malaybalay and Bacolod, these differences, at times expressed in contestations with
regard to the extent o f the local Churches’ public role, property rights and peace issues (more
peculiar to Bacolod), affected their political outcomes. BECs, although generally sanguine to lay
participation, were likewise differentiated according to their theological and pastoral leanings
(e.g., liturgical, developmental and liberational). Given these disparities then, positive church ad
intra was crucially vital as it consolidated the local Church’s position.
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Evidently, church ad intra in the Diocese of Bacolod was a lot more complex than in the 
Diocese of Malaybalay. The internal divisions that hit the Diocese of Bacolod, following the 
appointment of Bp. Gregorio, were a severe blow to the hierarchy-laity interaction, a parallel 
situation of some of the local Churches in Latin America following the appointment of 
conservative bishops. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some of these appointees (e.g., 
conservative Archbishop Fresno in Chile) fared well as mediators between the government and
f  o
rebel forces; and between opposing groups in society.
The rifts in the Diocese of Bacolod were multidimensional in that they affected various 
major organs of the diocese, and were not simply a tiff between the hierarchy and the laity. To 
say, however, that the leadership change from Fortich to Gregorio alone caused the internal 
conflicts oversimplifies the entire story. A number of factors brought about the divisions within 
the local Church. First, the ascendancy of President Aquino to power elicited mixed attitudes 
from church activists and organisations with regard to the democratic government. Second, the 
split and decline within the underground Left movement that had some influence on church 
organisations weakened the BCC/BECs and civil society organisations. Third, the rise of 
LOMAS particularly its renewal and charismatic organisations as a reaction to the threat posed 
by the Christian fundamentalist groups led to an intense rivalry with the BCCs/BECs. Many of 
these influential charismatic organisations were typically rich and middle class Negrenses that 
wanted to have a place in the local Church. With Bp. Gregorio’s close association with rich 
landowners (e.g., Eduardo Cojuangco), the conflict within the Diocese of Bacolod became a 
class contestation: Fortich and BECs epitomising the organised poor, and Gregorio and renewal 
communities symbolising the rich.
These developments severely affected the life and activity of the local Church in 
Bacolod. The rifts were gradual but sharply divisive, affecting adversely the local Church’s
58 Klaiber, The Church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America, 14.
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capacity and influence as a democratic actor. The quality of participation in the Church and in 
public affairs was muddled by internal ecclesial disputes. These disputes surfaced most 
significantly in the Church’s handling of the evacuees in the wake of military operations in 1989, 
the Diocesan Pastoral Congress convened to appropriate and implement PCP II’s ecclesiological 
vision to become a Church of the poor, the second anti-charter change, the anti-VFA campaign 
and protest movement during the Estrada crisis. The internal rifts were also visible in the day-to- 
day affairs of church governance such as in the Presbyteral Council meetings and bishop-priests 
relationship.
Despite these rifts, the Diocese of Bacolod did not completely recede from political 
involvement. The first reason explaining this phenomenon is that some programmes that were 
set up during the time of Fortich continued to exert some influence in the diocese.' These 
included the BCC/BECs, although these did not enjoy as much support during Gregorio’s time; 
the Social Action Center until some of its programmes were terminated in 1993; the Legal Aid 
Office until its closure in 1999, and the PPCRV which was originally an offshoot of church- 
backed NAMFREL. The second reason is the persistence of the civil society movement whose 
influential figures were, in one form or another, connected with church organisations in the pre- 
Gregorio days. The third reason is that a few key clergy leaders sympathetic to the pastoral 
thrust laid out by Fortich continued to occupy influential ecclesial positions (e.g., SAC Director, 
BEC Coordinator) in the diocese even during the time of Gregorio. Finally, the leadership of the 
Philippine Church (e.g., the CBCP and to some extent Cardinal Sin) was unremitting in their 
involvement in issues affecting democracy. The leadership provided some guidance support as 
regards the local Church’s mode of engagement. This was particularly true during the national 
and local elections, the peace campaigns, the first Charter change, and to some extent, the 
advocacy during the Estrada crisis.
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By contrast, the Diocese of Malaybalay did not have to endure a major church ad intra 
crisis. In the post-Claver period, the formation of BECs, lay empowerment, and commitment to 
justice issues remained top pastoral priorities of the diocese. There was no intense competition 
between the BECs and the renewal or charismatic groups, at least not in the way that the 
LOMAS and BCC/BECs had it in Bacolod. The decline of the Left in Bukidnon and its outlying 
areas did not seem to affect profoundly the capacity of the Church to mobilise on the basis of 
various democratic issues. The mechanisms of consultation and participation (e.g., meetings at 
different levels, general pastoral assemblies, etc.) built into the programme of the diocese 
continued to operate in the post-authoritarian era. These mechanisms of participation had a way 
of ironing out differences between and among the hierarchy and laity. The two bishops that 
succeeded Bp. Claver were like-minded and pursued largely the ecclesiological thrust laid out by 
him. The appointments of Bps. Rosales and Pacana after a progressive bishop seem to be 
exceptions to the Vatican’s sweeping move to rein in the political involvement of local 
Churches.59
Thus positive church ad intra influenced the political outcome of the local Churches’ 
involvement in democracy building. The finest moments of church ad intra in both cases were 
displayed when the BCC/BECs, with the support of the hierarchy, played significant roles in 
democracy building. These small Christian communities helped to shape the Tocquevillian civil 
associations.60 These small but politicised communities qualify as de Tocqueville’s ‘great free 
school’ of democracy building in the Church and in society.61 BCC/BECs fashioned an ethos of 
participation and engagement in the public sphere where citizenship is exercised. In the Bacolod 
diocese, the BCC/BECs were involved in the peace zone struggle of Cantomanyog and the
59 See Jean Daudelin and W. E. Hewitt, ‘Church and politics in Latin America,’ Third World Quarterly 16(2), 
(1995), 221-236; Stewart-Gambino, ‘Introduction....’
60 Ireland, ‘Popular religions and the building o f democracy in Latin America..., 114; see also Putnam, Making 
democracy work. .., 89-90.
61 Foley and Edwards, ‘The Paradox of civil society,’ 44.
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relocation of Sincang Residents. In both cases their campaigns received support from external 
groups ranging from civil society actors (e.g., PsPN, PEZAN in Cantomanyog) to local 
politicians (e.g., Sincang relocation), aside from the hierarchical leadership, parishes and church 
organisations. In both cases, the role of priests as intermediaries (Fr. Nueva in Cantomanyog 
and Fr. Rito in Sincang) proved pivotal in linking the church leaders and the local communities. 
In both cases, the hierarchical leadership backed the mobilisation, although in the Cantomanyog 
experience, Bp. Gregorio remained very cautious about the campaign. Retired bishop Fortich, 
however, filled in the gap to provide a strong hierarchical backing. The participation of 
BCC/BECs in the various mobilisations addressing the 1998 electoral issues and the first anti­
charter change campaign were concrete manifestations of local community participation making 
waves at the provincial, regional and national levels.
In Bukidnon, the San Fernando and Wao mobilisations to protect the environment were 
initiated by the BCC/BECs which were supported by the parish, and later by the diocese and by 
the bishops from the MSPC and CBCP. The roles played by Fr. Kelly (in San Fernando) and Fr. 
Almedilla with lay leader Edna Espinosa (in Wao) were vital in the mobilisation not only of their 
own BCC/BECs but in the entire diocese along with civil society actors. In the case of the 
installation of QUEMTRAS, the role played by Fr. Tabios likewise was decisive not only for the 
indigenous peoples (the Manobos) but also as a link person to the diocese and civil society. The 
presence of these church leaders (priests and lay) and their involvement provided vital linkage 
between the base communities and the hierarchical leadership. Through them both entities 
interacted and discerned the best way forward to protect and advance environmental interests. 
The Bukidnon BECs were also involved in the various democratic issues such as the national 
and local elections, the two anti-charter change campaigns, and during the impeachment trial of 
President Estrada. In all these cases, the two bishops (Rosales and Pacana) and the clergy in 
general gave their full support to the cause. By way of contrast, the MAPALAD advocacy in
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Bukidnon betrayed fragile church ad intra dynamics with the bishop, a few of the clergy 
members and lay leaders in support of the farmers’ cause while the parish priest and most local 
lay leaders were on the other side of the struggle. This tension was also reflected, if not 
exacerbated, on the national scene where various religious groups and Cardinal Sin endorsed the 
petition of the MAPALAD farmers while NASSA and the CBCP leadership remained silent.
Second lesson: The Church-civil society healthy interaction (church ad extra) along with 
hierarchy-laity interaction (church ad intra) dynamics widens the avenue o f participation and 
set out a new relationship between Church and civil society organisations which is favourable to 
democratisation. This positive interaction is expressed in three modes: the Church can mobilise, 
animate, and create partnership with civil society actors, and vice versa.
Evidently the Philippine Church in the post-authoritarian society did not act alone in building
democracy. It was different in the authoritarian period when civil society was emerging, when
the Church in many cases spearheaded, led, acted principally and engaged directly the State to
wage the democratic struggle. In the post-authoritarian setting, there is much more
consciousness on the part of the Church to link up with existing civil society organisations and
invite lay people to greater political involvement. In the Diocese of Bacolod, the peace
movement was launched with peace advocates and other civil society actors. The advocacy to
promote peace zones was supported by some bishops and pressed on President Aquino but it was
rejected by the military, by local and national government officials, by the CPP-NPA leadership
and by the rebel returnees. In the Diocese of Malaybalay, the environmental movement was
likewise sustained by the Church’s interaction with environmental groups and other
organisations. Although the Church originally took some initiatives (e.g., Wao advocacy in
Bukidnon), it was gradually more conscious of the rightful space of civil society agents. In the
case of Wao, Bp. Pacana was quite insistent that the civil society organisations take the
centrestage in the environmental struggle and that the Church should act as a support group.
Such a position fits in well with Vatican II and PCP II’s empowerment of the laity. The findings
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in both cases seem to suggest a shifting position of the Church vis-a-vis civil society from being 
an activist to being an animator of civil society.
Partnership with civil society organisations was also evident in the electoral movement 
particularly in the 1992 and 1998 presidential, congressional, and local elections. Despite the 
tensions between PPCRV and NAMFREL, both at the national and local levels, the Dioceses of 
Bacolod and Malaybalay succeeded in forging alliance with NAMFREL. PPCRV had the 
volunteers, Catholic establishments (notably the schools and parishes), BCC/BECs (except in the 
1992 elections when the Bacolod BCCs campaigned for boycott), and electoral education 
programmes whereas NAMFREL had the resources for a quick count of the electoral results. In 
both dioceses, this relationship, nevertheless, was ephemeral, that is, it did not go beyond the 
election period.
With regard to other national issues, the Diocese of Malaybalay consistently positioned 
itself with civil society protagonists (e.g., PEACE, PARE-Bukidnon) in the two anti-charter 
change movements and the ouster of President Estrada. In Bukidnon, in the absence of a major 
internal conflict dividing the diocese, the local Church’s relationship with civil society was much 
more formidable than in the Bacolod diocese. In the former’s experience lobbying for 
environmental protection (e.g., San Fernando and Wao), many environmental groups and civil 
society organisations stood side by side with the BCC/BECs and church organisations. This 
was also the case in their advocacy for the rights of the indigenous peoples leading to the 
installation of QUEMTRAS and SUHITRA. Partnership with civil society was undermined by 
the internal division within the Diocese of Bacolod, a telling sign that church ad intra and ad 
extra are positively correlated. On occasions when it resisted tendencies to curtail democratic 
gains such as the anti-charter change during the time of Ramos, the church leadership, church 
institutes, BECs and lay organisations linked up with civil society forces (including the Left) in 
the biggest protest movement in the province of Negros after the fall of Marcos. Protestant
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Churches likewise participated in the event. In several instances, however, not only was the 
Bacolod Church ambiguous in its stance with regard to national issues (e.g., VFA, anti- 
CONCORD, and movement to oust President Estrada), it also turned inward handling its internal 
conflict.
A number of factors explain the synergistic ties between the Church and civil society. 
First, aside from a strong church ad intra component, the presence of influential figures in both 
parties, whether priests or lay people, facilitated the coming together of these groups. In 
Malaybalay diocese, Fr. Kelly in San Fernando, Fr. Almedilla with lay leader Espinosa, Fr. M. 
Estaniel’s role in both NAMFREL and PPCRV, and Fr. Tabios in QUEMTRAS installation, Fr. 
Balansag in PEACE and PARE-Bukidnon, among others, were critical link persons between the 
hierarchical leadership and the civil society. In Malaybalay, civil society organizations such as 
NAMFREL, Lihok-Wao, PEACE and PARE-Bukidnon had key lay leaders who were central in 
making church-civil society partnership work. In Bacolod diocese, Fr. Nueva in Cantomanyog, 
Fr. Rito in Sincang, Fr. Hiponia and Fr. Rito with lay leaders Melocoton and Cabillo, were key 
leaders that linked the hierarchical leadership and civil society organisations, despite some signs 
of internal division within the Church. In Bacolod, the presence of peace activists in PsPN, Pax 
Christi, PEZAN who were also active lay leaders members of CFM (Hagad and Villanueva) 
factored in the church-civil society synergy.
Second, in both cases, the State agencies such as the judiciary, the local government, and 
local parties, were not strong enough to operate within the locality thus creating a vacuum in 
local governance. In the Diocese of Malaybalay, DENR, local law enforcers, many times the 
regional courts, and political parties were ineffective in curbing illegal logging practices. In the 
Diocese of Bacolod, issues pertaining to human rights and peace were aggravated or simply not 
addressed sufficiently by the local and national governments (although at one point, the local 
government persisted in initiating a 10-day ceasefire which was extended to another 10 days),
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judicial courts, and political parties. In the given cases, only the local Church with the support of 
civil society organisations was in a position to fill in the gaps.
Third, given the weak political institutions, the pressing issues (i.e., environment in 
Bukidnon, peace in Negros) had a way of closing the divide between the Church and civil 
society. The two bodies found themselves, as in the transition period, natural allies with shared 
interest in democratisation. Peace in Negros was an extremely crucial issue considering the 
scale of military assault (Operation Thunderbolt) and the incidents of violent encounters between 
the military and the NPA, whereas for Bukidnon the threat of an environmental catastrophe was 
equally pressing for its inhabitants.
Fourth, many of the civil society actors which emerged from the transition period were 
either heavily influenced by the Church or were allies of the Church in their struggle for 
democratisation. Thus there were already existing ties between the two parties that facilitated 
greater collaboration beyond the authoritarian period. In Bukidnon, groups like TFD, COPE, 
LTK, Lihok-Wa.o, PEACE, FLAG, NAMFREL, and so many others became partners of the local 
Church. In the Diocese of Bacolod, TFD, PsPN, PEZAN, PCPR, NAMFREL, NO-ERAP and 
others engaged in partnership with the Church for the same reason.
Church ad intra and ad extra dynamics in themselves are certainly not sufficient grounds 
to explain the local Churches’ continued involvement past the authoritarian stage. There are 
other factors that gave impetus to the Church’s role in post-authoritarian democracy building. 
Firstly, like the Philippine Church including the two local Churches in the study, Vatican II and 
the Catholic social teaching of the Church (including eco-spirituality) provided the theological 
and ecclesiological energy for its participation in the public sphere. PCPII, a national reception 
of Vatican II, likewise fuelled the trajectory of the local Church’s public engagement. Whether 
this engagement was on matters relating to peace or environment, Vatican II, the Catholic social 
teaching, and PCP II, lent legitimacy and motivation for the Church’s persistent involvement.
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This is much more visible in the Diocese of Malaybalay than in the Diocese of Bacolod which 
was then reeling from deep internal divisions. Nevertheless, the appropriation of Vatican II and 
PCP II remained uneven as evident in the ecclesiological cleavages and at times competing 
interpretations of the Church’s social teaching evident among the groups that became influential. 
Such tensions were most evident in the Diocese of Bacolod which was experiencing acute 
ecclesiological and doctrinal divides (e.g., pro-Fortich vs. pro-Gregorio groups, BCCs vs. 
LOMAS). To some extent, the Church in both cases was not acting primarily to protect its 
corporate interests, as Gill’s rational actor theory suggests for many of the Latin American 
countries.62 For Gill, the calculus of costs and benefits is a determinant factor in the hierarchy’s 
response or reaction to issues affecting its interests.63 Gill equates corporate interests with the 
hierarchy’s as if the laity and lay organisations were secondary elements within the Church. The 
Church’s pastoral thrusts were propelled and motivated to varying degrees by theological 
principles and renewal set out by the Vatican II, the Catholic social teaching and PCP II. In the 
absence of this theological base and impetus, current church involvement may have to be recast 
in other lines of pastoral involvement.
Secondly, both local cases in the transition period were quite engaged in confronting, 
locally and nationally, the authoritarian regime of Marcos. Both local Churches had progressive 
bishops to promote the reforms. Both bishops were deeply committed to resist the authoritarian 
state. Both dioceses were active in the defence of human rights through their respective legal aid 
offices. Both local Churches fostered the formation of BCC/BECs to mainstream lay 
participation. Many of the structures and programmes (e.g., consultation mechanism, 
BCC/BECs, Legal Aid, etc) set up during the transition period are still in place, although some 
either have changed markedly, declined or ceased altogether. Although in the Diocese of
62 Gill, Rendering unto Caesar. ...
63 Ibid., see also Gill, ‘The Struggle to be soul provider...;’ Gill, ‘The Economics of evangelization.’
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Bacolod, the new leadership and emerging contexts (e.g., rise of charismatic movement 
alongside fundamentalist groups, decline of underground Left, democratic setting) have no doubt 
reined in its brand of activism, evidently it was not ready to withdraw from the political 
engagement, unlike some of its local counterparts in Latin America, Central Europe and Africa. 
The influence of key clergy and lay leaders from the pre-Gregorio years and firmly embedded 
civil society organisations (e.g., BCCs) are perhaps two significant driving forces that kept the 
Church’s involvement alive.
Thirdly, given the bankruptcy of political parties and institutions as mentioned earlier, 
inevitably this invites other non-state actors (civil society organisations) to take up the cudgels 
against non-performing or undemocratic political institutions. The Church and civil society 
acted when the state agencies (e.g., law enforcers, judiciary) and governing institutions failed. 
The Church has a vast network locally, nationally and internationally which as Carroll puts it, 
‘only Coca Cola distributors can rival!’64 Moreover, the Philippine Church is perhaps, like in 
many Latin American countries, the most credible organisation which has the social influence, 
moral energy, and capacity to socialise and mobilise the citizens and engage the State and 
society. This form of engagement is evident in the case of the peace movement in Negros and the 
environmental constituency in Bukidnon and in some moments of the national Church’s 
involvement in a wide range of democratic issues.
An issue threatening the church’s ad intra and ad extra positive dynamics centres on 
active partisan politics such as campaigning, overt or covertly, for particular politicians to 
elective offices; and its position on personal and sexual morality that is at variance with civil 
society and public sentiment. The Church’s position and its manner of lobbying on some 
contentious issues such as population control and divorce have been perceived by many writers
64 Carroll, ‘Civil society, the Churches, and the ouster o f Erap,’ 246.
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as potentially divisive and undermining church-state separation.65 Although these issues have 
not been prominent in the narratives of the two local Churches, indications of Philippine Church- 
State differences on these issues, particularly on the government’s population policy, have 
surfaced now and then.66
In sum, apart from church ad intra, the Church’s partnership with civil society (church ad 
extra) expanded the site of participation to include non-church groups in civil society. Engaging 
civil society recasts the Church’s control over the path of democratisation and enabled creative 
ways of allowing non-church and non-state actors to contribute and play significant roles giving 
them their rightful domain in the public sphere.
Third lesson: the single most significant contribution o f  the Church to democracy building is its 
role as an agent o f citizenship formation and advocacy.
Based on the findings presented, engaged citizenship is the Church’s most important political 
inroad in post-authoritarian Philippines in the national sphere and in both local cases.
Engagement in citizenship touched upon various fields of interest. In Malaybalay diocese, 
citizenry awareness and mobilisation included issues linked to human rights, indigenous peoples’ 
rights, 1992 and 1998 electoral participation, defending the democratic constitution, and the 
campaign for the impeachment, resignation and removal of President Estrada. In Bacolod 
diocese, citizenship education and movement, apart from peace advocacy, meant commitment to 
human rights, safeguarding the democratic constitution during the Ramos period, and working 
for a strong and credible electoral system in 1992 and 1998. If the Malaybalay diocese was a 
key figure in the creation and consolidation of an environmental constituency, the Bacolod 
diocese was equally instrumental in the inauguration of a peace contingent.
65 Fleet and Smith, The Catholic Church and democracy in Chile and Peru’, Millard, ‘The Influence o f the 
Catholic Hierarchy in Poland; Casanova, Public religions in the modern world.
66 Joaquin G. Bemas, ‘Secretary Flavier and Bishop Varela,’ The Manila Chronicle, 10 August 1993, 5; Songco 
interview.
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The BCC/BECs along with civil society organisations were arguably vital schools of 
citizenship training and education in both local Churches. This point echoes de Tocqueville’s 
proposition that the art of association, in this case located in the BCC/BECs, is so crucial to 
citizens’ action.67 The BCC/BECs in Bukidnon were a catalyst in the formation of an 
environmental constituency, while the Cantomanyog BCC in Negros was instrumental in the 
creation of a peace movement. In both cases, they became sites of interest articulation and 
representation of the local communities. A number of related cases have been documented 
regarding BCCs in the Philippines,68 but very few have reached national and to some extent 
international recognition such as the experiences of San Fernando (Bukidnon) and Cantomanyog 
(Negros Occidental). Local issues were discussed and when necessary elevated to the parish and 
diocesan levels for wider discussion and action. These BCC/BECs initiatives had the support of 
the hierarchical leadership and had external linkage with groups in civil society and with local 
politicians (Bukidnon’s case), although the internal division in the Bacolod diocese factored in 
the decline of BCC activity and influence in the local area. In both campaigns, the notion of 
being a Christian was linked to being an informed and active citizen who responded to 
environmental and peace issues. Citizenship did not only mean assertion of individual rights or 
merely belonging to a group, but the incorporation of the former in collective rights through 
deliberations as in a civic republican notion of citizenship.69 Citizenship rights are construed not 
merely as individual entitlement, but also as a collective stake in a democratic enterprise. Rights 
too are not simply political, civil, social, cultural and economic but they can be contested in 
other areas such as peace, development, environment and ancestral domain claims. Rights can 
be contested by those afflicted with peace, environment issues and ancestral land displacement 
not only against the State but also against non-state entities (e.g., armed groups, loggers,
67 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, II, 117.
68 See Mendoza, et al., Church o f  the p e o p le ...'
69 Jones and Gaventa, ‘Concepts of citizenship...,’ 4.
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ancestral domain occupants). In so doing, peace and environment constituencies, and indigenous 
peoples can become shapers of social policy and citizens’ participation.
BCCs/BECs in the Diocese of Bacolod, however, are declining and they need to explore 
various ways of exploiting citizenship as a way of reinforcing fragile democratic institutions.
Their boycott in the 1986 and 1992 elections did not serve to advance the cause of 
democratisation. BCC/BECs in the Diocese of Malaybalay, however, continue to enjoy the 
support of the incumbent bishop and remain vigorous and dynamic in addressing local issues. In 
both cases, they need to project a proactive agenda in deepening the process of democratisation 
apart from reacting to local or national issues. Making the transition from a protest group to 
active and competent participants in citizenship and democracy building still poses a huge 
challenge for their potential contributions, if not survival in a democratising setting.
Nonetheless, despite the formation of these informed and active constituencies, it appears 
unclear whether or not they were able to translate their influence in terms of votes in the local 
and national elections. Bp. Rosales, although belatedly, did indicate in his pastoral letter before 
the 1992 elections to consider voting for candidates who, among other things, were committed to 
protect the environment and not to profit from forest clearing. However, some officials with 
known sympathies for logging companies were still elected to office. This bespeaks of the 
Church’s limitations in influencing the voting public. Additionally, the lack of post-election 
follow through on the issues articulated by these constituencies (peace and environment) and 
electoral promises of elected candidates are weak, if at all visible. In the national arena, this was 
also PPCRV’s and VOTE-CARE’s main predicament in post-election scenarios. For many of 
these cases, inaugurating a citizens’ movement on the basis of issues appears to be more 
workable than sustaining and making it operate on a day-to-day basis. In many instances, 
citizenship is still basically rights-based, with few indications of competent citizenship.70
70 See Elkin and Soltan, ‘Citizen competence and democratic institutions.’
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Competence in citizenship requires a fair amount of skills, knowledge, and capacity to make 
effective interventions. But all this is also dependent on the capability and competence of the 
State to respond to a citizenry action.
The Church’s direct involvement in citizenship formation is a growing interest in 
democratic and development studies.71 The study draws attention to an important pathway 
(engaged citizenship) that civil society in general and the Church in particular can explore more 
fully in pursuit of democratisation. A few more issues deserve closer investigation as a result of 
this study: are local Churches involved in promoting local governance? if so, how? are 
citizens’ movements sustainable beyond the issues which gave rise to their existence? how does 
the Church get involved in citizenship in everyday life beyond rights-based issues? how are 
local concerns (environment and peace) mainstreamed or translated in electoral votes? how does 
the notion of citizenship apply to the rights of the indigenous peoples?72 how does globalisation 
affect democracy building and the quality of church involvement in democracy?73
7.4 Whither the Philippine Church as an actor in democratisation?
Philippine democratisation is ongoing. While its quality of democracy looks weaker compared 
with other countries in Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand), its stability has an edge over some 
countries in the region (e.g., Indonesia).74 Its democratic impulse appears to be stronger than that 
of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and other countries in the region.75 But its 
democratic engagement is far from over.
71 See W. E. Hewitt, Base Christian communities and social change in Brazil (Lincoln and London: University 
o f Nebraska Press, 1991), 84-90; Meacham, ‘The Role o f the Chilean Catholic Church in the new Chilean 
democracy,’ 285-299; See also Sarah Brooks, ‘Catholic activism in the 1990s: new strategies for the neoliberal 
age,’ in Latin American religion in motion, eds. Joshua Prokopy and Christian Smith (London: Routledge, 
1999), 67-89.
72 See Stavenhagen, ‘Indigenous rights...;’ Yashar, ‘Contesting citizenship in indigenous movements and 
democracy in Latin America.’
73 David Held, Democracy and the global order: from  modern state to cosmopolitan governance (Stamford, 
California: Stamford University Press, 1995).
74 Case, Politics in Southeast A sia .... ’
75 Ibid. See also Putzel, ‘Why has democratization been a weaker impulse in Indonesia and Malaysia than in the 
Philippines?’
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Locating the Church in democratising regimes remains topical and a complex minefield. 
This study has opened up a window on the church-democracy relationships. The decline of 
academic interest in the Church as an actor in democratisation from the early 1990s tells of a few 
possibilities. This may suggest an apparent inertia of the Church in the post-authoritarian period. 
This may bespeak of changing socio-political and economic circumstances in current times and 
the Church’s own need to redefine its thrusts in the light of new emerging contexts. This may, 
however, invite observers to re-examine more closely or through other lenses the Church’s roles 
in post-authoritarian democratisation and bring the Churches back into the newly found 
democratic space. This study took on board these possibilities, but focused its treatment on the 
last one.
The lessons of this study have a bearing not only for the Church but also for other key 
political actors within civil society. Church ad intra is an imperative within the Church (local, 
national and global) inasmuch as ecclesiological and doctrinal divides prevail despite decades of 
reforms since Vatican II. The Church does not exist beyond class, gender and ethnic differences. 
Additionally, the Church is not simply the hierarchy or the laity as if both were mutually 
exclusive. Positive and constant intercommunication within and between the two parties 
increases the prospects of building consensus and reduces internal contradictions. Likewise, the 
Church must continually re-engage civil society organisations to increase its mobilisational and 
associational capabilities. While it has been sufficiently established that the Church has a 
capacity and influence to initiate citizenship, sustaining and making it competent remains a big 
challenge. The issues raised are equally pertinent for civil society actors. These actors need to 
review their relationship with the Church in post-authoritarian setting. Lessons derived from the 
church’s ad intra and ad extra linkages and its engagement with citizenship building in post- 
authoritarian democracy likewise have a bearing on civil society organisations particularly in 
places where church presence is particularly pervasive. These organisations need to exploit their
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own ad intra and ad extra components in strengthening citizenship. The possibilities for the 
Church and civil society are immense. The Church alongside civil society may continue the 
lines of its public engagement during the authoritarian period and face anachronistic activism. 
They could likewise be eclipsed from public affairs and let the political institutions and parties 
take over, but forfeit a decisive role of cultivating de Tocqueville’s ‘habits of the heart’ along the 
path of engaged citizenship. Still, the search for innovative and creative roles for the Church and 
civil society in a democratising context must be pursued. But for now, the evidence from the 
Philippine Church suggests that it is not yet ready to sing its swan song as a democratic 
protagonist despite its own fair share of undemocratic tendencies, by impulse or by intent.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Open and semi-focused interview guide questions
1. When and how did your local (or national) church begin its involvement in social and 
political issues? Who were the people involved?
2. How would you assess the relationship of the church leaders and lay people? What 
were the mechanisms of decision-making in the diocese? What is the leadership style of 
your bishop? How would you describe the transition from the previous bishop to the 
present?
3. Was your diocese (or the national church) involved in strengthening democracy after 
1986? What programmes and activities dealt with democratic issues? Did they effectively 
strengthen democracy? In what ways? What factors contributed to or militated against 
democracy building?
4. Evaluate the diocese’s (or the national church’s) involvement in democracy building 
after 1986. What are some of its strengths and weakness? What explains the nature of its 
involvement
5. Describe the past and present state of BECs in your diocese? How many members in 
the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and currently? How did the bishop interact with BECs? What is the 
structure of decision-making in these BECs?
6. Was your diocese (or the national church) involved in the elections of 1992 and 
1998? What activities were initiated and/or participated by the diocese? Who were 
principally involved? How? What is your assessment of the church’s involvement? Was 
there any follow up of the church’s involvement in electoral politics?
7. What there any partnership between the church and civil society in view of 
democracy building? Who initiates in joint programmes and activities of the church and 
civil society? How would you assess your civil society movement in your diocese (or the 
national church)? How would you evaluate the church-civil society relations in your diocese 
(or in the country)? What factors explain the relationship between the church and civil 
society?
8. Describe your legal aid office. What is the history of your legal aid office? Who 
were the people involved? What were the programmes in your office? How did these 
strength democracy? Was your church engaged in human rights issues in the diocese (or in 
the country)? To what extent was the church a vital actor in the defence of human rights?
9. What was your diocese’s participation in national issues appertaining to democracy 
during the time of President Corazon Aquino, President Fidel Ramos and President Joseph 
Estrada? How was the local church involved in these issues? What was the political 
outcome, local or national, of the church’s involvement?
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Appendix 2: Declaration concerning the establishment of a zone for peace
Pamat-ud sa pagtukod sang isa ka sona sang paghidaet 
26 Disyembre 1989
I DEKLARASYON
Kami nga mga pamuloyo, bilang mga sibilyan sang Sitio Cantomanyog, Barangay 
Haba, Candoni, Negros Occidental nagapamatuod nga ang amon lugar/ginapuy-an 
mangin isa ka SONA SANG PAGHIDAET. Isa ka bagay ang amon ginasigahum 
sining pagpamat-ud:
LIKAWAN/TAPNA-ON ANG PAG-ILINAWAY SA AMON DU-OG SA TUNGA 
SA GAHUM MILITAR SANG CPP/NPA KAG PC/AFP KAGIBAN PA NGA 
MGA GRUPO. Ining pagpamat-ud nagakahulugan nga wala sang armas nga 
makamalatay, ilabi na gid ang nagalupok, sa sulod sining SONA SANG 
PAGHIDAET.
II KATUYU-AN
Ang amon katuyu-an amo ang pagluntad sang matu-od nga paghidaet nga nasandig sa 
pagkamag-ululutod, paghangpanay kag pagtahud sa kinamatarung/dignidad sang tawo 
nga gintuga sang Dios sa Iya larawan. Luyag namon nga magluntad ang katawhay 
kag kalinong agud nga mapa-uswag namon ang amon pangabuhi kag palangabuhi-an. 
Ang pagluntad sang katawhay isa ka kondisyon sa pag-away namon sang KA- 
IMULON KAG INHUSTISYA. Sa malip-ot nga pulong, amon ginahandum ang 
paghidait kauswaean sang katawhan nga napasad sa hustisya.
III KONDISYON
1. Ang amon du-og bukas maskin kay sin-o man nga may maayo sang kabubut- 
on.
2. Luyag namon nga kami mahilway sa mga armas sang kamatayon ilabi na gid 
sang nagalupok, gani ang sin-o man nga magsulod sa sining SONA, dapat nga 
wala sang dala nga armas, NPA man ukon AFP, ukon CVOs.
3. Bukas kami sa mga grupo magmonitor sang mga hitabo ukon mga paglapas sa 
sining sadsaran.
4. Nagapangabay kag naga-apilar kami sa mga naga-ilinaway nga mga grupo nga 
respetahon ining amon pagpamat-ud.
IV MGA PAAGI SA PAG-IMPLEMENTAR SINING MGA PAMAT-UD
1. Ini nga pamat-ud ginapahibalo namon sa natungdan nga mga grupo sa 
pagkuha sang ila man nga pamat-ud.
2. Ipahibalo sa tanan nila nga mga units sa diin ining SONA napatungud agud 
respetahon ini.
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3. Ipahibalo man ini sa tanan nga mga opisyales kag ahensiya sang gobyemo nga 
may angut sa sitio (barangay officials, Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang 
Panlalawigan, Congresswomen, Health, etc).
4. Tukuron ang ehekutibo nga komitiba nga ginakatapu-an sang lima ka 
representante nga pumuluyo sa Cantomanyog. Nga amo ang nagapatuman 
sang pamat-ud kag mga sadsaran.
Ining ginbalay nga mga kaundan indi perpecto. Kada bulan sarang ini review-on.
Sono sa makasugtan sarang ini madugangaft.
English Translation of Cantomanyog declaration1
Declaration concerning the establishment of a zone for peace.
26 December 1989
I DECLARATION
We, the residents as civilians of Sitio Cantomanyog, Barangay Haba, Candoni, 
Negros Occidental, affirm that our place is a ZONE OF PEACE. This is made 
effective upon its declaration:
AVOID/STOP THE FIGHTING IN OUR PLACE BETWEEN THE MILITARY 
FORCE AND CPP/NPA AND PC/AFP AND OTHER (ARMED) GROUPS. This 
declaration means that there will be no arms those that kill, especially firearms within 
the ZONE OF PEACE.
II AIM
We want peace that will prevail based on brotherhood/sisterhood, mutual 
understanding and respect for rights/dignity of person as created by God in God’s 
image. We desire peace and quiet that will last so that we can develop our lives and 
livelihood. The prevalence of peace is a necessary condition if we are going to 
confront poverty AND INJUSTICE. In short, we desire to have peace, prosperity of 
people based on justice.
III CONDITIONS
1. Our place is open to whoever has goodwill.
2. We desire that we be free from arms that kill, especially firearms, and
therefore anyone who wants to enter this ZONE should not bring in fire arms,
NPA or AFP or CVOs.
1 Translated by Antonio Moreno with the assistance of Fr. Niall O’Brien.
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3. We are open to groups that monitor the events or violations of the covenant.
4. We wish and appeal to warring groups to respect our declaration.
IV WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECLARATION
1. This declaration we promulgate to the concerned groups who are making their 
own declaration.
2. We will inform those whose units belong to this ZONE to respect this.
3. We will inform all the officials and agencies of the government that are 
connected with the sitio (barangay officials, Sangguniang Bayan [Local 
Council], Sangguniang Panlalawigan [Provincial Council], Congresswomen, 
Health, etc.).
4. Set up an executive committee that will be composed of five representatives of 
the residents of Cantomanyog that will implement the declaration and the 
agreement.
The contents of this thing are not perfect. Every month this can be reviewed. This
can be altered insofar as we have agreed.
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Appendix 3: Chronology of Events
Date Church Philippine State and society
1891 Papal social encyclical Rerum 
Nov arum
1898 Declaration of Philippine Republic 
(Independence from Spain)
1931 Papal social encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno
1945 Creation of Catholic Welfare 
Organization (CWO), renamed 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of  
the Philippines in 1968
1946 Independence from the United States o f America
1955 Creation o f the Association of  
Major Religious Superiors of 
Men in the Philippines 
(AMRSMP)
1957 Creation o f the Association of 
Major Religious Superiors of 
Women in the Philippines 
(AMRSWP)
1962-65 Vatican II
1966 Creation o f National Secretariat 
for Social Action (NASSA)
1967 Papal social encyclical 
Populorum Progressio
National Rural Congress
1968 Medellin Conference, Columbia Establishment the Communist Party o f the 
Philippines (CPP)
1969 Insurgency movement begins
1971 ‘Justice in the World’ document
Formation of the Mindanao-Sulu 
Pastoral Conference (MSPC)
1972 Declaration of Martial Law
1973 Creation o f Church-Military 
Liaison Committee (CMLC)
1974 Task Force Detainees (TFD) 
was set up
1976 Tripoli Agreement between the government and 
Moro National Liberation Front (MLNF)
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1981 ‘Lifting’ of martial law 
Pope John Paul II’s visit
1983 CMLC is dissolved Assassination o f Former Senator Benigno 
‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr.
1984 Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) election
1985 Founding Congress of Bagong Alyansang 
Makabayan (New Nationalist Alliance, BAYAN)
1986
February 7 Snap Presidential elections
February 14 
February 16
CBCP statement on snap 
Presidential polls
Tagumpay ng Bayan (Victory o f the People) rally
February 22-25 
July 14 Pope John Paul IPs letter to the 
Bishops o f the Philippines
People Power I; Corazon Aquino becomes 
President o f the Republic (EDSA I)
September 15 Peace settlement between the government and the 
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
December 10 60-day military-NPA ceasefire begins
1987 Reorganisation o f NASSA
February 2 Ratification of the Constitution
May 11 Congressional and local elections
1988 CBCP Pastoral Letter: ‘What is 
happening to our beautiful land’
Formation of Caucus o f Development NGO 
Network (CODE-NGO)
1989
April Operation Thunderbolt in Negros
December Our Lady o f Peace mobilisation Failed military coup
1990 CBCP statement ‘Seek peace, 
pursue it.’
1990-93 Splits in the Revolutionary Left
1990-2000 ‘Decade o f Peace’
1991 Second Plenary Council o f the 
Philippines (PCP-II)
US Bases agreement expires
Papal social encyclical 
Centisimus Annus
Ceasefire agreement between the government and 
MNLF leading to peace settlement
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Creation of Pastoral Parish 
Council for Responsible Voting 
(PPCRV) and Voters’ Organiza­
tion, Training and Education 
toward Clear, Authentic, Respon­
sible Voting (VOTE-CARE)
Local Governance Act
Creation o f the National Unification Commission 
(NUC)
1992 Synchronised national and local elections
1994 Initial meeting leading to the creation o f the 
Bishops-Ulama Forum (BUF)
1995 BUF peace campaign in 
Mindanao
Congressional and local elections
1995-97 Charter change (Cha-cha) campaigns
1997
September 16 CBCP Pastoral Exhortation: 
Philippine Politics
September 21 Cardinal Sin, Former President 
Aquino led a rally in Rizal Park
National Day of Protests
1998 Synchronised national and local elections
1999 Anti-death penalty campaign Capital punishment is imposed killing six in the 
death row
March 9 CBCP-NASSA rejects Visiting 
Forces Agreement (VFA)
May 27 Senate ratifies VFA
August 20 Cardinal Sin, Former President 
Aquino led a rally in Makati; 
church backs nationwide 
protests
El Shaddai’s birthday party for Mike Velarde 
turned prayer rally for President Estrada’s 
Constitutional Correction for Development 
(CONCORD)
September 21 Church backs rallies in Metro 
Manila, 31 provinces and cities
2000
June Akbayan! calls for resignation of President 
Estrada
October 2 Jueteng expose o f Governor Singson
October 11 Resign President Estrada 
Statement o f the Cardinal Sin 
and Archdiocese of Manila
October 20 CBCP backs Cardinal Sin’s 
statement
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October 29 Formation of Kongreso ng Mamamayang 
Pilipino (KOMPILII, Congress of Filipino 
Citizens)
November 4 EDSA Shrine mobilisation
December 6 Peace deal with Rebolusyonaryong Partido 
Manggagawa -  Pilipinas [Revolutionary Party of  
Workers -  Philippines] Revolutionary Proletarian 
Army -  Alex Bongcayao Brigade (RPMP-RPA- 
ABB)
December 7 Impeachment trial o f President Estrada 
& Jericho March
2001
January 15-20 People Power II, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is 
proclaimed President of the Republic (EDSA II)
April-May ‘People Power HI’, Estrada supporters staged 
rally in EDSA and attempted to assault the 
Presidential Palace (EDSA III)
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Appendix 4: Comparative trust ratings in percentage points
Organisations/Establishments Trust Margin
Catholic Church +66
Colleges and Universities +53
Broadcast Media +40
Supreme Court +36




Foreign, Private Creditor-Banks +19
House of Representatives +17
Senate +16
CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces in Geographical Units) +6
CPP-NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines -  New People’s Army) -54
Note: Margin o f trust = ‘Big Trust’ minus ‘Little Trust’.
Source: SWS Nationwide Survey, September 1989 in Mangahas 1991, 2
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Appendix 5: Violent incidents and deaths during election campaign period, 1965-98
Year Type of election Violent incidents Deaths
1965 President & Congress 69 47
1967 Senate & Provincial 192 78
1969 Senate & Congress 59 52
1971 Senate & Provincial 534 905
1978 Congress 9 N.A
1980 Provincial 180 71
1981 President 178 102
1982 Barangay N.A. 14
1984 Congress 918 154
1986 President 296 153
1987 Congress 48 50
1988 Provincial 127 98
1989 Barangay N.A. 30
1992 Synchronised 87 60
1994 Barangay N.A. 26
1995 Congress 97 73
1997 Barangay N.A. 4
1998 Synchronised 188 42
Total 2,982 1,959
Notes: Synchronised elections include presidential, congressional and local elections excluding the barangay 
polls. Barangays are the smallest political units which roughly correspond to an area in a locality.
Source: ‘Report of the Commission on Elections to the President and Congress o f the Republic o f the 
Philippines, Vol. I (1992), 41, cited in A. B. Villanueva, ‘Parties and elections in Philippine politics,’ 
Contemporary South Asia 18(2), (September 1996), 175-192; John L. Linantud ‘Whither guns, goons, and gold? 




Aggiornamento -  the updating of the church identity and mission set out by Vatican II.
Alagad -  a community lay leader.
AI ay Kapwa (Offering to people) -  A Lenten renewal programme in 1974 which stressed the link 
between faith and social responsibility.
Ang Bandilyo (The Towncrier) -  This was a local newsletter of the Diocese of Malaybalay.
Bantay ng Bayan (People’s watchdog) -  a NAMFREL’s electoral watchdog.
Barangay sang Virgen (Virgin of the Barangay) -  This is a local devotional Marian organisation 
based in Negros.
Barrio -  a village.
Centesimus Annus (The Hundredth year) - Pope John Paul II’s encyclical in 1991 
commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum (1891).
Church ad intra -  refers to the internal interaction between the hierarchy (ordained ministers, 
that is, bishops, priests and deacons) and laity (non-cleric Catholics).
Church ad extra -  this is the church’s linkage with civil society, at times expressed in church- 
civil society synergy. This partnership is based on their shared interest in 
democratisation, ties and mutual confidence.
Comunidades eclesiales de bases (CEBs) - ‘Basic Christian Communities (BCCs)’ and its later 
variant Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs). In Cebuano, BCC stands for Gamay’ng 
Kristiyanong Katilingban (GKK) while BEC means Gamay ’ng Simbahanong 
Katilingban (GSK). Known in Brazilian Portuguese as Comunidades eclesiais de base.
Dagdag-bawas (vote padding and shaving) -  This is a scheme of vote rigging whereby votes are 
added to losing candidate(s) and votes are subtracted from winning candidate(s).
Dignitatis Humanae (Of human dignity) -  a Vatican II document entitled ‘Declaration on 
Religious Liberty’
Dumaan -  old inhabitant.
Dumagat -  lowland migrant.
Et veritas liberabit vos (And the truth shall set you free) -  an unsent reaction letter to a Rotnan 
letter criticising AMRSP and calling the bishops to assert their authority. This letter was 
written by progressive Philippine bishops.
Hacenderos -  Owners of vast estates {haciendas).
Hakot -  Herding people with the intention of making them vote illegally.
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Gaudium et Spes (Joy and hope) - This Vatican II document is entitled: ‘The Pastoral 
Constitution of the Church in the Modem World’
Kapilya (chapel) -  At times this term denotes the Christian community.
Katilingbanong pag-ampo -  Community worship.
Kristohanong katilingban -  Christian community.
Lagay -  bribery.
Lumad -  Cebuano term for indigenous peoples.
Lihok (Action) -Wao -  a protest movement organised through the Social Action Center in 
Wao.
Manindigan (Fight) -  This is a cause-oriented business organisation during the authoritarian 
period.
Masa -  Masses
Opus Dei -  a Catholic organisation founded in 1928 by recently canonised Josemaria Escriva de 
Balaguer.
Pacem in Terris (Peace on Earth) -  This Papal Encyclical written by Pope John XXIII in 1963, is 
also known as ‘Encyclical establishing Universal Peace, Truth, Justice, Charity and 
Liberty.
Panimabahon - Community worship of BCCs. BCCs in Mindanao refer to this prayer session as 
Katilingbanong Pag-ampo (community worship).
Poblacion -  Town centre.
Politicos -  generally refers to politicians.
Populorum Progressio (Progress of the people) - This social encyclical is also known as ‘On the 
Development of Peoples,’ written by Pope Paul VI in 1967.
Pur ok -  sub-units in a barangay.
Quadragesimo Anno (In the fortieth year) -  This is a social encyclical written in 1931 by Pope 
Pius XI, forty years after Rerum Novarum. This encyclical is also known for its title, ‘On 
Reconstruction of the Social Order.
Rerum Novarum (Of new things) -  This is the first social encyclical written in 1891 by Pope Leo 
XIII. The encyclical assumes the title: ‘Condition of Labour.’
Sacadas -  transient migrant workers.
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Salvaging -  extra-judicial killing.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan -  Provincial Council
Sentro -  Centre
Sitio -  a barrio sub-unit.
Trapo -  a Tagalog slur for traditional politician. Trapo also refers to a dirty rag.
Ut omnes unum sint (That they may be one) -  a letter written by conservative bishops in 
response to the letter Et veritas liberabit vos.
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